FIA CARD SERVICES, N.A. VS. CALLAHAN (MICHAEL P.), ET AL.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 13, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000732-MR
FIA CARD SERVICES, N.A., F/K/A
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-002357
MICHAEL P. CALLAHAN, A/K/A
MICHAEL CALLAHAN
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, TAYLOR AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: FIA Card Services, N.A., formerly known as MBNA America
Bank N.A. (FIA), appeals from the denial by the Jefferson Circuit Court of FIA’s
Petition and Application to Confirm and Enforce Arbitration Award against
Michael Callahan. No brief was filed on behalf of Callahan. After considering the
record in this case and the law applicable thereto, we find that the trial court should
have confirmed and enforced the arbitration award. Accordingly, we reverse.
Callahan applied for and was granted a credit card account from FIA.
Part of the agreement provided that all claims arising from the account would be
resolved through binding arbitration. Callahan subsequently failed to make
monthly payments on the card.
FIA then pursued arbitration with the National Arbitration Forum
(NAF). Callahan was personally served with notice of the arbitration proceedings
on July 18, 2007. He chose not to file an action with the circuit court pursuant to
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 417.060 to stay the arbitration. This statute
specifically authorizes a circuit court to “stay an arbitration proceeding
commenced or threatened on a showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate.”
KRS 417.060(2).
During the arbitration proceedings, Callahan did not object either to
the jurisdiction of the arbitrator or to the existence of an arbitration agreement.
The arbitrator found that: (1) the parties agreed to binding arbitration; (2) no party
claimed the arbitration agreement was invalid; (3) Callahan was properly served
with the arbitration claim; and (4) the arbitration proceeded in accordance with the
NAF Code of Procedure. On September 28, 2007, the arbitrator issued an award in
FIA’s favor in the amount of $14,186.17.
On October 1, 2007, in accordance with the arbitration agreement, a
copy of the award was served upon FIA and Callahan. Callahan did not apply to
-2-
the circuit court to vacate the award in accordance with KRS 417.160, or to modify
or correct the award in accordance with KRS 417.170. He simply failed to pay
FIA the amount awarded.
On February 29, 2008, pursuant to KRS 417.150, FIA filed a petition
with the circuit court to confirm and enforce the award. Callahan was served with
summons and a copy of the petition on or about March 7, 2008. He failed to
respond.
Nevertheless, on March 12, 2008, the circuit court denied FIA’s
petition giving as its reasoning that FIA failed to present the court with a “copy of
signed agreement to arbitrate.” (Trial Court’s Order, March 12, 2008; underlining
in original). This appeal followed.
The trial court’s ruling presents a question of law: Is independent
proof of an agreement to arbitrate a prerequisite to confirmation of an arbitration
award under Kentucky’s Arbitration Act?
Questions of law are reviewed for error by appellate courts de novo;
the trial court’s legal conclusions will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484, 489 (Ky.App. 2001). A trial court
has abused its discretion when its actions were arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair or
unsupported by sound legal principles. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson,
11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000).
We begin with the statute upon which FIA bases its right to
confirmation of the arbitration award.
-3-
Upon application of a party, the court shall confirm an
award unless, within the time limits hereinafter imposed,
grounds are urged for vacating or modifying or
correcting the award, in which case the court shall
proceed as provided in KRS 417.160 and 417.170.
KRS 417.150 (emphasis supplied). Callahan did not urge grounds for vacating,
modifying or correcting the award. In fact, by the time FIA filed its petition for
confirmation of the award in February 2008, Callahan’s opportunity to challenge
the award under either KRS 417.160 or KRS 417.170 had passed. KRS 417.160(2)
(“application . . . shall be made within ninety (90) days after delivery of a copy of
the award”); KRS 417.170(1) (“application [shall be] made within ninety (90) days
after delivery of a copy of the award”). Under such circumstances, the circuit
court lacked the discretion to do anything other than confirm the award.
When the circuit court required FIA to prove Callahan had agreed to
arbitrate by offering into evidence a signed arbitration agreement, it effectively
added language to KRS 417.150 that is not there. This is impermissible. Morsey,
Inc. v. Frazier, 245 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Ky. 2008)(“court must seek to harmonize all
provisions of a statute and neither add to nor subtract from its language”). We
believe the court was well intentioned. However, no court can “refuse[] to ignore
the statute’s plain meaning” even if doing so appears to the court to “further or
more efficiently accomplish the legislative purpose.” Id. (pertaining in that case to
workers’ compensation laws).
It is possible that the Jefferson Circuit Court read too broadly the
recent ruling by this Court in Fischer v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 248 S.W.3d
-4-
567 (Ky.App. 2007). The appellant in Fischer clearly and consistently denied the
existence of an agreement to arbitrate, raising the objection both prior to and
during the arbitration itself. Fischer further properly raised this issue before the
circuit court in challenging the award under KRS 417.160. Callahan never denied
the existence of such an agreement and thereby waived his right under the
Arbitration Act to do so.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the March 12, 2008 order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court and remand with instructions to grant FIA’s petition to
confirm the arbitration award.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.
Megan J. Linder
Cincinnati, Ohio
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.