BAUMGARTNER, SR. (TONY D.), ET AL. VS. BAUMGARTNER, JR (TONY D.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 12, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001768-ME
TONY D. BAUMGARTNER, SR. AND
CONNIE G. BAUMGARTNER
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOAN L. BYER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CI-502004
TONY D. BAUMGARTNER, JR. AND
AIMEE M. BAUMGARTNER
(NOW LEE)
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, COMBS AND WINE, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: Tony Baumgartner, Sr. and Connie Baumgartner (collectively
Grandparents1) appeal the August 28, 20092 order of the Jefferson Family Court
1
2
Ms. Baumgartner is not the biological grandmother of the child at issue.
All events hereinafter occurred in 2009 unless otherwise stated.
declining to exercise jurisdiction over their petition for custody of their minor
grandchild (Child). The family court determined that, although it had continuing
exclusive jurisdiction over the matter, Texas was a more convenient forum.
Because we find Kentucky did not have continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the
matter pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 403.824, we affirm.
Child was born in Texas but moved to Kentucky with her parents, Tony
Baumgartner, Jr. (Father) and Aimee Baumgartner (Mother), when she was three
weeks old.3 Grandparents, who live in Kentucky, became active in her life.
Sometime later Mother was granted an Emergency Protective Order (EPO) against
Father, and divorce proceedings ensued. The Shelby Circuit Court disposed of all
matters related to the divorce, the initial custody determination, and the EPO.
Mother and Child resided with Grandparents for a brief period after the petition for
dissolution was filed.
Mother and Father later reconciled and began cohabitating; Child lived with
them. Grandparents became concerned about this living arrangement and sought
custody of Child in a petition filed on June 10 in Jefferson County. Mother and
Father were served on June 11 in Kentucky. On June 12, Mother, Father, and
Child relocated to Texas.
Before the family court, Mother and Father argued Kentucky no longer had
jurisdiction over the matter, and the court initially agreed. The family court
changed its position, however, upon Grandparents’ motion pursuant to Kentucky
3
Child was four years old at the time the petition was filed.
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Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 52 and CR 59.05. The court ruled that while
Kentucky did retain continuing exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to KRS
403.824(1)(b), Texas was a more convenient forum for the matter and dismissed it
pursuant to KRS 403.834. This appeal followed.
Grandparents have raised a number of grounds on which they believe the
family court should have determined Kentucky was the proper forum for
modification of the custody order. Because we find Kentucky lost continuing
exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to KRS 403.824, we need not address them all.
“Whether a trial court acts within its jurisdiction is a question of law;
therefore, our review is de novo.” Biggs v. Biggs, 301 S.W.3d 32, 33 (Ky.App.
2009)(citing Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 810 (Ky. 2004)).
We reverse a finding of fact only when the family court’s determination was
clearly erroneous. CR 52.01. Further, “a correct decision will not be disturbed on
appeal merely because it was based on an incorrect ground or reason[.]” Haddad
v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 449 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Ky. 1969)(citing 5
Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 727, p. 170. We may therefore affirm the
dismissal of the action if dismissal was appropriate, but for a reason other than that
expressed by the family court.
Kentucky adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) in
1968 to govern Kentucky’s jurisdiction over interstate custody disputes. Williams
v. Bittel, 299 S.W.3d 284, 288 (Ky.App. 2009). The Uniform Child Custody and
Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), codified in KRS 403.822 et seq., was
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adopted in 2004 to replace the UCCJA and bring Kentucky law into conformity
with the federal Parental Kidnapping Act. Id. Broadly speaking, the UCCJEA was
designed “to avoid jurisdictional conflict and competition in custody matters.” Id.
In the instant case, the family court determined KRS 403.824(1)(b)
bestowed jurisdiction upon Kentucky courts, but subpart (1)(a) of the same statute
did not. Grandparents now argue the family court erred in failing to find
jurisdiction pursuant to KRS 403.824(1)(a), but that any such error was harmless
because the court found it had exclusive continuing jurisdiction under KRS
403.824(1)(b) and proceeded accordingly.
The starting point for understanding the proper application of the
jurisdictional statutes is KRS 403.822(1) because it “is the exclusive jurisdictional
basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this state.” KRS
403.822(2). When Mother filed her petition to dissolve her marriage to Father in
Shelby Family Court, that court acquired “jurisdiction to make an initial child
custody determination [because Kentucky was] the home state of the child on the
date of the commencement of the proceeding[.]” KRS 403.822(1)(a); see also
KRS 403.800(3), (4), (8)(defining “Child custody determination,” “Child custody
proceeding,” and “Initial determination”). The Shelby Family Court, having
“made a child custody determination consistent with KRS 403.822 or 403.826
[maintained] exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
(a) A court of this state determines that neither the child,
nor the child and one (1) parent, nor the child and a
person acting as a parent have a significant connection
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with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer
available in this state concerning the child’s care,
protection, training, and personal relationships; or
(b) A court of this state or a court of another state
determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any
other person acting as a parent do not presently reside in
this state.
KRS 403.824(1)(a), (b)(emphasis supplied).
The Grandparents’ petition seeking modification of custody, as defined by
KRS 403.800(11), was not filed in Shelby Family Court but in Jefferson Family
Court. Even if we presume both that Jefferson Family Court had concurrent
jurisdiction with Shelby Family Court and that Grandparents were “person[s]
acting as a parent[s]” as defined in KRS 403.800(13), we still must conclude that
the jurisdiction of both courts terminated when the Jefferson Family Court
determined that “the Court does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under
KRS 403.824[(1)](a) due to [Child’s] current lack of a significant connection with
Kentucky.” (Jefferson Family Court Order entered August 28, 2009, Record 186).
Much of the remainder of the Jefferson Family Court’s Order is irrelevant.
The Jefferson Family Court’s conclusion that “Kentucky does maintain
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under KRS 403.824[(1)](b)” is wrong and
illustrates a misreading of the statute. As described above, jurisdiction is not
conferred by KRS 403.824; that statute explains how jurisdiction terminates. Once
the circumstances described either in subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b) are found to exist,
jurisdiction ends.
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Additionally, the family court’s finding that Grandparents qualified as
persons acting as parents under KRS 403.800(13) was not supported by substantial
evidence. A person acting as a parent is one who had “physical custody of the
child or has had physical custody for a period of six (6) consecutive months”
during the year preceding the filing of the petition. KRS 403.800(13)(a). This was
neither pleaded nor proved.
Grandparents’ evidence falls short even if we were to give the statute a
broader reading as they propose. Their evidence was that they had cared for Child
“often” prior to her relocation to Texas. They specifically stated they “were used
as childcare providers” every other weekend and when Mother and Father were
working or having a date night, and that they had purchased medicine and clothing
for Child.4 While their affidavits reflect that they frequently took it upon
themselves to ensure Child received adequate care and necessities, there is no
indication they assumed parental roles. Caring for the child on weekends, on her
parents’ “date nights,” or occasionally while Mother and Father were at work more
resembles the behavior of a babysitter than that of a person acting as a parent.
Likewise, paying for medicine or other necessities, while generous and helpful,
does not make a party a person acting as a parent without some greater showing.
Grandparents’ general claims that they “cared for and supported” Child did not
4
Grandparents’ affidavits also addressed several instances in which they believed Mother and
Father had acted as irresponsible parents. However, those allegations are irrelevant to the issue
of jurisdiction, and we need not discuss them.
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rebut Mother’s statements that Grandparents had never undertaken responsibilities
so great that they assumed the role of parents.
In the absence of additional parent-like behavior, there were no facts before
the family court which justified a conclusion that Grandparents were acting as
parents. Applying KRS 403.824(1)(b), then, the family court should have found
that neither the child, nor a parent, nor a person acting as a parent, continued to
reside in Kentucky.
Grandparents’ next argument is that the family court should have exercised
jurisdiction pursuant to KRS 403.824(2) in conjunction with KRS 403.822. KRS
403.824(2) provides, “A court of this state which has made a child custody
determination and does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this
section may modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial
determination under KRS 403.822.” KRS 403.824(2)(emphasis supplied). This
argument fails since the Jefferson Family Court never made a child custody
determination as to Child. Furthermore, the language of the statute is permissive.
KRS 446.010(20). A court may exercise jurisdiction under the stated
circumstances. Under these circumstances, it was not an abuse of discretion for the
Jefferson Family Court to decline to exercise jurisdiction.
Grandparents also contend on appeal that the family court should have
exercised emergency jurisdiction over the matter because the child is at risk of
abuse or neglect. KRS 403.828(1) provides that:
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“[a] court of this state has temporary emergency
jurisdiction if the child is present in this state and the
child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an
emergency to protect the child because the child, or a
sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened
with mistreatment or harm.”
KRS 403.828(1)(emphasis supplied). The record reveals the child is no longer in
Kentucky, so this statute cannot apply. The family court did not err in failing to
exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction.
Because Kentucky no longer retained jurisdiction over Child pursuant to
either KRS 403.824(1) or KRS 403.828(1), the family court’s dismissal of
Grandparents’ petition for modification of custody was proper.
WINE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.
Nicole S. Bearse
Frankfort, Kentucky
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