UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, ET AL. VS. FURTULA (VERA)
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 8, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000811-MR
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY AND
UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-04556
VERA FURTULA
APPELLEE
AND
NO. 2009-CA-000852-MR
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY AND
UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-02145
ANTHONY MILLER AND
NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION,
D/B/A NATIONAL CITY BANK
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND NICKELL, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE: The University of Kentucky and the University
Board of Trustees (collectively, the “University”) appeal from the Fayette Circuit
Court’s order denying the University’s motion for summary judgment in a suit
filed against it by Vera Furtula. The University also appeals the Franklin Circuit
Court’s partial denial of the University’s motion to dismiss in a suit filed against it
by Anthony Miller.2 For the reasons stated herein, we reverse and remand as to
both appeals.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS IN
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
Appeal No. 2009-CA-000811-MR and Appeal No. 2009-CA-000852-MR have been
consolidated pursuant to an order of this Court entered February 3, 2010. Therefore, we will
dispose of them in one opinion.
VERA FURTULA CASE
Vera Furtula was employed at the University of Kentucky as a
housekeeper. Furtula filed an application for long-term disability (“LTD”) benefits
pursuant to a plan offered by the University to its full-time employees.
The LTD program is structured to provide each eligible “totally
disabled” employee a sum potentially worth as much as but not more than the
salary the employee made when actively employed. This amount is reached by
offsetting payable LTD benefits by amounts that program participants receive from
other sources such as workers’ compensation and social security benefits.
The program is provided at no cost to employees. Rather, the plan is
funded either by an LTD Trust or by the University’s current funds. Moreover, the
program is not subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”). The conditions of eligibility for the LTD program benefits are made
known to University employees through the University’s human resources policy
and procedure manual and the University’s staff handbook. The program is also
described in a plan document and a trust agreement between the University and the
trustee.
Furtula’s initial application for LTD benefits was ultimately denied
because her application failed to demonstrate that she was totally and permanently
disabled. Thereafter, Furtula filed an appeal with the University’s Office of
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Institutional Equity and Equal Opportunity, which was also denied because the
record did not establish that her condition met the definition of “total disability”
under the plan.
Furtula subsequently filed a complaint and jury demand with the
Fayette Circuit Court. In her complaint, Furtula alleged that the University
“wrongfully and in contrast to the evidence contained within the administrative
file, terminated the [LTD] benefits it owed to her pursuant to the terms of the
applicable policy of insurance.” Furtula also alleged that the University violated
the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (“UCSPA”), and breached its fiduciary
duty to her. She made no allegation of breach of contract. In its answer, the
University denied the allegations and asserted as a defense sovereign immunity,
governmental immunity, and qualified immunity as a complete bar to the cause of
action.
Thereafter, the University filed a motion for summary judgment
asking the trial court to dismiss that portion of Furtula’s complaint which alleged
violations of the UCSPA. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed that
portion of Furtula’s complaint which alleged violation of KRS 304.12-230, finding
that the statute did not apply as the University was not engaged in the business of
entering into insurance contracts.
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On March 10, 2009, the University filed another motion for summary
judgment asking the trial court to dismiss the remaining allegations of Furtula’s
complaint on the basis of sovereign immunity. Furtula countered that her
remaining claim was not barred because sovereign immunity had been waived by
the legislature pursuant to KRS 45A.245, which provides in part that any person
having a lawfully authorized written contract with the Commonwealth may bring
an action against the Commonwealth on the contract, including, but not limited to,
actions for breach of contract or for enforcement of a contract, or for both.
Thereafter, the Fayette Circuit Court denied the University’s motion
for summary judgment, stating that the allegations in Furtula’s complaint were
sufficient to raise a claim of breach of contract and that there were material issues
of fact as to whether there was a waiver of immunity regarding her claim under
KRS Chapter 45A. In the same order, the trial court transferred the case to the
Franklin Circuit Court pursuant to KRS 452.105 and 45A.245.
The University filed this appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in
denying its motion for summary judgment on the basis of sovereign immunity.
This Court entered a show cause order as to why the appeal should not be
dismissed as interlocutory. In response, the University cited the recent Kentucky
Supreme Court case of Breathitt County Bd. of Educ. v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883
(Ky. 2009), in which the Court held that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is
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properly invoked to address a trial court’s interlocutory order on the issue of
immunity from damages claims. This Court entered an order determining that
there was sufficient cause to allow the appeal to continue.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS IN
ANTHONY MILLER CASE
Anthony Miller was also a University employee who applied for LTD
benefits from the University’s LTD program. Miller filed his original lawsuit in
Fayette Circuit Court, alleging that the University’s denial of benefits was a
violation of the UCSPA and a breach of fiduciary duty. The University moved to
dismiss Miller’s case pursuant to Kentucky Civil Rule (CR) 12.02, 19.01, and 21
for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, failure to state a claim on which relief
may be granted, misjoinder of a party, and failure to name an indispensable party.
In support of its motion the University argued, among other things,
that Miller’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity. In his response to the
University’s motion, Miller argued that the governing documents were a contract
for which sovereign immunity had been waived pursuant to KRS 45A.245.
The Fayette Circuit Court denied the University’s motion in order to
give Miller an opportunity to establish that he had the kind of contract with the
University required to invoke the waiver of immunity set out in KRS 45A.245.
Additionally, the court transferred the case to the Franklin Circuit Court.
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Following transfer to the Franklin Circuit Court, the University moved
to dismiss Miller’s claims on the grounds unaddressed in Fayette Circuit Court.
Without reaching the question of immunity from KRS Chapter 304 claims, the
Franklin Circuit Court agreed that Miller had failed to state a claim for violation of
the UCSPA and thus it dismissed Miller’s claims under KRS Chapter 304 and the
UCSPA. However, the court denied the University’s motion to dismiss based on
sovereign immunity because of its concern that there are no provisions that enable
a participant or beneficiary aggrieved by a decision of the plan fiduciaries to obtain
any judicial review. On appeal, this Court again entered a show cause order, and
thereafter found that cause was shown pursuant to Prater.
III. ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate when the material facts are not in
dispute and the non-movant would be unable to produce evidence at trial
warranting judgment in his or her favor. 3 Steelvest v. Scansteel Service Center,
Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 483 (Ky. 1991). In order to defeat a properly-supported
3
Although in Miller’s case the University is appealing from the trial court’s denial of a motion to
dismiss, when a trial court considers matters outside of the pleadings, it must treat the motion as
one for summary judgment. Waddle v. Galen of Kentucky, Inc., 131 S.W.3d 361, 364 (Ky. App.
2004). The University argues that, because Miller specifically referenced the LTD program’s
governing documents in his complaint, the University’s submission of and citation to those
documents did not convert its motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See
Commercial Money Center, Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335-336 (6th Cir.
2007). However, this argument does not take into account the affidavit of Bart Miller, the
University’s disability benefits manager, which was also attached to the motion to dismiss.
Because the University attached documentation outside of the pleadings in its motion to dismiss,
the motion will be treated as one for summary judgment.
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summary judgment motion, a non-movant must present as least some affirmative
evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 482.
The facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party that is in
opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id. On appeal, the standard of
review of a trial court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment is de novo.
Scrifes v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996).
The University’s primary argument is that the University has
sovereign immunity under the facts of both of these cases, and therefore that both
cases should have been summarily dismissed.4 Furtula and Miller argue that the
LTD plan documents were a binding contract, and that the General Assembly has
waived sovereign immunity in cases of suits on contracts entered into with the
state.
The University is a state agency entitled to sovereign immunity. See
Withers v. University of Kentucky, 939 S.W.2d 340, 342-43 (Ky. 1997). The
University’s immunity can be waived only with a specific and express waiver from
the General Assembly. University of Louisville v. Martin, 574 S.W.2d 676, 677
(Ky. App. 1978).
4
The trial court in Miller’s case did not specifically discuss whether Miller’s complaint was
sufficient to raise a claim of breach of contract. However, because the court found that sovereign
immunity did not apply to Miller’s claim of breach of fiduciary duties, and this claim was part of
the overall question regarding whether there was a valid contract, we find that the issue was
preserved for our review.
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As already mentioned, KRS 45A.245 waives immunity for persons
who hold an authorized written contract with the Commonwealth. See KRS
45A.245(1). Specifically, the statute provides, in pertinent part, that:
Any person, firm or corporation, having a lawfully
authorized written contract with the Commonwealth at
the time of or after June 21, 1974, may bring an action
against the Commonwealth on the contract, including but
not limited to actions either for breach of contracts or for
enforcement of contracts or for both.
KRS 45A.245(1).
In both Furtula’s and Miller’s cases, the trial court made findings that
insurance contracts were not involved when examining the parties’ UCSPA claims.
When the trial court granted a partial summary judgment in the University’s favor
concerning the UCSPA claims in Furtula’s case, it made the following statements:
-[The LTD program] is a benefit of employment rather
than an insurance policy.
-In this case, there is no material issue of fact with regard
to whether the University of Kentucky or the UK Board
of Trustees is engaged in the business of entering into
contracts of insurance; they are not.
Similarly, the Franklin Circuit Court noted the following in Miller’s case:
-UK is not in the business of contracting for a
consideration to pay a sum of money upon the happening
of a certain contingency.
-Benefits like the LTD program “have been considered as
constituting neither an insurance company nor a contract
of insurance.”
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-The “self-administration and self-funding of the LTD
Plan by UK did not render UK to be an insurance
company or constitute an insurance contract with the
participants and beneficiaries.”
What the University established through the LTD benefits program
was not an insurance business, but an employee benefit plan, specifically a
“welfare benefit plan.” In the context of private employee welfare benefit plans,
such plans have been considered as constituting neither an insurance company nor
a contract of insurance. Dillard v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 of Virginia
Health and Welfare Fund, 1985 WL 17724 *5 (W.D. Va. Oct. 31, 1985).
Additionally, Furtula and Miller have failed to demonstrate that they
held any other type of written contract with the University for LTD benefits via the
LTD governing documents. The essential elements of a valid contract include an
offer and acceptance, full and complete terms, and bargained for consideration.
Cantrell Supply, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 94 S.W.3d 381, 384 (Ky. App.
2002).
In this case, none of the plan documents provided to this Court
evidence intent to create a contract on the part of the University.5 For example,
under Section 8.01 of the LTD trust agreement, 9.01 of the LTD plan document,
and 8.01 of the salary continuation plan, the LTD program is not to be construed as
5
See Dearman v. Dial Corp., 2010 WL 254928 (E.D. Mo., Jan. 19, 2010). The Court notes that,
as an unpublished Eastern District of Missouri case, the case holds no precedential value. We
do, however, find the analysis utilized by the district court to be persuasive.
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a contract of employment or a guarantee of continued employment. Additionally,
Section 8.01 of the LTD trust agreement states that:
[N]either the establishment of the Trust hereby created,
nor any modification thereof, nor the creation of any fund
or account, nor the payment of any benefits shall be
construed as giving to any Participant or other person any
legal or equitable right against the Employer, or any
officer or employee thereof, or the Trustee, except as
herein provided. Under no circumstances shall the terms
of employment of any Participant be modified or in any
way affected hereby.
Additionally, pursuant to Sections 8.01 and 8.02 of the LTD plan document, the
plan may be unilaterally modified, amended, or terminated at any time with no
notice. Moreover, the staff handbook through which the policy was disseminated
stated that it was not a contract. As a result, a reasonable employee could not
interpret the University’s plan language as an offer to enter into a contractual
relationship. See Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 662-63
(Mo. 1988) (where employee handbook contained general language and the
employer reserved the power to alter it, a reasonable at-will employee could not
interpret its distribution as an offer to modify his at-will status).
The University’s unilateral act of publishing its LTD benefits policy
in its human resources or staff handbook was not a contractual offer to its
employees, but merely disseminated informational statements on the University’s
self-imposed policies. Because the University made no offer to its employees, no
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power of acceptance was created in Furtula or Miller. Without an offer there can
be no contract, and without a contract there can be no cause of action for breach of
contract.
Moreover, the University maintains the program at no cost to
employees, and thus it does not require or even involve the kind of legal
consideration necessary to create a contract between Furtula and the University or
Miller and the University. Furthermore, the LTD program does not require or
encourage employees to give up or forego other potential sources of coverage, but
provides that the LTD benefits must be reduced by amounts from other sources so
that participants ultimately receive as much as they would have received if they
were actually working for the University.
Additionally, while we have not been cited to, nor have we uncovered,
any Kentucky cases on point concerning government LTD benefit plan documents,
we find the cases dealing with employer policies contained in employee handbooks
to be illustrative. What we have found to be true in almost every case is that
employer policies or benefit statements that are unilaterally imposed on at-will
employees are not contracts enforceable at law. See Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc.
v. Sprowls, 82 S.W.3d 193, 194 (Ky. 2002); Noel v. Elk Brand Mfg. Co., 53
S.W.3d 95, 98-99 (Ky. App. 2000) (upholding summary judgment for employer on
breach of contract claim where employee handbook stated that it “was not a
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contract”); Nork v. Fetter Printing Co., 738 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Ky. App. 1987)
(employee handbook containing disclaimer cannot be the basis for a breach of
contract claim).
The only thing the LTD program establishes for University employees
is a mere expectancy of the opportunity to apply for LTD benefits. University
employees remain at will and the University is under no contractual obligation to
pay LTD benefits or even to continue the LTD program in the future.
Our Supreme Court has held that “[a]n express personnel policy can
become a binding contract ‘once it is accepted by the employee through his
continuing to work when he is not required to do so.’” Parts Depot, Inc. v.
Beiswenger, 170 S.W.3d 354, 362 (Ky. 2005). However, in so holding, the Court
made clear that the personnel policies at issue did not contain any language
disclaiming a contractual relationship. As the Sixth Circuit later observed in
examining the decision:
The court held that Parts Depot’s manual constituted an
implied contract because the language used in the manual
was specific and contractual, rather than precatory, and
because the manual contained no disclaimer stating, for
example, that it was not a contract of employment.
Oaks v. 3M Co., 453 F.3d 781, 786 (6th Cir. 2006).
Moreover, even if a contract was formed, it would be an implied
contract. See Beiswenger, 170 S.W.3d at 363. As stated in Beiswenger:
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[E]mployer statements of policy . . . can give rise to
contractual rights in employees without evidence that the
parties mutually agreed that the policy statements would
create contractual rights in the employee, and, hence,
although the statement of policy is signed by neither
party, can be unilaterally amended by the employer
without notice to the employee, and contains no reference
to a specific employee, his job description or
compensation, and although no reference was made to
the policy statement in preemployment interviews and
the employee does not learn of its existence until after his
hiring.
Id. (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 892
(Mich. 1980)). The Court went on to note that “[t]he principle is akin to estoppel.
Once an employer establishes an express personnel policy and the employee
continues to work while the policy remains in effect, the policy is deemed an
implied contract for so long as it remains in effect.” Id. However, as already
stated, KRS 45A.245 applies only to written contracts. Commonwealth v.
Whitworth, 74 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Ky. 2002). Therefore, even if Furtula and Miller
had implied contracts with the University, this would not be sufficient to overcome
the University’s sovereign immunity.
Furtula and Miller cite the Court to Marcus v. Miller, 2007 WL
1519349 (Ky. App. May 25, 2007) to support the proposition that the LTD
programs are a contract that University employees can enforce. Their reliance is
misplaced. Marcus concerned a plaintiff-employee who was mistakenly overpaid
almost $30,000 in LTD benefits. The University’s right of recovery in Marcus –
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recognized by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals – was based, not
on contract, but on the equitable doctrine of monies had and received. Under that
doctrine, the plaintiff-employee’s receipt of overpaid LTD funds created an
independent, implied contract, independent of the LTD program documents, that
required him to repay those funds to the University. Regardless, nothing said in
Marcus could create a contract where one does not exist, and it certainly could not
waive the University’s immunity in this case.
Appellants also argue that Whittenburg Construction Co. v. University
of Kentucky, 2007 WL 3037721 (Ky. App. 2007) establishes that the University is
not immune from contract claims. Whittenberg, however, is inapposite in this case
because the plaintiff in Whittenberg had an actual, direct written contract with the
University.
Additionally, Furtula and Miller raise concerns about an application of
immunity that would exempt the University’s LTD benefits decisions from judicial
review. However, the sovereign immunity defense is a constitutional protection
that can be waived only by the General Assembly. Wells v. Commonwealth, Dep’t
of Highways, 384 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1964).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the Fayette Circuit Court
and the Franklin Circuit Court are reversed and remanded with directions to the
Franklin Circuit Court to enter orders dismissing both cases.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Barbara A. Kriz
Lexington, Kentucky
M. Austin Mehr
Timothy E. Geertz
Lexington, Kentucky
Stephen L. Barker
Joshua M. Salsburey
Lexington, Kentucky
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