PANNELL (RICK) VS. SHANNON (ANN), ET AL.
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RENDERED: AUGUST 26, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001172-MR
RICK PANNELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-03131
ANN SHANNON AND
ELEGANT INTERIORS, LLC
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; CAPERTON AND WINE, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE: Rick Pannell brings this appeal from a May 25, 2010,
Order of the Fayette Circuit Court awarding Pannell damages against Elegant
Interiors, LLC, for breach of a lease agreement and absolving Ann Shannon of any
individual liability. We affirm.
The facts of this case are straight forward. Elegant Interiors was
organized by Shannon in 2000 as a limited liability company (LLC). Shannon was
its only member. In February 2004, Shannon, on behalf of Elegant Interiors,
executed a written lease agreement (February 2004 lease) with Pannell. Therein,
Elegant Interiors leased 3,645 square feet of commercial space for a starting
monthly rental payment of $5,727.50. Due to its failure to file an LLC annual
report and to pay a $15 filing fee, Elegant Interiors was administratively dissolved
by the Kentucky Secretary of State on November 1, 2005. Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 275.295.
In March 2006, a “Release” and a second lease (March 2006 lease)
were executed by the parties. Under the March 2006 lease, the rental space was
decreased to 1,654 square feet, and the monthly rental payment was, likewise,
decreased to $2,598.98.
On July 21, 2006, Pannell filed the instant action alleging breach of
the March 2006 lease for failure to make the required rental payments for June and
July 2006. Pannell named as defendants both Elegant Interiors and Shannon.
Pannell sought to hold Shannon individually liable for breach of the March 2006
lease. During pendency of the action, Elegant Interiors’ dissolution was cancelled
by the Kentucky Secretary of State, and the limited liability company was
reinstated by the Secretary of State on August 11, 2006. KRS 275.295.
Shannon filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that she was
not individually liable for breach of the March 2006 lease as Elegant Interiors was
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the tenant as set forth under the terms of the lease. As a member of the limited
liability company Elegant Interiors, Shannon maintained that she was shielded
from individual liability for breach of the March 2006 lease.
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Shannon
holding that she was not exposed to individual liability and that Elegant Interiors
was the tenant under the March 2006 lease. In so holding, the circuit court
reasoned:
The Court holds that, as a matter of law, the final
controlling lease agreement between the parties was the
lease agreement with amendments made and dated March
2, 2006. The first paragraph of this amend[ed] lease
defines the “Tenant” as “Elegant Interiors, a LLC
corporation” [sic]. Accordingly, the Tenant, and the
party assuming the obligations of Tenant, under the
amended lease remained the Limited Liability Company.
Further, the Court holds that regardless of the
administrative dissolution of the LLC on November 1,
2005, pursuant to KRS 275.295(3) the reinstatement of
Elegant Interiors, LLC, on August 11, 2006 (before the
entry of any judgment in this matter), related back to the
time of its administrative dissolution. Accordingly, the
amendments to the lease on behalf of the LLC are
effective “as if the administrative dissolution had never
occurred.”
Thereafter, the circuit court concluded that Elegant Interiors breached the March
2006 lease and awarded Pannell damages against the entity Elegant Interiors. This
appeal follows.
Pannell argues that the circuit court erred by holding that Elegant
Interiors was the tenant under the March 2006 lease. Pannell maintains that
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Shannon signed both the March 2006 lease and the Release in her individual
capacity and not as a member of Elegant Interiors. Pannell points out that Shannon
merely signed her name to the March 2006 lease and did not indicate that her
signature was in a representative capacity for Elegant Interiors. Additionally,
Pannell cites to the title of the March 2006 lease as “Lease Agreement for Ann
Shannon” and that Shannon was the only party other than Pannell specifically
identified in the Release. Pannell maintains that the parties’ intended Shannon to
be the tenant and to be individually liable under the March 2006 lease.
As the circuit court rendered summary judgment upon Shannon’s
individual liability for breach of the March 2006 lease, we must determine whether
there existed any material issue of fact and whether Shannon was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 56; Steelvest, Inc.
v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991). Our review
proceeds accordingly.
It is well established that interpretation of an ambiguous contract
presents an issue of law, and our review proceeds de novo. Allen v. Lawyers
Mutual Ins. Co. of Ky., 216 S.W.3d 657 (Ky. App. 2007); Hibbits v. Cumberland
Valley Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 977 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. App. 1998). And, a contract
must be interpreted as a whole so as to give effect to the parties’ expressed intent.
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Jenkins Constr. Co., 60 S.W.2d 105, 248 Ky. 839 (1933);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Hobbs, 268 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. 1954). Where different
instruments evidence a single transaction, these instruments are interpreted
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together to, likewise, determine the parties’ intent. Veech v. Deposit Bank of
Shelbyville, 278 Ky. 542, 128 S.W.2d 907 (1939).
The contract at issue is the March 2006 lease. It is undisputed that the
parties simply utilized the previously executed February 2004 lease and made
minor modifications thereto, which included decreasing the amount of rental space
and the monthly payment. The parties indicated their assent to these modifications
by initialing same. The March 2006 lease reveals that it was executed on March 2,
2006, and concomitant therewith, the parties executed a Release dated March 2,
2006.
On the first page of the March 2006 lease, it specifically provides that
the “tenant” is “Elegant Interiors, LLC.” Although it states that the lease
agreement is for Ann Shannon, it is clear that Shannon is not the tenant as the lease
clearly identifies the tenant as Elegant Interiors. Additionally, the first paragraph
of the March 2006 lease plainly states that the lease was “between Rick Pannell,
landlord, . . . and Elegant Interiors . . . (Tenant).” The March 2006 lease could not
be clearer – the tenant was Elegant Interiors and not Shannon.
Additionally, any argument that the Release somehow modifies the
March 2006 lease and replaces Shannon individually as tenant is simply untenable.
The Release read, in part:
IT IS AGREED UPON THAT THE SIGNING OF THIS
DOCUMENT BY BOTH PARTIES ASSURES THAT
ANN SHANNON WILL NOT BE HELD
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BUILDING OF ANY
WALLS, CONSTRUCTION, CAM COSTS, OR ANY
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EXPENSES PERTAINING TO STE 140, BEGINNING
TODAY, MARCH 2, 06, AND WILL BE ONLY
RESPOSIBLE FOR PAYMENT OF THE REMAINING
1654 SF @ 18.00 SF [18.856 written in above 18.00 and
initialed by both parties]AND KNOWN AS STE 150,
LOCATED AT THE SAME ADDRESS. UPON
ACCEPTANCE OF THIS DOCUMENT, A NEW
LEASE WILL BE SIGNED BY ANN SHANNON, FOR
THE CHANGES IN SF (1654 SF @ 18.00) [18.856
written above 18.00 and initialed by both parties] AND
CAM COSTS ONLY FOR STE 150.
Essentially, the Release merely operates to set forth the material terms of the
parties new agreement and to provide that a new lease would be executed setting
forth such terms. Shannon did sign the Release and the March 2006 lease without
indicating that her signature was within her representative capacity as a member of
Elegant Interiors. However, Shannon also signed the February 2004 lease without
signifying that same was in her representative capacity. It is certainly beyond cavil
that Elegant Interiors was the tenant under the February 2004 lease and that
Shannon signed in her representative capacity. So, it is likewise with the March
2006 lease and the Release.
Also, the March 2006 lease and the Release cannot be reasonably interpreted
as imposing individual liability upon Shannon. Generally, a member of a limited
liability company may assume individual liability only by “unequivocal terms” that
unmistakably imposes such individual liability. Upon this issue, our Supreme
Court has held:
[A]ssumption of personal liability by a member of an
LLC is so antithetical to the purpose of a limited liability
company that any such assumption must be stated in
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unequivocal terms leaving no doubt that the member or
members intended to forego a principal advantage of this
form of business entity.
Racing Inv. Fund 2000, LLC v. Clay Ward Agency, Inc., 320 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Ky.
2010). Here, neither the March 2006 lease nor the Release states in “unequivocal
terms” that Shannon was to be individually liable and intentionally abandons the
cloak shielding her from liability as extended by Elegant Interiors. Upon the
whole, we believe Elegant Interiors was the tenant under the March 2006 lease and
that the March 2006 lease did not impose individual liability upon Shannon.
Alternatively, Pannell argues that Shannon is individually liable because
Elegant Interiors was administratively dissolved as a limited liability company at
the time of execution of the March 2006 lease. For the reasons stated hereafter, we
disagree.
The undisputed facts are as follows. Elegant Interiors was organized as a
limited liability company in 2000. It entered into the first lease with Pannell on
February 2004. On November 1, 2005, the Kentucky Secretary of State
administratively dissolved Elegant Interiors as a limited liability company for
failure to file an annual report and pay a $15 filing fee. The new lease between
Elegant Interiors and Pannell was entered into on March 2, 2006, (March 2006
lease), while Elegant Interiors was administratively dissolved.1 Subsequently, on
1
In her disposition, Ann Shannon stated that she was unaware that Elegant Interiors, LLC, had
been administratively dissolved at the time she executed the March 2006 lease.
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August 11, 2006, the Secretary of State reinstated Elegant Interiors as a limited
liability company.
In this Commonwealth, our legislature enacted KRS 275.295(3)(c), which
provides that upon reinstatement of an administratively dissolved limited liability
company:
[T]he reinstatement shall relate back to and take effect as
of the effective date of the administrative dissolution, and
the limited liability company shall resume carrying on
business as if the administrative dissolution had never
occurred.
KRS 275.295(3)(c).2 This statute (KRS 275.295(3)(c)) was recently interpreted in
Fairbanks Arctic Blind Company v. Prather & Associates, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 143
(Ky. App. 2005).3 Therein, the Court held that KRS 275.295(3)(c) clear intent was
for:
[R]einstatement to restore a corporation to the same
position it would have occupied had it not been dissolved
and that reinstatement validates any action taken by a
corporation between the time it was administratively
dissolved and the date of its reinstatement. Simply put,
the General Assembly meant what it said, that upon
reinstatement, it is “as if the administrative dissolution
. . . had never occurred.”
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes 275.295 was repealed effective January 1, 2011.
3
In his brief, Rick Pannell cited to an unpublished case of the Court of Appeals that seemingly
conflicted with Fairbanks Arctic Blind Company v. Prather & Associates, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 143
(Ky. App. 2005). Pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.28(4)(c), a party may
only cite to unpublished opinions when there is a complete lack of published authority upon an
issue. We refer Pannell to the above CR 76.28(4)(c) and caution him to only cite unpublished
opinions in accordance therewith. See Ann Taylor, Inc. v. Heritage Ins. Service, Inc., 259
S.W.3d 494 (Ky. App. 2008).
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Fairbanks Arctic Blind Co., 198 S.W.3d at 146. As reinstatement of a limited
liability company relates back to the effective date of dissolution and operates as if
dissolution never occurred, it naturally follows that members of such company are
not individually liable for actions undertaken on behalf of the company during its
dissolution. See Fairbanks Arctic Blind Co., 198 S.W.3d 143. Hence, the
subsequent reinstatement of Elegant Interiors as a limited liability company
“relates back” to date of its dissolution, and Shannon cannot be held individually
liable for any actions undertaken on behalf of Elegant Interiors while it was
administratively dissolved.
In sum, we are of the opinion that the circuit court properly granted
summary judgment concluding that Shannon was not individually liable for breach
of the March 2006 lease.
For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES:
Carroll M. Redford, III
Susan Y.W. Chun
Lexington, Kentucky
Dan M. Rose
Christopher L. Thacker
Lexington, Kentucky
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