BROWDER (JOE A.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 23, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001420-MR
JOE A. BROWDER, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00547
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER, STUMBO, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Joe Alexander Browder, Jr. appeals from the Daviess
Circuit Court’s order denying his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to
RCr1 11.42. For the following reasons, we affirm.
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Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Browder was arrested and searched after police officers made two
controlled buys of crack cocaine from him. Pursuant to a guilty plea, Browder was
convicted of three counts of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree,
trafficking in a controlled substance within 1,000 yards of a school, and possession
of drug paraphernalia. He was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.
In his pro se motion for RCr 11.42 relief, Browder moved for an
evidentiary hearing and for vacation of his judgment and sentence, on the grounds
that his guilty plea was invalid and that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. After considering the Commonwealth’s response, the trial court, without
conducting a hearing, denied Browder’s motion. This appeal followed.
First and foremost, “‘a plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of all
defenses other than that the indictment charged no offense.’” Sparks v.
Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky.App. 1986) (quoting Sanders v.
Commonwealth, 663 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Ky.App. 1983)). The court therefore
properly limited its consideration of Browder’s motion to his claims that he was
afforded the ineffective assistance of counsel and entered an invalid guilty plea,
rather than addressing the evidentiary and other issues raised in his motion for
relief.
The test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is “whether the
plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of
action open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91S.Ct.
160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). The record must contain “an affirmative
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showing that [the plea] was intelligent and voluntary.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). “[T]he validity of a
guilty plea is determined not by reference to some magic incantation recited at the
time it is taken but from the totality of the circumstances surrounding it.” Kotas v.
Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ky. 1978) (citing Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 749, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)). If, as here, no
mental evaluation was ordered, despite a claim of competency concerns, the
standard on review is: “whether a reasonable judge, situated as was the trial court
judge whose failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing is being reviewed, should
have experienced doubt with respect to competency to stand trial.” Williams v.
Bordenkircher, 696 F.2d 464, 467 (6th Cir. 1983).
Browder elected to enter a plea of guilty during the voir dire phase of
his jury trial. In his colloquy with the court, Browder confirmed that he was
entering his guilty plea voluntarily, freely and intelligently. He stated that he had
thirteen years of education, that he knew the difference between right and wrong
both presently and when he committed the offenses, and that he knew his behavior
at the time of the offenses was in fact wrong. In light of Browder’s claim that he
had been previously diagnosed with a mental illness, the court made a point of
ensuring that Browder knew the difference between right and wrong. Browder’s
attorneys stated that they believed he was competent to stand trial or enter a guilty
plea, and that he was competent when he committed the offenses.
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Browder further declared that he had no complaints against his
attorneys and that he was satisfied with their representation. Browder stated that
he had read, understood, and agreed with the contents of the guilty plea forms. He
acknowledged that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty and wanted to
take advantage of the Commonwealth’s plea offer, and that he knew his guilty plea
would result in the waiver of his right to appeal and all defenses to the charges.
Browder informed the court that no promises or force had been used to get him to
plead guilty, that he was pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty, and that he
was doing so willfully, freely, and voluntarily.
A review of the record reflects that a reasonable judge, situated as was
the trial court judge here, should not have experienced doubt with respect to
Browder’s competency to stand trial. The court declined to order a KCPC2 mental
evaluation of Browder, which Browder’s attorneys had moved for after Browder
had accused them of uttering a racial slur against him. A subsequent investigation
into the matter revealed Browder’s allegation was baseless and the court found
nothing in the record demonstrated the need for such an evaluation, as Browder
had been participating logically and vocally throughout proceedings. Furthermore,
the attorneys’ and Browder’s representation to the court that Browder was
competent, along with the court’s observations of Browder throughout this case,
including the guilty plea, confirm that despite Browder’s claim of mental
incompetency, his guilty plea was intelligently and voluntarily made.
2
Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center.
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Thus, the court’s acceptance of his plea of guilty was not in error.
Moreover, “[w]here the movant’s allegations are refuted on the face of the record
as a whole, no evidentiary hearing is required.” Sparks, 721 S.W.2d at 727. Since
the record plainly refutes Browder’s allegation that his guilty plea was invalid, the
court did not err by declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
Next, Browder claims that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. We disagree. Such a claim requires Browder to show: (1) that counsel’s
representation was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, measured against prevailing professional norms; and (2) that he
was prejudiced by such deficient performance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Gall v.
Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Ky. 1985) (adopting Strickland standard).
Under the first prong of Strickland, review of defense counsel’s
performance begins with the
[S]trong presumption that counsel acted reasonably and
effectively. [The court] must also recognize that a
defendant is not guaranteed errorless counsel or counsel
that can be judged ineffective by hindsight, but rather
counsel rendering reasonably effective assistance.
Finally, [the court] must consider the totality of evidence
before the jury and assess the overall performance of
counsel throughout the case in order to determine
whether the identified acts or omissions overcome the
presumption that counsel rendered reasonable
professional assistance.
Mills v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 310, 328 (Ky. 2005)(internal citations
omitted).
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Here, the court’s order denying RCr 11.42 relief included the
following relevant findings, as summarized by this Court:
At his arraignment on November 10, 2004, Browder
refused to have counsel appointed and informed the court
that he intended to hire private counsel and would do so
by the end of November. The court reset formal
arraignment for November 19, 2004. On that date,
Browder informed the court that he had still not hired
private counsel, but that he had the funds to do so and did
not believe he was entitled to a public defender. Browder
requested the arraignment be reset again for ten days.
The court accommodated his request. On December 1,
2004, Browder yet again informed the court that he had
not hired an attorney, and he requested another
continuance. The court once more granted Browder’s
request and reset the arraignment for December 14, 2004.
The court advised Browder that a trial date was
preliminarily set for April 29, 2005. When Browder
informed the court on December 14, 2004 that he had
still not hired private counsel, the court appointed a
public defender to stand in on the case as Browder’s
counsel for arraignment. The appointed public defender,
along with another public defender, advised the court that
they would serve as counsel for Browder. The court
formally set the trial date for April 29, 2005. One of the
public defenders then filed an agreed order regarding
discovery, a notice of appearance, and a notice to
preserve evidence. Browder was present in court on
April 7, 2005 with his attorneys for a hearing regarding
the Commonwealth’s motion to amend count five of the
indictment. Browder was belligerent and disruptive in
court and accused one of the public defenders and an
investigator of using a racial slur against him. The public
defender made an oral motion for a KCPC evaluation,
which the court denied, stating that nothing had occurred
thus far to reflect any need for a KCPC evaluation. After
an investigation, Browder’s accusations were found to be
baseless and it was determined that no conflict prevented
the accused public defender from continuing to represent
Browder. When the results of the investigation were
being presented to the court, Browder once again became
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disruptive and was removed from the courtroom
temporarily. Upon his return, he adamantly refused the
Commonwealth’s plea offer of five years on a guilty plea
to count three and stated that he no longer wished to have
the office of public advocacy represent him and that he
was hiring a private attorney. The court ruled that it
would relieve the public defenders from actively
representing Browder by preparing for trial, but
ordered that they remain counsel of record until
Browder’s new attorney entered an appearance
or, alternatively, to answer questions Browder may
have during the trial should he decide to represent
himself. At a hearing on April 27, 2005, Browder
informed the court that he had hired private counsel to
represent him, that he had assets in excess of $60,000.00
and that he was ineligible for a public defender. The
Commonwealth advised the court that it had spoken with
the private counsel who Browder claimed was
representing him before the hearing, and that the private
counsel had informed the Commonwealth that he was not
representing Browder. In any event, the day of trial, two
days later, Browder informed the court in chambers that
he now wished to have a public defender but that his
public defenders of record were not prepared for trial.
The public defenders admitted as much, and moved for a
continuance on the grounds of unpreparedness and
that they would have filed a motion for a competency
hearing had they been able to be more actively involved,
rather than standby counsel. The court denied their
motion, finding that they had reviewed all of the
evidence in the case and were fully informed of the facts
of the case. Furthermore, the court stated that it did not
believe Browder to be incompetent, that there had been
no evidence up to that point of either a mental defect or a
mental disease, and that Browder appeared to appreciate
the nature and consequences of the proceedings against
him and could rationally participate in his defense.
During voir dire, the public defenders again moved for a
continuance, on the ground that they did not feel
adequately prepared for trial. The court again denied the
motion, stating that it believed Browder’s actions were
last minute maneuverings intended to frustrate the court’s
scheduling, as the court had made it clear to Browder that
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if the case was not tried on April 29, the next available
date would be months from then. The court also stated
that if the office of public advocacy was not as prepared
as they believed they could have been, that was due only
to Browder’s informed decisions and conduct up to that
point. The Commonwealth’s voir dire continued until a
public defender approached the bench and informed the
court that Browder wished to accept the plea offer of a
combined sentence of ten years’ imprisonment with
dismissal of the PFO charge. The court sent
the
jury out of the courtroom and began a colloquy with
Browder regarding the plea of guilty.
Reviewing the facts in light of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct.
at 2064, the court concluded that Browder had not been afforded ineffective
assistance of counsel. The record reflects that counsel reviewed all evidence and
discovery prior to trial, that they were ready and willing to continue preparing for
Browder’s trial until Browder fired them in open court on April 7, 2005. Only on
the morning of trial, some three weeks later, did Browder inform the court of his
desire to have appointed counsels’ representation of him reinstated. Thereafter, the
court refused to grant Browder a continuance, finding that it knew of no one more
knowledgeable of the facts and evidence in the case than the public defenders who
had been acting as stand-by counsel.
Our review of the record shows that Browder has failed to satisfy the
first prong of the Strickland test by proving that the performance of his trial
counsel was deficient. Moreover, as Browder’s allegation of ineffective counsel is
clearly refuted, the trial court did not err by declining to conduct an evidentiary
hearing.
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The order of the Daviess Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joe A. Browder, Jr., Pro se
Eddyville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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