RUSTIN (ANTHONY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 29, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002250-MR
ANTHONY RUSTIN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CALDWELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CLARENCE A. WOODALL, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-00019
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS AND DIXON, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Anthony Rustin appeals from an order of the Caldwell
Circuit Court denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search
conducted pursuant to a warrant. After our review of the record and the pertinent
law, we vacate the order and remand.
On the afternoon of September 29, 2006, Trooper William Braden of the
Kentucky State Police (KSP) received a telephone call from an anonymous tipster.
1
Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580
The caller told Braden that he had observed Rustin unloading a substantial amount
of marijuana from an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) and placing it into a barn on
Rustin’s property. Trooper Braden was not acquainted with the tipster; nor was he
aware of any past interaction or experience with the informant by any other law
enforcement officer.
Upon receiving the tip, Trooper Braden and another KSP officer drove to the
address provided by the caller. They observed that the barn’s location in relation
to the house was accurately described. They also ran a check on the license plate
of a pickup truck that was in the driveway of the residence. It was registered to
Rustin.
Trooper Braden testified that although he did not knock on the door of the
residence, he assumed that no one was at home because the house was dark. He
and the other detective then prepared an affidavit which they presented to the local
district judge. The affidavit did not identify the informant. The judge found
probable cause and signed a search warrant for Rustin’s barn.
In the search that followed, KSP officers found nearly eight pounds of
marijuana in a horse trailer inside the barn and a small amount in Rustin’s
residence.2 Rustin and the ATV were found at his family’s hunting lodge two
miles away from his home.
In February 2007, Rustin was indicted for one count of trafficking in
marijuana over five pounds, first offense; and one count of possession of drug
2
Rustin’s wife had consented to the search of the residence following their search of the barn.
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paraphernalia, first offense.3 On January 3, 2008, the trial court held a hearing
concerning Rustin’s motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the search
warrant; it denied the motion. On December 2, 2009, Rustin entered a conditional
plea of guilty to one count of trafficking in marijuana more than eight ounces, less
than five pounds. He received a sentence of five-years’ incarceration. This appeal
follows.
Rustin argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. He contends that
KSP’s reliance on the word of an anonymous tipster alone failed to provide the
requisite probable cause to justify issuance of a search warrant.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution mandates that “no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause[.]” Kentucky’s parallel provision is Section
10 of our Constitution, which provides that “no warrant shall issue to search any
place . . . without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation.”
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983),
the Supreme Court of the United States established the guidelines for determining
whether sufficient probable cause for a warrant existed as a result of an anonymous
tip. The Court held as follows:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
3
Rustin, a Vietnam veteran, has no criminal history.
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probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing
court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a
substantial basis for . . . concluding that probable cause
existed.
Id. at 238-239. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court of Kentucky adopted this
totality-of-the-circumstances test in Beemer v. Commonwealth, 665 S.W.2d 912
(Ky. 1984).
Inherent in the totality-of-the-circumstances test is that there must be “a
balancing of the relative indicia of reliability accompanying an informant’s tip.”
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 180 S.W.3d 494, 499 (Ky.App. 2005)(citing Gates,
supra, at 234). Our review must focus upon the four corners of the affidavit
without recourse to or consideration of extrinsic evidence. Commonwealth v.
Pride, 302 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Ky. 2010).
In examining the element of probable cause, our courts have repeatedly and
consistently emphasized the importance of an informant’s reliability and the
existence of a credible basis for believing in the reliability of an informant. See
Hampton v. Commonwealth, supra; Johnson v. Commonwealth, supra; U.S. v.
May, 399 F.3d 817 (6th Cir. 2005). Very recently, our Supreme Court stated that a
police investigation began “after determining that the confidential informant was
reliable, a fact critical to the determination of probable cause[.]” Commonwealth
v. Pride, 302 S.W.3d at 50. (Emphasis added). In U.S. v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970 (6th
Cir. 2000) (en banc), an informant had worked extensively with law enforcement
in the past. The Sixth Circuit held that the reliability of the informant was so well
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established that his tip alone provided sufficient probable cause for a warrant to be
issued – while simultaneously warning by a clear caveat that such acceptance
should not automatically apply and that the totality of the circumstances must be
utilized.
A tipster who identifies himself by name is given more credibility than one
who is wholly anonymous. Commonwealth v. Kelly, 180 S.W.3d 474, 477 (Ky.
2005). However, those tips are not always sufficient without other indicia of
reliability. Hampton v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 740, 746 (Ky. 2007).
At the threshold of our inquiry is an examination of the affidavit upon which
a search warrant is based. It is the affidavit which succeeds or fails in convincing a
court that probable cause indeed is present. We have researched case law to
determine what criteria are employed by our courts in scrutinizing an affidavit for
sufficiency.
The Commonwealth has cited Lovett v. Commonwealth, 103 S.W.3d 72, 78
(Ky. 2003), for the proposition that an affidavit need not contain a detailed
recitation concerning an informant’s reliability. Our Supreme Court refused to
adopt a strict rubric requiring such adherence to a formula or list of factors:
Thus, the mere fact that DeFew’s affidavit did not
contain recitations as to the informant’s veracity,
reliability, and basis of knowledge is not conclusive that
the warrant was issued without probable cause.
Id. at 78. The Lovett Court carefully analyzed other criteria touching upon the
informant’s reliability. Most convincing to the court was the fact that the
informant implicated and indeed incriminated himself in the alleged crime. The
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Court held that such an admission against his own penal interest clothed the
informant with sufficient reliability to render the affidavit adequate.
While the confidential informant in the present case did
not specifically admit to criminal activity, he made such
statements detrimental to his penal interest as that he was
a regular visitor to Appellant’s methamphetamine
laboratory and that he had been in possession of a duffel
bag containing items used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine. Therefore, these facts provide
another “indicium of reliability” to the information
provided by the confidential informant.
Id. at 79.
In Hampton, supra, our Supreme Court held that a tip from an
informant (even though it came from an informant who was familiar to police
officers) was too vague to provide probable cause. However, it upheld the finding
of probable cause based on corroborating circumstances recited in the affidavit.
Courts have found that probable cause existed in several cases where the affidavits
related to past experiences with informants. Johnson, supra; May, supra; U.S. v.
Taylor, 301 Fed. Appx. 508 (6th Cir. 2008); Pride, supra; Allen, supra.
U.S. v. Miller, 314 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 2002), involved an informant who did
not have past experience with police. However, the fact that he was willing to
continue working with them and to be named in the affidavit was held to have
provided probable cause. The Court also found the informant’s depth and precision
of detail to be persuasive. Thus, the courts consistently analyze the totality of the
circumstances on a case-by-case basis without announcing a rigid or certain listing
of factors as determinative.
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In the case before us, we are urged to accept the tip alone as being sufficient
to constitute probable cause for the district judge to have issued a search warrant.
However, the underlying affidavit did not supply any facts indicating the
reliability, experience, or past history of dealing with the informant. It merely
referred to an anonymous telephone call from a “confidential informant” who had
observed certain alleged activity. The affidavit did not indicate whether the
informant had been involved with Rustin (at the risk of his own penal interest as in
Lovett, supra) or whether he had seen Rustin from a distance. It did not indicate
whether the police knew anything about the informant or why he wished to remain
unnamed in the affidavit. Later, at the suppression hearing, Trooper Braden
testified that he was unfamiliar with the informant and did not believe that other
law enforcement officers had past experiences that would reflect on the
informant’s reliability.
Courts have found that although affidavits lacked probable cause based on
informants’ tips, nonetheless probable cause might result from police
investigations corroborating the reliability of the tips. See Gates, supra; U.S. v.
Smith, 783 F.2d 648 (6th Cir. 1986).
The corroboration here consisted of merely
verifying the informant’s description of the residence and its spatial relation to the
barn on the property. A vehicle on the premises was registered to Rustin. The
Sixth Circuit addressed a highly similar situation in U.S. v. Hammond, 351 F.3d
765 (6th Cir. 2003), and declined to find probable cause – in spite of the fact that
the affiant named one informant and had received additional anonymous tips:
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Neither the anonymous phone calls nor [the detective’s]
drive by Hammond’s residence can be considered
substantial enough to corroborate Holt’s tip for purposes
of probable cause. First, Holt was not established as a
reliable informant in any respects. Second, the
information provided by Holt and the anonymous callers
was lacking in detail[.] . . . Third, [the detective], when
driving by the property, noticed nothing out of the
ordinary at the Hammond residence. [The detective]
only served to corroborate the fact that a Hammond lived
in Rockcastle County on KY 1955 and that there was a
gate across his property. Such information would not be
difficult for anyone to obtain and does not suggest
criminal activity.
Id. at 773. Such information is precisely what supported the affidavit in the case
before us.
In U.S. v. Leake, 998 F.2d 1359 (1993), probable cause was not found after
police conducted surveillance on a home for two nights without observing any
suspicious activity. In Leake, the Sixth Circuit observed as follows, “this case
demonstrates the importance of taking sufficient time to verify an anonymous tip
before a warrant is requested. . . . More police work was needed.” Id. at 1365.
The analogy to both Leake and Hammond is compelling in our review of the
case before us. The informant provided some detail and first-hand observation, but
the affidavit did not provide information as to if or why the informant wished to
remain anonymous; it did not state whether the informant’s information resulted
from involvement in Rustin’s alleged activity; and the corroborating details were
information that could easily be obtained by any member of the public – the very
kind of information deemed to be insufficient corroboration by Leake and
Hammond. The police officers could have spent more time obtaining information
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rather than seeking a search warrant on the day that they received the tip. Case law
dictates that indeed they should have: “More police work was needed.” Leake,
supra.
The Commonwealth argues that if we determine that there was no probable
cause for a search warrant, we should still uphold it as valid under a good-faith
exception. We disagree.
The Supreme Court of the United States established the good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule in U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d
677 (1984), holding that evidence obtained by a defective warrant will not be
excluded if law enforcement officers had acted in good faith when they carried out
the warrant. However, the Leon court provided exceptions to its own rule. Leon
recited circumstances in which the officer’s reliance would not be reasonable: (1)
if the affidavit contains false or misleading information; (2) in cases of
abandonment by the judge of a detached and neutral role; (3) in cases where the
officer’s belief in the existence of probable cause is entirely unreasonable; and (4)
where the warrant is facially deficient by failing to describe the place to be
searched or the thing to be seized. Crayton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.3d 684,
687-88 (Ky. 1992)(Citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-24, 104 S.Ct. at 3420-21).
The third Leon exception governs in this case. The officer’s belief in the
existence of probable cause was unreasonable under the criteria set forth in case
law. We have examined the four corners of the affidavit, and we can discover no
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indicia of reliability. The independent police corroboration was cursory and
inadequate to provide a showing of probable cause.
Accordingly, we vacate the order of the Caldwell Circuit Court denying
Rustin’s motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William F. McGee, Jr.
Abigail C. Barnes
Smithland, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
John Paul Varo
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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