FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES VS. FOLK (MICHAEL)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: OCTOBER 29, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001725-MR
FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY M. BARTLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CI-00569
MICHAEL FOLK
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
AND
REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON, JUDGE; ISAAC,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: This appeal concerns a Kenton Circuit Court order denying
1
Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
a motion to dismiss or alternatively to stay litigation pending arbitration made by
Fidelity Brokerage Services in a tort action filed by Michael Folk. The trial court
denied the motion on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce
the parties’ arbitration agreement. After careful review, we reverse the court’s
order and remand this case for further proceedings.
In December 1998, Folk and his then-wife, Kathryn, opened
investment brokerage accounts with Fidelity, where Kathryn was employed as a
database administrator. The customer agreement included an arbitration clause
providing that “all controversies that may arise . . . shall be determined by
arbitration in accordance with the rules then prevailing of either the New York
Stock Exchange, Inc., or National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. . . .”
Folk and Kathryn divorced in March 2008. In early 2009, Folk filed a
complaint against Fidelity, Kathryn, and her co-worker alleging the tort of outrage
and breach of duty relating to Folk’s investment accounts at Fidelity. In response,
Fidelity cited the arbitration clause in the parties’ agreement and moved to dismiss
the complaint or alternatively to stay litigation pending arbitration pursuant to the
relevant provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the Kentucky
Uniform Arbitration Act (KUAA). Folk opposed Fidelity’s motion, contending
that the agreement was an unenforceable contract of adhesion. In August 2009, the
trial court denied Fidelity’s motion on grounds that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration agreement. Fidelity now appeals the court’s
decision pursuant to KRS 417.220(1)(a).
-2-
First, we address a jurisdictional issue raised by Folk. He contends
that this is an improper interlocutory appeal, as KRS 417.220(1)(a) specifically
provides for appellate review of “[a]n order denying an application to compel
arbitration made under KRS 417.060.” Folk points out that Fidelity did not file an
application to compel arbitration; rather, Fidelity moved to dismiss the complaint
or alternatively stay the litigation pending arbitration. The record shows, however,
that Fidelity filed its motion pursuant to both the FAA and KUAA. Section 16 of
the FAA specifically provides for an immediate appeal of an order refusing a stay
of litigation. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(a).2 While we acknowledge Folk’s strict reading
of KRS 417.220(1)(a), we are not persuaded that this is an improper interlocutory
appeal.
On appellate review of an order denying a motion to stay litigation
pending arbitration, we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact, unless clearly
erroneous, and we review the court’s application of the law to the facts de novo.
Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 340 (Ky. App. 2001).
At the outset, we note that the FAA and the KUAA contain “nearly
identical” provisions relating to the validity of arbitration agreements. Louisville
Peterbilt, Inc. v. Cox, 132 S.W.3d 850, 853-54 (Ky. 2004). The FAA, however,
specifically addresses the enforceability of arbitration provisions contained in
2
In Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S.Ct. 1896, 1900, 173 L. Ed. 2d 832 (2009), the
United States Supreme Court noted that, where a movant requests a stay of litigation pursuant to
§ 3 of the FAA and the request is subsequently denied, § 16 plainly entitles the movant to seek
immediate appeal of that denial.
-3-
contracts “evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. In Fite &
Warmath Const. Co., Inc. v. MYS Corp., 559 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Ky. 1977), the
Kentucky Supreme Court found the FAA applicable “to actions brought in the
courts of this state where the purpose of the action is to enforce voluntary
arbitration agreements in contracts evidencing transactions in interstate
commerce.” Thereafter, in Kodak Min. Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp., 669 S.W.2d 917,
919 (Ky. 1984), the court determined that agreements governed by the FAA are
“specifically enforceable by stay of a judicial proceeding brought in Kentucky
where the proceeding involves issues referable to arbitration.”
Generally, once litigation commences, the burden is on the party
seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement to present prima facie evidence that an
arbitration agreement exists between the parties. Valley Const. Co., Inc. v. Perry
Host Management Co., Inc., 796 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Ky. App. 1990). Once the
existence of an arbitration agreement is established, the burden shifts to the party
seeking to avoid arbitration to present evidence the agreement is unenforceable.
Id.; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2, KRS 417.050.
In its minimal findings of fact, the trial court found that the parties
entered into a contract in which Folk “agreed to open joint brokerage accounts with
his then wife and be subject to arbitration.” The court acknowledged that Fidelity
sought enforcement of the arbitration provision pursuant to both the FAA and the
KUAA. The court also noted that the brokerage contract contained a
Massachusetts choice-of-law provision and that the contract failed to designate
-4-
Kentucky as the site for arbitration. As a result, the court found that it had “no
subject matter jurisdiction to compel the parties to arbitration,” and denied
Fidelity’s motion. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied solely on Ally Cat,
LLC v. Chauvin, 274 S.W.3d 451, 455-56 (Ky. 2009), wherein the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that courts of this Commonwealth do not have jurisdiction to
enforce arbitration agreements that fail to designate Kentucky as the site for
arbitration. Recently, however, in Ernst & Young, LLP v. Clark, --- S.W.3d ----,
2010 WL 3374414 (Ky. 2010), the Kentucky Supreme Court clarified the holding
of Ally Cat, stating, “Ally Cat has no applicability to an arbitration agreement
governed exclusively by the Federal Arbitration Act.” Id. at 11, fn. 8.
Here, the court did not consider the applicability of the FAA, i.e.
whether the brokerage agreement was “a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce,” and instead disposed of the motion on jurisdictional
grounds. 9 U.S.C. § 2; see also Fite, 559 S.W.2d at 734. Although the agreement
failed the jurisdictional analysis of the KUAA, we believe the court erred as a
matter of law by denying the motion to stay without considering the applicability
of the FAA to the brokerage agreement between Fidelity and Folk. It is undisputed
that Fidelity presented evidence establishing the existence of the brokerage
agreement and the arbitration provision contained therein; consequently, the
burden shifted to Folk to present evidence of unenforceability. Our review of the
record indicates that Folk did not refute Fidelity’s assertion that the FAA applied to
the parties’ agreement; rather, Folk asserted that the agreement was an
-5-
unenforceable contract of adhesion. As the trial court failed to address the
applicability of the FAA to Fidelity’s motion and Folk’s opposition thereto, we
believe remand is appropriate.3 For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the order
of the Kenton Circuit Court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
ISAAC, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent.
As argued by Folk, I believe the order entered by the Kenton Circuit Court now on
appeal is interlocutory and otherwise not properly appealable at this time.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 54.01.
Appellate review of an otherwise nonappealable interlocutory order is
permissible pursuant to KRS 417.220(1)(a). Under KRS 417.220, an appeal may
be taken from an order denying an application to compel arbitration under KRS
417.060 or an order granting an application to stay arbitration made under KRS
417.060(2). The latter requirement is clearly not triggered in this appeal since no
application to stay an arbitration proceeding was made in this case. The majority
thus assumes that the motion filed by Fidelity in the Kenton Circuit Court is an
application to compel arbitration under KRS 417.060(3) or is otherwise controlled
3
We do not address the validity of the arbitration provision or Folk’s defenses to enforcement of
the brokerage agreement, as these issues are for the trial court to consider on the merits.
-6-
by Section 16 of the FAA regarding a stay of legal proceedings. However, upon
close review of the motion, no such request to compel arbitration was made by
Fidelity to the circuit court. The motion itself is characterized as a motion to
dismiss the Kenton Circuit Court proceeding or, in the alternative, a motion to stay
that legal proceeding. There is no language in the motion that seeks to compel
arbitration as provided for in KRS 417.060(1).4 The failure to pursue arbitration by
Fidelity is further amplified by the request for relief in Fidelity’s motion under the
caption of “Conclusion.” In that conclusion, Fidelity requests the following relief:
Based on the foregoing, Fidelity respectfully
requests that the Court stay or dismiss the Complaint
pending arbitration.
Clearly, Fidelity has made no request to the circuit court to compel
arbitration. Obviously, Folk does not believe the arbitration provision is applicable
to his claim. If Fidelity’s motion is granted, Folk’s claim would effectively be
abated, which is not provided for in KRS 417.060, since arbitration was not
requested or ordered.
Arbitration agreements and any rights arising therefrom are
contractual in nature. Valley Constr. Co. v. Perry Host Mgmt., 796 S.W.2d 365
(Ky. App. 1990). Accordingly, arbitration rights can be waived. Id. The
arbitration provision set forth in the Customer Agreement is not one sided as
inferred by Fidelity. In other words, the arbitration clause does not apply only to
4
KRS 417.060(4) permits a stay of the litigation if an application is made to compel arbitration
as provided for in subsection (1). There being no application to compel in this case, a say is not
permissible under Kentucky law.
-7-
Folk in the event a dispute arises between the parties, assuming that the arbitration
agreement is valid and applicable to this action. If the arbitration agreement is
applicable to this action, upon filing the complaint, Folk arguably waived his right
to compel arbitration. I believe the burden was then upon Fidelity to enforce the
terms of the contract by seeking to compel arbitration under KRS 417.060. The
complaint in this action was initiated in February 2009. I find nothing in the
record that reflects a written demand by Fidelity for arbitration. Again, assuming
the arbitration provisions (Paragraph 18) of the Customer Agreement are
applicable, they specifically require that a written demand for arbitration be made.
More than eighteen months have now passed since litigation was commenced and
Fidelity has still not made a written application or otherwise filed a motion in this
action to compel arbitration. I have seen no evidence in the record on appeal that
Fidelity has complied with the Customer Agreement. Thus, even if the order on
appeal was appealable, there would be a substantial issue to be resolved below as
to whether Fidelity waived its right to pursue arbitration in any dispute between
Folk and Fidelity arising from the Customer Agreement. See Jackson v. Mackin,
277 S.W.3d 626 (Ky. App. 2009).
Finally, since the order on appeal is interlocutory and not properly
appealable under KRS 417.220(1)(a), I do not believe we reach the jurisdictional
issues regarding the application of Ally Cat, LLC v. Chauvin, 274 S.W.3d 451 (Ky.
2009). The majority relies on the recent case of Ernest & Young, LLP v. Clark,
____ S.W.3d ___, 2010 WL 3374414 (Ky. 2010), to support remanding this case
-8-
for consideration of the FAA’s effect, if any, upon these proceedings. In Ernest &
Young, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that “Ally Cat has no application to an
arbitration agreement governed exclusively by the Federal Arbitration Act.” Id. at
FN. 8. There is nothing in paragraph 18 of the Customer Agreement that
references the FAA. Fidelity also admits in its brief that both the FAA and the
KUAA (KRS Chapter 417) are applicable to the arbitration issues raised in this
case. See p. 4 and appendix 2. By Fidelity’s own admission, the agreement is not
governed “exclusively” by the FAA. Given that the claims set forth in the
complaint, as amended, allege tortious conduct and do not look to transactions
involving interstate commerce, I have serious doubt as to the applicability of the
FAA to this litigation. Thus, since the majority is remanding this case, these are
issues that must be addressed, in my opinion.
Finally, I do not believe federal statutes can be used to create
appellate jurisdiction for the Kentucky Court of Appeals where it otherwise does
not exist. I can find no precedent to support this proposition. The majority relies
on Section 16 of the FAA to warrant hearing this appeal, which is simply not
applicable as I have previously stated. Our Court follows applicable Kentucky law
and rules regarding review of interlocutory judgments below to trigger appellate
jurisdiction. See Watson v. Best Financial Services, Inc., 245 S.W.3d 722 (Ky.
2008). In this case, the judgment on appeal is interlocutory and not appealable
under applicable Kentucky law, in my opinion.
-9-
While I do agree with the majority that the circuit court failed to
address the applicability of the FAA to this proceeding, I do not believe the circuit
court had to address that issue since there had not been a request by Fidelity to
compel arbitration in this proceeding. For the foregoing reasons, I would dismiss
this appeal.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Russell S. Sayre
Catherine E. Howard
Covington, Kentucky
Michael Folk, Pro Se
Villa Hills, Kentucky
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.