PINSON (STEVEN), ET AL. VS. THACKER (BOBBY), ET AL.
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 30, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001525-MR
STEVEN PINSON;
AND SHERRY PINSON
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00930
BOBBY THACKER; AND
THACKER AUTO PARTS, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL AND WINE, JUDGES; HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE.
WINE, JUDGE: Steve and Sherry Pinson (“the Pinsons”) appeal from a summary
judgment by the Pike Circuit Court dismissing their claim against Thacker Auto
Parts, Inc. (“Thacker Auto”) to obtain the release of a mortgage lien and damages
pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 382.365(4). Although it is not
clear that the mortgage lien secures post-judgment attorney fees, we agree with the
trial court that Thacker Auto had good cause to deny the Pinsons’ request to
release the lien after satisfaction of the judgment. We disagree with the trial court
that the lien clearly includes post-judgment attorney fees. However, we conclude
that this issue was not ripe for adjudication at the time the Pinsons brought this
action and is now moot. Hence, we affirm the entry of summary judgment.
The underlying facts of this action were set out in detail in the prior
appeal as follows:
In March 1993, the Pinsons purchased an auto
parts business from Thacker Auto for $300,000, secured
by a promissory note and mortgage. Pinson leased the
business premises from Thacker and continued to operate
the business as Nationwide Auto Parts. Eleven years
later, in July 2004, the Pike District Court found Pinson
guilty of forcible detainer and directed him to vacate the
business premises. In August 2004 Thacker Auto filed a
mortgage foreclosure action against Pinson. Meanwhile,
Pinson and his wife filed several bankruptcy proceedings.
In November 2004, before Pinson finished moving
inventory from the premises, which he had been ordered
to vacate, the leased building and its contents were
destroyed by fire. Thacker then intervened in the
foreclosure action, asserting that Pinson had defaulted in
his rent payments, and that he had “negligently or
otherwise” caused the fire. Further, Thacker Auto
amended its complaint to name Pinson's casualty
insurance provider, Kentucky Farm Bureau (Farm
Bureau), as a defendant in the action. That claim was
eventually resolved by Farm Bureau's tender to the Pike
Circuit Court Clerk of a total of $50,000 for structural
loss and $160,000 for inventory loss. In April 2006 the
court entered a partial summary judgment awarding
Thacker the $50,000 tendered by Farm Bureau for the
structural loss.
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The civil action went to trial in November 2006,
and the jury found that Pinson intentionally started the
fire. In accordance with the jury's verdict, the court
entered a judgment finding the Pinsons jointly and
severally liable to pay (1) Thacker a total of $109,600
plus prejudgment and post[-]judgment interest relating to
unpaid rent and structural damage, (2) Thacker Auto
$45,900 plus prejudgment and post[-]judgment interest
relating to the unpaid promissory note, (3) Thacker Auto
$19,000 in attorney's fees, and (4) costs to both Thacker
and Thacker Auto. The court subsequently amended its
judgment to prioritize the various liens, and to reflect that
Steve Pinson individually, but not Sherry Pinson, was
liable for payment. The court also found that $50,000 of
the judgment in favor of Thacker for the destruction of
the premises already had been satisfied by the April 2006
partial summary judgment in his favor.
On January 5, 2007, the day after entry of the judgment, the Pinsons
paid $77,787.91 to Thacker Auto in satisfaction of the judgment. However, Pinson
also appealed the amount of the award of attorney fees.1 On March 14, 2007, the
Pinsons sent a written notice to Thacker Auto requesting that Thacker Auto release
the mortgage lien on the property. Thacker Auto declined to release the lien
because the Pinsons’ appeal was still pending.
The Pinsons filed this action seeking release of the lien and damages
pursuant to KRS 382.365. On July 18, 2008, the trial court granted Thacker
Auto’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that the mortgage lien
secures attorney fees incurred in collecting any unpaid amount of the purchase
price, including attorney fees which would be incurred. Since attorney fees would
1
On appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment, including the entire award of attorney fees.
Pinson v. Thacker, Nos. 2007-CA-000262-MR & 2007-CA-000282-MR, 2008 WL 4998428
(Ky. App. 2008).
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presumably still accrue while the matter was on appeal, the trial court found that
the total amount of the mortgage could not be determined until the appeal was
finally resolved. As a result, the court concluded that Thacker Auto was not
obligated to release the lien at that time. The Pinsons now appeal.
KRS 382.365(1) requires that a holder of a lien on real property “shall
release the lien in the county clerk's office where the lien is recorded within thirty
(30) days from the date of satisfaction.” KRS 382.365(4) further provides that “[i]f
the court finds that the lienholder received written notice of its failure to release
and lacked good cause for not releasing the lien, the lienholder shall be liable to the
owner of the real property or to a party with an interest in the real property in the
amount of one hundred dollars ($100) per day for each day, beginning on the
fifteenth day after receipt of the written notice, of the violation for which good
cause did not exist.” The parties in this case agreed that Pinson has satisfied the
judgment in favor of Thacker Auto. Thacker Auto maintains that the mortgage
lien also secured post-judgment attorney fees and costs incurred while the matter
was on direct appeal.
There is no Kentucky caselaw which directly addresses this point.
Other jurisdictions have determined that once a contract has been merged into the
judgment, post-merger attempts to collect attorney's fees authorized only by the
merged contract cannot be sustained. See Monarc Construction, Inc. v. Aris Corp.,
188 Md.App. 377, 981 A.2d 822 (2009); Hatch v. T & L Associates, 319 N.J.
Super. 644, 726 A.2d 308 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1999); Florida Pottery Stores of
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Panama City, Inc. v. American Nat. Bank, 578 So.2d 801, 806, (Fla. App. 1991);
Production Credit Ass’n. of Madison v. Laufenberg, 143 Wis.2d 200, 420 N.W.2d
778, 779 (1988), Chelios v. Kaye, 219 Cal.App.3d 75, 80, 268 Cal.Rptr. 38, 40
(Cal. App 4 Distr. 1990), and Caine & Weiner v. Barker, 42 Wash.App. 835, 713
P.2d 1133, 1134 (1986). Taking a contrary view, the Kentucky Supreme Court
recently held that res judicata does not preclude a claim for post-judgment and
appellate attorney fees because the claim for additional attorney fees is distinct and
separate from the contract claim. Moorhead v. Dodd, 265 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Ky.
2008).
But while Thacker Auto may have a separate claim for post-judgment
attorney fees, it is not clear that this claim is secured by the existing mortgage lien.
Given this ambiguity in the law, we agree with the trial court that Thacker Auto
had a good cause for declining to release the lien while the appeal was pending.
Furthermore, Thacker Auto’s cause of action for additional attorney
fees did not accrue until the appeal was resolved. Consequently, the application of
the mortgage lien to that prospective claim was not ripe for adjudication at the time
Pinson brought this action. And finally, the parties agree that Thacker Auto
executed and recorded a release of the mortgage on April 1, 2009. Therefore, the
Pinsons’ request to release the lien is now moot. Consequently, we need not reach
the substantive question of whether the mortgage lien applied to post-judgment
attorney fees.
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Accordingly, the summary judgment by the Pike Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James L. Hamilton
Pikeville, Kentucky
Donald Kyle Deskins
Pikeville, Kentucky
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