RICE (KATHY) VS. GRIFFIN (JACKIE), ET AL.
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RENDERED: AUGUST 6, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001170-MR
KATHY RICE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00052
JACKIE GRIFFIN, individually
and as administratrix of the estate of
CURTIS W. RICE
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; MOORE AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: Kathy Rice appeals from two orders of the Harlan Circuit
Court, but her appeal primarily involves the interpretation and application of
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 392.090(2), the statute that bars an adulterous
spouse from receiving his or her dower or curtesy rights. In the first order at issue,
dated May 9, 2008, the circuit court denied Kathy summary judgment on the
question of whether KRS 392.090(2) barred her from receiving a dower interest
from the estate of her husband, Curtis Rice. In the second order, dated June 4,
2009, the circuit court declared that KRS 392.090(2) did indeed bar her from
receiving a dower interest from that estate. After a careful review of the record, we
find that Kathy was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law and
accordingly reverse.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This controversy arises from the tragic death of Curtis Rice, who died
intestate on September 12, 2004, after being struck by a piece of equipment in a
work-related accident. Curtis was married to Kathy Rice; however, Kathy began
living separately and apart from him on June 1, 2004. On August 25, 2004, Kathy
had also petitioned to dissolve their marriage, but her petition was still pending at
the time of Curtis’s death.
In Action No. 04-P-165, the Harlan District Court, Probate Division,
appointed Curtis’s mother, Jackie Griffin, as the administratrix of Curtis’s estate.
In this capacity and in her individual capacity, Griffin petitioned the Harlan Circuit
Court for a declaration of rights relating to Curtis’s estate on January 19, 2005.
Specifically, Griffin asked the circuit court to hold, as a matter of law, that Kathy
had forfeited any interest in Curtis’s estate pursuant to KRS 392.090(2).
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In her answer, Kathy denied that KRS 392.090(2) barred her from
receiving an interest in Curtis’s estate.1 Kathy also moved for summary judgment
regarding this issue on August 2, 2007, based upon Griffin’s failure to: 1)
specifically allege in the petition that Kathy was living in adultery; and 2) produce
any evidence in support of her petition for a period of over two years following the
filing of that petition.
On September 6, 2007, the circuit court held a hearing on her motion,
but it made no ruling upon it until May 9, 2008. On September 12, 2007, Griffin
filed a “supplemental response” to Kathy’s motion. In relevant part, Griffin’s
supplemental response alleged that Kathy began living with Billy Halcomb shortly
after Curtis’s death; it also included an affidavit from Billy Halcomb. In relevant
part, Halcomb’s affidavit states:
2. That prior to the death of Mr. Curtis Rice, the Affiant
had an adulterous relationship with the Defendant, Kathy
Rice;
3. That the Affiant went on a date with the Defendant on
the Friday prior to the death of Mr. Curtis Rice. The next
day, the Saturday prior to Mr. Rice’s death, the Affiant
and the Defendant again went out. The Affiant and the
Defendant went to a bar, became intoxicated, and the
Defendant went home with the Affiant where she spent
the night, and the two had sexual intercourse;
1
In her brief, Griffin alleges that Kathy’s motive for opposing her declaratory action revolves
around “a workers’ compensation settlement of nearly $60,000.00,” which the estate purportedly
received after Curtis Rice “was killed on the job.” The record and pleadings contain no
information about this settlement and this Court is unaware of whether this settlement, if it
exists, was ever made a part of Curtis Rice’s estate, properly or otherwise. Regardless, however,
the issue presented in this case is whether, by virtue of her marriage to Curtis Rice, Kathy is
entitled to any share of Curtis Rice’s estate; the issue is not what is contained in that estate.
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4. That the Defendant told the Affiant that she was in the
process of getting a divorce from Mr. Rice when they
began seeing each other;
5. That the Affiant and the Defendant continued to see
each other, and began living together[.]
In sum and to add clarity to this affidavit as supported by the record,
Halcomb alleged that he went on a date with Kathy on Friday, September 10,
2004--two days before Curtis died--and that he went on another date with Kathy
and had intercourse with her on Saturday, September 11, 2004--one day before
Curtis died. Kathy made no objection to the fact that Griffin had introduced this
affidavit into the record after the September 6, 2007 hearing date.2 Consequently,
when the circuit court entered its May 9, 2008 order relating to Kathy’s motion, it
considered Halcomb’s affidavit. Furthermore, the circuit court denied Kathy’s
motion on the basis of that affidavit, stating in its order: “[T]he court cannot find
that Kathy Rice did not live in adultery due to the affidavit of Billy R. Halcomb
who stated that he had sexual intercourse with Kathy Rice and that they began
living together.”
2
Rice also appears to argue that it was an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to grant Griffin
additional time to submit evidence, including Halcomb’s affidavit, following the summary
judgment hearing held on September 6, 2007. However, while the circuit court did make an oral
pronouncement during that hearing to the effect that Griffin would be allowed additional time to
submit further evidence, and while the record contains no indication that Rice objected to that
pronouncement, the circuit court never reduced that oral pronouncement to writing. Thus, it
never became an effective, let alone appealable, order. See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 869 S.W.2d
35 (Ky. 1994); see also Allen v. Walter, 534 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Ky. 1976) (“It is elementary that a
court of record speaks only through its records. An order is not an order until it is signed. Until
then the judge can change his mind and not enter it.”)
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The trial on this matter was held on May 15, 2009. There, Kathy
testified that she had never engaged in sexual intercourse with any man during her
separation from Curtis. Halcomb, however, testified consistently with his
affidavit. On June 9, 2009, the circuit court entered its order based upon those
proceedings. Finding Halcomb’s testimony persuasive, it held that KRS
392.090(2) barred Kathy from receiving any interest from Curtis’s estate. This
appeal followed.
As stated above, the subjects of this appeal are the circuit court’s May
9, 2008 order denying Kathy summary judgment, and its June 4, 2009 order
declaring that Kathy had forfeited her interest in Curtis’s estate. However, because
our conclusion regarding the trial court’s May 9, 2008 order is dispositive to this
matter, we address only that order in our analysis.3
II. ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kentucky
Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 56. “The record must be viewed in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts
are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.,
807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). Summary judgment is proper only where the
movant shows that the adverse party could not prevail under any circumstances.
Id. (citing Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985)). Thus,
3
We pause to note that even reviewing the order entered after the trial would not change the
outcome of this case as we decide that the circuit court misinterpreted KRS 392.090(2).
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Kentucky's stringent standard governing a court in reviewing the propriety of
summary judgment dictates that it may be granted only where it appears
impossible for the non-moving party to produce evidence at trial warranting
judgment in his favor. Id. at 482.
In the case at bar, however, Kathy appeals the trial court’s decision to
deny, rather than grant, summary judgment in her favor. In this circumstance,
[t]he general rule under CR 56.03 is that a denial of a
motion for summary judgment is, first, not appealable
because of its interlocutory nature and, second, is not
reviewable on appeal from a final judgment where the
question is whether there exists a genuine issue of
material fact. Bell v. Harmon, Ky., 284 S.W.2d 812
(1955).
However, there is an exception to the general rule
found in Gumm v. Combs, Ky., 302 S.W.2d 616 (1957),
and subsequently approved in Loy v. Whitney, Ky., 339
S.W.2d 164 (1960), and Beatty v. Root, Ky., 415 S.W.2d
384 (1967). The exception applies where: (1) the facts
are not in dispute, (2) the only basis of the ruling is a
matter of law, (3) there is a denial of the motion, and (4)
there is an entry of a final judgment with an appeal
therefrom. Then, and only then, is the motion for
summary judgment properly reviewable on appeal, under
Gumm.
Transportation Cabinet, Bureau of Highways, Com. of Ky. v. Leneave, 751 S.W.2d
36, 37 (Ky. App. 1988).
Here, the latter two elements of the exception allowing for review of a
denial of summary judgment, as stated in Leneave, are present. Furthermore, we
conclude that the two remaining elements of Leneave are present as well: the
relevant facts relating to this claim are not in dispute and the basis for the trial
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court’s ruling was a matter of law. The reasons that these remaining elements of
Leneave are also present warrant further explanation and regard KRS 392.090(2),
the circuit court’s holding, and the specifics of Kathy’s argument.
In total, KRS 392.090(2) provides that “[i]f either spouse voluntarily
leaves the other and lives in adultery, the offending party forfeits all right and
interest in and to the property and estate of the other, unless they afterward become
reconciled and live together as husband and wife.” Furthermore, there is no
dispute that at the time of the May 9, 2008 order, the only evidence of record
demonstrated that Kathy may have committed, at most, one act of adultery two
days prior to Curtis’s death. In light of the above, the obvious basis of the circuit
court’s decision to deny summary judgment in favor of Kathy was its holding as a
matter of law that the evidence presented in Halcomb’s affidavit of only one act of
adultery met the statutory criteria of KRS 392.090(2), i.e., that Kathy was living in
adultery.
Kathy contends the trial court erred in its application of KRS
392.090(2) because its denial of summary judgment as a matter of law was entirely
dependent upon an underlying misinterpretation of the law, i.e., the meaning of
“lives in adultery,” per KRS 392.090(2). She urges that the phrase “lives in
adultery,” for the purpose of that statute, means that more than one act of adultery
must take place; as such, she contends that it is irrelevant whether she engaged in
one act of adultery with Halcomb two days prior to Curtis’s death and that
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Griffin’s failure to adduce evidence of additional acts of adultery prior to Curtis’s
death entitled her to judgment as a matter of law.
In light of the above, we find that the remaining conditions set forth in
Leneave have been met and that we may properly review the denial of Kathy’s
summary judgment motion because: 1) defining the phrase “lives in adultery” is a
matter of statutory interpretation and a question of law that we review de novo; and
2) if KRS 392.090(2) does require more than one act of adultery in order to apply,
then the trial court’s May 9, 2008 order misapplied the law. That said, based on
the plain language given to the statute by the General Assembly, we are compelled
to agree with Kathy that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove that she
met the statutory definition of living in adultery at the time of Curtis’s death.
As we are reviewing statutory interpretation, we review this issue
under a de novo standard. Commonwealth v. Garnett, 8 S.W.3d 573, 575-76
(Ky.App.1999). Courts are bound by a number of statutory construction
principles. One of the most basic precepts is that we “may not interpret a statute at
variance with its stated language.” SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Revenue Cabinet,
40 S.W.3d 883, 885 (Ky.App. 2001). “[S]tatutes must be given a literal
interpretation unless they are ambiguous and if the words are not ambiguous, no
statutory construction is required.” Commonwealth v. Plowman, 86 S.W.3d 47, 49
(Ky. 2002). Further, and important to the present analysis, we cannot add or
subtract from the language used in a statute. Commonwealth v. Harrelson, 14
S.W.3d 541, 546 (Ky. 2000).
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Turning to how “living in adultery” has been interpreted in this
Commonwealth, we begin with Bond v. Bond’s Adm’r, et al., 150 Ky. 389, 150
S.W. 363, 364 (1912). There, the former Court of Appeals analyzed the identical
language of the predecessor statute of KRS 392.090, Kentucky Statute (Ky. St.) §
2133, and stated:
This statute does not mean that [the wife] shall constantly
live with one man in adultery during her abandonment of
the husband in order to forfeit her right of dower or
distributable share; but if she admits any man or men to
her periodically, or whenever it is convenient or
opportunity is afforded, during said abandonment, such
conduct constitutes a living in adultery within the
meaning of the statute.
While Bond provides some guidance, it does not speak to the issue of
whether the General Assembly intended one act of adultery to constitute living in
adultery for purposes of KRS 392.090(2). Nor, for that matter, does any other case
in Kentucky at present. See James R. Merritt, 2 Ky. Prac., Prob. Prac. & Proc §
210 (2d ed. 1984). Thus, for the purpose of resolving how the General Assembly
intended to define how a spouse may live in adultery, we turn to Ky. St. § 2117, a
statute that existed contemporaneously with Ky. St. § 2133 and Bond, which used
substantially the same language, i.e., the phrase “living in adultery.”
By way of its history, Ky. St. § 2117 was formerly Kentucky’s faultbased divorce statute, became KRS 403.020, and was subsequently repealed
altogether by 1972 Kentucky Acts, Chapter 182 § 29, when the Kentucky General
Assembly enacted KRS 403.110 et seq. following a national trend to permit no-9-
fault divorces. At the time of Bond, and in relevant part, it stated that a party not at
fault could obtain a divorce if the other was “living in adultery with another man or
woman.”
The value of Ky. St. § 2117, for the purpose of our analysis, is that it
demonstrates that the General Assembly illustrated its patent declaration of its
intent that there is a difference between “living in adultery” and a single act of
adultery. Indeed, the former Court of Appeals recognized the General Assembly’s
choice of words to show this intent in Baker v. Baker, 136 Ky. 617, 124 S.W. 866,
867 (1910):
While the statute (section 2117, Ky. St.) will allow the
husband a divorce upon proof by two witnesses, or one
and strong corroborating circumstances, of a single act of
adultery on the part of the wife, or such lewd, lascivious
behavior on her part as proves her to be unchaste, without
actual proof of adultery, to entitle the wife to a divorce
on the ground of the husband’s adulterous conduct it
must be proved by two witnesses, or one and strong
corroborating circumstances, that he is living in adultery
with another woman. Why this distinction is made, if,
indeed, any sound reason for it exists, we need not stop to
inquire, but in view of the statute it must be recognized;
hence, we can but admit that a single act of adultery on
appellee’s part would not entitle appellant to the divorce
asked. To authorize it there must be proof that he was
“living in adultery with another woman.” As previously
indicated, this was made apparent by the evidence
introduced in appellant’s behalf, which, as a whole, we
regard convincing. While to constitute a living together
in adultery there must be more than a single act, there
need not be a living together continuously, or for a given
time, nor is it necessary for the man to abide in the same
house with the woman; but if he at stated periods, or
frequently, spend the day or night, or any considerable
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part of his time with a woman, not his wife, at such times
having carnal knowledge of her at will, though at other
times he be domiciled with his wife, it constitutes the
offense against the wife’s marital rights which the statute
declares a ground for divorce.
(Emphasis added).
Under Baker and its interpretation of Ky. St. § 2117, women were not
treated the same as men regarding adultery; fortunately, that has since been
rectified. Nonetheless, the historical analysis of living in adultery as compared to
that of a single act of adultery as used by the General Assembly aids our analysis
herein. In sum, we glean three things regarding the General Assembly’s intent
over the years to use the phrase “lives in adultery” or “living in adultery” rather
that just using the term “adultery” from the combination of Baker, Bond, Ky. St.
2117, and Ky. St. 2133: first, that in Baker, the former Court of Appeals analyzed
“living in adultery,” per Ky. St. 2117, in exactly the same way as it later analyzed
“living in adultery” per Ky. St. 2133 in Bond; second, that the General Assembly
intended that a single act of adultery does not constitute an offense against a
spouse’s marital rights sufficient to constitute “living in adultery” (see Baker, 124
S.W. at 867); and third, the General Assembly made a deliberate choice to include
that same phrase in KRS 392.090(2), rather than a single act of adultery. “A
universally accepted rule of statutory construction is that the General Assembly is
presumed to know the status of the law and the constructions placed on it by the
courts.” Butler v. Groce, 880 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Ky. (1994), J. Lambert dissenting
(citing Baker v. White, 251 Ky. 691, 65 S.W.2d 1022 (1933); Commonwealth,
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Dept. of Banking & Secur. v. Brown, 605 S.W.2d 497 (Ky.1980)). Courts construe
statutes, not rewrite them. Thus, in light of the absence of any other authority
addressing the circumstance of only one act of adultery within the context of KRS
392.090(2), we are constrained by the patent language used by the General
Assembly to interpret “living in adultery” in exactly the same manner as in Baker.
Accordingly, we have no choice but to conclude that one act of adultery is not
“living in adultery” within the meaning of that statute. As a consequence, Griffin’s
action against Kathy, based upon that statute and supported only by evidence of
one act of adultery prior to Curtis’s death, should not have progressed beyond
summary judgment as a matter of law.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the decision of the Harlan Circuit Court to bar
Kathy from any interest in the estate of Curtis Rice, by virtue of KRS 392.090(2),
is REVERSED.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCURS in result only and files separate
opinion.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, concurring in result only: Respectfully, I
concur in result only. I believe this antiquated statute deserves constitutional
scrutiny or legislative revision. It is premised on archaic common law. The only
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legal guidance are decisions by our court which were rendered prior to the time
when women had the right to vote.
This is now the twenty-first century. Our courts have now abolished
the use of fault to deny property in a divorce proceeding because a party is
adulterous. If the legislature so desired, they could continue this statute by
adequately defining cohabitation with a sufficient period of time to strip someone
of their dower or curtesy rights.
However, the description of adultery within this statute is so broad
that it cannot be defined and should not be defined. The opinion by the majority
gives legitimacy to this statute which should be repealed or struck down on
constitutional grounds. I cannot agree with this obsolete statute.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Karen S. Davenport
Harlan, Kentucky
Otis Doan, Jr.
Harlan, Kentucky
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