CARPENTER-MOORE (SHEILA) VS. CARPENTER (CHAD), ET AL.
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 24, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000164-ME
SHEILA CARPENTER-MOORE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE LISA O. BUSHELMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-01651
CHAD CARPENTER; R.M.F.C.,
M.S.C., AND L.B.C., CHILDREN
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE: Sheila Carpenter-Moore appeals from the Kenton
Family Court’s decision denying her motion to relocate with the parties’ three
minor children. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Chad Carpenter initiated divorce proceedings against Sheila
Carpenter2 in June 2004. Before the parties were divorced, the court entered an
order on December 9, 2004, that the parties would share joint legal custody of their
children.
Thereafter, the family court entered a bifurcated divorce decree on
August 31, 2005, dissolving the marriage but reserving all other issues, including
child custody, and stating that all temporary orders would remain in effect pending
future resolution.
An agreed order was entered on March 21, 2007, stating that the
parties would have joint legal custody, with Sheila as the primary residential
parent.
On November 1, 2007, Sheila filed a motion requesting to relocate the
children to Glade Springs, Virginia to be with her fiancé.3 At a hearing held on
November 13, 2007, Chad’s counsel stated on the record that Chad did not want
the relocation. The judge set a hearing date for February 7, 2008, stating that she
wanted to hear all of the evidence in the matter. The court also appointed a
guardian ad litem (“GAL”).
On January 30, 2008, Chad filed a motion for review of parenting
time, which was set for hearing on February 7, 2008, the same date as the motion
2
Sheila has remarried and now goes by Sheila Carpenter-Moore.
3
In a pretrial hearing on February 7, 2008, Chad’s counsel was told that Sheila intended to move
to Ohio and not Virginia as previously indicated. Chad had not been notified of that fact prior to
that time.
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for relocation. Meanwhile, on February 4, 2008, the GAL issued a report stating
that she believed it was not in the best interests of the children to be relocated.
On February 6, 2008, Sheila filed a motion for the court to summarily
grant her relocation motion based on the fact that Chad had not complied with
Fenwick v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. 2003), and KRS 403.340 and 403.350.
This motion was also set to be heard on February 7, 2008.
On the morning of February 7, 2008, in response to the motion to
summarily grant relocation, Chad filed a motion for a change of custody with two
affidavits attached. That same day, at the scheduled hearing the judge requested
briefing on the legal issues involved with the motion to relocate and the motion to
modify custody. The court also gave Sheila time to file a response to Chad’s
motion for a change of custody, but no response was filed.
In response to the family court’s briefing request, Sheila filed a
memorandum in support of her motion to relocate, again arguing that Chad had
failed to comply with the procedures described in Fenwick, as well as KRS
430.340. Chad filed a memorandum in support of his motion for a change of
custody, arguing that he had followed the procedures described in Fenwick, and
therefore that the court should consider his motion for a change of custody.
On June 2, 2008, the court held a hearing in chambers, which was
apparently not on the record. Thereafter, the judge issued findings of fact and
conclusions of law on August 11, 2008, stating that Chad had submitted sufficient
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evidence of emotional harm to the children, necessitating a full evidentiary hearing
under KRS 403.340(2).
On October 23, 2008, the Kentucky Supreme Court rendered
Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759 (Ky. 2008), which specifically dealt with
relocation issues and made a change in relocation motion procedures previously
mandated by Fenwick.
Prior to the hearing on October 31, 2008, Chad filed a motion to plead
in the alternative for a modification of visitation/timesharing to name him the
residential parent, specifically citing the Pennington case as the basis of his
motion. The record does not reflect any response by Sheila to this motion. The
family court ultimately determined that Pennington applied to the case and that,
according to Pennington, the best interests of the child standard applied to motions
for relocation.
Additionally, on November 13, 2008, Sheila filed a motion to change
Chad’s visitation/timesharing and/or award Sheila sole custody of the children
without any supporting affidavits.
On January 6, 2009, the family court heard the remainder of the
relocation, custody modification, and visitation/timesharing modification evidence.
Chad’s counsel made an oral motion to deny Sheila’s change of custody motion,
which was granted. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge asked for position
statements from the parties, which both parties subsequently filed.
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On March 30, 2009, the family court issued an opinion and order
denying Sheila’s motion to relocate. No decision was made on any other issue,
including Chad’s custodial modification motion and his alternative motion to
modify timesharing. All other issues were reserved for future rulings.
Sheila filed an appeal of the March 30, 2009 decision. That appeal
was dismissed by this Court as premature, as Chad’s motions for modification of
custody and timesharing had not been ruled upon. Thereafter, the family court
entered an amended opinion and order on December 22, 2009, denying all other
outstanding motions, which maintained the status quo, making no custody changes,
and stating that the order was final and appealable. The court also reaffirmed the
decision to deny the motion to relocate. Sheila has filed the present appeal from
the orders entered on March 30, 2009 and December 22, 2009.
Under Kentucky Civil Rule (CR) 52.01, a court’s findings of fact shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. We review the family court’s legal
conclusions under a de novo standard. Brewick v. Brewick, 121 S.W.3d 524, 526
(Ky. App. 2003).
Sheila first argues that the court erred when it failed to summarily
grant her motion to relocate. The basis of the motion was that Chad had failed to
comply with the procedure described in Fenwick, which states that:
[W]hen a primary residential custodian gives notice of
his or her intent to relocate with the parties’ child, the
burden is then upon any party objecting to file a custody
modification motion within a reasonable time and after
that, to satisfy the modification standard of KRS 403.340
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in order to change the designation of primary residential
custodian.
Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d at 786. Sheila contends that because Chad did not file a
motion for modification until three months after Sheila’s motion for relocation, and
because his motion did not allege that the relocation would endanger the children,
but simply alleged that it would not be in their best interests, he did not allege
sufficient grounds for the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Additionally,
Sheila argues that, because the family court based its decision to hold an
evidentiary hearing based on the GAL’s report and other evidence, and not merely
on the affidavits, it was error for the court to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Chad argues that Sheila failed to preserve the issue for appellate
review because she did not object to the family court’s finding that there was
sufficient evidence of emotional harm to hold an evidentiary hearing. Because
Sheila argued in her motion to summarily grant her motion to relocate and her
memorandum in support of her motion to relocate that Chad had not complied with
Fenwick, we find that the issue was sufficiently preserved for our review.
We find that Chad and the court complied with the procedures
required in Fenwick. Given the motions filed and the amount of activity in the
case, we do not find that three months was an unreasonable time in which to file
the motion for a change of custody. In Fowler v. Sowders, 151 S.W.3d 357 (Ky.
App. 2004), this Court held that a father was not required to allege serious physical
or emotional endangerment to a child to support his motion for a change of
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custody. Rather, the removal of a child from its known surroundings and extended
family was a change of circumstances that merited a full hearing under KRS
403.340. Id. at 359.
Most importantly, as explained in Pennington, much of the procedural
discussion in Fenwick must be disregarded because the Court applied the incorrect
standard in that case. The relocation in Fenwick was raised prior to entry of the
final custody decree. Had the relocation motion been made post-decree, as it was
here, the focus should have been on whether an actual change in custody was being
sought.
Fenwick directed the parent opposing relocation to file a motion for
change of custody pursuant to KRS 402.340, yet subsequently acknowledged that
“the essence of joint custody is shared decision-making,” and that “the joint
custody itself will remain unaffected by [the mother’s] relocation because [the
father] will still be able to continue sharing substantial time with his children
through personal contact and other means . . . [.]” Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d at 789.
Therefore, a parent opposed to relocation but not seeking a change in joint custody
does not need to make a motion for a change of custody, but rather a motion for
modification of timesharing. Pennington, 266 S.W.3d at 768. “[S]ince the nature
of the custody does not change, the trial court is not bound by the statutory
requirements that must be met for a change of custody, but can modify timesharing
based on the best interests of the child as is done in modifying visitation.” Id.
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Because Fenwick is not applicable to this case, any error in failing to follow its
procedural mandates is harmless, as the custody decree was never modified.
Therefore, the family court did not err in failing to summarily grant Sheila’s
motion to relocate.
Sheila next argues that the family court erred in “retroactively”
applying the decision in Pennington. Chad again argues that, because Sheila did
not file any responsive documents to Chad’s motion to change custody, and filed
no documents arguing that the family court should not apply the Pennington case,
she failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. Sheila argues in her brief
that this issue was preserved for review when her counsel discussed the applicable
law and standard of review during the January 6, 2009 hearing. During that
discussion, Sheila’s lawyer stated as follows:
And [the court is] going to have to determine the
applicability of Pennington or . . . you know, and I don’t
know . . . it’s kind of an unusual situation of, is this
particular case going to apply to something that’s already
been filed and hasn’t concluded, so . . . is it retroactive
and does Fenwick apply . . . I don’t know if I have an
answer to that . . . [.]
Although there is no evidence of an objection in the record made to the family
court’s final decision to apply Pennington, we find that the issue was sufficiently
preserved for our review.
The family court stated in its March 30, 2009 order that “Pennington
governs because it is the law in effect at the time a decision is made, rather than at
the time the case is filed that governs,” and cited BellSouth Telecommunications,
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Inc. v. Southeast Telephone, Inc. and Public Commission of Kentucky, 462 F.3d
650, 657 (6th Cir. 2006). Sheila quotes the portion of BellSouth which discusses
the retroactive application of new law to substantive rights, including several
citations which state that retroactivity is disfavored.
However, all of the cases cited by Sheila dealt with the application of
new statutes or regulations retroactively to events which had already occurred.
Pennington is not a statute or a regulation, it is a judicial decision rendered during
the proceedings in this case. Therefore, the more appropriate discussion should
revolve around the retroactive applicability of new judicial precedent. In cases
involving new judicial precedent, “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it
renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Alexander, 5 S.W.3d 104, 106 (Ky. 1999).
In Alexander, the courts looked to whether the decision resulted in a procedural or
a substantive change in the law. Id.
In this case, the Pennington case did not affect Sheila’s substantive
rights. Rather, Pennington clarified the procedures that currently exist under KRS
403.340 and 403.320 for the process of challenging a motion for relocation.
Additionally, it must be noted that no decision or event had actually
taken place to which Pennington could have been applied retroactively. No
decision had been rendered on the appealed issue at the time that Pennington was
rendered. No final hearing had been held on the motion to relocate, the motion to
summarily grant the motion to relocate, or Chad’s custodial modification motion.
The final decision of the family court had not been made. Therefore, the family
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court did not err in its determination that Pennington was the applicable law in this
case.
Finally, Sheila argues that the family court failed to give appropriate
weight to the GAL for the children and made findings of fact that were not
appropriate or supported by the record. Sheila argues that, although the original
report from the GAL indicated that the GAL was opposed to relocation, her
supplemental report stated the following:
My original concern with taking the children from their
father seems to be not as critical, given the fact that R.
says his dad is never around to play with, all he does is
play video games and that he is afraid his dad will get
mad because he does that a lot. Another concern I
previously had was that the children were going to miss
out on after-school activities and sports, but dad is unable
to attend many practices and games due to his 2-10
schedule. R. seems to really like Dad’s fiancée, but
spending time with Dad rather than fiancée is the
important issue here.”
The report also states that “If the burden the Court has placed on the parties to
prove is that a move from dad would cause irreparable harm, I do not feel it would
cause irreparable harm to the children if they were to move with their mother.”
As already stated, this Court will not disturb the court’s findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous. In this case, based on the evidence, we are
unable to find that the family court clearly erred when it found that relocation was
not in the best interests of the children.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Kenton Family Court is
affirmed.
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THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KELLER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
R. Kim Vocke
Covington, Kentucky
M. Patia R. Tabar
Florence, Kentucky
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