JOHNSON (ROSA J.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 10, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002028-MR
ROSA J. JOHNSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL E. BRADEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-00016-002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND
NO. 2008-CA-002391-MR
MARK ANTHONY RUTHERFORD
v.
APPELLEE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL E. BRADEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-00016-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Mark Anthony Rutherford appeals from the judgment of
the Whitley Circuit Court sentencing him to eight years’ imprisonment for child
abuse in the first degree. Rosa J. Johnson appeals from the judgment of the
Whitley Circuit Court sentencing her to twelve months’ imprisonment, probated
for two years, for child abuse in the third degree. For the following reasons, we
affirm both judgments.
These appeals arise from the prosecution of Rutherford and Johnson
as co-defendants for the abuse of Johnson’s daughter. In January 2007, Rutherford
and Johnson resided together with Johnson’s minor daughter from a previous
relationship. On the evening of January 9, 2007, Rutherford spanked Johnson’s
daughter twice for spilling apple juice on the couch. Rutherford claimed after the
spanking the daughter fell while he playfully chased her around the house.
Additionally, Rutherford claimed that on the same night he accidentally struck the
daughter with his belt when he swung it around a doorway without knowing she
was on the other side.
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute(s)
(KRS) 21.580.
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The following day, while the daughter was at daycare, an employee of
the daycare noticed bruises on her back. The employee contacted child protection
services which sent two people to investigate the matter. The investigators
examined the daughter and observed bruises on her back, buttock, and left leg that
implicated strikes with a belt. The investigators then contacted Detective Tim
Helton of the Kentucky State Police.
After viewing the bruises, Det. Helton asked Rutherford and Johnson
to drive to the police station for questioning. Johnson initially told a police officer
that she was at the home during the spanking incident and witnessed Rutherford
lightly spank her daughter two to three times. However, after viewing pictures of
the bruises, Johnson told the police she was actually at the grocery store when the
spanking occurred, and Rutherford had asked her to lie to the police before the
interview.
Rutherford and Johnson were tried as co-defendants before a jury on
July 23, 2008. At the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, both Rutherford
and Johnson moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied.
Rutherford was convicted of criminal abuse in the first degree and sentenced to
eight years. Johnson was convicted of criminal abuse in the third degree and
sentenced to twelve months, probated for two years. These appeals followed.
Both Rutherford and Johnson contend the trial court erred by denying
their motions for a directed verdict because the Commonwealth failed to present
sufficient evidence of each crime. Specifically, Rutherford claims the
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Commonwealth did not prove he intentionally spanked the child or that he caused
cruel punishment to the child. Johnson contends the Commonwealth did not
provide evidence she was at the home during the spanking. We disagree.
Upon consideration of a motion for a directed verdict,
the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a
reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not
be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the
trial court must assume that the evidence for the
Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to
such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict
is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) (citations omitted).
Rutherford was convicted of criminal abuse in the first degree,
defined by KRS 508.100 as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal abuse in the first degree
when he intentionally abuses another person or permits
another person of whom he has actual custody to be
abused and thereby:
(a) Causes serious physical injury; or
(b) Places him in a situation that may cause him
serious physical injury; or
(c) Causes torture, cruel confinement or cruel
punishment;
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to a person twelve (12) years of age or less, or who is
physically helpless or mentally helpless.
In this case, Rutherford told the police he spanked the child on the
evening of January 9, 2007, and later testified that he did spank the child. Despite
Rutherford’s argument that no evidence was presented to show he caused cruel
punishment to the child, the Commonwealth presented evidence of the extensive
bruising on the child’s back, buttocks, and thighs the day after the spanking. Thus,
sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to conclude Rutherford spanked the
child and the spanking caused the extensive bruising. Kentucky law is clear that
the jury’s function is “to determine whether the amount of force used during a
spanking constitutes cruel punishment.” Canler v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d
219, 222 (Ky. 1994). Since sufficient evidence existed for the jury to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that Rutherford spanked the child and that the spanking
was cruel punishment, the trial court did not err by denying Rutherford’s motion
for a directed verdict.
Johnson was convicted of criminal abuse in the third degree, defined
by KRS 508.120 as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal abuse in the third
degree when he recklessly abuses another person or
permits another person of whom he has actual custody to
be abused and thereby:
(a) Causes serious physical injury; or
(b) Places him in a situation that may cause him
serious physical injury; or
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(c) Causes torture, cruel confinement or cruel
punishment;
to a person twelve (12) years of age or less, or who is
physically helpless or mentally helpless.
Here, although Johnson testified to being out of the house when the
spanking incident occurred, the Commonwealth presented evidence that Johnson
originally told police that she was at home when Rutherford spanked the child.
Additionally, though Johnson testified she was not aware of the severe bruises until
she saw pictures at the police station, evidence was presented that she dressed the
child the morning after the spanking, though Johnson claimed it was in the dark
and she could not see any bruises. When conflicting testimony is presented, it is
the jury’s role “to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be
given their testimony, and in the exercise of that function they may believe one
witness though contradicted by a number of others, or one set of witnesses to the
exclusion of others.” Bowling v. Commonwealth, 318 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Ky. 1958).
Thus, sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to conclude Johnson recklessly
permitted Rutherford to abuse her child. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by
denying Johnson’s motion for a directed verdict.
The judgments of the Whitley Circuit Court are affirmed.
DIXON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND
DISSENTS IN PART.
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LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND
DISSENTING IN PART: I concur with the majority opinion with respect to the
conviction of Appellant Anthony Rutherford. However, I dissent with respect to
Appellant Rosa J. Johnson.
I believe the trial court erred in failing to grant Johnson’s motion for
directed verdict. There was no evidence that she participated in the abuse of the
child and only the slightest evidence that she was at all complicit in the abuse
inflicted on the child.
The only evidence of her presence at the time the abuse occurred was
clearly contrived to protect Rutherford. She then recanted her initial story to police
on seeing the bruises on the child and revealed that she was away at a grocery
store. The majority opinion concedes that, at the earliest, she became aware of the
abuse well after it occurred.
The Commonwealth must present evidence from which a reasonable
jury could believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged. In my view, the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to reach this
threshold. Trowel v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1977). Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 951 (Ky. 1994).
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT ROSA J.
JOHNSON:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Brandon Neil Jewell
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT MARK
ANTHONY RUTHERFORD:
J. Brandon Pigg
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
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