PAGE (TERESA ANN TRADER) VS. TRADER (GREGORY ALLEN)
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 3, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000302-MR
TERESA ANN TRADER PAGE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE SUSAN WESLEY MCCLURE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00097
GREGORY ALLEN TRADER
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND MOORE, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
MOORE, JUDGE: Teresa Ann Trader Page appeals from a judgment of the
Hopkins County Family Court, which attributed a child support arrearage amount
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
of $30,588.48 to Teresa under a property settlement agreement previously entered
into by the parties to this appeal. After careful review of the record, we reverse.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant Teresa Trader (now Page) and Appellee Gregory Trader
were married on June 25, 1982. There were three children born of the marriage;
namely, Katie Trader, born September 28, 1988; Callie Trader, born October 17,
1991; and Cole Trader, born April 25, 1995. Teresa and Gregory separated on
December 31, 1999, and subsequently entered into a property settlement
agreement, which includes a provision to deviate from the child support guidelines,
on February 2, 2000. This agreement was incorporated into a decree of dissolution
of marriage entered May 19, 2000.
In September 2007, Gregory filed a “Motion to Amend the Property
Settlement and Child Custody Agreement.” This motion involved the amount of
equity, if any, to which Teresa was entitled relative to certain marital realty the
parties agreed would be sold post-divorce decree and the amount of child support
arrearage, if any, Teresa owes to Gregory.
The trial court entered a final and appealable judgment on January 21,
2009. The trial court held that Teresa’s child support obligation began in October
2001 and that she should be awarded her share of the marital equity as of said date.
Specifically, the trial court found that Gregory owed Teresa $16,959.03 in equity
but that Teresa owed Gregory a child support arrearage of $30,588.48.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
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As are most other aspects of domestic relations law, the establishment,
modification, and enforcement of child support are prescribed in their general
contours by statute and are largely left, within the statutory parameters, to the
sound discretion of the trial court. Van Meter v. Smith, 14 S.W.3d 569, 572 (Ky.
App. 2000). In Downing v. Downing, 45 S.W.3d 449 (Ky. App. 2001), a panel of
this Court discussed the standard of review for appellate courts in child support
matters:
Kentucky trial courts have been given broad discretion in
considering a parent's assets and setting correspondingly
appropriate child support . . . . However, a trial court's
discretion is not unlimited. The test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound
legal principles.
Downing at 454; see also McKinney v. McKinney, 257 S.W.3d 130, 133 (Ky. App.
2008).
III. ANALYSIS
A.
APPELLEE’S ARGUMENTS ON CR 52.04 AND 52.02.
At the outset, the Court notes that Gregory relies on Kentucky Rule(s)
of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.04 and 52.02 to argue that Teresa failed to ask the trial
court to make specific findings of fact on a number of issues she presents before
this Court. Gregory also states that her failure to do so is fatal to review of those
claims on appeal. We disagree. Teresa’s arguments before this Court are not
based on the trial court’s failure to make factual findings. Rather, she clearly
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claims error in the trial court’s decision-making process based on legal analysis.
Hence, Gregory is incorrect that the issues Teresa raises on review fail under the
CR 52.04 or 52.02 standards.
B.
CHILD SUPPORT CLAIM.
The trial court concluded that Teresa incurred a child support
arrearage of $30,588.48. In so finding, the court stated the following:
When parties enter into agreements regarding child
support obligations, they ordinarily designate a “date” on
which the obligation becomes effective. Indeed these
parties have done just that in their agreed orders
regarding subsequent modification of their child support
obligations. The agreement incorporated into the decree
provides that the “guideline” amount would become
effective upon the sale of the real property if the property
sold prior to Gregory’s return to work. (It is undisputed
that Gregory has not, to this date, returned to work).
The Court has previously found that the property was
“sold” at the time Gregory refinanced the mortgage
(September 2001) . . . . Therefore, the Court finds that
Teresa’s monthly obligation for the period from October
1, 2001 through September 30, 2007 was $424.84.
The trial court abused its discretion in reaching its conclusion. The
record reflects that no specific amount of child support was specified in the
“Property Settlement & Child Custody Agreement” and certainly the amount of
$424.84 is not specified in that document. The trial court based its calculations on
numbers that were included on a child support worksheet that was not mentioned
or incorporated into the parties’ Property Settlement and Child Custody
Agreement.
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This Court has previously held that written clauses in documents
occurring after a party’s signature can be deemed invalid and non-binding on the
parties to that document. See Rowe v. Ratliff’s Heirs, 225 Ky. 70, 7 S.W.2d 852
(1928). Further, information that is written following a party’s signature must be
referenced in the document preceding the signature if it is to be given full effect.
Kelley v. J.R. Rice Realty Co., 235 Ky. 643, 32 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Ky. App. 1930). In
the present case, the trial court bound Teresa to child support calculations that were
not encompassed by her signature. The record reflects that the child support
worksheet was not attached to the agreement. When asked whether the child
support worksheet was calculated at the time of the agreement, Gregory testified
that “the court did it, I didn’t, we didn’t [;] the court did.” Therefore, there is no
evidence that the child support worksheet was ever signed by either party at the
time of the agreement.
There is also no evidence in the record that the child support
worksheet was ever incorporated by reference into the agreement. In fact, the child
support worksheet was not attached to the agreement when it was filed and was
only filed later by counsel for Gregory. This child support worksheet was not
signed or initialed by the parties. As the child support worksheet was never signed
by either party or incorporated by reference into the agreement, the trial court
abused its discretion in establishing child support based on calculations that could
not be binding on either party.
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Further, the agreement evidences that the parties waived child support
because of the shared parenting time. Separation agreements or property
settlement agreements create contractual rights between the parties. Wagner v.
Wagner, 821 S.W.2d 819 (Ky. App. 1992). In interpreting a contractual
agreement, a contract should be read and construed in the light of the intention of
the parties at the time it was entered into. Johnson v. Stumbo, 277 Ky. 301, 126
S.W.2d 165 (1938). Generally, ambiguities of contracts are construed against the
drafter. Wolford v. Wolford, 662 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 1984). Words, which have no
technical meaning in law, must be interpreted in light of the usage and
understanding of the common man. This interpretation is often referred to as the
plain language test. Fryman v. Pilot Life Insurance Co., 704 S.W.2d 205, 206 (Ky.
1986). Under Kentucky law, the agreement in question created a contract between
the parties and is governed by the plain language test.
A plain language reading of the agreement yields the conclusion that
the parties waived child support because they were sharing parenting time and not
because the parties had not sold the marital residence. Specifically, paragraph six
of the parties’ separation agreement states:
Inasmuch as the Wife will be working third shift and
Husband is currently disabled and unable to work, the
Husband shall be the caregiver for the children during the
hours Wife is at work.
Paragraph seven of the agreement further states:
The parties acknowledge the provisions of the Kentucky
Child Support Guidelines and have agreed to modify the
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amounts to be paid. Inasmuch as each of the parties will
be providing for the care of the children on a daily basis,
this is an appropriate case to deviate from the guidelines.
(Emphasis added).
The plain language of the contractual agreement between Teresa and
Gregory demonstrates that child support was not to be assessed due to the equal
parenting time afforded to both parties. A judgment and divorce decree
incorporating the agreement was entered into in 2000 and neither party appealed
from it. Regardless of whether the judgment met the requirements of Kentucky
Revised Statute(s) (KRS) 403.211, the time for questioning that has long passed.
Further, a review of the record indicates that there is no language
supporting the contention that child support would be assessed against Teresa
when the marital property is sold. The closest language to support the trial court’s
ruling is found in paragraph seven of the agreement, which states:
In the event the parties’ real estate sells prior to the
Husband returning to work, the wife will be obligated to
commence payment of child support pursuant to the
Hopkins County Child Support Guidelines. If and when
the Husband returns to work, the parties will be required
to secure day care and the child support provisions herein
waived shall be reassessed and apportioned appropriately
to conform to the child support guidelines.
A plain language reading of the above paragraph requires a finding that Teresa is
to pay child support if the parties’ real estate is sold prior to Gregory returning to
work. The record is clear that Gregory has never returned to work.
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Further, under paragraph seven referenced above, the child support
obligation would not arise until the real estate “sells.” The trial court based its
ruling on the belief that the real estate sold when Gregory decided to keep the
home as evidenced by his refinancing of the home in September 2001. To
accomplish the selling of the marital realty, Gregory testified that he put the
property “in the hands of the realtor.” He further testified that he used two
different realtors. So, at one point, Gregory was trying to sell the property to
someone other than himself. However, he clearly testified that he decided to keep
the marital property and not sell it.
The terms of the agreement do not reference “refinancing,” only
selling. If the plain language test is to be applied, the property was never sold and
Teresa’s child support obligation never arose. Further, when Gregory refinanced
the marital realty, he did not sell it to himself in that he never gave Teresa her
portion of the equity in the property. No money ever exchanged hands. At best,
Teresa’s child support obligation arose when she did, indeed, receive her share of
the equity. Teresa did not receive her share of the equity until a January 21, 2009
decision of the lower court.
We note further language in the agreement that states that “the child
support provisions herein waived shall be reassessed and apportioned appropriately
to conform to the child support guidelines.” Therefore, the child support
obligation was not automatically set by this language. This language merely
provided an avenue to reassess the obligation at a later date. Gregory only sought
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to have Teresa’s child support obligation “reassessed” as of October 2007 when he
filed a motion to do so. Prior to October 2007, Gregory testified he never filed a
motion to have child support established.
Deviating from the child support guidelines based on percentages of
parenting time has been recognized by Kentucky courts. See Downey v. Rogers,
847 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Ky. App. 1993); Brown v. Brown, 952 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. App.
1997); Plattner v. Plattner, 228 S.W.3d 577 (Ky. App. 2007). The parties chose to
do so here. Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that Gregory ever
returned to work or that he sold the martial residence, the only actions under the
agreement that would have triggered Teresa’s child support obligation. Therefore,
we find that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to follow the plain
language of the agreement as required by Kentucky law.
C.
CLAIM UNDER KRS 403.212.
The trial court found that “Teresa’s obligation to remit child support
began October 1, 2001 at the rate computed pursuant to the Guidelines and to
which the parties had agreed, namely, $424.84 per month.” The trial court further
found that Teresa’s monthly obligation for the period from October 1, 2001
through September 30, 2007 was $30,588.48.
KRS 403.213 states:
Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the
decree, provisions for the support of a child shall be terminated
by emancipation of the child unless the child is a high school
student when he reaches the age of eighteen (18).
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The child support worksheet that the trial court utilized to surmise certain
arrearages attributable to Teresa was support for three children: Katie Trader, born
September 28, 1988; Callie Trader, born October 17, 1991; and Cole Trader, born
April 25, 1995. Based on the timeframe the trial court utilized in determining its
child support calculation (October 1, 2001 through September 30, 2007), the oldest
daughter, Katie, would have turned eighteen on September 28, 2006.
However, the trial court calculated the child support and failed to take
into account the change in age of the oldest daughter. From September 2006 to
September 2007, child support should not have been calculated to include Katie,
who turned eighteen. During this period only two of the parties’ children would
have been eligible for child support. Therefore, the trial court misapplied KRS
403.213 and erred in calculating the child support obligation.
Accordingly, the order of the Hopkins County Family Court is
reversed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ben Leonard
Dawson Springs, Kentucky
James (Chip) Adams II
Madisonville, Kentucky
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