CLAY (DEMARCUS) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 25, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000914-MR
DEMARCUS CLAY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-01169
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND WINE, JUDGES; HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE.
WINE, JUDGE: Demarcus Clay (“Clay”) was indicted by a Fayette County grand
jury on the charges of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance; possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon; carrying a concealed deadly weapon; seconddegree fleeing or evading police; possession of marijuana; loitering for prostitution
purposes; and second-degree persistent felony offender. A Fayette County jury
found Clay guilty of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, seconddegree fleeing or evading police, and possession of marijuana and sentenced him to
ten years’ imprisonment, from which he now appeals. On appeal, Clay contends
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause and that the trial court improperly
denied his motion to suppress pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure
(“RCr”) 9.78. Upon review, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
In the late evening hours of July 20, 2007, Officer Ron Kornrumpf
(“Kornrumpf”) of the Lexington police noticed a woman walking back and forth
several times on West Seventh Street, a known high crime, high narcotics and high
prostitution area. Although Kornrumpf suspected the woman was loitering for
purposes of prostitution, he was unable to investigate as he was responding to
another call.
At 3:20 a.m. on the morning of July 21, 2007, Kornrumpf observed a
black Toyota traveling on Limestone Street. The vehicle pulled over on the left
side of the street immediately after passing Fifth Street. Kornrumpf observed a
black male (later identified as Clay), and two females (one white and one black,
and one of whom he had observed walking the street earlier), immediately cross
the street and approach the Toyota. As Kornrumpf drove past the stopped vehicle,
he observed the black female being helped into the back seat of the car by Clay.
He also observed the white female talking to a second black male (later determined
to be the driver of the vehicle) at the rear of the vehicle.
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Kornrumpf pulled behind the vehicle and turned on his emergency
lights for safety. He exited his vehicle and asked all four individuals to step to the
rear of the vehicle so he could speak with them. The second black male (the
driver) fled down the street and refused to obey Kornrumpf’s commands for him to
return to the vehicle.
Clay, without being asked, handed his wallet with his identification to
Kornrumpf. Clay refused to make eye contact with Kornrumpf and repeatedly
looked over his shoulders. Kornrumpf testified that this behavior aroused his
suspicions and that he believed Clay was either going to run or try to harm him.
Kornrumpf informed Clay he was going to pat him down to check him
for weapons. Clay was wearing baggy pants and a hooded sweatshirt at the time.
He stated he would not allow Kornrumpf to search him unless there were charges
against him. Kornrumpf requested back-up, then asked Clay to place his hands on
his head. Clay complied, but fled once Kornrumpf positioned himself to frisk
Clay.
Kornrumpf followed Clay, commanding him to stop. While Clay was
running, he did not swing his arms at his sides, but rather he kept his hands in front
of his waistband. During the foot pursuit, Kornrumpf observed Clay making a
throwing motion toward a residence at 545 North Limestone. As Clay did so, his
left hand caught the top of a fence, which allowed Kornrumpf to catch him.
During a search incident to Clay’s arrest, officers found a small
package of crack cocaine and a small baggie containing marijuana. Additionally, a
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9mm gun was found at 545 North Limestone, but Clay denied ownership and no
fingerprints were found on the gun. Clay was subsequently arrested on the charges
of loitering for prostitution; fleeing or evading police; possession of marijuana;
possession of a handgun by a convicted felon; and carrying a concealed deadly
weapon. He was also charged with trafficking in a controlled substance as he
stated to police that he was trying to “fleece her for some head”, trading cocaine
for sexual favors. The charge of loitering for prostitution was later dismissed.
Clay made a motion to suppress, and a hearing was held on January 4,
2008. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court made oral
findings of fact and conclusions of law, finding that Kornrumpf had a reasonable,
articulable suspicion to conduct a search of Clay.1 The trial court subsequently
entered a written order denying Clay’s motion to suppress.
Thereafter, Clay was tried before a jury on January 10, 2008. The
jury returned guilty verdicts on the charges of possession of marijuana, trafficking
in a controlled substance and second-degree fleeing or evading police. Further, the
jury returned not guilty verdicts on the charges of possession of a handgun by a
convicted felon and carrying a concealed deadly weapon. The jury ultimately
recommended a ten-year sentence for the felony offense of trafficking in a
controlled substance. The Commonwealth and Clay agreed to twelve month
sentences for each of the misdemeanor offenses.
Analysis
1
Clay does not challenge the sufficiency of these findings.
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We first address Clay’s claim that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress. RCr 9.78 requires that, on a motion to suppress, the “trial
court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury” and
shall resolve the issues of fact. If those facts are supported by substantial evidence,
the finding of the trial court shall be conclusive.
When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, this
Court must determine whether the trial court’s findings were supported by
substantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76 (Ky. 2002). We
review for clear error, giving deference to the inferences drawn by the trial court.
Id. at 79.
If the findings are supported by substantial evidence, we review the
trial court’s application of the law to those facts de novo. Commonwealth v. Jones,
217 S.W.3d 190, 193 (Ky. 2006). Reasonable suspicion is determined by
examining the “totality of the circumstances” in order to decide whether a police
officer had a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting criminal activity
was afoot. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750, 151
L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).
Kornrumpf’s first suspicion that something was amiss was premised
on the quick departure of the second male who had been the driver of the suspect
vehicle. That individual refused to return to the vehicle despite Kornrumpf’s
repeated requests for him to do so. When considering the totality of the
circumstances, the flight of other individuals is one of many factors that, when
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taken together, may give an officer reasonable suspicion for a brief detention.
Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 182 S.W.3d 556, 559 (Ky. App. 2005).
Clay was observed with a suspected prostitute in a high crime, high
narcotics and high prostitution area at 3:20 a.m. Kornrumpf had seen this
suspected prostitute hours earlier walking back and forth on the street. Kornrumpf
believed, from his experience, that the female was loitering for purposes of
prostitution. Later, Kornrumpf saw the same female, along with Clay and a second
female, approaching a vehicle he had just observed pull over to the side of the
road. Kornrumpf then observed one of the females being helped into the back of
the car, further arousing his suspicion. From his experience, Kornrumpf believed
this behavior to be indicative of solicitation for prostitution or possibly promoting
prostitution. All of these circumstances, when considered together, led the officer
to believe that criminal activity was afoot, affording him the opportunity to make a
brief, investigatory stop. Baker v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Ky. 1999).
The area of town and the flight of an individual are factors that, when considered
as a whole, could lead to reasonable suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
124 (2000). Although presence in a high narcotics area is not sufficient on its own
to form a reasonable suspicion, an officer is not required to ignore relevant
characteristics of a particular location when determining if further investigation is
warranted. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676, 145
L.Ed.2d 570 (2000).
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During the stop, Clay continuously looked around and over the
officer’s shoulder, which indicated to Kornrumpf that he was possibly going to flee
or try to hurt him. Clay was wearing baggy clothing which could have concealed a
weapon. A protective search which is permitted without a warrant (and on the
basis of reasonable suspicion less than on probable cause) must be strictly limited
to that which is necessary for the discovery of any weapons that might be used to
harm an officer or others nearby. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see also Commonwealth v. Crowder, 884 S.W.2d 649 (Ky.
1994). The purpose of a limited search is not to discover evidence of a crime, but
rather to allow an officer to pursue an investigation without fear of violence.
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993).
In the case sub judice, the officer made it clear he wanted to pat down the appellant
to determine if he possessed any weapons.
Taking into account all of these circumstances, the trial court correctly
found that Kornrumpf had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a Terry
search to ensure his own safety and the safety of those around him. Terry, supra.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not commit
error when it denied Clay’s motion to suppress. The ruling of the Fayette Circuit
Court is therefore affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Roy A. Durham
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Bryan D. Morrow
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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