LIFESTYLES OF JASPER, INC. VS. GREMORE (NOW ACUFF) (NIKKI)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 6, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001396-DG
LIFESTYLES OF JASPER, INC.
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT
v.
HONORABLE DENNIS R. FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-XX-00001
NIKKI GREMORE
(NOW NIKKI ACUFF)
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER, STUMBO, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Lifestyles of Jasper, Inc. (Lifestyles) appeals from an
order of the Calloway Circuit Court affirming the Calloway District Court’s order
sustaining Nikki Acuff’s garnishment challenges and vacating the default judgment
in favor of Lifestyles. Lifestyles’ motion for discretionary review was granted by
this court for the limited purpose of determining whether Lifestyles’ filing of
Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) Form 1099-C evinced cancellation of Acuff’s
debt. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
In 2002, Lifestyles filed this action to collect on an unpaid account.
Acuff failed to respond, and the district court granted Lifestyles’ motion for a
default judgment. The record reflects that Lifestyles intermittently attempted to
collect the judgment. After three years of unsuccessful collection efforts,
Lifestyles filed a Form 1099-C, Cancellation of Debt, with the I.R.S. for calendar
year 2006. After the filing of a 2007 garnishment with Acuff’s employer that
resulted in payments being withheld from Acuff’s wages, Acuff filed a
garnishment challenge with the district court based on the Form 1099-C. The
district court upheld the challenge, ordered Lifestyles to return the amounts
collected, and held that the default judgment had been discharged. The Calloway
Circuit Court affirmed the district court and this appeal followed.
On appeal, a trial court’s factual findings, if supported by substantial
evidence, will be upheld as not being clearly erroneous. See Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998); CR 52.01. “With
regard to the trial court’s application of law to those facts, we engage in a de novo
review.” Keeney v. Keeney, 223 S.W.3d 843, 848-49 (Ky.App. 2007). “The trial
court's interpretation of a garnishment or exemption statute is, of course, a question
of law.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Ky.App. 1999). “This
Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions de novo.” Id. (citing Louisville &
-2-
Nashville R.R. v. Commonwealth, ex rel Ky. R.R. Comm’n, 314 S.W.2d 940, 943
(Ky 1958)).
The undisputed evidence before the trial court was that Acuff owed a
judgment to Lifestyles and had made no payments. Lifestyles had made sporadic
attempts to collect. In response to I.R.S. regulations which appear to require the
filing of a Form 1099-C, Cancellation of Debt, Lifestyles did so. However, while
the district and circuit courts held that Acuff’s debt was discharged due to
Lifestyle’s filing of Form 1099-C, the regulations1 and I.R.S. rulings2 make clear
that Form 1099-C is to be utilized for reporting purposes only, and not as evidence
of an actual discharge of indebtedness. Thus, the issue in this case is whether the
district court abused its discretion by sustaining Acuff’s challenges to Lifestyles’
garnishments, and holding that the default judgment was discharged.
The district court apparently was persuaded by Acuff’s defense that
Form 1099-C cancelled the debt, or satisfied the judgment, despite I.R.S. rulings to
the contrary in similar cases, see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-0207; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
1
26 Treas. Reg. § 1.6050P-1(a) (2009) provides, in part, as follows: [A]ny applicable entity
[including any organization a significant trade or business of which is the lending of money] that
discharges [in whole or in part] an indebtedness of any person . . . during a calendar year must
file an information return on Form 1099-C with the Internal Revenue Service. Solely for
purposes of the reporting requirements of section 6050P and this section, a discharge of
indebtedness is deemed to have occurred . . . if and only if there has occurred an identifiable
event described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, whether or not an actual discharge of
indebtedness has occurred on or before the date on which the identifiable event has occurred.
2
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-0207, 2005 WL 3561135 (Dec. 30, 2005) (“The Internal Revenue
Service does not view a Form 1099-C as an admission by the creditor that it has discharged the
debt and can no longer pursue collection.”); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-0208, 2005 WL 3561136
(Dec. 30, 2005) (“Section 6050P and the regulations do not prohibit collection activity after a
creditor reports by filing a Form 1099-C.”).
-3-
Rul. 2005-0208. Kentucky’s highest court, however, long ago recognized that a
judgment creditor may have a satisfaction of judgment set aside upon proof that the
entry was made by mistake or fraud. Commonwealth ex rel. Bates v. Hall, 251 Ky.
280, 64 S.W.2d 585, 586 (1933); see also 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 843 (2006)
(noting “[a]s between the parties, a satisfaction of judgment, although absolute and
unqualified on its face, may be cancelled and set aside upon motion and proof that
satisfaction was entered by mistake; was procured by misrepresentation, fraud,
duress, or undue influence; or was irregularly or improperly entered”). While the
decision in Bates was directed towards mistake, duress, or fraud, we hold that it is
sufficiently broad to cover the instant situation in which a judgment creditor files a
form to comply with I.R.S. regulations. Since the only evidence before the trial
court was that the judgment had not been paid and that Lifestyles filed the Form
1099-C only to comply with I.R.S. regulations, and not in satisfaction of the debt,
the district court abused its discretion in holding that the judgment was discharged.
The order of the Calloway Circuit Court is reversed and remanded,
with directions to remand the case to the Calloway District Court to reinstate the
default judgment and garnishment order, and to direct Acuff to repay Lifestyles
any and all sums previously collected but remitted to her as a result of her
challenges to the garnishment, and to make any and all payments due on the
account until the judgment herein is satisfied.
ALL CONCUR.
-4-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
No Brief for Appellee
Stanley K. Spees
Paducah, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.