CAMPBELL (JAMES) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 30, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001881-MR
JAMES CAMPBELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 86-CR-00113
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, DIXON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: James Campbell appeals the denial by the Fayette Circuit
Court of his Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02 motion to correct his
sentence in light of the recent Kentucky Supreme Court opinion of Peyton v.
Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 504 (Ky. 2008).1 Campbell argues that he was
1
Peyton, in overruling Devore v. Commonwealth, 662 S.W.2d 829 (Ky. 1984), interpreted
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 533.060(2) to mean that felonies committed while on parole
entitled to relief and an evidentiary hearing under CR 60.02 as his sentence is now
in error because the trial court followed the Devore interpretation of KRS
533.060(2), now overruled by Peyton. He also argues that the trial court
wrongfully denied his motion for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law
under CR 52.04, filed after the trial court overruled his current CR 60.02 motion.
The Commonwealth disagrees. After a review of the parties’ arguments, the
record, and the applicable law, we find no error in the denial of either Campbell’s
CR 60.02 motion nor his CR 52.04 motion by the Fayette Circuit Court and,
accordingly, we affirm.
Campbell was convicted of third-degree burglary and theft by a jury
over twenty years ago. While the jury recommended Campbell be sentenced to
three years on each count, Campbell was found to be a persistent felony offender
and each sentence was enhanced to fifteen years. At Campbell’s final sentencing,
the Commonwealth informed the trial court that Campbell was a parolee and as
such the sentences had to run consecutively pursuant to Devore and its
interpretations of KRS 533.060 and KRS 532.110. Campbell’s sentences were
then set consecutively for a total of thirty years.
Campbell’s conviction and his sentence were affirmed on direct
appeal. Thereafter, Campbell filed numerous post-conviction motions similar to
his current CR 60.02 motion, all of which were denied by the trial court. Those
that were appealed were affirmed. When Campbell presented the trial court with
shall serve consecutively to the felony sentence for which paroled but may serve concurrently to
one another.
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his current CR 60.02 motion, the trial court stated that it was overruling this
motion for the same reasons as set out in its prior orders denying Campbell’s
multiple similar post-conviction motions. Campbell then moved the trial court for
findings of fact and conclusions of law under CR 52.04, which the trial court
overruled. It is from the denial of these motions that Campbell now appeals.
On appeal Campbell makes three arguments.2 First, that the trial court
abused its discretion when the court summarily overruled his current CR 60.02(f)
motion because his sentence is now contrary to the law in Peyton. Second, that
Campbell was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his latest CR 60.02(f) motion.
Third, that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law pursuant to CR 52.04 upon Campbell's written request
after the denial of his current CR 60.02(f) motion.
In contrast, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in overruling the current CR 60.02 motion for six reasons.
First, Campbell's claim is not properly within the purview of the present CR 60.02
motion, as relief under CR 60.02 is an extraordinary remedy and Campbell’s
claimed errors do not merit relief. Second, the current motion relitigates issues that
have been previously raised on direct appeal and in prior post-conviction motions.
2
Campbell made two secondary arguments that do not merit relief and as such we only briefly
address them. First, we do not find Campbell’s argument that the trial court was not bound by
the doctrine of stare decisis to be relevant to the appeal at hand, as the trial court was bound to
follow established appellate precedent under Supreme Court Rules (SCR) 1.040(5). Second,
while Campbell is correct that more lenient standards apply to prisoners filing pro se, we have
not interpreted this as an abandonment of our rules of procedure or jurisprudence. See Brooks v.
Commonwealth, 447 S.W.2d 614, 618 (Ky. 1969).
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Third, the motion falls outside the time parameters of CR 60.02, as it was filed
over twenty years after Campbell’s conviction became final. Fourth, even if the
current motion was timely filed, it would not entitle him to relief, as Campbell is
bound by the law of the case doctrine from the litigation of his prior appeals and
motions. Fifth, retroactive application was not addressed by the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Peyton. Sixth, the trial court stated that it was overruling the
current motion because of the reasons set forth in its prior orders. Nothing more
was required and as such the trial court did not err.3
Campbell responds to the Commonwealth’s arguments and claims that
he must reraise the issues presented in the case sub judice,- as he has no other
avenue in which to pursue the sentencing error. Campbell further argues that while
his motion was filed over twenty years after his conviction, it was timely filed as
the Kentucky Supreme Court has now corrected its mistaken interpretation and that
if it did not desire a retroactive application of Peyton, the Court would have said
so.
In light of the aforementioned arguments, we now turn to our
established jurisprudence. We review the denial of a CR 60.02 motion under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. White v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Ky.
App. 2000); Brown v. Commonwealth, 932 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Ky. 1996). The test
for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary,
3
Campbell also filed a writ of mandamus with this Court which was denied as the issues raised
in the writ could be brought upon appeal. We note that the ruling on the writ did not preclude
our deciding the merits of Campbell’s claimed errors and simply established that, procedurally,
the issues raised could be brought forth on appeal.
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unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Commonwealth v.
English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citing 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review §
695 (1995)). Therefore, we will affirm the lower court's decision unless there is a
showing of some “flagrant miscarriage of justice.” Gross v. Commonwealth, 648
S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky. 1983).
Campbell seeks relief on appeal pursuant to CR 60.02(f). Relief may
be granted under CR 60.02(f) for any reason of an extraordinary nature justifying
relief. A CR 60.02(f) motion must be made within a reasonable time. See CR
60.02 and Gross at 858. An evidentiary hearing is not required to assess the
reasonable time restriction inherent in CR 60.02 motions as such is left to the
discretion of the Court. Id.
The burden of proof falls squarely on the movant to “affirmatively
allege facts which, if true, justify vacating the judgment and further allege special
circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief.” McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948
S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky.1997) citing Gross at 856. To justify relief, the movant must
specifically present facts which render the “original trial tantamount to none at
all[.]” Brown at 361.
Given this jurisprudence, we turn to the arguments of the parties. In
the case sub judice Campbell’s first argument is conclusive of this appeal.
Accordingly, we give Campbell’s second and third arguments only brief
consideration.
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Campbell’s first argument is that Peyton should be applied
retroactively. We have concluded that Peyton, as decided by our Supreme Court,
was not intended to be applied retroactively.
Recently, our Kentucky Supreme Court discussed the retroactive
application of Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2006), in Leonard v.
Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009).
In Leonard, the Court concluded that the new procedural rule
applicable to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 proceedings
announced in Martin could not be applied retroactively to a collateral attack on a
judgment that was final when Martin was decided. Leonard is instructive in
deciding the case sub judice. Like Campbell, Leonard had previously appealed his
conviction and had previously been denied post-conviction relief many years
before a subsequent court decision changing the interpretation of the law.
Campbell is now, as was Leonard then, seeking to “avoid the general rule against
retroactive application of a decision.” Leonard at 161.
Our Supreme Court stated in Leonard at 161-162, that:
Appellant claims that this Court's own procedural rules
allow him to avoid the general rule against retroactive
application of a decision. He first argues that the purpose
of CR 60.02, under which the motion giving rise to this
appeal was filed, is to allow a court to correct a mistake.
Thus, he claims barring retroactive application would
undermine the purpose and language of the rule. This is
incorrect. As Appellant correctly notes, CR 60.02
replaced the common law writ of coram nobis. That writ,
however, was aimed at correcting factual errors, not
legal errors. Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98
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(Ky.1998). Appellant is not seeking remediation of a
factual error; rather, he is seeking to correct the legal
decision that his ineffective assistance claims were
procedurally barred, a decision that was correct under the
case law in existence at the time.
A change in the law simply is not grounds for CR 60.02
relief except in “aggravated cases where there are strong
equities.” Reed v. Reed, 484 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Ky.1972).
This is not such a case. Appellant has received significant
direct and collateral review at the state and federal levels
since his conviction some 25 years ago. His previous
sentence has been reduced by gubernatorial order. The
equities do not weigh in favor of using CR 60.02 to apply
Martin's change in the law to Appellant's case.
(Emphasis supplied).
In comparing Leonard to the current case, we note that Campbell, as
did Leonard, filed a CR 60.02 motion many years after his conviction was final.
Campbell, as did Leonard, seeks to correct a legal decision and not a factual error,
the former being an improper use of CR 60.02 while the latter is a proper use.
Procedurally, Campbell and Leonard are in the same posture. Our Supreme Court
found that Leonard could not properly challenge his sentence by means of a CR
60.02 motion and, necessarily, that the facts in Leonard did not rise to the level
necessary to grant relief as they were not exemplary of an aggravated case with
strong equities. Reed at 847.
If Leonard’s twenty-five-year-old conviction, challenged multiple
times with post-conviction motions, was found by our Supreme Court to not be
such a case, then Campbell’s twenty-year-old conviction which has been the
subject of multiple post-conviction motions is, likewise, not such a case.
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The proscription against “applying new rules retroactively once a
judgment is final on direct review makes sense, given the interest in finality of
judgments.” Leonard at 160. The retroactive application of Peyton is, thus,
proscribed. To permit otherwise would wholly vitiate the finality of judgments in
that each change in the law would allow or require relitigation of the facts and law
of every case.
In considering Campbell’s second argument that he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing, we must consider the purpose of an evidentiary hearing which
is to determine facts which are not discernable from the record. The issue of
whether Peyton is retroactive is a legal conclusion and what few facts, if any, that
would be necessary to determine if it should be applied retroactively in Campbell’s
case are easily discernable from the record. Therefore, an evidentiary hearing was
unnecessary.
In considering Campbell’s third argument that he was entitled to
additional findings of fact and conclusions of law under his CR 52.04, we must
understand that CR 52.04, by its own terms, addresses an additional finding of fact
on an issue essential to the judgment. In contrast, Campbell presents a legal
argument; there were no facts to be found. Moreover, CR 52.01 specifically
provides that “[f]indings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on
decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided
in Rule 41.02.” The denial of CR 60.02 relief does not fall within the purview of
CR 52.04 and, thus, does not require written findings and conclusions. This is
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particularly so when there are no facts to be found and any legal conclusion
regarding the retroactive interpretation of Peyton would be reviewed de novo.
Thus, Campbell was not entitled to CR 52.01 findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and the trial court did not err in denying Campbell’s motion for
additional findings of fact and conclusions of law.
In light of the aforementioned reasons, we find no error in the trial
court’s denial of either Campbell’s CR 60.02 or CR 52.04 motion. We affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James K. Campbell, Pro Se
Lexington, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Joshua D. Farley
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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