STROUP (RANDY DEAN) VS. STROUP (CATHY DAWN)
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 1, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001515-MR
RANDY DEAN STROUP
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HANCOCK CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MIKE L. MCKOWN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00085
CATHY DAWN STROUP
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING, VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, LAMBERT, AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: Randy Dean Stroup appeals from the order and judgment
of the Hancock Circuit Court wherein the court awarded forty-five percent of the
parties’ stock in their trucking business, First Class Services (“FCS”), to Cathy
Dawn Stroup and awarded Cathy maintenance in the amount of $3,800.00 per
month for life or until she remarries or cohabitates. We agree with Randy that the
court erred in failing to find a value of the trucking company, FCS, prior to
determining Cathy’s award of maintenance, that an award of maintenance without
valuing all the assets exceeded the trial court’s discretion, and that the trial court
erred in placing restrictions on the management of the corporation. Accordingly,
we reverse, vacate and remand for further consideration by the trial court.
The facts that are relevant to this case may be briefly summarized.
The parties were married for over twenty years when Cathy filed for dissolution of
the marriage in August of 2007. During the early years of the parties’ marriage,
both spouses drove tractor-trailers. In the late 1980s, Randy and his brother,
Willie, formed and operated FCS.1 The closely-held corporation was very
successful in the 1990s and the parties lived exceptionally well. In the late 1990s,
Randy and Willie began another joint venture, a river terminal, with the assets of
FCS as collateral. Beginning in 2001, Randy and Willie began having conflicts.
The tension culminated when Randy discovered that Willie had been mismanaging
FCS. In March 2004, Randy sued Willie seeking, among other things, the
appointment of a receiver.
Thereafter, Jim King, CPA, was appointed as receiver for FCS. In
order to satisfy the creditors, Randy sold the river terminal, purchased the stock of
FCS owned by Willie,2 sold some assets of FCS, and borrowed the remaining
funds from King Southern Bank. Thus, in 2005, Randy became the sole owner of
1
Cathy has not worked meaningfully outside the home after the birth of the parties’ children
nineteen years ago.
2
Willie had filed for bankruptcy.
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FCS, which was heavily debt-laden, but still generating sufficient cash flow to pay
its creditors on a current basis.
Throughout the next few years, FCS recovered. Then in 2008, the
overall economic downturn of the economy and the loss of a large account caused
FCS to lay off nineteen employees in 2008, all resulting in economic loss to FCS.3
At the hearing concerning the parties’ marital estate, the court was
presented four different expert valuations for FCS by King, David York, Terry
Walker, and Dr. Shannon Pratt. Based on these facts and the evidence presented,
the court found in its order and judgment of March 23, 2009, substantial problems
with each expert’s valuation. The court found that the probable value of FCS was
somewhere between York’s value of $2,720,000 and Walker’s value of $1,256,000
and noted that when capital gains tax and the amount of the Shareholder’s
Accounts Receivable was factored in, FCS had minimal value. Thus, it concluded
that the only method to ensure that both Randy and Cathy shared in the risk and
potential profitability of FCS required the court to award Cathy a percentage of the
FCS stock. The court noted that to order Randy to pay Cathy for the stock, given
his and FCS’s current financial difficulties, would push either FCS or Randy into
insolvency. As such, the court declined to find a value on FCS.4
The court then proceeded to find that FCS was a marital asset and
divided it in just proportions, with Randy awarded 55% and Cathy 45% of the FCS
3
In 2007 there were approximately 145 employees.
Randy made a motion for more definite findings concerning the value of the corporation, the
court again declined to find the value of FCS.
4
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stock. The court placed certain restrictions on Randy and FCS to protect Cathy.
These restrictions required FCS to be audited by a CPA each year and for the
report to be furnished to Cathy; that any dividends FCS paid be proportionately
divided between the shareholders; that Randy cannot borrow money from FCS
without loaning a proportionate amount to Cathy or obtaining her consent; that
Randy’s salary remain at its current rate unless Cathy approves an increase in
writing; that the employee benefits Randy receives from FCS cannot exceed their
current amount; and in the event that FCS has taxable income that flows to the
shareholders, FCS will in some manner provide income to the parties with which
to pay the income taxes on such income. After setting the restrictions, the court
then turned to the issue of maintenance.
The court assessed Cathy’s property as insufficient to support her
needs, and found it uncertain whether the FCS stock will provide her with future
income. The court determined that maintenance for life5 was appropriate in the
amount of $3,800, as the marriage was a long-term one and that Cathy had not
worked beyond minimum wage in years. It is from this order and judgment that
Randy now appeals.
5
Unless Cathy remarries or cohabitates with another adult not related to her by blood.
-4-
On appeal Randy makes numerous arguments6 which we believe to be
more concisely presented as: 1) the trial court erred by not placing a value on the
FCS stock and denying the motion for more definite findings concerning said
value; 2) without a value placed on the FCS stock the trial court erred in its award
of maintenance as it did not fully undertake the necessary assessment of the
parties’ respective assets; 3) the court erred by dividing the FCS stock without
permitting Randy to pay Cathy for her share of the stock.
At the outset we note that a family court’s findings of fact will not be
set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. See Hunter v. Hunter, 127 S.W.3d 656,
659 (Ky.App. 2003). A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is supported by
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence, when taken alone or in
light of all the evidence, which has sufficient probative value to induce conviction
in the mind of a reasonable person. Id. (Internal citations omitted). Questions of
law are reviewed de novo. See Western Ky. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Revenue
Cabinet, 80 S.W.3d 787, 790 (Ky.App. 2001).
6
Randy specifically argues: 1) the family court erred by failing to find the value of FCS; 2) the
family court should be instructed to consider the valuation testimony of King; 3) the failure of
the family court to permit Randy to purchase 45% of FCS was an abuse of discretion; 4) this
Court should remand this case to the family court for a determination of the expenses of the
parties upon which the award of maintenance was based; 5) this Court should reverse the amount
and duration of maintenance. Cathy counter-argues: 1) that the family court correctly awarded
FCS to the parties by dividing the stock, the marital asset, in just proportions; 2) the court
correctly rejected use of King’s valuation; 3) the court properly placed restrictions on Randy’s
majority interest to protect Cathy’s minority interest; and 4) the award of maintenance to Cathy
is appropriate in terms of amount and duration. As we find dispositive the issue concerning the
valuation of the FCS stock and the corresponding award of maintenance and are remanding this
matter to the trial court for further proceedings, we decline to address Randy’s remaining issues.
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In addition, we note that in dividing marital property and debt
equitably, a trial court has wide latitude, and absent an abuse of discretion we shall
not disturb the trial court's ruling. See Smith v. Smith, 235 S.W.3d 1 (Ky.App.
2006), and Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513 (Ky. 2001). Similarly, in
maintenance awards, the trial court is afforded a wide range of discretion, which is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Platt v. Platt, 728 S.W.2d 542,
543 (Ky.App. 1987). Abuse of discretion implies arbitrary or capricious action or
at least an unreasonable and unfair decision. See Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d
777, 783 (Ky.App. 2002). With these standards in mind, we turn to the parties’
arguments.
Randy first argues that the trial court erred by not placing a value on
the FCS stock and denying the motion for more definite findings concerning said
value. As the trial court repeatedly declined to assign a value to the FCS stock, the
question before this Court is whether such an “omitted finding involves a matter
which was essential to the trial court's judgment. As this involves a question of
law, we need not defer to the trial court's conclusion that its findings were
sufficient.” McKinney v. McKinney, 257 S.W.3d 130, 134 (Ky.App. 2008) citing
Jarrett v. Jarrett, 2006-CA-001557-MR, 2007 WL 2460730 (August 31, 2007).
With this in mind we look to our jurisprudence.
KRS 403.190 requires the trial court to value the property of spouses
in determining the disposition of property. Specifically, KRS 403.190 states:
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(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage or for
legal separation, or in a proceeding for disposition of
property following dissolution of the marriage by a court
which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse
or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court
shall assign each spouse's property to him. It also shall
divide the marital property without regard to marital
misconduct in just proportions considering all relevant
factors including:
(a) Contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the
marital property, including contribution of a spouse as
homemaker;
(b) Value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(c) Duration of the marriage; and
(d) Economic circumstances of each spouse when the
division of property is to become effective, including the
desirability of awarding the family home or the right to
live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having
custody of any children.
Id. (emphasis added).
Moreover, in Gaskill v. Robbins, 282 S.W.3d 306 (Ky. 2009), our
Supreme Court was presented the issue of valuation of a business; specifically,
how to value goodwill of the business. In remanding the case back to the trial
court to determine the value of Gaskill’s business in light of its decision the Court
noted:
The valuation of a business is complicated, often
speculative or assumptive, and at best subjective....
Nonetheless, when a business is established during a
marriage and is thus marital property, the trial court is
required to fix a value and divide it between the spouses.
To do this, a trial court must hear factual evidence, which
generally will include expert testimony. If a court is to
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arrive at a fair market value of a business, often stated as
what a willing buyer will pay a willing seller, the court
must have the means to answer at least the following
questions a willing buyer would ask:
1. What can be earned from the business over a
reasonable period of time? This value must then be
reduced to present value, and includes the concept of
transferable goodwill.
2. What is the value of the hard assets? This
includes real estate, equipment, client lists, cash accounts
or anything else the business may own or control.
3. What is the value of the accounts receivable?
This has a potential discount because all the accounts
may not be collectible.
4. What is the value of the training of the
personnel who will remain with the practice, or what is
the cost to train new personnel?
5. What are the liabilities that will remain after the
purchase? This includes personnel salaries, taxes, debt
service, and other costs of doing business.
While some of these questions are comparatively
easy to answer, some of them are complex and require
application of accounting and business valuation
methods.
Gaskill at 311-312.7
7
Gaskill requires that a trial court arrive at a value based on the evidence presented:
Using an average to obtain a value, without some basis other than
an inability to choose between conflicting and competing valuation
methods, is nothing more than making up a number, for there is no
evidentiary basis to support that specific number. Employing all
four methods, then averaging them, is tantamount to no method at
all. If an expert believes four methods are valid, yet each produces
a different number, this provides little or no help to the trial court.
The trial court must fix a value, and there should be an evidencebased articulation for why that is the value used.
Gaskill at 315.
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Given Gaskill and KRS 403.190, the trial court was required to
undertake an assessment of the value of the property in the marital estate, which
included the FCS stock. This omitted finding was a matter essential to the
judgment. Therefore we vacate the award of maintenance and remand to the trial
court to make a determination of the value of FCS.
On remand, if the trial court is dissatisfied again with the expert
opinions proffered by the parties concerning the valuation of the FCS stock,8 the
court has discretion to order additional experts. See Robinson v. Robinson, 569
S.W.2d 178, 180 (Ky.App. 1978) overruled on other grounds by Brandenburg v.
Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky.App. 1981)(“If the parties come to the end of
their proof with grossly insufficient evidence on the value of the [real] property
involved, the trial court should either order this proof to be obtained, appoint his
own experts to furnish this value, at the cost of the parties, or direct that the
property be sold.).
As to Randy’s second argument that without a value placed on the
FCS stock the trial court erred in its award of maintenance as it did not fully
undertake the necessary assessment of the parties’ respective assets, we agree.
KRS 403.200 requires the court to assess the parties’ assets prior to an
award of maintenance:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal
separation, or a proceeding for maintenance following
8
We note that “A family court operating as finder of fact has extremely broad discretion with
respect to testimony presented, and may choose to believe or disbelieve any part of it.” Bailey v.
Bailey, 231 S.W.3d 793, 796 (Ky.App. 2007)
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dissolution of a marriage by a court which lacked
personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the court
may grant a maintenance order for either spouse only if it
finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:
(a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property
apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs;
and
(b) Is unable to support himself through appropriate
employment or is the custodian of a child whose
condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the
custodian not be required to seek employment outside the
home.
(2) The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and
for such periods of time as the court deems just, and after
considering all relevant factors including:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance, including marital property apportioned to
him, and his ability to meet his needs independently,
including the extent to which a provision for support of a
child living with the party includes a sum for that party as
custodian;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or
training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find
appropriate employment;
(c) The standard of living established during the
marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of
the spouse seeking maintenance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is
sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the
spouse seeking maintenance.
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Without a proper valuation of the parties’ assets, the court is unable to
undertake the statutory considerations prior to awarding maintenance. In the case
sub judice the court exceeded its discretion by awarding permanent maintenance
without assigning a value to the FCS stock. Thus, we remand for reconsideration
of the award and amount of maintenance after a value has been assigned to the
FCS stock.
Last, we address Randy’s arguments that the court erred by dividing
the FCS stock without permitting Randy to pay Cathy for her share of the stock
and, alternatively, that if the trial court did not err in preventing Randy from
purchasing Cathy’s stock, then it erred by placing a cap on Randy’s salary. We
note that our jurisprudence favors protection of the spouse with the minority
interest in the business which often requires the purchase of that minority stock by
the other spouse. In Goldstein v. Goldstein, 377 S.W.2d 52 (Ky. 1964), the
Supreme Court of Kentucky held:
Accepting the valuation of the drug store as a going
business at $45,000, it is quite a different thing to say that
a minority share of its capital stock has a proportionate
value. A small business being very much like a cow, not
divisible in kind, it was necessary to give control of the
store to one or the other of the parties. The chancellor
gave it to J. I., and in that we concur. But 15% of the
stock in a business run by someone with whom the
minority shareholder is incompatible and at odds is a
thing of dubious value if indeed it has any value at all. It
cannot be eaten and ordinarily it cannot be sold. Whether
it bears dividends is largely subject to the will of the
controlling party. We feel therefore that instead of
leaving Beatrice an interest in the corporation the
judgment should have directed the payment of its
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equivalent in money, either in a lump sum or installments
secured by a pledge of J. I.'s stock.
Goldstein at 56.
In McGinnis v. McGinnis, 920 S.W.2d 68 (Ky.App. 1995), this Court
addressed a situation where the appellee was awarded one-half of all financial
benefit of appellant’s stock, which was required to be divided within seven years.
Therein, the court noted the essential differences between the situation presented
and that of Goldstein, supra:
[H]ere the parties are not majority shareholders in the
corporation and there is nothing to indicate that appellee
either was involved in, or could assert a right to
participate in any way in, the corporation's management
or functioning. See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, Ky., 487 S.W.2d
272 (1972); Goldstein v. Goldstein, Ky., 377 S.W.2d 52
(1964). Indeed, not only did the vested and nonvested
HRI stock together constitute less than nine percent of
the total stock issued and outstanding, but here the trial
court specifically directed that appellant would retain
“full control over the stock.” Hence, any potential right
of appellee to interfere in the corporation's affairs, or to
become embroiled in disputes with appellant concerning
the management of the corporation, were essentially
negated.
McGinnis, 920 S.W.2d at 72.
The facts of the case sub judice are more akin to Goldstein than to
McGinnis. With only two shareholders in FCS, Cathy is disadvantaged as a
minority shareholder. To award her a larger share, however, strengthens her
potential for creating issues with management of the company. Regardless, both
McGinnis and Goldstein make clear that joint control of a business between two
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such parties is not an acceptable resolution. The trial court sub judice was faced
with the unenviable position of making a decision that may bankrupt FCS or
Randy on one hand, or that would limit the control of FCS on the other hand.9
While the trial court’s decision may be difficult, a decision must be made
commensurate with the applicable law. We reverse the decision of the trial court
which allowed both parties control over the management of the corporation,
including the limiting of Randy’s salary, all of which interfered with the
management of the corporation. We remand for consideration of an appropriate
remedy for under McGinnis and Goldstein and any other applicable law.
In light of the aforementioned, we reverse, vacate and remand to the
trial court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Frank Stainback
Owensboro, Kentucky
Candy Yarbray Englebert
Owensboro, Kentucky
9
Given Goldstein, the trial court could have exercised its discretion and divided the stock and
then directed Randy to pay Cathy its equivalent in money, either in a lump sum or installments,
over a definite period of time, to avoid the issues of bankruptcy, management concerns, and
minority shareholder protection, which the trial court can address on remand.
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