NETHERWOOD (SHELLEY) VS. KENNEDY (ELAINE), ET AL.
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 10, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001508-MR
SHELLEY NETHERWOOD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-010493
ELAINE KENNEDY AND
EKM REAL ESTATE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE: Shelley Netherwood (Netherwood) brings this appeal
from orders of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered August 27, 2007, and July 17,
2008, denying her motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration pursuant to the
terms of two real estate listing agreements. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we
affirm.
Netherwood is a resident of Miramar Beach, Florida, who formerly
owned real property located on Ballardsville Road in Jefferson County, Kentucky.
On May 20, 2004, Netherwood entered into two multiple listing contracts
(hereinafter collectively referred to as “the contracts”) with Elaine Kennedy, a
licensed real estate broker in Kentucky who was doing business as EKM Real
Estate in Jefferson County, Kentucky.1 The contracts allowed Kennedy to list and
seek buyers for two tracts of real estate owned by Netherwood, located at 10826
and 11000 Ballardsville Road, Jefferson County, Kentucky.2 The contracts were
entered into for a six-month period and were subsequently extended by agreement
of the parties through May 1, 2005. The contracts provided that any disputes
arising thereunder would first be submitted to mediation, and if not resolved, then
the disputes would be decided by binding arbitration. The arbitration provisions in
the contracts were identical and read as follows:
MEDIATION/BINDING ARBITRATION: Any
dispute or claim (including, without limitation, claims of
fraud, misrepresentation, warranty and negligence) of
Sellers, Buyers, Brokers, Agents or any of them for a
sum greater that the limits of small claims court
jurisdiction arising out of this contract or the breach
thereof or arising out of or relating to the physical
condition of the property covered by this contract shall
first be submitted to mediation in accordance with the
guidelines and procedures of a qualified, reputable
Greater Louisville Association of REALTORS, Inc.
mediator (names and addresses of which may be obtained
1
The contracts appear to be standard form listing agreements utilized by members of the Greater
Louisville Association of Realtors.
2
There were ultimately four tracts of property owned by Shelley Netherwood shown by Elaine
Kennedy to prospective buyers.
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from the Greater Louisville Association of REALTORS,
Inc.). Disputes shall include (among other things) issues
relating to representation made by the Buyer, Seller or
any Broker or Agent, or other person or entity in
connection with this contract. Any agreement signed by
the parties pursuant to the mediation conferred shall
be binding.
If mediation does not result in an agreement signed by
the parties, all such claims or disputes shall be decided by
binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the
real estate industry, then in effect, adopted by the
American Arbitration Association unless the parties
mutually agree otherwise. Notice of the demand for
arbitration shall be filed in writing by registered or
certified mail with the other parties to the contract and
with a registered arbitrator (a list of which is available at
the Greater Louisville Association of REALTORS, Inc.
main office) or other arbitrators which the parties may
agree upon and shall be made within 180 days after the
dispute has arisen. An actual oral hearing shall be held
unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. The
Kentucky Real Estate Commission still retains
jurisdiction to determine violations of KRS 324.160.
Any proceeding to determine damages shall be conducted
by an arbitrator pursuant to this clause and not in court.
The terms of these paragraphs shall survive the closing.
Kennedy identified at least two prospective purchasers during the
term of the contracts. One of the prospects, Five Star Development, Inc., engaged
in substantial negotiations with Netherwood and her attorney over an approximate
eight-month period that resulted in a written offer and several letters of intent. The
negotiations with Five Star broke off in early April 2005. Kennedy subsequently
demanded her commission under the contracts alleging she had procured a ready,
willing, and able purchaser of the property in Five Star. Netherwood then
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demanded a refund from Kennedy of $5,000 that had been advanced to promote
the sale of the property.
In December 2005, Netherwood sold the property to another
purchaser. Kennedy then commenced this action in the Jefferson Circuit Court on
December 8, 2005, to collect a sales commission under the contracts.
The procedural history of this case can be described as “tortured,” at
best. Netherwood, acting pro se, has repeatedly attacked counsel for Kennedy
regarding his truthfulness in these proceedings. Netherwood has filed at least three
motions to dismiss this action, arguing that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to
hear this case because of the failure of Kennedy to seek arbitration within 180 days
of the dispute arising between the parties. This time limitation is stated in the
arbitration provision previously set forth above. Although we do not reach the
contractual time limitation issue, we nonetheless believe Netherwood’s arguments
are misplaced.
In order to determine whether the parties in this action agreed to
arbitrate any disputes arising under the contracts, we must initially determine
whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and, if so, whether the parties’ dispute
is within the scope of such agreement. General Steel Corp. v. Collins, 196 S.W.3d
18 (Ky. App. 2006). The interpretation of a contract, including the arbitration
clause therein, is a matter of law for the Court to review. Cinelli v. Ward, 997
S.W.2d 474 (Ky. App. 1988). Accordingly, our review is de novo. First
Commonwealth Bank of Prestonsburg v. West, 55 S.W.3d 829 (Ky. App. 2000).
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The circuit court concluded in its orders of August 27, 2007, and July
17, 2008, that the arbitration provisions were valid but the parties had waived their
rights thereunder. Since arbitration rights are contractual in nature, they may be
waived. Valley Constr. Co., Inc. v. Perry Host Mgmt. Co. Inc., 796 S.W.2d 365
(Ky. App. 1990). However, in our review of applicable Kentucky law, we do not
reach the waiver issue in order to affirm the circuit court’s decision not to dismiss
this action for failure to arbitrate in a timely manner. Rather, we conclude that the
arbitration provisions within the contracts do not comply with Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 417.200 and thus are not enforceable by the parties to this action.
KRS 417.200 expressly provides that an arbitration agreement
described in KRS 417.050 must provide for arbitration within this state to confer
jurisdiction on a circuit court to enforce the agreement. The Kentucky Supreme
Court has recently addressed this very issue in Ally Cat, LLC v. Chauvin, 274
S.W.3d 451 (Ky. 2009). In Ally Cat, the Supreme Court specifically held as
follows:
Subject matter jurisdiction to enforce an agreement to
arbitrate is conferred upon a Kentucky court only if the
agreement provides for arbitration in this state. Thus, an
agreement to arbitrate which fails to include the required
provision for arbitration within this state is unenforceable
in Kentucky courts.
Ally Cat, LLC, 274 S.W.3d at 455.
Accordingly, subject matter jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration
provision is conferred upon a Kentucky court only if the agreement provides for
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the arbitration to be conducted in Kentucky. An agreement to arbitrate which fails
to include the required provision for arbitration within this state is unenforceable
by Kentucky courts. Id.
Ally Cat also arose out of a property dispute in Jefferson County. Ally
Cat, LLC, purchased a condominium for use as a medical clinic. Ally Cat
automatically became a member of the condo association where all members
became subject to a Homeowners Limited Warranty Agreement (HOLW). The
HOLW contained an arbitration provision that provided all disputes arising
thereunder must be arbitrated. As a result of defects in the condo, Ally Cat sued its
seller for fraud and other tortious conduct. The seller sought to enforce the
arbitration provision in the HOLW, which, again, mandated that any disputes
between the parties be arbitrated. Ironically, the language in the arbitration
provision in the HOLW in Ally Cat is remarkably similar to the language in the
arbitration provisions found in the contracts in our case. And, like the warranty
agreement in Ally Cat, the arbitration provisions in the contracts fail to state
specifically that the arbitration contemplated therein is to take place in Kentucky.
As noted, the Supreme Court in Ally Cat concluded that the trial court had no
subject matter jurisdiction to order the parties to arbitrate the dispute given that the
arbitration provision failed to comply with KRS 417.200.
We would further note that this case is distinguishable from one
where an arbitration agreement looks to disputes arising in interstate commerce
and the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) are controlling. The
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Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act (KUAA) and the FAA are substantially
identical. Louisville Peterbuilt, Inc. v. Cox, 132 S.W.3d 850 (Ky. 2004).
Generally, when interpreting an arbitration agreement, both the FAA and KUAA
recognize that all doubts concerning the scope of arbitration agreements should be
resolved in favor of arbitration. Id. However, neither party in this appeal has
raised the applicability of the FAA to these proceedings nor would it appear to be
applicable on its face, given that the contracts were entered into in Kentucky and
pertain exclusively to the sale of real property in Kentucky. Were the FAA
applicable to this case, then the restrictions set forth in Ally Cat regarding the strict
compliance with KRS 417.200 would not be applicable. The Kentucky Supreme
Court has recently emphasized this distinction in Ernst and Young v. Clark, ___
S.W.3d ___ (Ky. 2010). In Ernst, the Supreme Court stated that Ally Cat has no
applicability to an arbitration agreement governed exclusively by the FAA.
However, the Supreme Court reemphasized its holding in Ally Cat that arbitration
agreements that do not specifically state that the arbitration is to be held in
Kentucky are not enforceable by Kentucky courts, limited to those cases where the
FAA is not exclusively controlling. Ernst, ___ S.W.3d at ___ n.8.
In summation, we are of the opinion that the circuit court properly
denied Netherwood’s motion to dismiss based upon the Kentucky Supreme Court
precedent in Ally Cat as we must conclude that the arbitration provisions in the
contracts are not enforceable under KRS 417.200. We do not reach the issue of
waiver nor do we address the merits of the parties’ respective claims.
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However, we would be remiss if we did not point out that this case
has floundered in our Court system now for almost five years. The circuit judge
should be commended for the restraint and tolerance he has shown in this case.
Netherwood has filed at least three motions to dismiss and Kennedy has filed at
least two motions for summary judgment, all of which have been denied by the
circuit court. Additionally, the circuit court has scheduled a trial in this action on
at least three occasions. Based upon our review of the record, there does not
appear to be any legal basis to delay the prompt trial of this action upon return to
the court’s active docket. We encourage both parties to end their personal hostility
that has been exhibited throughout this case and to immediately proceed to trial on
the merits of the disputed issues arising under the contracts and as set forth in the
complaint and counterclaim, and as further detailed in the circuit court’s order of
March 25, 2008, denying cross motions for summary judgment. We also would
encourage Netherwood to obtain counsel to represent her interests at trial. The
damage claims asserted in this case are substantial. While Netherwood has
sufficiently presented her case on appeal in a pro se capacity, in substantial
compliance with applicable rules, the perils of representing oneself in a jury trial
are many and the consequences dire. One consequence of self-representation
could result in an adverse judgment regardless of the merits of one’s claim or
defense. We emphasize the wisdom of the oft-quoted maxim in our legal system
that “a man [or woman] who represents himself has a fool for a client.” See
Hummel v. Com., 306 S.W.3d 48 (Ky. 2010). If Netherwood continues to
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represent herself at trial, she shall be held to the same standards and court rules as
any licensed attorney, including civility and respect for opposing counsel and the
court. See Lattanzio v. Joyce, 308 S.W.3d 728 (Ky. App. 2010).
For the forgoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court
denying Netherwood’s motion to dismiss is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Shelley Netherwood, Pro Se
Miramar Beach, Florida
Carl D. Frederick
Theodore W. Walton
Laura E. Landenwich
Louisville, Kentucky
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