BROWN (ZIRL) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 13, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001920-MR
ZIRL BROWN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ERNESTO SCORSONE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00458
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL AND VANMETER, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Zirl L. Brown appeals from a judgment of the Fayette Circuit
Court following a conditional guilty plea2 to charges of criminal attempt to possess
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09.
a controlled substance3 (amended) for which his sentence was fixed at twelve
months probated for two years; possession of open alcohol beverage container in a
motor vehicle4 for which he was ordered to pay a $30.00 fine; and operating on a
suspended/revoked operator’s license5 for which he was ordered to pay a fine of
$100.00. On appeal, he argues the trial court erroneously denied his motion to
suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his sports utililty vehicle
(SUV) because police lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the
search. After reviewing the record and the law, we are convinced the officers had
reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Brown’s SUV. Therefore, we affirm the
judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court.
This appeal stems from a traffic stop made in the early morning hours
of March 1, 2008, in an area of Fayette County, Kentucky, known for drug sales.
Details of the stop and subsequent search were provided by Officer Brian Peterson
of the Lexington Division of Police, the only witness to testify at the suppression
hearing.
While on patrol in a marked police cruiser, Officer Peterson was
flagged down by a white woman waving her arms from her car at the intersection
of Seventh and Jackson Streets. She told Officer Peterson she was a nurse on her
3
Brown was indicted for possession of controlled substance first degree under KRS 218A.1415,
which is a Class D felony. However, he ultimately entered a conditional guilty plea to and was
convicted of criminal attempt to possession of controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor.
Criminal attempt is explained in KRS 506.010.
4
KRS 189.530(2), a violation.
5
KRS 186.620(2), a Class B misdemeanor.
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way to work and while waiting at the stop sign at Sixth Street and Elm Tree Lane,
a black man wearing light colored pants approached her car on foot. Nothing else
happened as she waited at the stop sign, but the woman complained that people
often approach her car as she travels through the area en route to work and she was
tired of it. Officer Peterson testified police receive many complaints about nightly
drug activity and loitering in that area. He compared drug sales in that
neighborhood to a drive-thru restaurant window where a potential buyer drives into
the area, briefly stops his vehicle, a seller approaches the vehicle on foot, drugs are
exchanged for money, and the driver leaves the scene with the drugs.
Based on his knowledge of the area and the information provided by
the nurse, Officer Peterson called for two additional uniformed officers to assist
him in investigating the complaint. At the intersection of Sixth Street and Elm
Tree Lane the officers saw a dark SUV parked near a stop sign. The officers
observed a black male, later identified as John H. Adams, Jr., approach the
passenger side of the SUV by foot, remain less than one minute, leave, and return
within one minute. Officer Peterson did not know if the SUV’s motor was running
or how many people, if any, were inside the SUV. Officers never saw Adams
reach inside the SUV.
As officers approached the intersection to speak with Adams, he
began walking away from the SUV and crossed the street. As officers got closer to
Adams, he began running along Sixth Street. The officers gave chase and one of
them caught and detained Adams who had tossed what was believed to be a gun
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during the foot chase. Officers recovered a BB pistol that Adams said he carried
for protection. A Terry6-type search of Adams revealed no other weapons.
Officers did not search Adams for drugs or money because they did not believe
they had probable cause to perform a warrantless search. Furthermore, Officer
Peterson did not believe Adams was the man who had approached the nurse.
When asked, Adams denied any involvement with the SUV. Even though officers
had just observed Adams approach the SUV twice, they permitted him to leave the
scene.
While officers were speaking with Adams, the SUV left, heading east
on Sixth Street. Dispatch was alerted that a dark Chevy Blazer, last seen headed
toward Ohio Street on Sixth Street, might be related to the narcotics trade. About
five minutes later, the Blazer passed the officers again and one of them recorded
the license plate number which was relayed to dispatch. Solely on the strength of
the radio dispatch, another officer stopped the SUV at the intersection of Maple
and Loudon Avenues.
Brown, wearing light tan pants, was the Blazer’s only occupant. A
K-9 officer at the scene made a positive hit on the SUV. After having Brown exit
the SUV, Officer Peterson found a loose rock of suspected crack cocaine in the
center console of the vehicle underneath some items. An open can of beer,
standing upright, was also found on the floor of the Blazer.
6
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
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Brown was arrested shortly after 4:00 on the morning of March 1,
2008, and indicted in April 2008. He entered a not guilty plea at arraignment.
While no written motion to suppress was filed, the trial court7 conducted a
suppression hearing at Brown’s request on July 10, 2008. After hearing testimony
from Officer Peterson and argument from counsel, the court made the following
oral findings: officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe crime was
afoot and to stop Adams and the SUV when Adams ran from officers after they
had twice observed Adams approach the SUV; allowing Adams to leave the scene
did not dissipate their reasonable, articulable suspicion that the SUV had been
involved in a drug crime and to continue investigating the SUV and its driver; the
lack of drugs on Adams could reasonably be interpreted to mean Adams was the
seller and the drug he sold was now inside the SUV; the stop and search were
conducted by an experienced officer8 in an area known for high drug activity;
Officer Peterson had just received a citizen complaint about someone approaching
her car on foot; officers traveled to and observed the intersection identified by the
nurse before approaching Adams and later the SUV; officers acted carefully and
conservatively and tried to stay within constitutional boundaries by not searching
Adams for anything other than weapons; and finally, Brown’s vehicle was not
7
Judge Sheila Isaac presided over the suppression hearing. Judge Ernesto M. Scorsone presided
over entry of the guilty plea and final sentencing.
8
Officer Peterson testified he has been a police officer for six years. Throughout that time he
has worked the same beat, known as the Central Sector, covering downtown Lexington and an
area just north of the city. Officer Peterson testified he was familiar with the Sixth Street and
Elm Tree Lane neighborhood. At the time of the stop, he was in uniform and driving a marked
police cruiser.
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searched until a K-9 officer had made a positive hit on the SUV. Based upon these
findings of fact, the trial court denied the suppression motion. The trial court did
not reduce its findings to a written order but merely stated, “the motion is hereby
Denied for reasons stated on the record.”
On August 22, 2008, Brown entered a conditional guilty plea to all
three charges. Although no writing shows any issue was reserved for appeal as
required by RCr 8.09, defense counsel did state on the record during the guilty plea
colloquy that a conditional plea was being entered and that Brown was reserving
the court’s suppression ruling. This appeal followed. We affirm.
We begin with a word about preservation. Although mentioned by
neither party, RCr 8.09 governs the entry of a conditional guilty plea. That rule
specifies in pertinent part,
[w]ith the approval of the court a defendant may enter a
conditional plea of guilty, reserving in writing the right,
on appeal from the judgment, to review of the adverse
determination of any specified trial or pretrial motion.
While Brown’s defense counsel stated during the guilty plea colloquy that a
conditional plea was being entered and that the suppression ruling was appealed,
grounds for an appeal were not reserved in writing as required by RCr 8.09. Thus,
nothing was properly preserved for our review. Although inartful, we will
consider the oral reservation of the issue by defense counsel, and the lack of any
objection by the Commonwealth, to be adequate to preserve the issue for our
review under these circumstances. See Gabbard v. Commonwealth, 887 S.W.2d
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347, 350 (Ky. 1994) (holding acknowledgement and reference by court to an issue
in conditional plea proceedings can preserve said issue for appellate review).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section
Ten of Kentucky’s Constitution forbid unreasonable searches and seizures. While
warrantless searches or seizures are generally improper, Williams v.
Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2004), an exception to the warrant
requirement allows officers to make brief investigatory stops when they “have a
reasonable articulable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be afoot.’” Id. at 5,
quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884. The reasonable, articulable
suspicion requirement is “less demanding . . . than probable cause and requires a
showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence. . . .” Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 675, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). Since
Brown contests only the propriety of the stop, the single question before us is
whether officers had a sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal
activity was afoot when they engaged in a Terry-style detention of Brown.
We utilize a two-part evaluation when reviewing denial of a
suppression motion. We review factual findings for clear error; we review de novo
the court’s application of the law to the facts. Ornelas v. United States, 527 U.S.
690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); Adcock v.
Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1998). See also RCr 9.78. It is well-settled in
Kentucky that after a hearing on a defendant's suppression motion, the trial court's
findings are deemed conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. See e.g.,
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Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968, S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1998); Canler v. Commonwealth,
870 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1994), citing Harper v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 665
(Ky. 1985); and Crawford v. Commonwealth, 824 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1992).
Substantial evidence means that which “a reasonable mind would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion” and evidence that, when “taken alone or in the
light of all the evidence . . . has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in
the minds of reasonable men.” See Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky.
2003). The determination that a stop was supported by reasonable articulable
suspicion, in other words, that occupants within the vehicle are, or are about to be,
involved in criminal activity, is reviewed de novo. Ornelas, 527 U.S. at 699. To
make such a determination, we must consider the totality of the circumstances
surrounding Brown's detention. U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690,
695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 987 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Ky.
1998).
In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we summarize the
evidence as follows. Officer Peterson was familiar with the area due to working
that beat for at least five years. He knew the neighborhood to be a high crime area
for drug activity. A citizen flagged down Officer Peterson just before 4:00 a.m. to
express her displeasure that people repeatedly approached her vehicle on foot as
she drove to work. Upon receiving the complaint, Officer Peterson summoned two
other officers to provide assistance. While conducting surveillance of the
intersection of Sixth Street and Elm Tree Lane, the officers saw someone approach
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a dark SUV on foot, stop briefly, leave and then return within one minute. This
activity was consistent with the “drive-thru” drug transactions Officer Peterson
knew to be common in that area.
When officers approached Adams, the man on foot, he ran and tossed
what appeared to be a gun. Officers recovered the item which turned out to be a
BB pistol Adams claimed he carried for protection. When officers asked Adams
about the dark-colored SUV, he lied to them saying he knew nothing about it. This
statement was inconsistent with the officer’s own observations as they had just
watched Adams approach the SUV, disappear and then reappear at the SUV’s
passenger-side door. Based upon the foregoing, officers had sufficient reasonable
and articulable suspicion to conduct a Terry-type frisk of Adams which yielded no
additional weapons. However, since Adams was not wearing light colored pants as
described by the nurse and Officer Peterson did not believe him to be the person
who had approached the nurse on foot, the officers did not believe they had
probable cause to further investigate Adams and allowed him to leave.
However, contrary to Brown’s argument, allowing Adams to leave did
not dissipate their reasonable and articulable suspicion about the SUV being
involved in a drug crime. Officers linked Adams and the SUV based on their
observation of Adams approaching the vehicle twice in the span of a couple of
minutes. Additionally, the search of the SUV did not occur until after the drug dog
had positively alerted on the SUV.
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As the trial court stated in denying Brown’s suppression motion, the
officers were careful and conservative in their actions. We agree. The court’s
factual findings constitute substantial evidence and are supported by the record.
Thus, they are conclusive. Talbott. Furthermore, we are convinced the trial court
correctly applied the law to its factual findings. As a result, we hold the officers
had sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop and search Brown based
upon their experience, personal observations, knowledge of the area’s high crime
reputation, and positive alert by the K-9 officer.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Steven J. Buck
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
John Paul Varo
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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