SALLEE (JOEY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 13, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001136-MR
JOEY SALLEE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00657
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, LAMBERT, AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: Joey Sallee appeals from the order of the Kenton Circuit
Court denying his request to run his Kenton County sentence concurrently with his
sentence from Grant County. Sallee argues that he was not “awaiting trial” in
Kenton County and thus the trial court should have run his sentences concurrently,
to which the Commonwealth disagrees. After a thorough review of the parties’
arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the Kenton Circuit Court.
The facts that give rise to this appeal began on July 26, 1999, when
Sallee was arrested in Kenton County for trafficking in marijuana within 1000
yards of a school and for possession of drug paraphernalia. When a police officer
failed to appear for the third time, when the case was called in district court on
September 20, 1999, the charges were dismissed. Thereafter, on December 15,
2000, the Kenton County Grand Jury returned a true bill charging Sallee with
trafficking in marijuana in connection with his July 1999 arrest1, in Kenton Circuit
Court. On January 22, 2001, Sallee, without counsel, appeared for arraignment.
Because he lacked counsel, the trial court rescheduled arraignment for February 5,
2001. Sallee did not appear for the rescheduled arraignment and a warrant was
issued for his arrest.
Thereafter, on December 21, 2005, well after his indictment in
December, 2000 in Kenton County, Sallee appeared in Grant Circuit Court and
pled guilty to one count of theft of identity and one count of alcohol intoxication.
On January 25, 2006, Sallee was formally sentenced to 3.5 years and fined $1000
for identity theft and $25 for alcohol intoxication. The Grant Circuit Court
probated Sallee’s sentence for five years, with the condition that he serve 120 days
of his sentence.2
1
Case number 00-CR-657.
On November 14, 2007, Sallee’s probation in Grant County was revoked due to his failure to
comply with the probation conditions, namely, “absconding probation supervision, failure to
attend AA/NA meetings as directed, failure to pay court ordered monies, and failure to enroll in
2
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Sallee next appeared before the Kenton Circuit Court on February 27,
2006, more than five years later, and was arraigned on the trafficking charge,
pleading not guilty. Thereafter, Sallee changed his plea to guilty. In two
subsequent orders, the trial court scheduled Sallee’s sentencing for July 10, 2006,
and then on July 31, 2006. On September 12, 2006, an arrest warrant was issued
for Sallee and later served upon him on September 13, 2006. On November 5,
2007, Sallee was formally sentenced to serve two years in prison. In the
sentencing order the court did not specify whether Sallee’s sentence was to run
concurrently or consecutively to the Grant County sentence.
On April 27, 2009, Sallee, pro se, asked the Kenton Circuit Court to
“clarify” for the Department of Corrections that his Kenton County sentence was
to run concurrently with his Grant County sentence. According to Sallee, the
Department of Corrections determination that his sentence should run
consecutively was wrong and stemmed from its mistaken belief that the acts giving
rise to the Grant County charges occurred while he was “awaiting trial” in Kenton
County. Sallee argued that after his initial arrest and charge of trafficking in
Kenton County was dismissed, he was released from custody, his bail money was
returned, and when he was later indicted in Kenton County for trafficking he was
unaware of the indictment until the early part of 2006. Thus, Sallee argued that he
was not awaiting trial in Kenton County since he had never been served with an
arrest warrant or indictment from the Kenton County case. Sallee argued that he
GED classes.”
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was not awaiting trial in Kenton County until the execution of the indictment
and/or his formal arraignment of the charges.
The trial court denied Sallee’s request on June 3, 2009, and stated:
This matter is before the court on the defendant’s
motion for clarification which is really a motion to run
his sentences concurrently.
The defendant was arrested for “Trafficking in a
Controlled Substance within 1000 yards of a School”, the
charges in this case, on July 26, 1999. The Police Officer
failed to appear at the September 20, 2000 call of the
case and the charges were dismissed. The defendant was
indicted directly on these charges on December 15, 2000.
On January 22, 2001 the defendant was present but
without counsel for the first arraignment call. On that
date the court re-scheduled arraignment for February 5,
2001. The defendant did not answer the call and a
warrant was issued on the indictment on February 6,
2001 based on the defendant’s failure to appear. The
defendant’s next appeared in this court on February 27,
2006.
Based on these facts, the court concludes that the
defendant was notified and present before the court on
these charges prior to his indictment in Grant Circuit
Court 05-CR-122.
Therefore, pursuant to KRS 533.060(B)[sic] the
Defendant’s sentence must run consecutively.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
the Defendant’s Motion for Clarification is OVERRULED.
Kenton County Circuit Court’s Order of June 3, 2009.
It is from this order that Sallee now appeals.
On appeal Sallee argues3 that the trial court erred in applying KRS
533.060 instead of KRS 532.110 as he was unaware that he was awaiting trial in
Kenton County until after he had committed the crime, and been convicted and
3
Sallee also argues that the Commonwealth’s Appellee brief was untimely filed with this Court
and should be stricken. However, a review of the record reveals this argument is without merit.
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sentenced in Grant County. In support thereof, Sallee argues that he was not
awaiting trial per KRS 533.060 when he committed the offense in Grant County
since he was never arrested in connection with the Kenton County indictment, that
proper notification never issued with respect to the indictment, and that he did not
know he had been indicted.
Sallee claims to have appeared before the Kenton County Court in
January 2001 because he was told there was a “matter” in Kenton Circuit Court
and that court did not proceed because he did not have an attorney. Sallee further
asserts that he was never advised to appear at any subsequent hearing to answer to
a charged offense, nor was he remanded into custody. Moreover, Sallee argues
that there was no record notifying state authorities that he was to be arrested for
charges in Kenton County when he appeared before the Grant Circuit Court;
otherwise, he would not have been released on probation. Thus, Sallee claims that
because the Kenton County judgment of conviction did not specify whether his
two-year sentence would run concurrently with or consecutively to his sentence
from Grant County, KRS 533.060 is inapplicable and KRS 532.110(2) is
applicable.
The Commonwealth argues that Sallee’s argument that he was
unaware of his indictment must fail because it is illogical for Sallee to argue that he
appeared in court in January 2001 for a warrant without there being an underlying
charge. Moreover, the same trial court handled the case from indictment to
conclusion, so this Court should give deference to the trial court’s factual finding
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that Sallee was notified of the charges. Thus, the Commonwealth argues that
Sallee committed an offense in Grant County while “awaiting trial” in Kenton
County. Accordingly, the Commonwealth asserts that the trial court properly
denied Sallee’s motion to run his sentences concurrently.
At the crux of this appeal are two statutes, KRS 533.060 and KRS
532.110. Thus, we note that in reviewing the trial court's decision in the matter
sub judice, matters of statutory construction are subject to de novo review and the
Court of Appeals is not bound by the circuit court's interpretation. Halls Hardwood
Floor Co. v. Stapleton, 16 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Ky.App.2000).
KRS 533.060 states in relevant part:
(3) When a person commits an offense while awaiting
trial for another offense, and is subsequently convicted or
enters a plea of guilty to the offense committed while
awaiting trial, the sentence imposed for the offense
committed while awaiting trial shall not run concurrently
with confinement for the offense for which the person is
awaiting trial.
Whereas, KRS 532.110 states:
(2) If the court does not specify the manner in which a
sentence imposed by it is to run, the sentence shall run
concurrently with any other sentence which the defendant
must serve unless the sentence is required by subsection
(3) of this section or KRS 533.060 to run consecutively.
In Commonwealth v. Hunt, 619 S.W.2d 733 (Ky.App.1981) this Court
found KRS 532.110 and KRS 533.060 irreconcilable
determined,
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. However, this Court
Upon careful consideration, the Court determined that
KRS 533.060(2) controlled in situations where there is
conflict between the two statutes. Id. Soon thereafter, this
ruling was extended to hold that in cases where either
KRS 532.110(1)(a) or KRS 533.060(3) may apply to
direct sentencing, KRS 533.060(3) shall control. Handley
v. Commonwealth, 653 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Ky.App. 1983).
Brown v. Commonwealth, 295 S.W.3d 854 (Ky.App. 2009).
Thus, KRS 533.060(3) is to be applied to cases where conflict
between KRS 532.110 and KRS 533.060 exists. This is reflected in the legislative
change in 2002 to KRS 532.110, which by its own language now makes a silent
judgment on sentencing subject to KRS 533.060. Accordingly, the determinative
question is whether Sallee was “awaiting trial.”
As held in Moore v. Commonwealth, 990 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Ky.
1999):
The phrase “awaiting trial” is not limited to indictment.
An indictment is not all inclusive as to a definition of the
phrase “awaiting trial.” It can also include the period of
time following arrest. It is the intent of the legislature to
punish persons who were convicted of committing a
subsequent crime or crimes while awaiting trial more
severely by eliminating the possibility of concurrent
sentences. Such persons are considered to be awaiting
trial if they have sufficient knowledge of the first offense
by means of arrest for that crime or crimes and are
released on bond or are otherwise incarcerated for the
crimes charged. The phrase “awaiting trial” as used in
this statute is broad enough to include the period of time
immediately after arrest.
Moore at 621.
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We agree with the Commonwealth that it is illogical for Sallee to
argue that he appeared before the Kenton Circuit Court in January 2001 and was
unaware that a criminal proceeding had been initiated against him. As Moore
noted, “the contention that KRS 533.060(3) must be strictly or narrowly construed
is without merit, and the suggestion that there is a notice requirement cannot be
found in the language of the statute.” Id. at 620. Consequently, Sallee’s argument
that he was unaware that he was awaiting trial in Kenton County when he
committed the subsequent offenses in Grant County must fail. As such, the trial
court did not err in denying Sallee’s motion for clarification, i.e., his motion to run
his sentences concurrently.
Finding no error, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joey Sallee, Pro Se
Sandy Hook, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Jeffrey A. Cross
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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