CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES VS. G. (J. T.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 4, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000211-ME
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TAMRA GORMLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-J-00205
J. T. G. AND A.G., AN INFANT
APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: FORMTEXT LAMBERT AND VANMETER, JUDGES; HARRIS,
SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: The Cabinet for Health and Family Services appeals from
the Scott Circuit Court, Family Division’s order finding it in contempt for failing
to pay child care assistance costs. After careful review, we vacate and remand.
This action began as a child custody case and originated in Jefferson
Family Court. Initially, the child, A.G., resided with her mother and maternal
grandmother in Louisville, Kentucky. A.G. was removed from her mother’s care
following a juvenile neglect petition filed by the Cabinet for Health and Family
Services (hereinafter “the Cabinet”) on or about November 17, 2004. The initial
removal of the child was based upon displays of mental instability by the mother,
including suicidal ideations, which resulted in the child’s maternal grandmother
taking out a Mental Inquest Warrant (MIW) on the mother. Following the MIW,
the mother was hospitalized at the University of Louisville medical center.
Shortly after A.G.’s removal, the mother identified the child’s
maternal uncle, Appellee J.T.G., as a suitable relative placement for her daughter.
Following a background check and a thorough home evaluation completed by the
Cabinet, A.G. was then placed in the temporary custody of J.T.G., with supervised
visitation allowed to the mother. Although A.G. was thriving in her uncle’s home,
visitations with her mother became increasingly more disruptive and difficult. One
major complication was that J.T.G. resided in Scott County and A.G.’s mother was
still living in Jefferson County. It became apparent that the best interests of the
child would be served by giving permanent custody to J.T.G. and his paramour,
C.S.
By order entered June 2, 2005, the Jefferson Family Court granted
permanent custody of A.G. to J.T.G. and his long-time paramour, C.S. J.T.G.
claims that he advised the Cabinet and the Jefferson Family Court that he would
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not be able to agree to permanent custody of A.G., due to limited finances, unless
the Cabinet agreed to provide and pay for child care assistance and provide
Kinship Care until the child was out of grade school. J.T.G. claims that the
Cabinet considered this information and then advised the Jefferson Family Court
Judge in open court that it would agree to provide and pay for childcare and
provide Kinship Care. The June 2, 2005, order makes no mention of this
agreement and we cannot find written evidence of the agreement in the record.
On August 10, 2005, the Jefferson Family Court transferred the action
to Scott County at the request of J.T.G. and C.S. On or about August 23, 2005, the
Scott Family Court accepted the transferred case and officially assigned it the case
number of 05-J-00205-001. The Cabinet set up and paid for childcare from June
2005 through September 2008. Thereafter, the Cabinet advised J.T.G. that
childcare payments for A.G. were not going to be made any longer. J.T.G. claims
that he told the Cabinet he would not be able to pay for childcare and that the
Cabinet advised him to return to Jefferson Family Court to get a written order for
childcare.
On September 11, 2008, despite having transferred the action to Scott
Family Court, the Jefferson Family Court ordered the Cabinet to provide daycare
assistance for A.G. and to assist J.T.G. and C.S. in accessing other appropriate or
available services such as Jumpstart. On November 21, 2008, J.T.G. returned to
the Scott Family Court and filed a pro se motion to have the Jefferson Family
Court’s order enforced. The Scott Family Court issued an order for the Cabinet to
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show cause as to why it was not in contempt for failing to comply with the
Jefferson Family Court’s order to pay daycare costs and ordered the Cabinet to
immediately make the daycare account current.
On January 5, 2009, the Scott Family Court ordered the Cabinet to
pay the outstanding balance and ongoing expenses per the “law of the case.” On
January 8, 2009, the Scott Family Court again ordered the Cabinet to pay daycare
costs for A.G. and stated that per the law of the case and the order of the Jefferson
Family Court, the Cabinet was ordered to pay the outstanding daycare balance and
to continue paying the ongoing daycare expenses in addition to the kinship care
J.T.G. received.
The Cabinet then filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the Scott
Family Court’s order, arguing that the September 11, 2008, order of the Jefferson
Family Court was unconstitutional on its face, as its express terms violated the
provisions of KRS 610.010(12) and the precedents set forth in both Cabinet for
Health & Family Services v. Huddleston, 185 S.W.3d 222 (Ky. App. 2006), and
Cabinet for Health & Family Services v. G.W.F., 229 S.W.3d 596 (Ky. App.
2007).
On February 2, 2009, the Scott Family Court denied the Cabinet’s
motion to alter, amend, or vacate by reiterating that the Jefferson Family Court
order was the “law of the case” and that the Cabinet had to pay A.G.’s daycare
costs plus all arrearages by February 6, 2009, or be held in contempt of court. The
Cabinet now appeals to this Court.
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The Cabinet argues on appeal that the order of the Jefferson Circuit
Court was void ab initio and was unconstitutional on its face. Further, the Cabinet
argues that the Scott Family Court’s reliance on the “law of the case” doctrine is
misplaced and was in error. After careful review, we agree that the Jefferson
Family Court order was void ab initio and that the Scott Family Court’s reliance on
the law of the case doctrine was erroneous.
We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to alter, amend, or
vacate pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05 for an abuse of
discretion. See Batts v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 217 S.W.3d 881, 883 (Ky.
App. 2007). The test for an abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision
was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000).
The Cabinet argues that the Scott Family Court did not utilize sound
legal principles when it found that the Jefferson Family Court’s order was “law of
the case” since this order was void ab initio. We agree that the Jefferson Family
Court lost jurisdiction over the matter once it was transferred to Scott Family Court
and that the August 10, 2005, order of the Jefferson Family Court was therefore
void ab initio.
Although the Jefferson Family Court order does not specifically state
so, it appears that the transfer to the Scott County Family Court was pursuant to
KRS 452.010. Section (1) of that statute states that “[t]he parties to any civil
action in a Circuit Court may, by consent, have an order in or out of court for its
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removal to any other Circuit Court.” Although the specific question of the
transferor court’s jurisdiction after a transfer takes place is one of first impression
regarding civil matters, this issue has been addressed by Kentucky courts in the
criminal law context.
In Woods v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 275, 147 S.W.2d 690, 691
(1941), the Court held that “when a case has been removed the court from which it
came has been divested of jurisdiction[.]” Similarly, section 25:14 of the
Kentucky Criminal Practice Manual, entitled “Procedure after venue is changed,”
provides that “[t]he original court making the transfer has no further jurisdiction to
prosecute the action as long as the transfer is in effect.” 9 Ky. Prac. Crim. Prac. &
Proc., § 25:14 (2008-2009).
This principle certainly makes sense in the context of child custody
cases–if shared jurisdiction was possible, individuals would simply forum shop
until they found a favorable court and then claim that their custody order was
superior to the other courts’ orders. In fact, addressing this problem was one of the
fundamental reasons for the creation of the family court system in Kentucky. For
example, in Wallace v. Wallace, 224 S.W.3d 587, 591 (Ky. App. 2007), this Court
expressly held that “Kentucky has created the family court system. The ‘one
judge, one family’ approach is a remedy to the fractionalization of family
jurisdiction.”
Although the Cabinet did not challenge the validity of the September
11, 2008, Jefferson Family Court order until the denial of its CR 59.05 motion to
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alter, amend, or vacate, we are still permitted to address this issue on appeal.
Questions of general jurisdiction “may be raised by the parties or the court at any
time and cannot be waived.” Privett v. Clendenin, 52 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Ky. 2001)
(citing Commonwealth Health Corp. v. Croslin, 920 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. 1996)).
Moreover, the issue “may be raised for the first time on appeal.” Id. (citing
Karahalios v. Karahalios, 848 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Ky. App. 1993)).
It is well established in Kentucky law that any order issued by a court
that did not have proper jurisdiction is “void ab initio . . . is not entitled to any
respect or deference by the courts.” S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 833 (Ky.
App. 2008) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, the Jefferson Family Court
order is considered “a legal nullity, and a court has no discretion in determining
whether it should be set aside.” Id. (citing Foremost Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 892
S.W.2d 607, 610 (Ky. App. 1995)); see also Wedding v. Lair, 404 S.W.2d 451
(Ky. 1966).
Applying the foregoing to the facts of the instant case, it is clear that
the Jefferson Family Court did not have general jurisdiction when it issued the
order dated September 11, 2008, given that it transferred the action to Scott Family
Court on August 10, 2005. As a result, this order had no legal effect whatsoever,
and the Scott Family Court’s adoption and reliance on it was an abuse of
discretion.
J.T.G. argues on appeal that the Scott Family Court also referenced
the June 2, 2005, order of the Jefferson Family Court, which awarded him sole
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custody of A.G. J.T.G. claims that the June 2, 2005, order also established that the
Cabinet was ordered to pay childcare costs and, thus, appears to argue that the
Jefferson Family Court made an appropriate ruling as to childcare costs when it
still retained jurisdiction over the case. A careful review of the record and the June
2, 2005, order denotes that no such mention of the Cabinet paying any costs was
made by the Jefferson Circuit Court in its order. While it appears from the
subsequent payments by the Cabinet for childcare from 2005 through September
2008 that the Cabinet did agree to pay such costs, it is not listed in the Jefferson
Circuit Court’s order, and we cannot find any other findings of fact adopted by that
order in the record.
Further, when the Scott Family Court adopted the void judgment of
the Jefferson Family Court, the Scott Family Court asserted that the order was the
“law of the case.” However, in Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Housing Authority, 244 S.W.3d 747, 751 (Ky. App. 2007), this Court held,
[t]he law of the case doctrine is “an iron rule, universally
recognized, that an opinion or decision of an appellate
court in the same cause is the law of the case for a
subsequent trial or appeal however erroneous the opinion
or decision may have been.” (Emphasis added) (citing
Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Blackwell’s Adm’r,
291 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Ky. 1956)).
Thus, by its very definition, the law of the case doctrine only applies to cases that
have first been appealed and then remanded back to the trial court. See also H.R.
ex rel. Taylor v. Revlett, 998 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. App. 1999).
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More importantly, the specific question as to whether the law of the
case doctrine applies to orders of the trial-level courts was resolved by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in the case of Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 174 S.W.3d
451, 466-467 (Ky. 2005). There, the Court held:
[a]s applied in Kentucky, the law of the case doctrine
applies only to rulings by an appellate court and not to
rulings by a trial court. Scamahorne v. Commonwealth,
376 S.W.2d 686, 687-88 (Ky. 1964). See also United
States v. Akers, 702 F.2d 1145, 1147-48 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
While some courts take a more liberal view of the
doctrine and have applied it to trial court rulings . . . we
decline to join them.
Id. See also Buckley v. Wilson, 177 S.W.3d 778 (Ky. 2005). Thus, even if the
Jefferson Family Court order was not void, the law of the case doctrine would not
have been the proper legal doctrine to apply to this case and the Scott Family Court
abused its discretion in so applying it.
The Cabinet argued in its CR 59.05 motion to alter, amend, or vacate
that the Jefferson Family Court’s September 11, 2008, order was unconstitutional
because it violated KRS 610.010(12) and the precedents set forth in both Cabinet
for Health & Family Services v. Huddleston, 185 S.W.3d 222 (Ky. App. 2006),
and Cabinet for Health & Family Services v. G.W.F., 229 S.W.3d 596 (Ky. App.
2007). In denying the cabinet’s motion, the Scott Family Court did not address the
merits of the Cabinet’s argument and instead erroneously reiterated that the
Jefferson Family Court’s order was the “law of the case.”
KRS 610.010(12) states:
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Except as provided in KRS 630.120(5), 635.060(3), or
635.090, nothing in this chapter shall confer upon the
District Court or the family division of the Circuit Court,
as appropriate, jurisdiction over the actions of the
Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet in the
placement, care, or treatment of a child committed to the
Department of Juvenile Justice or committed to or in the
custody of the cabinet; or to require the department or the
cabinet to perform, or to refrain from performing, any
specific act in the placement, care, or treatment of any
child committed to the department or committed to or in
the custody of the cabinet.
Given that the Scott Family Court erroneously relied on the invalid order entered
by the Jefferson Family Court, utilized an inapplicable legal doctrine in
determining the merits of J.T.G.’s claims, and never made a proper finding as to
whether this statute applied to the Cabinet and the facts of this case, we hold that
the Scott Family Court abused its discretion in denying the Cabinet’s CR 59.05
motion to alter, amend, or vacate its previous orders mandating the payment of
childcare costs by the Cabinet
Accordingly, we vacate the February 2, 2009, order of the Scott
Family Court and remand with instructions for the court to reconsider the
Cabinet’s CR 59.05 motion in light of this opinion, including but not limited to a
consideration of KRS 610.010(12) and its applicability to the facts of this case.
The Court is instructed to disregard the invalid order entered by the Jefferson
Circuit Court on September 11, 2008, as the order was void. Should the court
determine that the Cabinet must pay childcare costs, it should issue a new order
mandating such.
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HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
VANMETER, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURRING: I concur because I
believe Woods v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 275, 147 S.W.2d 690 (1941), is
dispositive of the issue before us; to wit, whether the Jefferson Family Court had
jurisdiction to enter its September 11, 2008, order which is the predicate for the
Scott Circuit Court orders under review in this appeal. It is significant to note that
the Jefferson Family Court order bears case number 04-J-505589-001,
notwithstanding that that case had previously been transferred to Scott Circuit
Court, assigned a Scott County case number (05-J-00205-001), and never
retransferred to Jefferson County. Consequently, the September 11, 2008,
Jefferson Family Court order was entered in a nonexistent case and is a nullity, and
it was an abuse of discretion for the Scott Circuit Court to endeavor to enforce it.
VANMETER, JUDGE, DISSENTING. I respectfully dissent. Here,
the Cabinet's brief and the majority opinion begin with the premise that because the
case was transferred from the Jefferson Circuit Court to the Scott Circuit Court, the
Jefferson Circuit Court lost subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter. However,
in fact both the circuit courts possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter. See
Privett v. Clendenin, 52 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Ky. 2001) (stating that “[s]ubject-matter
jurisdiction refers to a court’s authority to determine ‘this kind of case’ as opposed
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to ‘this case[,]’” citing Duncan v. O’Nan, 451 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Ky. 1970)).
While the record is clear that venue of the matter was transferred to the Scott
Circuit Court, nothing prevented the parties from choosing to waive venue and
return to the Jefferson Circuit Court, as happened here.
According to J.T.G., he originally agreed to take the child only after
the Cabinet agreed in court to provide kinship care1 assistance with child care
expenses. Unfortunately, the record contains no written agreement or order for the
payment of such funds. Meanwhile, in June 2005, J.T.G. and C.S. were named as
the child's permanent custodians, and the case was transferred to the Scott Circuit
Court for any further proceedings.
The Cabinet thereafter provided kinship care assistance for several
years. When the Cabinet ceased paying for child care, J.T.G. was advised by a
Cabinet representative that he should seek an order from the Jefferson Circuit
Court directing the Cabinet to resume providing assistance. J.T.G. followed the
advice and filed his motion in that court. Significantly, the Cabinet does not argue
that it lacked notice of the motion or failed to appear at the hearing. However, the
Cabinet failed to raise any issues at that time regarding venue. On September 11,
2008, the Jefferson Circuit Court entered an order directing the Cabinet to provide
1
Kinship care is established by KRS 605.120(5), which provides that “[t]o the extent funds are
available, the cabinet may establish a program for kinship care that provides a more permanent
placement with a qualified relative for a child that would otherwise be placed in foster care due
to abuse, neglect, or death of both parents.” Further, a “kinship caregiver who is dissatisfied
with an action or inaction on the part of the cabinet relating to financial assistance under the
Kinship Care Program shall have rights to a hearing pursuant to 921 KAR 2:055.” 922 KAR
1:130, Section 19(2). Certainly, neither party has raised the administrative procedure, and to that
extent, its consideration has been waived.
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kinship care assistance. No appeal was taken and the order became final in
October 2008.
In November 2008, J.T.G. sought enforcement of the order by the
Scott Circuit Court. The Scott Circuit Court ordered enforcement of the order and
this appeal followed.
Contrary to the Cabinet's arguments, this matter does not turn on
whether the Jefferson Circuit Court had jurisdiction. Clearly, the court had
subject-matter jurisdiction over this type of case. While the Cabinet could have
challenged the Jefferson Circuit Court’s exercise of venue, it did not do so. In
other words, the issue of venue was waived. As noted by the Kentucky Supreme
Court, venue, unlike jurisdiction, “may be conferred by waiver[.]” Fritsch v.
Caudill, 146 S.W.3d 926, 927 (Ky. 2004) (citing James v. Holt, 244 S.W.2d 159
(Ky. 1951)). The court further noted in Fritsch that “while the concept of venue is
important, it does not reach the fundamental level of jurisdiction, a concept
whereby the authority of the court to act is at issue.” 146 S.W.3d at 927 (citing
Duncan v. O'Nan, 451 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1970)). Because the Cabinet failed to
object timely to the Jefferson Circuit Court’s exercise of venue, it implicitly agreed
to that court’s determination of the issue brought in J.T.G.’s motion, i.e., whether
an agreement existed concerning the payment of certain child care expenses.
Issues of jurisdiction and venue therefore did not prevent the Jefferson Circuit
Court from entering its order, and the Cabinet's claim that the Jefferson Circuit
Court’s order was void ab initio must fail.
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Next, the Cabinet claims that the Jefferson Circuit Court's order was
unconstitutional on its face as being in violation of KRS 610.010(12), which
specifically excludes from trial court jurisdiction those matters which involve the
Cabinet's efforts to place, care for or treat children. However, a careful reading of
the statute shows that it applies only to children who are “committed to or in the
custody of the cabinet[.]” The child herein was neither committed to nor in the
custody of the Cabinet during the time in issue, and the record is clear that J.T.G. is
the child’s permanent custodian. The statute therefore is not applicable to the
court's efforts to enforce the order directing the Cabinet to pay child care costs.
Finally, regardless of whether the Jefferson Circuit Court's order was
the "law of the case," certainly the Scott Circuit Court was obligated to enforce the
final order issued by that court. No error occurred.
The Scott Circuit Court's order should be affirmed.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jerry M. Lovitt
Georgetown, Kentucky
J. T. G., Pro Se
Sadieville, Kentucky
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