JOHNSON (LEE ANN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 5, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000288-MR
LEE ANN JOHNSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEORGE DAVIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00087
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON, KELLER AND MOORE, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Lee Ann Johnson appeals the decision of the Boyd Circuit
Court that revoked her pretrial felony diversion and ordered her to serve two years.
After our review, we find the time had expired on the diversion agreement and we
reverse and remand this matter for further actions consistent with this opinion.
The facts are not in contention and the Commonwealth concedes it
was error to revoke the diversion previously granted because the agreed time for
the diversionary period had expired. On August 18, 2004, Lee Ann Johnson
appeared before the Boyd Circuit Court and entered a plea of guilty pursuant to a
diversion agreement offered by the Commonwealth to three counts of possession
of a forged instrument in the second degree.
The trial judge signed the judgment on August 25, 2004, that
postponed the imposition of the two-year sentence for a period of five years on a
plea of guilty subject to the terms of a felony diversion agreement. The judgment
itself indicates it was “Entered this the 18th day of August, 2004.” Of critical
import to this case is the judge’s notation of “nunc pro tunc” after that date. The
judgment was not however actually entered of record by the clerk until August 26,
2004. Pursuant to the terms of the judgment, the case was set for review on
August 19, 2009.
On August 19, 2009, Johnson did not appear for the diversion status
hearing. The Commonwealth made an oral motion to revoke the diversion
agreement based on allegations that during the unsupervised pretrial diversion
period, Johnson had been arrested multiple times, received multiple convictions
including at least one felony and that there was currently a bench warrant issued
for her arrest in another county. The trial court issued a bench warrant for
Johnson’s arrest for her failure to appear at the hearing. She appeared before the
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trial court on September 23, 2009, after being arrested and a revocation hearing
was scheduled for October 14, 2009.
At the revocation hearing, Johnson’s attorney argued the diversion
period began on August 18, 2004, when the trial judge signed the judgment and
thus, the five-year term of diversion had expired. The Commonwealth
acknowledged that if the August 18, 2004, date was the date used to calculate the
term of diversion, Johnson had in fact exceeded the five-year period and the
diversion could not be revoked. The Commonwealth however argued that the
initiation of the diversion period was August 26, 2004, when the judgment was
entered by the clerk and thus, the diversion period had not expired when the
Commonwealth sought the revocation. The trial court, noting the divergence and
confusion regarding the date, ruled the diversion period did not expire until August
19, 2009, which was the date of the review hearing. With that ruling, the trial
court found the diversion period had not expired and revoked the diversion,
sentencing Johnson to serve two years.
It has long been the law in Kentucky that a judgment or order is not
effective until it has been entered by the clerk. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
(CR) 58(1). Here however, the trial judge provided the notation “nunc pro tunc”
next to the date of August 18, 2004. As the Commonwealth concedes, that
notation creates an effective date of August 18, 2004.
a judgment nunc pro tunc is retrospective, and has the
same force and effect, to all intents and purposes, as if it
had been entered at the time when the judgment was
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originally rendered. It aids and cures proceedings which
otherwise would be defective and irregular for want of a
proper entry of judgment to sustain them.
Hoffman v. Shuey, 223 Ky. 70, 2 S.W.2d 1049, 1052 (1928) (citation omitted).
The period of diversion expired two days before the Commonwealth’s
motion to revoke. Any effort by the Commonwealth to revoke a pretrial felony
diversion agreement must “be made before expiration of the pretrial diversion
period.” Tucker v. Com., 295 S.W.3d 455, 458 (Ky. App. 2009).
We reverse the judgment and sentence on a plea of guilty entered on
August 18, 2004, and remand this case to the Boyd Circuit Court with instructions
to dismiss the indictment with prejudice and list this case “Dismissed–Diverted” as
required by Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) § 533.258.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Roy Durham II
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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