GUASP (KEN) VS. ALDRIDGE (JOHN), ET AL.
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 19, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002095-ME
KEN GUASP
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SUSAN WESLEY MCCLURE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00374
JOHN AND REGINIA ALDRIDGE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, CAPERTON, AND CLAYTON, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: This is a dispute over custody of three children. Ken
Guasp, the natural father of Michaela Renee Guasp, Daniel Thomas Guasp, and
Sidda Leigh Guasp, appeals from a judgment of the Hopkins Circuit Court in
which the court awarded custody of the children to their maternal grandparents,
John and Reginia Aldridge. On appeal, Ken argues that the evidence did not
support the trial court's finding that he is an unfit parent. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ken Guasp was married to Erin Elaine Aldridge Guasp Trout, and
during the marriage, they had three children. On July 17, 2006, the marriage was
dissolved by a decree of dissolution entered by the Hopkins Circuit Court. At that
time, Erin was awarded sole custody of the three children. On April 10, 2007, Erin
died in an automobile accident, which left Ken as the children’s only surviving
biological parent. Immediately after Erin’s death, the Aldridges refused to allow
Ken to have the children.
On April 25, 2007, Ken filed a petition for immediate custody of the
children. Thereafter, on April 26, 2007, the family court issued an ex parte order
giving Ken sole custody of the children and requiring that physical custody of the
children be relinquished to Ken. Then, on May 8, 2007, the Aldridges filed an
answer to the petition for immediate custody and claimed, among other things, that
they were de facto custodians with equal standing to Ken and it would be in the
best interest of the children to stay with them. Later, they amended the answer to
state that Ken was an unfit parent and therefore not suitable as a parent.
The court held a hearing on June 13, 2007, and, subsequently, ordered
grandparent visitation rights to the Aldridges. Then, in late June, the Aldridges
filed a show cause motion because Ken failed to abide by the terms of the
visitation schedule. After a hearing on that issue, Ken was found in contempt and
sentenced to thirty days in jail, and the Aldridges were given temporary custody of
the children. The parties remained in conflict over the issues and, ultimately, the
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court set bond for Ken and ordered an evaluation of the children by Dr. Shirley
Spence.
Following his release on bond, Ken filed a motion requesting
reunification with the children. After a hearing on July 25, 2007, the court ordered
that the children remain with the Aldridges but set a visitation schedule for Ken.
The parties continued to contest numerous legal issues. On the issue of
jurisdiction, the court ruled on July 27, 2007, that it did have jurisdiction. Next, on
August 30, 2007, it entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order,
which found that the Aldridges were not de facto custodians. Ken continued to
move for the return of the children and the Aldridges continued to contest. In due
course, on January 17, 2008, the court entered orders that Ken have temporary
custody of the children.
The litigation over custody of the children persisted. Eventually, the
court held a hearing about grandparent visitation on June 30, 2008, and, thereafter,
entered an order granting grandparent visitation. Finally, on May 18, 2009, the
court conducted another hearing to determine the custody of the children. On
October 8, 2009, the court entered a final order and judgment holding that Ken is
an unfit parent and awarding custody of the three children to the Aldridges. It is
from this order that Ken now appeals.
ISSUE
Ken argues that the trial court misapplied Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 405.020 and controlling case law because it failed to find a number of
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elements that must be present before a finding of unfitness. He maintains that his
parental unfitness was not established. The Aldridges assert not only that Ken is
an unfit parent but also that it serves the best interest of the children that they be
awarded custody.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review in cases such as this is that we are only
entitled to set aside the trial court's findings if those findings are clearly erroneous.
As stated in Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01, “[f]indings of fact
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Hence, the
dispositive question that we must answer is whether the trial court's findings of fact
are clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence. “The test of
substantiality of evidence is whether when taken alone or in the light of all the
evidence it has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of
reasonable men.” Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298,
308 (Ky. 1972), citing Blankenship v. Lloyd Blankenship Coal Company, Inc., 463
S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1970).
Moreover, regardless of conflicting evidence, the weight of the
evidence or the fact that the reviewing court would have reached a contrary
finding, as stated in CR 52.01, “due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” These tasks, judging the
credibility of witnesses and weighing evidence, are tasks within the exclusive
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province of the trial court. Thus, “[m]ere doubt as to the correctness of [a] finding
[will] not justify [its] reversal.” Allen v. Devine, 178 S.W.3d 517, 524 (Ky. App.
2005). In addition, appellate courts should not disturb trial court findings that are
supported by substantial evidence. M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 979
S.W.2d 114, 116 (Ky. 1998). With this standard in mind, we will now review the
case at hand.
ANALYSIS
Child custody disputes between a surviving parent and a nonparent are
governed by KRS 405.020(1), which provides that “[if] either of the parents dies,
the survivor, if suited to the trust, shall have the custody, nurture, and education of
the children who are under the age of eighteen.” Thus, the surviving parent has a
superior right to custody over the nonparent so long as the surviving parent is
“suited to the trust.” Furthermore, custody contests between a parent and a
nonparent, who does not fall within the statutory rule on “de facto” custodians, are
determined under a standard requiring the nonparent to prove that the case falls
within an exception to parental entitlement to custody. One exception to the
parent’s superior right to custody arises if the parent is shown to be “unfit” by clear
and convincing evidence. Davis v. Collinsworth, 771 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1989).
Therein, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated:
The type of evidence that is necessary to show
unfitness on the part of the mother in this custody battle
with a third party is: (1) evidence of inflicting or
allowing to be inflicted physical injury, emotional harm
or sexual abuse; (2) moral delinquency; (3)
abandonment; (4) emotional or mental illness; and (5)
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failure, for reasons other than poverty alone, to provide
essential care for the children.
Id. at 330. In a later case, our Court clarified that even if clear and convincing
evidence of current unfitness on the basis of failure to provide parental care and
protection is presented, the trial court must further find, before granting permanent
custody to a nonparent, that there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will
improve and be able to provide appropriate care and protection. Forester v.
Forester, 979 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Ky. App. 1998).
Further elucidation of the Davis factors was given by the Kentucky
Supreme Court in an unreported opinion, Knight v. Young, 2010 WL 252246 (Ky.
2010)(2007-CA-001850-MR).1 The Court explained that not every factor listed in
Davis must be found in order to find a parent not “suited to trust.” It noted that
Davis does not explicitly require that a finding must be reached on each factor but
merely listed the types of evidence that can show unfitness.
Here, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Ken
inflicted or allowed to be inflicted emotional harm upon the children; that Ken’s
moral delinquency was established by clear and convincing evidence; that Ken,
prior to Erin’s death, had abandoned the children; and that Ken, for reasons other
than poverty alone, failed to provide essential care for the children and that there is
no reasonable expectation that his ability to provide care will improve. Further, the
court noted that it did not find that it had been established by clear and convincing
evidence that Ken suffered from a mental or emotional illness. After making its
1
CR 76.28 allows unpublished cases to be cited for consideration by the court if there is no
published opinion that would adequately address the issue before the court.
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findings, the court painstakingly outlines the evidence that it relied on to make its
findings. In so doing, the court explains that it is not enumerating all the evidence
it considered nor all the evidence that support the findings but rather the evidence
the court found compelling as well as clear and convincing. We need not agree
with each finding by the court in determining whether the evidence overall was
clear and convincing.
Ken addresses each finding by the court and opines that none of the
evidence is clear and convincing and, therefore, the court’s decision is clearly
erroneous. We are not persuaded by Ken’s reasoning. Merely reciting that the
evidence is not clear and convincing does not make it so. And Ken’s contention
that the court did not meet the Forrester mandate that the trial court must find, by
clear and convincing evidence, that there is no reasonable expectation that the
natural parent will improve his or her ability to parent the children in the future is
not accurate. The trial court clearly states in its opinion that “[t]he Court also finds
that, for reasons other than poverty alone, Ken has failed to provide the essential
emotional and physical care for the children due to his alcohol use and abuse and
further that his ability to provide this care will improve in the foreseeable future.”
Notwithstanding Ken’s strong objection to whether this issue was proven by clear
and convincing evidence, we can only say, given the trial court’s discretion in such
matters, nothing provided by Ken shows that the trial court’s conclusion was
clearly erroneous. This case and its tragic consequences have a lengthy and
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persuasive history of Ken’s lack of progress in meeting the needs of his children.
We cannot say that the trial court’s findings in this regard were clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
The record for this case is voluminous and contentious. We observe
the trial court did an admirable job of sorting through the evidence and determining
that Ken was not fit to parent these children and that it was in the best interest of
the children to be in the custody of the maternal grandparents. We concur with the
trial court’s carefully written, well-researched, and thoughtful opinion that awarded
custody of the children to the maternal grandparents. Regardless of our agreement
with the trial court’s assessment of the situation, given our standard of review
wherein we are only entitled to set aside the trial court's findings if those findings
are clearly erroneous, we clearly have no choice but to affirm the decision of the
Hopkins Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Simms
Louisville, Kentucky
Randall C. Teague
Madisonville, Kentucky
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