HUDSON (MICHAEL) VS. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 4, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001595-MR
MICHAEL HUDSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH E. MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-008385
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND DIXON, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: Michael Hudson appeals from a jury verdict and
judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of CSX Transportation, Inc.
Hudson filed suit against CSX under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA),
45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq., claiming that he had sustained a permanent brain injury as
1
Senior Judge Michael L.Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
a result of his exposure to various industrial solvents and cleaners during his
employment with CSX. On appeal, Hudson claims that the trial court erroneously
excluded evidence, including expert testimony, relating to his alleged exposure to
the solvent trichloroethylene. After our review, we affirm.
The following facts were testified to at trial. Hudson began his career
with the railroad in 1973 as a machinist apprentice at the Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Company, a predecessor to CSX, and worked at that location until 1988.
He began his employment at the company’s South Louisville Locomotive Repair
& Maintenance Shops and eventually became a journeyman machinist in 1978.
Hudson’s job duties included cleaning locomotives and their parts, working on
lathes, rebuilding injectors, and tuning up engines. To clean this equipment,
Hudson used a solvent that railroad employees referred to as “Dowclean,”
“Dowcleaner,” or “L&N #3” – which the record reflects was composed of the
chlorinated hydrocarbons 1,1,1 trichloroethane and perchloroethylene – along with
mineral spirits and alkaline soaps. According to Hudson, he regularly removed
Dowclean out of a drum or vat with a bucket and used it to clean motor parts.
Hudson testified that when using Dowclean, he became dizzy and
lightheaded and would get headaches. Because of this, he stayed in an area where
Dowclean was being used no longer than necessary and routinely went outside to
get fresh air and to clear his head. Other railroad employees experienced similarly
adverse symptoms when they used the solvent. Hudson also recalled working near
vapor phase degreasers – machines that were heated and used to clean engine parts.
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He testified that he would breathe in fumes when he had to remove something
from the degreaser, but he did not know what chemical was used in the machine.
Hudson testified that he generally took an aspirin to alleviate any
headaches that he experienced and got on with his work because he wasn’t a
“complainer.” He could not recall ever going to a shop nurse, medical officer, or
other health care provider with complaints about any of his symptoms while he
worked for the railroad. Hudson also indicated that he had no idea that his use of
chemical solvents in his work might have a long-term detrimental effect on his
health. However, he testified that as early as the mid-to-late 1980s, he began
having memory problems, sleep issues, and more chronic headaches. He also
began having trouble focusing on a single task or otherwise concentrating. Years
after leaving the company for another job, Hudson was diagnosed with “chronic
toxic encephalopathy,” a somewhat controversial diagnosis that is typically
characterized as a form of permanent, irreversible brain injury characterized by
short-term memory loss, depression, anxiety, and diminished mental function. It
was also suggested that this injury was the result of overexposure to dangerous
chemicals and solvents while Hudson was employed at CSX.
On September 24, 2003, Hudson filed suit against CSX in Jefferson
Circuit Court and sought relief pursuant to FELA. He claimed that during the
course of his employment with CSX, he was regularly overexposed to toxic
solvents, chemicals, fumes, mineral spirits, lye soaps, and other cleaners and
solvents – including 1,1,1 trichloroethane – due to the negligence of CSX. Hudson
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alleged that this overexposure had resulted in various permanent injuries, including
chronic toxic encephalopathy.
After extensive discovery, the case was tried before a Jefferson
County jury from July 15, 2008, through July 25, 2008. Seventeen witnesses
testified in all, with the majority of those being expert witnesses and other
physicians. Following its deliberation, the jury voted 9-3 in favor of CSX and
concluded that the company had not been negligent by failing to provide Hudson
with a reasonably safe place to work. Thus, CSX was found not liable for any
claimed injuries suffered by Hudson during the course of his employment with the
company – including toxic encephalopathy. Hudson subsequently filed this
appeal.
On appeal, Hudson argues that the trial court erred by excluding
evidence, including expert opinion testimony, relating to his exposure to the
chemical solvent trichloroethylene while he was employed at CSX and how that
exposure contributed to his injuries. Prior to trial, CSX filed a motion in limine
seeking to exclude any testimony relating to chemicals other than those to which
Hudson was exposed and to which he testified. During his depositions, Hudson
specifically mentioned only Dowclean, mineral spirits, and lye as cleaners to which
he had been exposed. Because of this fact, CSX contended that evidence as to
which chemicals had caused Hudson’s alleged injuries should be limited to these
items. CSX also argued that Hudson’s experts had limited their causation opinions
only to Hudson’s exposure to Dowclean, mineral spirits, and possibly
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perchloroethylene; thus, CSX contended that the trial court should exclude
evidence that Hudson was exposed to any other solvents – including
trichloroethylene – because of a lack of expert testimony linking that possible
exposure to Hudson’s injuries. CSX notes that although many of Hudson’s experts
provided broad disclosures relating to a number of chemicals and solvents, their
deposition testimony focused on Dowclean and excluded other solvents, including
the chlorinated solvent trichloroethylene. Hudson argued in response that although
he had not personally mentioned all of the solvents to which he had been exposed,
that testimony would be produced by his former coworkers at the railroad;
therefore, CSX’s motion should be denied.
On July 8, 2008, the trial court entered an order granting CSX’s
motion. That order stated as follows:
Testimony relating to chemicals other than those to
which Plaintiff was exposed and to which he testified.
CSX seeks to prohibit testimony that Plaintiff was
exposed to chemicals other than lye, “Dow Cleaner,” and
mineral spirits; Plaintiff’s experts have concluded that his
brain damage is a result of exposure to “Dow Cleaner.”
Assuming the other chemicals Plaintiff wishes to have
presented at trial are not contained in the product which
allegedly caused Plaintiff’s permanent injury,
introduction of those other chemicals is minimally
relevant at best. The prejudice to CSX is obvious – it
knew of and/or subjected its employees to other
chemicals; i.e., prior bad acts. This potential prejudice
far outweighs any peripheral relevance and will not be
admitted. KRE [Kentucky Rules of Evidence] 402, 403,
and 404. CSX’s motion is GRANTED.
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Thus, the trial court precluded any testimony or evidence relating to solvents or
chemicals used in the South Louisville shops unless it was shown through
Hudson’s experts that those items contributed to his brain injuries. This ruling
ultimately prevented Hudson from presenting evidence specifically relating to his
alleged exposure to trichloroethylene and how it may have contributed to his
injuries.2
Hudson claims that this decision flew in the face of a plethora of
deposition testimony and documentation that had conclusively established that he
had been exposed to trichloroethylene while employed at CSX. In response, CSX
contends that the exclusion of evidence relating to Hudson’s alleged exposure to
trichloroethylene was appropriate in light of the fact that his experts failed to
causally relate his toxic encephalopathy specifically to his being exposed to
trichloroethylene. CSX further argues that – unlike the evidence of Hudson’s
exposure to Dowclean – there was no direct testimony produced indicating that
Hudson was exposed to trichloroethylene or that exposure to trichloroethylene
caused him any acute symptoms of dizziness or lightheadedness or any long-term
chronic injury. Instead, there was only the suggestion that the solvent could be
found in locations where Hudson worked. CSX also maintains that the exclusion
of this evidence did not hinder Hudson’s ability to establish that his injuries were
caused by overexposure to chemical solvents.
2
The record reflects, however, that the trial court did allow some testimony relating to the
toxicity of chlorinated solvents in general, including trichloroethylene. A former coworker of
Hudson’s was also allowed to testify about the use of the solvent in vapor-phase degreasers and
how those machines produced a very strong smell and fumes.
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We review a trial court’s decision as to the admittance or exclusion of
evidence under an “abuse of discretion” standard. Clephas v. Garlock, Inc., 168
S.W.3d 389, 393 (Ky. App. 2004). This standard also applies as to the
admissibility of expert testimony. Burton v. CSX Transp., Inc., 269 S.W.3d 1, 6
(Ky. 2008). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision
was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). An abuse of
discretion exists only when we are “firmly convinced that a mistake has been
made.” Overstreet v. Overstreet, 144 S.W.3d 834, 838 (Ky. App. 2003) (citation
omitted).
Hudson argues that the record – including avowal testimony produced
at trial – supports his position that he was exposed to trichloroethylene during his
employment with CSX. Al Fritts, a former general manager of safety, general
manager of risk management, and chief safety officer for CSX, testified in his
deposition that he believed that trichloroethylene was used in the South Louisville
shops in the 1970s while Hudson was an employee with the company. Larry
Elmore, Hudson’s former coworker, testified at trial that trichloroethylene was
used as a degreasing agent in many areas throughout the South Louisville shops,
including those in which Hudson worked. Elmore indicated that trichloroethylene
was a key ingredient used in vapor-phase degreasers of the type referenced by
Hudson in his testimony. Such degreasers were located throughout Shop 1 of the
South Louisville shops in particular, and CSX employees did not like to work near
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them because of the fumes they produced. J.C. Kelly, another coworker of
Hudson’s, gave additional avowal testimony that he and other CSX employees had
used trichloroethylene. Based on this evidence, there is certainly cause to believe
that Hudson was exposed to the solvent during his employment with the railroad.
The fact that Hudson himself did not mention this solvent by name should not have
necessarily precluded evidence of his exposure to it from being introduced.
This conclusion alone, however, does not end the discussion.
Hudson’s alleged exposure to trichloroethylene in this case is only relevant if
sufficient evidence is produced identifying that exposure as a cause of his claimed
injuries. “It is beyond dispute that causation is a necessary element of proof in any
negligence case.” Baylis v. Lourdes Hosp., Inc., 805 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Ky. 1991).
Moreover, it is well-established that “evidence of causation must be in terms of
probability rather than mere possibility[.]” Id. This latter rule is of particular
importance here.
In our recent opinion in Combs v. Stortz, 276 S.W.3d 282 (Ky. App.
2009), we addressed a situation in which the plaintiff’s treating physician offered a
medical opinion that the plaintiff “might possibly” require neck and/or shoulder
surgery. The trial court excluded this opinion as speculative and that decision was
appealed to this Court. We agreed with the trial court’s decision and held that “the
intent of the law is that if a physician cannot form an opinion with sufficient
certainty so as to make a medical judgment, neither can a jury use that information
to reach a decision.” Id. at 296, quoting Schulz v. Celotex Corp., 942 F.2d 204,
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209 (3rd Cir. 1991). Thus, where a plaintiff’s expert couches his opinion only in
terms of “possibility” as opposed to “probability” or “certainty,” it is not error to
disallow that opinion from being admitted as evidence because of its speculative
nature. See id., quoting Schulz, 942 F.2d at 208-09; see also Young v. L.A.
Davidson, Inc., 463 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Ky. 1971).3
After reviewing the disclosures, deposition testimony, and trial
testimony produced by Hudson’s experts, it is clear that none of them linked
Hudson’s alleged toxic encephalopathy directly to trichloroethylene in anything
more than a speculative manner that touched only on “possibility.” For example,
Dr. George C. Rodgers, Jr., a professor of pediatrics, pharmacology, and
toxicology at the University of Louisville and an expert witness in toxicology,
testified in his deposition that “[t]he solvents that we’re dealing with here are
trichloroethane, perchloroethylene, mineral spirits, perhaps trichloroethylene. That
one always gets argued. Those are the organic solvents that are at issue.” Dr.
Rodgers concurred with the diagnosis of others that Hudson suffered from toxic
encephalopathy, but he declined to render his own diagnosis. At trial, Dr. Rodgers
3
We note that this opinion should not be viewed as an overturning of our decision in Sakler v.
Anesthesiology Associates, P.S.C., 50 S.W.3d 210 (Ky. App. 2001), in which we held that
“defendants in medical malpractice actions may introduce expert witness testimony to rebut a
plaintiff’s expert witness testimony couched in terms of ‘reasonable medical probability,’ even
though the defendant’s expert witness’s testimony is couched only in terms of ‘possibility.’” Id.
at 213. The difference between the levels of certainty required by a plaintiff’s expert’s opinion
as opposed to a defense expert’s opinion in terms of causation can be explained by the fact that
plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing causation. In contrast, defendants are not required to
“disprove” causation. Instead, they must only produce “credible evidence which tends to
discredit or rebut the plaintiff’s evidence” so as to “convince the trier of fact that the alleged
negligence was not the legal cause of the injury.” Id. at 214, quoting Wilder v. Eberhart, 977
F.2d 673, 676 (1st Cir. 1992).
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testified that he believed that Hudson developed a permanent brain injury as a
result of his exposure to solvents – specifically trichloroethane and
perchloroethylene – while employed by CSX. However, he ultimately produced
no opinions directly linking Hudson’s injuries to the particular solvent
trichloroethylene within a reasonable degree of probability.
Dr. Edward L. Baker, an occupational medicine expert and the
Director for the Institute of Public Health at the University of North CarolinaChapel Hill, did not identify trichloroethylene as a solvent that served as a basis for
his opinion in his expert disclosure. Like Dr. Rodgers, he also offered only
equivocal testimony during his deposition on the subject of trichloroethylene:
Q. Is it fair to say that as you sit here today, your
opinions are that his exposures are related to Dow Clean
and mineral spirits because you can’t name other ones for
me?
A. Well, I will simply say that at this facility,
trichloroethylene was used at one point. However, I
don’t have evidence that relates to his particular work
and how that might have linked to this particular
chemical. That’s why I can’t say with more specificity
about exposure to that particular solvent. But in general
terms, I believe that he could well have been exposed to
trichloroethylene.
***
Q. Do you have any opinion, sir, within a reasonable
degree of medical probability that Mr. Hudson’s work or
alleged work with trichloroethylene, TCE, may have or
did, in fact, cause the problem he’s having?
A. Again, I don’t have an opinion on – as it relates to
your specific question, because I would have to go back
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again and ascertain whether or not there’s evidence in the
record specifically that relates to trichloroethylene. As I
said earlier, it’s my view that it was used at this facility
over time.
At trial, Hudson introduced avowal testimony from Dr. Baker seeking to causally
relate Hudson’s exposure to trichloroethylene to his toxic encephalopathy. Again,
however, Dr. Baker was equivocal in his answer. He was asked:
Q. And so do you have an opinion within the realm of
medical probability whether trichloroethylene in this –
would have contributed to the cause of his solventinduced toxic encephalopathy?
A. Well, it would be my view that he was exposed to a
number of chlorinated hydrocarbon solvents that all have
similar structures and similar toxicities.
Trichloroethylene is one of them. If he was exposed to
trichloroethylene significantly, it would have contributed
to this problem.
(Emphasis added). Thus, Dr. Baker remained unable to opine within a reasonable
degree of medical probability that Hudson had been exposed to trichloroethylene to
such an extent that it helped cause his toxic encephalopathy.
Dr. Michael J. Ellenbecker, an expert in industrial hygiene, testified in
a similarly speculative manner:
Q. What basis do you have, sir, that Mr. Hudson was
exposed to TCE [(trichloroethylene)]?
A. Well, it is my recollection that other machinists at the
South Louisville shop testified to specifically using TCE.
Mr. Hudson did not recall, as I indicated earlier, the
names of any of the other materials he used, but based on
coworker testimony, I think it’s at least possible that he
was exposed to TCE.
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Q. Do you have an opinion within a reasonable degree of
not possibility but probability as to whether Mr. Hudson
was exposed to TCE?
A. No.
Q. So with regard to TCE, your opinion is just a
possibility, correct?
A. Yes.
Dr. Ellenbecker went on to testify that he could not state with a greater than 50
percent certainty that Hudson was exposed to trichloroethylene. He also offered no
specific testimony as to whether that solvent had a causal effect on Hudson’s toxic
encephalopathy. At trial, however, he was allowed to testify generally as to the
toxicity of trichloroethane, perchloroethylene, and trichloroethylene over CSX’s
objection.
Hudson’s other expert witnesses also failed to specifically link
Hudson’s alleged exposure to trichloroethylene to his toxic encephalopathy. For
example, Dr. R. Michael Kelly, a board-certified internal and occupational
medicine physician and expert in occupational medicine, asserted in his deposition
that “Dowclean” is a “mixture of Trichloroethane and Trichloroethylene”;
however, the parties agree that the solvent identified as “Dowclean” in this case
did not contain trichloroethylene and was instead composed of 75 percent 1,1,1
trichloroethane and 25 percent perchloroethylene. Moreover, Dr. Kelly offered no
evidence in his deposition specifically connecting an exposure to trichloroethylene
to Hudson’s injuries.
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Consequently, although there was perhaps sufficient evidence that
Hudson was exposed to trichloroethylene while employed at CSX to justify putting
evidence relating to that chemical before the jury, the fact that Hudson’s experts
could only tenuously, at best, link trichloroethylene to Hudson’s toxic
encephalopathy was a justifiable reason for the court to decline to do so. See
Combs, 276 S.W.3d at 296, quoting Schulz, 942 F.2d at 208-09. Thus, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing introduction
of this evidence at trial.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
DIXON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
CAPERTON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN
PART AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
CAPERTON, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND
DISSENTING IN PART: I agree with the majority on the analysis concerning the
testimonies of the fact witnesses wherein the majority concludes that “Based on the
evidence, there is certainly cause to believe that Hudson was exposed to the
solvent [trichloroethylene] during his employment with the railroad.”
I dissent because I disagree with the exclusion of the avowal
testimony of Dr. Edward L. Baker. The introduction of Dr. Baker’s testimony is
certainly controlled by KRE 703 and our recent decision in Combs v. Stortz, 276
S.W.3d 282 (Ky. App. 2009). As the majority agrees, Stortz requires that the
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testimony of a medical expert be couched in terms of medical probability or
certainty as to whether a particular chemical would have caused a particular result.
In examining the avowal testimony of Dr. Baker contained in the
majority opinion, I note that in response to the question “And so do you have an
opinion within the realm of medical probability whether trichloroethylene in this –
would have contributed to the cause of his [Hudson’s] solvent-induced toxic
encephalopathy?” Dr. Baker did not reiterate the word “probability” but did in fact
state, quite unequivocally, “If he was exposed to trichloroethylene significantly, it
would have contributed to this problem [toxic encephalopathy].”
No interpretation of Dr. Baker’s response is needed, he spoke plainly.
Dr. Baker said if Hudson was exposed significantly, the exposure would have
contributed to Hudson’s toxic encephalopathy. This is beyond probability and into
the realm of certainty, as required by Stortz. Once Dr. Baker unequivocally linked
the chemical trichloroethylene to Hudson’s toxic encephalopathy, it was then a
jury question based upon the factual evidence presented by Hudson whether
significant exposure did in fact occur and the extent it contributed to Hudson’s
“problem.”
I believe there is little doubt that the exclusion of Dr. Baker’s
testimony affected a substantial right of Hudson; it would have been the only
medical testimony linking trichloroethylene with toxic encephalopathy. Therefore,
pursuant to KRE 103, it was reversible error to exclude the testimony. I would
reverse and remand for a new trial.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Kenneth L. Sales
David G. Bryant
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE:
Rod D. Payne
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Paul Kelley
Louisville, Kentucky
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