PITTMAN (WILLIAM ERIC) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 16, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001785-MR
WILLIAM ERIC PITTMAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ERNESTO SCORSONE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-01380
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CAPERTON, CLAYTON, AND DIXON, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: William Eric Pittman entered a guilty plea to one count of
unlawful use of electronic means to induce a minor to engage in sexual activities or
other prohibited activities. In exchange for the plea, he received a sentence for five
years imprisonment, to serve sixty days, with the remainder of the sentence
probated for five years. On appeal, Pittman argues that Kentucky Revised
Statute(s) (KRS) 510.155 is unconstitutional. We affirm.
The charges against Pittman arose from his conversations with a
Kentucky State Police detective posing as a fourteen-year-old girl in a Yahoo chat
room. Pittman’s Yahoo identity was titled “female_playmate_wanted,” and he
falsely listed his name as “Rob Johnson.” These conversations occurred between
May 7, 2007, and July 11, 2007. Even though Pittman believed the “girl” was only
fourteen years old, he initiated graphic sexual conversation, offered to send her
“naughty” pictures, requested pictures of her in panties or a bikini, suggested that
he take nude pictures of her when they met, and arranged to meet the girl for sex.
On March 19, 2007, Pittman filed a motion to dismiss his indictment
alleging that KRS 510.155 was unconstitutional. The Fayette Circuit Court entered
its findings of fact, conclusion of law, and order on June 2, 2008, overruling
Pittman’s motion to dismiss. Subsequently, on August 1, 2008, Pittman entered a
conditional plea, pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09,
for violating KRS 510.155. On September 17, 2008, the trial court entered final
judgment and sentenced Pittman. This appeal follows.
Pittman argues that the peace officer provision KRS 510.155 violates
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, both on its face and as applied to
him, because no actual child was involved in his communication and the statute
punishes mere belief.
Although KRS 510.1551 was amended by the 2009 Legislature, the
statute in effect at the time of this criminal behavior stated:
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See 2009 Kentucky Laws Ch. 100 (HB 315).
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(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly use a
communications system, including computers, computer
networks, computer bulletin boards, cellular telephones,
or any other electronic means, for the purpose of
procuring or promoting the use of a minor, or a peace
officer posing as a minor if the person believes that the
peace officer is a minor or is wanton or reckless in that
belief, for any activity in violation of KRS 510.040,
510.050, 510.060, 510.070, 510.080, 510.090, 529.100
where that offense involves commercial sexual activity,
or 530.064(1)(a), or KRS Chapter 531.
(2) No person shall be convicted of this offense and an
offense specified in KRS 506.010, 506.030, 506.040, or
506.080 for a single course of conduct intended to
consummate in the commission of the same offense with
the same minor or peace officer.
(3) A violation of this section is punishable as a Class D
felony.
Notwithstanding Pittman’s recital of the jurisprudence about First
Amendment protection of speech, it cannot be ignored that it has long been held
that “[o]ffers to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First
Amendment protection.” U.S. v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1841,
170 L.Ed.2d 650, 76 USLW 4275 (2008). In Williams, the Supreme Court held
that a federal statute prohibiting the pandering and solicitation of child
pornography did not violate the First Amendment. Id.
Contrary to Pittman’s belief that his action was protected by the
holding in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 152
L.Ed.2d 403 (2002), the Supreme Court in Williams explained that the statute in
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question for their situation did not violate the First Amendment protection of
virtual child pornography found in Ashcroft because:
A crime is committed only when the speaker believes or
intends the listener to believe that the subject of the
proposed transaction depicts real children.
Williams, 128 S.Ct. at 1844. In addition, Pittman’s contentions that the statute
impermissibly captures his legal behavior with another adult are specious. The
statute itself expressly states that it applies to those with a manifested intent to
knowingly target children. Pittman specifically acted to procure sexual activity
with a child. And courts have long recognized that the government has a
compelling interest in protecting children, including the need to protect children
from sexual exploitation. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 102 S.Ct.
3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). And the statute is narrowly tailored to serve this
interest because it includes only behavior that manifests a clear intent to solicit
children for a proscribed activity, which is undoubtedly harmful to children and
odious to adults.
Moreover, in a recent decision designated for publication, Filzek v.
Com, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2009 WL 414462 (Ky. App. 2009)(2008-CA-000536-MR),
the Court relied on Williams. Our Court succinctly and correctly delineated the
reasons that offers to engage in illegal transactions are excluded from First
Amendment protection, and further held that KRS 510.155 was not
unconstitutional on its face or as applied to that defendant:
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KRS 510.155 merely prohibits the use of
electronic means to engage in or solicit already otherwise
prohibited activities. As such, the First Amendment
protections are not implicated. Under Williams, a
defendant could be convicted for pandering or soliciting
virtual pornography if the defendant believed that the
pornography involved actual children. The same
reasoning applies by analogy to the peace officer
provision of KRS 510.155. It is not material that the
child turned out to be a police officer. It is the
defendant's belief that he was soliciting an actual child to
engage in sexual activities which is at issue. “There is no
First Amendment exception from the general principle of
criminal law that a person attempting to commit a crime
need not be exonerated because he has a mistaken view
of the facts.” Williams, 128 S.Ct. at 1845. KRS 510.155
is not unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Filzek.
Filzek, 2009 WL 414462. We concur in the reasoning of the Filzek court, and
likewise hold that KRS 510.155 is not unconstitutional on its face or as applied to
Pittman. No constitutionally protected right exists to solicit sexual conduct from
minors, and as such, this statute and like statutes may punish actions that include
speech made for the sole purpose of procuring activities that are validly prohibited.
In the statute it is action, not thought, that is validly prohibited.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
R. Tucker Richardson, III
Brandi Lewis
Lexington, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Heather M. Fryman
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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