WILLIAMS (ROBERT LEON) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 8, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002352-MR
ROBERT LEON WILLIAMS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00162
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE: Following his conditional plea of guilty2 to
tampering with physical evidence, possession of marijuana, operating a motor
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09.
vehicle under the influence of alcohol (DUI), being a second-degree persistent
felony offender, and imposition of a five-year prison sentence, Robert Leon
Williams appeals from the order of the Hardin Circuit Court which denied his
motion to suppress evidence found by police officers in the vicinity of his DUI
arrest. After a careful review of the record, the law, and the briefs, we affirm.
On November 6, 2005, while on patrol Radcliff Police Officer
Branson McLeod noticed a vehicle stopped on a road. Officer McLeod stopped to
investigate, and activated his in-cruiser video camera which recorded the
subsequent events. Since he had not received information about the stopped car on
his police radio, Officer McLeod assumed that the vehicle had not been stopped
there long. From running the license plate number, Officer McLeod learned that
the vehicle was registered to Williams. He then exited his patrol car for further
investigation and found that the car was empty. Williams was standing outside the
car on the driver’s door side. Joy Young was standing outside the car on the
passenger’s side. The two admitted that they had been to a club, but claimed they
had exited the car and were having an argument when Officer McLeod arrived.
The officer observed that the car’s motor was not running but the key
was in the ignition. He wanted to speak to Young privately so he asked Williams
to return to the car. Williams walked to the car and sat in the driver’s seat. Officer
McLeod gave Williams a portable breathalyzer test (PBT) and a sobriety test. He
failed both tests and was arrested for DUI. The officer then asked Williams if he
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would like for Young to drive his car home. Williams replied that he did not want
Young to have the keys but that she could sit in the car until someone arrived to
drive her home.
While booking Williams on the DUI Charge, Officer McLeod
watched the in-car video, which shows that while McLeod was talking to Young
Williams reached into his front pocket and tossed an object into a nearby field.
McLeod and two other officers went to the field and found a small bag of
marijuana in the location where Williams had tossed the object.
Williams was subsequently indicted by the Hardin County Grand
Jury. His motion to suppress was heard in Hardin Circuit Court on January 17,
2007, and denied. On that same date, Williams entered his conditional guilty plea
in accordance with RCr 8.09. The judgment and order imposing sentence entered
on March 7, 2007, recited that Williams was “reserving the right to appeal the
denial of suppression, heard before Hon. Janet P. Coleman on January 17, 2007.”3
Our review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is a twostep analysis.
First, factual findings of the court involving historical
facts are conclusive if they are not clearly erroneous and
are supported by substantial evidence. Second, the
ultimate issue of the existence of reasonable suspicion or
probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact
subject to de novo review. In conducting this analysis,
the reviewing court must give due weight to inferences
3
We quote this language because in his brief Williams makes some mention of a motion to
dismiss the DUI charge which was also heard on January 17, 2007. We are not considering the
trial court’s ruling on that motion because it has not been reserved for appeal in accordance with
RCr 8.09.
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drawn from the facts by the trial court and law
enforcement officers and to the circuit court’s findings on
the officer’s credibility.
Baltimore v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532, 539 (Ky. App. 2003).
It is well settled that a trial court does not have authority to dismiss an
indictment based upon a lack of probable cause or insufficient evidence.
Commonwealth v. Bishop, 245 S.W.3d 733, 735 (Ky. 2008). A trial court may,
however, suppress evidence discovered from an arrest that lacked probable cause.
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Ky. 2001).
“Probable cause must exist and be known by the arresting officer at
the time of the arrest.” Commonwealth v. White, 132 S.W.3d 877, 883 (Ky. App.
2004). Therefore, Officer McLeod must have had a reasonable belief, in light of
the circumstances, that there was a “fair probability” that Williams operated the
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Id.; see also Eldred v.
Commonwealth, 906 S.W.2d 694, 705 (Ky. 1994).
Relying on the factors contained in Wells v. Commonwealth, 709
S.W.2d 847 (Ky. App. 1986), Williams argues that the Commonwealth could not
prove that Williams was actually in control of the car. Those factors include: (1)
whether the person in the vehicle was asleep or awake; (2) whether the vehicle’s
motor was running; (3) the location of the vehicle and the circumstances
surrounding how the vehicle arrived at the location; and (4) the intent of the person
behind the wheel. Id. at 849. Williams’ strict reliance on these factors is
misplaced.
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The factors established in Wells are not exclusive. Instead, the factors
are merely suggestive and exhibit the need for a totality of the circumstances
analysis. See Harris v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Ky. App. 1986).
As this Court wrote in White, 132 S.W.3d at 883, “[p]robable cause is a ‘fluid
concept – turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts –
not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules” (internal citations
omitted). Applying this fluid concept we can deduce from the facts, surrounding
circumstances, and suggested Wells factors that there was a “fair probability” that
Williams operated the vehicle.
Based upon a lack of reports and the location of the vehicle, Officer
McLeod concluded that the car had been parked in the roadway for a short period
of time. The car was registered to Williams, who was near the driver’s door when
Officer McLeod arrived. After Williams failed the PBT and sobriety tests,
Williams did not want Young to drive the car. When told to get in the car,
Williams sat in the driver’s seat. While this evidence may not amount to proof of
DUI beyond a reasonable doubt, it certainly establishes a reasonable inference that
Williams drove the car while intoxicated.
There was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s factual
determination, and the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts.
Accordingly, we affirm the Hardin Circuit Court’s denial of
Williams’ suppression motion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ed Monahan
Public Advocate
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Roy Alyette Durham
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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