WIMBERLY (MICHAEL LYNN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 3, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001715-MR
MICHAEL LYNN WIMBERLY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00196
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS AND DIXON, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: Appellant, Michael Lynn Wimberly, appeals pro se from an
order of the Daviess Circuit Court denying his motion for post-conviction relief
pursuant to RCr 11.42. Finding no error, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge Sheila Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant
to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS 21.580.
On April 4, 2005, a Daviess County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on two
charges of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine), subsequent
offense, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and operating a
vehicle on a suspended driver’s license. The trafficking charges stemmed from
two controlled undercover drug buys conducted on December 4, 2004, and
February 14, 2005. Appellant was subsequently indicted in January 2006 for being
a first-degree persistent felony offender. Following a trial, Appellant was
convicted of all charges and was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. The
convictions and sentence were affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court on direct
appeal. Wimberly v. Commonwealth, 2006-SC-000406 (September 20, 2007).
On April 28, 2009, Appellant filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion raising several
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant also moved for the
appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. By order entered August 10,
2009, the trial court denied all motions. This appeal ensued.
In an RCr 11.42 proceeding, the movant has the burden to establish
convincingly that he was deprived of some substantial right that would justify the
extraordinary relief afforded by the post-conviction proceeding. Dorton v.
Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1968). An evidentiary hearing is
warranted only “if there is an issue of fact which cannot be determined on the face
of the record.” Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049 (1994); RCr 11.42(5). See also Fraser v.
Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 981
2
S.W.2d 545, 549 (Ky. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1026 (1999). “Conclusionary
allegations which are not supported by specific facts do not justify an evidentiary
hearing because RCr 11.42 does not require a hearing to serve the function of a
discovery deposition.” Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Ky.
2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 838 (2003), overruled on other grounds in Leonard
v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009). However, when the trial court
conducts an evidentiary hearing, the reviewing court must defer to the
determinations of fact and witness credibility made by the trial judge. McQueen v.
Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1986); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934
S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1996); McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302 (6th Cir. 1996).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984), sets forth the standards which measure ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. In order to be ineffective, performance of counsel must fall below
the objective standard of reasonableness and be so prejudicial as to deprive a
defendant of a fair trial and a reasonable result. Id. “Counsel is constitutionally
ineffective only if performance below professional standards caused the defendant
to lose what he otherwise would probably have won.” United States v. Morrow,
977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 975 (1993). Thus, the
critical issue is not whether counsel made errors, but whether counsel was so
“manifestly ineffective that defeat was snatched from the hands of probable
victory.” Id.
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In considering ineffective assistance, the reviewing court must focus on the
totality of evidence before the trial court or jury and assess the overall performance
of counsel throughout the case in order to determine whether the alleged acts or
omissions overcome the presumption that counsel rendered reasonable professional
assistance. Strickland; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct.
2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 302 (1986). A defendant is not guaranteed errorless counsel, or
counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel likely to render reasonably
effective assistance. McQueen v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1997), cert.
denied, 521 U.S. 1130 (1997). The Supreme Court in Strickland noted that a court
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct.
at 2065.
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in not finding that his counsel
was per se ineffective because he was suspended from the practice of law during
the pendency of the case. Essentially, Appellant believes that he was prejudiced by
counsel’s failure to disclose his criminal activities, his lack of moral character, and
the conflict between his interests and those of Appellant. We find these claims to
be without merit.
Attorney Stephen Robey was retained in February 2005 to represent
Appellant on the instant charges. Robey actively litigated the case including filing
a motion to dismiss, a motion to suppress and several discovery motions. In fact,
on July 25, 2005, the trial court conducted a lengthy evidentiary hearing during
4
which Robey appeared and participated. However, at a September 30, 2005, status
conference, the trial court was informed that Robey had been temporarily
suspended from the practice of law. Inquiry Com’n v. Robey, 172 S.W.3d 404
(Ky. 2005).2 Although the trial court initially appointed a public defender,
Appellant retained private counsel who entered an appearance on December 19,
2005, and represented Appellant throughout the remainder of the proceedings.
In rejecting Appellant’s claim of per se ineffective assistance of counsel, the
trial court noted,
In this case, it cannot be said that Mr. Robey’s performance fell
below the standard articulated in Strickland and Foley. The Court is
mindful that Mr. Robey was suspended from the practice of law in
Kentucky on September 22, 2005, but there is no indication that his
addiction to intoxicants, at that time, had any adverse effect on his
representation of Mr. Wimberly between the time of Wimberly’s
arrest in February of 2005 and the appointment of Wimberly’s new
attorney, Hon. Joseph Bennett, in November 2005. Indeed, Mr.
Robey filed several motions with the Court on behalf of his client, Mr.
Wimberly, before his suspension. It was not until late September
2005, four months before trial, did the Court become aware of
Robey’s suspension and order that the Department of Public
Advocacy represent Mr. Wimberly.
We are also of the opinion that counsel is not per se ineffective simply because he
was disbarred on unrelated matters. See Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d
380 (Ky. 2002), overruled on other grounds in Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279
S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009).
Nor do we find any merit in Appellant’s claim that counsel was ineffective
for failing to have the evidence against him suppressed. As previously noted,
2
Robey later resigned from the practice of law under terms of permanent disbarment. Robey v.
Kentucky Bar Association, 266 S.W.3d 234 (Ky. 2008).
5
Robey appeared and litigated the suppression motion during the evidentiary
hearing. At the conclusion, the trial court ruled that the search of the automobile
was proper. However, the trial court noted that the search of the house was more
problematic because of the conflict in testimony regarding the home owner’s
consent to the search. As such, the trial court granted both sides additional time to
brief the issue. Neither the Commonwealth nor Robey filed any additional
information. The trial court subsequently denied the motion to suppress.
We find no support for Appellant’s contention that the suppression motion
was denied simply because Robey failed to further brief the issue. Rather, it is
clear from the trial court’s order that its decision regarding the search of the house
hinged on the credibility of the witnesses:
Ms. Kelly Board testified that Officer Powell began
searching the apartment before anyone ever asked her for
consent. She denied ever giving consent to search.
However, the weight of the evidence is that Ms. Board
did, in fact, consent to the search of her apartment and
the Court so finds.
Appellant has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient in
this respect or that he was prejudiced by such. Strickland.
For the reasons set forth herein, the order of the Daviess Circuit Court
denying Appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42 is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael Lynn Wimberly, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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