WECKMAN (KEEGAN C.) VS. WECKMAN (KIRA A.)
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RENDERED: JULY 9, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001844-ME
KEEGAN C. WECKMAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JO ANN WISE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-D-00675-001
KIRA A. WECKMAN
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; WHITE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
WHITE, SENIOR JUDGE: Keegan Weckman, a United States Marine stationed at
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, appeals from a domestic violence order (DVO)
issued against him by the Fayette Family Court. Keegan claims that the court erred
by refusing to allow him to call a relevant witness to testify on his behalf. Keegan
1
Senior Judge Edwin M. White sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
also claims that no evidence was presented at the hearing to prove “injury or threat
of imminent injury.” After carefully reviewing the hearing, we conclude that
Keegan was denied fundamental due process rights and a fair hearing. Therefore,
we vacate the Fayette Family Court’s DVO.
I. Factual Background
On August 25, 2009, Kira filed a petition in the Fayette Family Court
for an EPO to be issued against Keegan, her husband of less than one year. The
petition stated that on August 2, 2009:
An argument lead [sic] to out lashes of anger. Keegan
tried to confine me into a corner in our apartment where I
asked him to step out of my way when he did not move I
tried to push my out of the corner in our kitchen. He then
slammed me into the stove. I was still trying to push past
him so I could leave the environment. Once I broke
away from him he still had a hold of my shirt and thats
[sic] when he swung his fist in an attempt to hit my face
and he missed by 4 inches. I was very shocked and knew
I needed to leave. I began to gather a few belongings.
He then went into our bedroom and pulled the shotgun
out and held it to his head and said, “I’ll kill myself if
you leave me.” Concerned I took the fire arm and said I
won’t let him and he reached for a knife in the kitchen
and stated, “I can still slit my wrists.”
The family court granted Kira’s petition and scheduled a DVO
hearing. The court heard Kira’s petition on September 24, 2009. Consistent with
the petition, Kira testified that on August 2, 2009, in Onslow County, North
Carolina, Keegan confronted her and prevented her from moving out of a corner.
She testified that Keegan shoved her against a stove when she tried to move past
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him. He swung his fist but missed her by four inches. Then she alleged that
Keegan retrieved a gun and threatened to kill himself if she left him.
Kira continued to live with Keegan until she moved into her parent’s
Lexington home on August 17, 2009. She never called the police to report the
incident. At the hearing, Kira admitted that she made the first physical contact by
shoving Keegan.
In his testimony, Keegan disputed almost all of Kira’s testimony. He
denied swinging at Kira, confining her to a corner, and threatening to kill himself.
In fact, Keegan brought a statement from a North Carolina neighbor who claimed
that Keegan’s gun had been at his house since July 7, 2009. Keegan also testified
that Kira suffers from bipolar disorder and does not take medication. The trial
court interrupted Keegan and chastised him for discussing Kira’s mental health
problems. The court claimed that bipolar disorder has only a very limited
relevance in a DVO proceeding and demanded that he get to the point.
Keegan testified that he went to the home of Kira’s parents on August
20, 2009, at 11:30 PM. He testified that he had learned of Kira’s premarital
infidelities and went to tell her that he wanted a divorce. The next day he returned
to the home with his father to pick up the couple’s dog. Keegan testified that Kira
acted erratically by throwing the dog’s kennel and screaming. Further, he testified
that Kira’s mother threatened to call his commanding officer and “ruin his career.”
No allegations of domestic violence arise from either interaction.
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After defense counsel ended his direct examination of Keegan, the
court asked Keegan several questions including why he found it appropriate to go
to the home of Kira’s parents at 11:30 PM. Then the court questioned Keegan
about Kira’s motive to lie in the petition.
Court: All four of those things that she said happened
that night, she sat here and just completely and totally
made all of that stuff up? Every bit of it is a lie, is that
what you are saying? Is that not right?
Keegan: Yes.
Court: Why would she make all of that up? What
motivation? You’ve been married since Valentine’s Day
of this year. You have no children. I dare say you
probably have no property. Why do you think that she
made all of those lies up?
Keegan: To ruin my career, ma’am.
The court then stated that it made a decision to enter the DVO for a
period of three years because it did not believe Keegan. When defense counsel
stated that an intention to call Keegan’s father as a witness, the court refused and
said that his testimony was irrelevant. Defense counsel was not given an
opportunity to make any arguments. On appeal, Keegan claims that the family
court erred by refusing to allow him to call his father as a witness. We agree. The
errors in this case necessitate a review of the procedural aspects of DVO hearings,
petitions, and the due process rights of which those subject to a DVO are entitled.
II. Domestic Violence Orders
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In 1992, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted KRS 403.715 to
403.785 as a way, “[t]o allow persons who are victims of domestic violence2 and
abuse to obtain effective, short-term protection against further violence and abuse
in order that their lives will be as secure and as uninterrupted as possible[.]” KRS
403.715(1); see also Rankin v. Criswell, 277 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Ky. App. 2008).
Pursuant to the enactment, “[a]ny family member or member of an
unmarried couple who is a resident of this state or has fled to this state to escape
domestic violence” may petition the court in the county in which he resides to
issue a protective order to protect against acts of domestic violence. KRS
403.725(1).
The court shall issue an emergency protective order (EPO) if the court
determines that the allegations in the petition, “. . . indicate the presence of an
immediate and present danger of domestic violence and abuse[.]” KRS
403.740(1). Following an ex parte proceeding, the trial court shall enter the EPO
“[r]estraining the adverse party from any contact or communication with the
petitioner as directed by the court[.]” KRS 403.740(1)(a).
An emergency protective order shall remain in effect no longer than
fourteen days, at which time a full hearing shall be scheduled. KRS 403.740(4).
At the hearing, the court may enter a DVO for a period of time not to exceed three
years. KRS 403.750(2).
2
KRS 403.720(1) defines “domestic violence and abuse” as “ physical injury, serious physical
injury, sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious
physical injury, sexual abuse, or assault between family members or members of an unmarried
couple[.]”
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A. Standard of Review
A court may only enter a DVO if the petitioner shows that by “a
preponderance of the evidence that an act or acts of domestic violence and abuse
have occurred and may again occur[.]” KRS 403.750(1); Bissell v. Baumgardner,
236 S.W.3d 24, 29 (Ky. App. 2007). The preponderance of the evidence standard
is met when the evidence establishes that the petitioner “was more likely than not
to have been a victim of domestic violence.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934
S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1996).
DVO hearings must grant both parties equal footing from which to
state their case. There is no presumption that the petition is true or that the
petitioner is truthful. The family court appeared to disregard the above standard
when repeatedly questioning Keegan about Kira’s motivation to lie.
Further, we conclude that both the court’s tone and line of questioning
were improper. “A witness should not be required to characterize the testimony of
another witness . . . as lying. Such a characterization places the witness in such an
unflattering light as to potentially undermine his entire testimony.” Moss v.
Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Ky. 1997).
Individually, the trial court’s line of questioning and apparent
presumption that the petitioner was truthful may not require reversal. Those errors
combined with the additional errors discussed herein, however, require us to vacate
the DVO.
B. Due Process Rights
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Those subject to a DVO are placed under significant restrictions.
Kingrey v. Whitlow, 150 S.W.3d 67, 70 (Ky. App. 2004) (Knopf, J., concurring).
They may face employment consequences, the loss or decrease of child custody,
the loss of the right to bear arms, increased difficulty in traveling abroad, and an
overall restraint on liberty. Further, a person subject to a DVO faces immediate
arrest and incarceration for a period up to one year for violation of the court order.
Rankin, 277 S.W.3d at 625.
Although DVO hearings are civil proceedings, the significant
consequences trigger procedural protections.
Whether any procedural protections are due depends on
the extent to which an individual will be ‘condemned to
suffer grievous loss.’ The question is not merely the
‘weight’ of the individual’s interest, but whether the
nature of the interest is one within the contemplations of
the ‘liberty or property’ language of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484
(1972) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, those subject to a DVO are entitled
to due process rights, such as the right to call witnesses and a full evidentiary
hearing. Wright v. Wright, 181 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Ky. App. 2005).
1. The Right to a Full Evidentiary Hearing
Family courts are given broad discretion in weighing the evidence and
witness credibility.
[T]he trier of fact has the right to believe the evidence
presented by one litigant in preference to another. The
trier of fact may believe any witness in whole or in part.
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The trier of fact may take into consideration all of the
circumstances of the case, including the credibility of the
witness.
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1996) (internal citations
omitted). Credibility may only be determined once the trier of fact has heard all
relevant evidence. Only after conducting the evidentiary hearing may the court
decide whether, under a preponderance of the evidence, domestic violence
occurred and may occur again. Rankin, 277 S.W.3d at 626. Keegan was not
allowed to summarize the evidence or argue possible defenses in a closing
statement. The court deprived Keegan of his right to a full evidentiary hearing by
interrupting the proceeding and making a premature judgment.
2. The Right to Call Witnesses
Although the court stated that Keegan’s father’s testimony was
irrelevant, the testimony could be relevant to the question of imminent harm. As
used in KRS 403.270, the term “imminent” harm means “impending danger and, in
the context of domestic violence and abuse . . . [,] belief that danger is imminent
can be inferred from a past pattern of repeated serious abuse.” KRS 503.010(3).
The fact that he witnessed Keegan and Kira’s last interaction makes his testimony
relevant to the imminent harm inquiry. Further, the father’s testimony could have
been used to advance the defense theory that Kira sought a DVO in an attempt to
ruin Keegan’s career, which clearly relates to credibility.
3. The Right to Present Evidence
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We are also concerned that the trial court unnecessarily limited
Keegan’s testimony concerning Kira’s mental bipolar disorder. The trial court
claimed that Keegan used Kira’s bipolar disorder as a way to attack her. The
record does not support this contention. As long as the testimony is admissible
under the rules of evidence, mental health disorders and medication schedules can
be highly relevant to credibility.
Keegan’s counsel did not object to the trial court’s limitation of
testimony. Nonetheless, we conclude that palpable error exists as the limitation
deprived Keegan of the ability to formulate certain defenses.
As Keegan was denied fundamental due process rights and all relevant
evidence was not presented, we are unable to address his claim that the evidence
did not reflect injury or threat of imminent injury.
III. Conclusion
We recognize that “domestic violence statutes should be construed
liberally in favor of protecting victims from domestic violence[.]” Barnett v.
Wiley, 103 S.W.3d 17, 19 (Ky. 2003). Nonetheless, the issuance of a DVO must
not be taken lightly. While the orders provide protection to victims, they often
have devastating effects on those to whom they are issued against. It is essential
that courts embrace the gravity of this decision.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, we vacate the Fayette Family
Court DVO issued against Keegan Weckman and remand the order for a hearing in
conformance with this opinion.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
No appellee brief filed.
C. Ed Massey
Erlanger, Kentucky
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