FERRIELL (JANE) VS. PODGURSKY (SALOMAN)
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 30, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000445-MR
JANE FERRIELL, D/B/A J. KEITH
UPHOLSTERY AND DESIGN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SUSAN SCHULTZ GIBSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-005941
SALOMAN PODGURSKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE, TAYLOR, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Jane Ferriell, d/b/a J. Keith Upholstery and Design,
appeals from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court following a jury verdict.
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
In 1981, Ferriell began leasing a building located on Frankfort
Avenue in Louisville from Salomon Podgursky for the purpose of operating a
furniture upholstery business. Subsequently, Ferriell relocated her business to
another Podgursky-owned building on the same street and, later, executed a written
lease with him covering the period of April 1, 1994, to March 31, 1996. Within
three months of the lease’s expiration, the parties began negotiating a lease
renewal, which concluded when Ferriell rejected Podgursky’s proposed written
contract and the parties reached an oral agreement on a month-to-month lease.
During her leasing of Podgursky’s building, Ferriell informed him of
numerous roof and ceiling leaks, which Ferriell alleged Podgursky failed to
properly maintain and repair. In 1997, Ferriell showed Podgursky a new leak and
a piece of fallen ceiling plaster. Although Podgursky made repairs, Ferriell
contended that the repairs were inadequate and that the building’s ceiling and walls
continued to deteriorate. In the following year, in late March, Ferriell informed
Podursky that a leak in a second floor room had damaged some of her fabric rolls.
According to Podgursky, after being informed of the ceiling damage, he was
unable to make immediate repairs because of continuous rain in the area.
On or about April 20, 1998, the plaster ceiling of a furniture room
collapsed resulting in personal property being covered with wet grit and plaster.
After the collapse and the continued water leaking, Ferriell moved her property as
well as that of her customers to other areas within the building. During this time,
Podgursky presented Ferriell’s husband with a “Notice and Release,” providing
that he was not liable for damage due to ceiling collapses, which Mr. Ferriell
signed.
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Subsequently, Ferriell terminated her lease and left the premises on
July 13, 1998. On September 14, 2000, Ferriell filed a complaint against
Podgursky, alleging breach of contract by his failure to provide a safe and usable
business premises. She sought damages for loss of her personal property, her
customers’ property, the interruption of her business, damages to her reputation
and goodwill, and for constructive eviction. Subsequently, she filed an amended
complaint alleging willful, wanton, and gross negligence. For her negligence
claims, she requested attorney’s fees and punitive and consequential damages.
After Podgursky filed a motion for summary judgment, the trial court,
then-Circuit Court Judge Thomas Wine presiding, dismissed Ferriell’s claims for
willful, wanton, and gross negligence. Further, the trial court dismissed her claims
for loss of her personal property, loss of her customers’ property, damage to her
reputation and goodwill, punitive damages, and for constructive eviction. Finally,
the trial court limited Ferriell’s claim to lost profits to the period from her first
notification to Podgursky regarding the leaks until she vacated the premises.
Subsequently, following Judge Wine’s recusal, Ferriell filed a motion
to reconsider Judge Wine’s previous orders, which, upon reconsideration, were
upheld. When a third trial judge began presiding over the case, Ferriell filed a
listing for special damages containing the expenses related to her previous claims,
which had been previously dismissed. After Podgursky contested the listing, the
trial court excluded evidence relating to these claims. Following a jury trial,
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Ferriell was awarded $1,850 for reasonable relocation costs but received no award
for lost business profits. This appeal followed.
Ferriell contends that the trial court’s finding that she had a month-tomonth rather than a year-to-year tenancy or a holdover tenancy was erroneous.
Citing the parties’ lease agreement, Ferriell contends that she was permitted to
extend her lease on an annual basis, requiring a finding that she had a year-to-year
tenancy. In the alternative, she contends that the parties’ nonverbal actions created
a holdover tenancy despite the trial court’s adverse finding. We disagree.
The standard of review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is
whether it correctly found that there were no genuine issues of material fact and
that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Amos v. Clubb,
268 S.W.3d 378, 380-81 (Ky.App. 2008). Summary judgments are reserved for
cases where the moving party demonstrates that the non-moving party cannot
prevail at trial under any circumstances. Price v. Godby, 263 S.W.3d 598, 601
(Ky.App. 2008). An appellate court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo.
Baker v. Weinberg, 266 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Ky.App. 2008).
As the trial court noted in its initial order finding a month-to-month
tenancy, Ferriell testified at her deposition that she had a month-to-month tenancy
following the expiration of the 1994 lease agreement. Although she characterizes
her prior testimony as a misstatement due to Podgursky’s counsel’s labeling of the
term, Ferriell’s characterization of the lease as month-to-month was voluntary and
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was stated several times during her testimony. While Ferriell minimizes this
testimony, deposition testimony can support a basis for granting a summary
judgment. Miller v. Hutson, 281 S.W.3d 791, 793 (Ky. 2009). Here, Ferriell’s
testimony was clear and unequivocal that there was a month-to-month tenancy.
Further, Ferriell’s argument that the parties’ written lease provided for
a year-to-year tenancy is misplaced. Citing the contract language used in Khourie
Bros. v. Jonakin, 222 Ky. 277, 300 S.W. 612 (1927), Ferriell argues that her
written lease with Podgursky expressly provided that her tenancy was year-to-year.
However, in Khourie Bros., the lease contained express terms permitting its
extension for a “period of 3 years commencing immediately upon the expiration of
this lease....” Id. at 613 (internal citations omitted). In pertinent part, Ferriell’s
lease provided the following:
The initial term of this Lease shall be for a period of two
(2) years, commencing on April 1, 1994, and ending on
March 31, 1996, (the “Initial Term”). The term of this
Lease may be renewed for such additional terms(s) as
may be agreed upon by Landlord and Tenant. Such
renewal(s) shall be on the same terms and conditions
herein, except that the amount of "Rent" (as defined in
Section 4 hereof) shall be increased as agreed by
Landlord and Tenant. Tenant shall not have the
automatic right to extend the term of this Lease, but may
only extend the term if Landlord and Tenant are able to
agree on the amount of the increase in Rent for such
extension(s). The Initial Term and the foregoing
described extension(s) are hereinafter collectively
referred to as the “Term.”
Clearly, this language is not analogous to the express language found
in Khourie Bros. Nothing in Ferriell’s lease provided that she could extend the
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lease for a definite year-to-year period as in Khourie Bros. To the contrary, the
lease merely permitted the parties to renew “for such additional terms(s) as may be
agreed upon by...” the parties. Because the interpretation and legal effect of a
contract is a matter of law for the courts, we conclude that the trial court correctly
determined that the parties’ lease did not create a year-to-year tenancy. Bank One,
Pikeville v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet, 901 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Ky.App. 1995).
Alternatively, Ferriell contends that the application of Kentucky’s
holdover statute, KRS 383.160, results in a year-to-year tenancy. Because she
possessed the building beyond ninety days after the expiration of her two-year
lease and Podgursky did not seek her removal, she contends that her tenancy was
converted to year-to-year by virtue of the holdover statute. We disagree.
KRS 383.160(1) provides the following:
If, by contract, a term or tenancy for a year or more is to
expire on a certain day, the tenant shall abandon the
premises on that day, unless by express contract he
secures the right to remain longer. If without such
contract the tenant shall hold over, he shall not thereby
acquire any right to hold or remain on the premises for
ninety (90) days after said day, and possession may be
recovered without demand or notice if proceedings are
instituted within that time. But, if proceedings are not
instituted within ninety (90) days after the day of
expiration, then none shall be allowed until the expiration
of one (1) year from the day the term or tenancy
expired....”
However, the holdover statute is inapplicable if the tenant has established either
that the landlord consented to her remaining on the premises for a specified time
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for a temporary period, or if the parties were engaged in negotiations regarding
renewal of the lease when the previous term expired. Masterson v. DeHart Paint
& Varnish Co., 843 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Ky. 1992).
Based on Ferriell’s testimony, the trial court found that the parties
began negotiating a lease renewal within ninety days of the expiration of the 1994
lease. The trial court further found that a month-to-month tenancy was created at
the end of these negotiations. Thus, Ferriell’s reliance on the holdover statute is
misplaced because she was negotiating a new lease when her prior lease expired
and, thus, could not convert her expired lease into a year-to-year tenancy. Id.
Ferriell next contends that the trial court improperly found that she
failed to present adequate evidence to establish that Podgursky acted with willful,
wanton or gross negligence. Contending that Podgursky had an affirmative duty to
exercise ordinary care to prevent foreseeable injury, Ferriell argues that Podgursky
repeatedly failed to heed her advice regarding the constant leaking and structural
impairments of his building. Thus, she contends that her willful and wanton, and
gross negligence claims should have been submitted to the jury. We disagree.
In City of Middlesboro v. Brown, 63 S.W.3d 179, 181 (Ky. 2001), our
Supreme Court stated the following:
This Court has stated that gross negligence is “something
more than the failure to exercise slight care. We have
stated that there must be an element either of malice or
willfulness or such an utter and wanton disregard of the
rights of others as from which it may be assumed the act
was malicious or willful.” Horton v. Union Light, Heat
and Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1985), also
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illuminates the gross negligence definition and sets the
standard that should be applied. “In order to justify
punitive damages there must be first a finding of failure
to exercise reasonable care, and then an additional
finding that this negligence was accompanied by ‘wanton
or reckless disregard for the lives, safety or property of
others.’” (internal citations omitted).
Moreover, when a claim for gross, reckless, or wanton negligence is made for
punitive damages, KRS 411.184(2) provides that a “plaintiff shall recover punitive
damages only upon proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant
from whom such damages are sought acted toward the plaintiff with oppression,
fraud or malice.” Clear and convincing proof can be shown by offering evidence
of a probative and substantial nature carrying sufficient weight to convince
ordinarily prudent-minded people of its validity. W.A. v. Cabinet for Health and
Family Services, Com., 275 S.W.3d 214, 220 (Ky.App. 2008).
Although finding that Podgursky may have negligently repaired the
roof, the trial court ruled that negligent work does not necessarily constitute
willful, wanton, or gross negligence. Further, it found that Podgursky’s
presentation of the liability release prior to conducting roof repairs was not
evidence of reckless behavior because it related to the recent discovery that the loft
area was supported by piping rather than by an I-beam. Properly finding that
Ferriell’s claims were not limited by the release, the trial court’s finding that the
release was not proof of willful, wanton, or gross negligence was not erroneous.
Further, the record reflects that Podgursky attempted multiple repairs
to his building’s roof and ceiling and these repairs permitted Ferriell to continue
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operating her business in the building until the ceiling collapsed. Thus, after
viewing the entire record in a light most favorable to Ferriell, we conclude that the
trial court properly found that Ferriell could not establish that Podgursky’s conduct
constituted a willful, wanton, or gross disregard for her life, safety or property
under the clear and convincing evidence standard.
Ferriell next argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim
for general damages for breach of the lease agreement, her claim for damages to
her personal property, and her claim for damages to her customers’ personal
property. We disagree.
Kentucky permits wrongly evicted tenants to recover damages for
losses that can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, that are the natural result
of the breach, and that are reasonably within the contemplation of the parties as the
probable result of a breach. Kearns v. Sparks, 296 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Ky. 1956).
However, if parties have an exculpatory contract, the exemption from liability for
negligence, ordinary or gross, is not per se invalid, but its terms must be clear and
unmistakable and will be strictly construed. Cumberland Valley Contractors, Inc.
v. Bell County Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d 644, 649 (Ky. 2007).
The trial court’s dismissal of Ferriell’s claims for damages to her and
her customers’ personal property was proper. As the trial court found, Paragraph
6.3 of the parties’ lease agreement, which terms constituted a part of the parties’
oral lease agreement by virtue of Paragraph 3, precluded Ferriell from holding
Podgursky liable for her personal property damages. Specifically, Paragraph 6.3
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provides that all personal property placed in or on the leased premises by the tenant
shall be at the risk of the tenant. While Ferriell contends that this provision is in
conflict with the lease’s requirement that Podgursky maintain the roof, Paragraph
6.3’s express terms clearly and unmistakably address the issue of personal property
damage and must be given effect. Jett v. Doe, 551 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Ky. 1977).
Ferriell next contends that the trial court improperly excluded the
testimony of her expert witness, accountant Glenn Curry, regarding her lost profits.
According to Ferriell, Curry calculated the lost sales resulting from the interruption
of her business due to the collapsed ceiling. Contending that his testimony met the
standard provided in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v.
Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2000), Ferriell argues that Curry’s testimony
should have been admitted. We disagree.
As stated in Thompson, 11 S.W.3d at 577-78, a trial court has broad
discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and our standard of review is
limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion. “The test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial judge's discretion was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,
or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Id. at 581.
Applying this standard, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
excluding Curry’s testimony. The trial court limited evidence of Ferriell’s lost
profits to the time period from the ceiling collapse until she left the premises,
which was April 20, 1998, to July 13, 1998. However, according to his testimony,
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Curry believed that his business interruption loss calculations could not be
calculated for a short period, including a span of months.
He further testified that analyzing the business interruption loss
calculations over a year’s time period was preferable because of the many
variables and factors occurring every quarter. While Ferriell disagrees, the trial
court was in the best position to weigh Curry’s testimony and decide if it should be
admitted. Smith v. Smith, 235 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky.App. 2006). Accordingly, while
Curry may have been a qualified expert, the trial court’s decision to exclude his
testimony for not being sufficiently probative of the relevant time period was not
an abuse of discretion. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d at 577-78.
Ferriell next contends that the trial court erred by denying her claim
for moving expenses and for lost time. Contending that the collapsed ceiling
caused her and her husband significant relocation costs and lost wages, she
contends that she should have been permitted to recover on these claims.
We note that the jury awarded Ferriell her reasonable relocation
expenses, and, thus, her non-specific claim for relocation costs will not be further
addressed. Regarding Ferriell’s claims for compensation for lost time, we believe
this issue was subsumed by her claim for relocation expenses, because their
relocation, costing them time, was a necessary element of their jury award for
reasonable relocation expenses.
Ferriell next contends that trial court erred by denying her claim for
“Interest on Debts Incurred.” In her brief, Ferriell states the following:
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Appellant is not asking for reimbursement of the
principle [sic] of any debts incurred but she is asking to
recover the expenses that were the result of lost cash flow
because of the collapsed ceiling. That would include
interest on provable loans for monies that Appellant had
to borrow because of disrupted cash flow following the
collapsed ceiling.
Ferriell further argues that the trial court’s error was to limit her recovery for her
business losses to the term of her estate or to her possessory interest, which ended
at the termination of her tenancy. We disagree.
“Our courts have established that an alleged error may be deemed
waived where an appellant fails to cite any authority in support of the issues and
arguments advanced on appeal.” Hadley v. Citizen Deposit Bank, 186 S.W.3d 754,
759 (Ky.App. 2005). Further, a party’s brief must contain citations to the record to
support her arguments. Smith, 235 S.W.3d at 4-5. In her brief, Ferriell has not
cited any legal authority supporting her claim and has not cited to the record
regarding her claim for interest. Under the circumstances, we are left to speculate
regarding what damages are claimed and what legal authority supports her claim.
Consequently, due to her failure to comply with CR 72.12(4)(c)(v), we conclude
that Ferriell is not entitled to relief on this issue. Hadley, 186 S.W.3d at 759.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court
on the jury verdict is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
George R. Carter
Louisville, Kentucky
Scott A. Davidson
Louisville, Kentucky
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