HICKS (JOHN) VS. MAGOFFIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
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RENDERED: AUGUST 21, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001025-MR
JOHN HICKS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MAGOFFIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLEY C. CHILDERS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00127
MAGOFFIN COUNTY BOARD
OF EDUCATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; VANMETER, JUDGE; LAMBERT,1
SENIOR JUDGE.
VANMETER, JUDGE: John Hicks appeals from a summary judgment entered by
the Magoffin Circuit Court dismissing his claim relating to the failure of the
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Magoffin County Board of Education (Board) to hire him for the position of
special education teacher/director. We affirm.
Hicks, a certified special education teacher, applied to the Board
seeking the position of special education teacher/director for the 2002-03 school
year. The Board declined to hire Hicks, instead hiring a noncertified but otherwise
qualified teacher after obtaining an emergency certificate approved by the
Kentucky Education Professional Standards Board. Hicks filed a complaint in the
Magoffin Circuit Court, and discovery was conducted. Eventually both parties
filed motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted summary
judgment for the Board. This appeal followed.
Hicks contends that the trial court erred by granting summary
judgment for the Board. We disagree.
Summary judgment shall be granted only if “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” CR2 56.03. The trial court must view the record “in a light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be
resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476,
480 (Ky. 1991). Further, “a party opposing a properly supported summary
judgment motion cannot defeat it without presenting at least some affirmative
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Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Id. at 482.
On review, the appellate court must determine “whether the trial court correctly
found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving
party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d
779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996).
The matter now before us turns on the application of KRS 161.100,
which addresses the issuance of emergency teaching certificates in pertinent part as
follows:
When a district board of education satisfies the Education
Professional Standards Board that it is impossible to
secure qualified teachers for a position in a school under
the control of the district board, the Education
Professional Standards Board may issue emergency
certificates to persons who meet the qualifications
determined by the Education Professional Standards
Board for emergency certificates.
A “qualified teacher” is defined by 16 KAR3 2:120, § 1, as a teacher “who holds
the appropriate certification for the position unless the superintendent of the
employing school district has documented evidence that the teacher is unsuitable
for appointment.”
The application of KRS 161.100 was examined by this court in
Roberts v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ., 173 S.W.3d 918 (Ky.App. 2005). Roberts
was a certified special education teacher who was employed for four years but then
was not rehired for the fifth year which would have provided him tenure. The
record showed that students had complained of harassment by Roberts and that his
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Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
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previous principal had recommended that Roberts not be rehired. After submitting
a letter of resignation, Roberts applied but was not hired for other teaching
positions. Instead, pursuant to KRS 161.100, emergency certified teachers were
hired for some of the positions. The circuit court granted summary judgment for
the school board, finding that the record contained sufficient documentation to
support the school superintendent’s determination that Roberts was “unsuitable for
appointment[,]” and therefore was not a qualified teacher for purposes of KRS
161.100 and 16 KAR 2:120. On appeal, Roberts argued that although the
superintendent had the right to determine whether a certified teacher was
“qualified” pursuant to 16 KAR 2:120, a genuine issue of material fact existed as
to whether he in fact was qualified. This court disagreed, finding that Roberts had
provided no evidence to support his claim that the superintendent abused her
discretion in finding that Roberts was unqualified or to support his claim that the
school board violated KRS 161.100 by implementing the superintendent’s
recommendation. The record was “replete with evidence that Roberts could indeed
be found unsuitable for appointment[,]” 173 S.W.3d at 924, and Roberts had failed
to meet his burden of presenting “‘at least some affirmative evidence
demonstrating that there [was] a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial.’” Id.
at 923 (quoting Hubble v. Johnson, 841 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ky. 1992)). Therefore,
this court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the school board.
Here, as in Roberts, Hicks was a certified special education teacher
who was rejected as a candidate for a teaching position which was awarded to an
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emergency certified teacher. The trial court reviewed the deposition testimony and
concluded that the evidence was sufficient to show that Hicks was
not a qualified teacher for purposes of being hired by the
Defendant Magoffin County School System. Mr. Hicks’
former employer, Floyd County School System, provided
a poor recommendation of Plaintiff Hicks to the
Defendant and absolutely did not recommend him for
employment with Magoffin County and further there was
testimony of record that Mr. Hicks was under review by
the Professional Standards Board at the time of his
application. The Court has also considered other
testimony of record indicating additional factors which
indicated that [Hicks] was not suitable for employment
with [the Board] that included his poor communication
skills and a poorly drafted application regarding spelling,
punctuation and capitalization.
The trial court noted that the Board’s hiring policy required it to consider the
teacher’s certification level, educational background, prior work experience,
recommendations, and personal characteristics shown during the interview process.
However, regardless of whether Hicks was under review or already had been
admonished by the Professional Standards Board at the time of his application, the
Board clearly had before it substantial evidence relating to the factors it was
required to consider.
The record on appeal does not include the deposition testimony and
other evidence considered by the trial court below. Thus, as in Roberts, this court
must presume, “[t]o the extent that the record is incomplete, . . . that the omitted
portions support the summary judgment.” 173 S.W.3d at 923 (citing
Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Richardson, 424 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Ky.
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1968)). Because Hicks failed to meet his burden of providing affirmative evidence
to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, we must conclude that the
trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for the Board.
Hicks also contends on appeal that the Board erred by considering his
admonishment by the state Education Professional Standards Board as a basis for
finding him not qualified for appointment as a special education teacher. Not only
was this issue not raised below, but the record shows that the Board relied upon
substantial other grounds in reaching its decision.
The summary judgment entered by the Magoffin Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Timothy Parker
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
Donald W. McFarland
Salyersville, Kentucky
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