BRINEGAR (GREG) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 27, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000914-MR
GREG BRINEGAR
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ESTILL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS P. JONES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00049
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE AND STUMBO, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant, Greg Brinegar, seeks reversal of the Estill Circuit
Court’s decision to admit evidence of Appellant’s prior bad acts under Kentucky
Rules of Evidence (KRE) 404(b). Brinegar was convicted of second-degree arson
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute
21.580.
by complicity and sentenced to ten years in prison. Brinegar contends that the
Circuit Court abused its discretion when it determined as admissible evidence of
Brinegar’s involvement in four similar fires, other than the one for which he was
indicted. KRE 404(b) allows introduction of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts if such evidence is offered for some other purpose than merely proving the
character of a person that tended to show action in conformity therewith. The
evidence of Brinegar’s involvement in the four uncharged fires showed a relevant
common scheme or plan associated with the arson for which he was convicted.
Therefore, we affirm.
On April 4, 2005, as a result of arson, a fire burned down the Little
Doe Creek Church of the Living God in Estill County. As part of the subsequent
investigation, Amie Wilson and Greg Brinegar each made formal statements
indicating the other’s involvement in a total of five fires. Both were charged with
arson related crimes for the church fire only. Originally a co-defendant, Wilson
agreed to a plea bargain that granted her probation in exchange for her testimony
against Brinegar. At trial, over Brinegar’s objection, Wilson testified that Brinegar
repeatedly manipulated her into starting a number of fires in Estill County,
including the fire that burned down the church. This court must determine if the
evidence was properly admitted.
The admissibility of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1999). The test for abuse of
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discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision regarding the evidence was
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Id. at
945.
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” KRE
404(b). However, prior bad acts may be admitted to show a defendant's “common
scheme or plan.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 943-44 (Ky. 1999).
Ultimately, this court must make three inquiries: probativeness, relevance, and
prejudice. Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 889 (Ky. 1994) (citing
Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, 3d ed., Sec. 2.25(II) (1993)).
Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if, (1) it is offered to prove a common
scheme or plan; (2) such evidence is relevant to serve a purpose other than proving
a defendant’s criminal disposition; and (3) the probative worth and need for the
evidence outweighs potential prejudice to the accused. O’Bryan v.
Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Ky. 1982) (citations omitted).
First, we consider whether there was a common scheme or plan. For
the “common scheme or plan” exception to apply, the charged offenses must be
“part and parcel of a greater endeavor” that included the prior bad acts. English,
993 S.W.2d at 945. If the method of the commission of the other uncharged
crimes is so similar as to indicate a reasonable probability that all of the crimes
were committed by the same person, evidence that the defendant committed the
other uncharged crimes is admissible to show a common scheme or plan. Billings
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v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Ky. 1992). “Common facts rather than
common criminality are the keystone of such an examination.” Lear v.
Commonwealth, 884 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Ky. 1994).
In Adcock v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. 1986), the
appellant was convicted of the murder, rape, and burglary of an 80-year-old
woman. The trial court allowed evidence that the appellant had previously broken
into the victim’s home and had robbed and beaten her. Id. at 442. On appeal, the
Court reasoned that such evidence was properly admitted because “the
circumstances were so similar and were near enough in time as to constitute a
signature of sorts of the appellant.” Id. at 443.
In this case, the evidence not only indicates that Brinegar committed
similar crimes within the previous three weeks, but that he committed them in the
same geographic vicinity, that in each case he directed a fire to be started in a
particular way, sometimes reporting the fire himself, and was on site to put out
each fire in question. The circumstances were very similar and near enough in
time to constitute a “signature of sorts” under Adcock. The evidence reveals a
common scheme or plan whereby this volunteer firefighter on inactive status
intentionally started fires near his home so that he could put them out.
Next, we consider relevance. Evidence is relevant if it has any
tendency to increase the likelihood of the fact for which it was offered. KRE 401
(emphasis added). Estill County Fire Chief Derek Muncie testified about four
other fires being in the vicinity of and close in time to the church fire and that
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Brinegar, a volunteer firefighter on inactive status with the department, was present
at each of the fires, even calling in to report some of them. Wilson testified that
she and Brinegar worked together in starting these fires. This evidence helped
clarify the circumstances surrounding Brinegar’s course of conduct over the three
weeks leading up to the indicted offense, subsequently increasing the likelihood of
a common scheme or plan to start fires. Evidence that each of the four other fires
were started by lighting a rag soaked in paint thinner share common facts with the
church fire for which Brinegar was indicted. This evidence demonstrates facts
common to all of the conduct and is relevant to the specific crime for which
Brinegar was charged. Consistent with Lear, supra, the evidence does not merely
support a propensity for common criminality.
“A ruling based on a proper balancing of prejudice against probative
value will not be disturbed unless it is determined that a trial court has abused its
discretion.” Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 890 (citing Rake v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d
527, 528 (Ky. App. 1970)). Here, the uncharged conduct was strikingly similar to
the charged crime, establishing a relevant pattern of conduct. There was a proper
purpose for this evidence and its potential for prejudice did not outweigh its
probative value. The trial judge, acting within his discretion, properly admitted the
evidence.
The Estill Circuit Court’s Judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Samuel N. Potter
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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