CAIN (PHILLIP) VS. COMMONWEATLH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 4, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000337-MR
PHILLIP CAIN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHRAND, II, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00496
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND NICKELL, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Phillip Cain (Cain), pro se, appeals from an order of the
Boone Circuit Court’s denying his Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
11.42 post-conviction motion based upon alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
The trial court denied his motion, finding the performance of Cain’s attorney did
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
not fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. After
review, we affirm, holding that Cain failed to show that but for the alleged
ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, he would have reasonably insisted on going to
trial rather than entering into a plea agreement.
On July 5, 2005, Cain and Mark Jackson (Jackson) spent the day
ingesting heroin and alcohol, at the end of which they stole a car, drove to a nearby
hotel, and stole $300.00 while holding the hotel clerk at knifepoint. The hotel
clerk’s phone call to the police led to the arrest of Cain and Jackson along I-75
with the money and knife in their possession. Also, the hotel clerk was willing to
testify about the robbery at trial. After Cain’s arrest, the Boone County grand jury
returned a four-count indictment charging him with: (1) complicity2 to commit
robbery in the first degree;3 (2) operating a motor vehicle while license revoked or
suspended;4 (3) receiving stolen property with a value of $300 or more;5 and (4)
being a persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO I).6 If convicted and
given the maximum sentence allowed on each count, Cain could have been
imprisoned for twenty-five years or more.
Following plea negotiations, the Commonwealth offered Cain a plea
agreement whereby it would recommend a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment in
2
KRS 502.020.
3
KRS 515.020, a Class B felony.
4
KRS 186.620, a Class B misdemeanor.
5
KRS 514.110, a Class D felony.
6
KRS 532.080.
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exchange for a guilty plea and his testimony against Jackson. Cain accepted the
plea agreement. During the guilty plea hearing, Cain stated in open court, he was
satisfied with the legal counsel he had received prior to entering into the plea
agreement and that he was entering into the agreement “freely, knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily.” Furthermore, after the trial court reviewed the plea
agreement, he reviewed documents Cain had signed stating his attorney had “fully
explained” the case to him, he understood the “charges” against him, and a
“Certificate of Counsel” signed by Cain’s attorney stating she had discussed the
case with Cain and he understood his rights. The trial judge then accepted Cain’s
plea of guilty and subsequently sentenced him in accordance with the plea
agreement.
Almost three years later, Cain filed a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42
seeking to vacate his conviction due to receiving ineffective assistance of counsel.
After reviewing the record, the trial court denied the motion, finding Cain had
failed to provide any evidence that his attorney had provided ineffective counsel.
This appeal followed.
The standard of review for denial of a motion for post-judgment relief
under RCr 11.42 is well-settled. Generally, to establish a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel, a movant must meet the requirements of a two-prong test by
proving: 1) counsel's performance was deficient; and 2) the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985),
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cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3311, 92 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986). Under
Strickland, the standard for attorney performance is reasonable, effective
assistance. A movant bears the burden of establishing his counsel's representation
fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. In doing so, he must
overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance was adequate.
Jordan v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. 1969); McKinney v.
Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1969).
If an evidentiary hearing was held, we must determine whether the
trial court erroneously found Cain received effective assistance of counsel. Ivey v.
Commonwealth, 655 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. App. 1983). When, as here, an evidentiary
hearing was not held, our review is limited to “whether the motion on its face
states grounds that are not conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true,
would invalidate the conviction.” Lewis v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322
(Ky. 1967). See also Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. App.
1986).
When a movant enters a guilty plea, the Strickland standard of review
is slightly modified in that he must first show his counsel’s performance was
deficient, and then show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203, (1985); see also
Sparks, 721 S.W.2d at 727-28 (Ky. App. 1986). With these standards in mind we
address Cain’s three allegations of error.
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Cain first argues his conviction should be vacated because his attorney
failed to develop a diminished capacity defense prior to negotiating the plea
agreement and allowing Cain to enter into such agreement. In his brief to this
Court, Cain makes several unsupported allegations regarding his attorney’s failure
to develop such a defense and how these alleged failures fell below professional
standards. However, even if we were to assume these unsubstantiated allegations
sufficiently satisfied the first prong of the Sparks test, Cain has failed to satisfy the
second prong. Cain has not affirmatively shown that had his attorney developed
this defense he would have reasonably insisted on going to trial. As stated
previously, a defendant has the burden of showing why his plea agreement should
be vacated. Sparks, 721 S.W.2d at 727. Cain has failed to meet that burden.
Thus, we agree with the trial court that counsel’s actions did not fall outside the
wide range of professionally competent assistance that is constitutionally
guaranteed. Based on the record before us, we discern no ineffectiveness of
counsel, nor any prejudice to Cain.
Next, Cain alleges his conviction should be vacated because of an
alleged personality conflict between himself and his attorney which prevented his
attorney from providing effective assistance of counsel. According to his brief,
Cain and his attorney had a strained relationship caused by several tense
encounters marked by name calling. As a result of these encounters, Cain alleges
his attorney intentionally refused and failed to take his phone calls, did not
interview certain witnesses, and did not properly inform him of the parole
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eligibility requirements. However, once again, assuming arguendo that these
alleged failures fell outside the wide range of professionally acceptable conduct,
Cain still fails to show he would have reasonably insisted on going to trial, thereby
taking the risk of being sentenced to a prison term of twenty-five years or more as
opposed to accepting a ten-year plea agreement, regardless of the applicable parole
eligibility. Moreover, along with filing a number of motions on Cain’s behalf,
Cain’s attorney also managed to convince the trial court to dismiss one charge and
obtained a favorable plea agreement. Therefore, we hold the alleged conflict
between Cain and his attorney does not mandate a finding of ineffectiveness of
counsel and is insufficient to require this Court to vacate Cain’s conviction and
sentence.
Finally, Cain argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for an
evidentiary hearing on the grounds that newly discovered evidence7 could have
affected his decision to enter into his plea agreement. However, a movant is not
automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his RCr 11.42 motion; there
must be a genuine issue of fact which cannot be determined on the face of the
record. Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742 (Ky. 1993). Further,
“[n]ewly discovered evidence is not a basis for RCr 11.42 relief.” Foley v.
Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 878, 887 (Ky. 2000) (citing McQueen v.
7
This new “evidence” concerned possible impeachment testimony about Jackson’s involvement
in a similar instance of criminal conduct in Ohio. Cain alleges this new evidence showed
Jackson had a propensity for inducing others to commit crimes and subsequently “telling big a
lie” to exonerate himself. Without further explanation, Cain contends this evidence could have
aided in his defense.
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Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1997)). Cain merely asserted this
impeachment evidence could, not would, have changed his decision to plead
guilty. Cain has failed to show that without the newly discovered “evidence” he
now advances there is a reasonable probability the outcome below would have
been different or that he would have reasonably insisted on going to trial. The
totality of the circumstances militates against such a conclusion. Therefore, the
trial court did not err in denying Cain’s motion for an evidentiary hearing.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Boone Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Phillip Cain, pro se
Sandy Hook, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Bryan D. Morrow
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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