DAY (TIM) VS. DAY (SHANNON)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: DECEMBER 11, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000133-MR
TIM DAY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER J. MEHLING, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00731
SHANNON DAY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND VANMETER, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE: Tim Day appeals from a decree of dissolution of
marriage. He argues that the trial court erred by determining that his entire
workers’ compensation settlement was marital property and that his child support
obligation was improperly calculated. We affirm.
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Tim Day and Shannon Day were married on June 17, 2000, in Boone
County, Kentucky. Two minor children were born of the marriage. Mr. Day
suffered a work-related back injury on January 3, 2006. The parties separated on
April 16, 2006. Mr. Day filed his application for workers’ compensation benefits
after separation. The workers’ compensation settlement agreement was approved
after Ms. Day had petitioned for dissolution of marriage. Mr. Day received a gross
settlement of $30,000.00 for his injury. He received: (1) $15,000.00 for future and
past income benefits; (2) $10,000.00 for waiver of future medical benefits; (3)
$2,500.00 for waiver of his right to reopen; and (4) $2,500.00 for a waiver of his
right to vocational rehabilitation.
The trial court entered a decree of dissolution on November 6, 2007.
In the decree, the trial court concluded that Mr. Day’s entire workers’
compensation settlement was a marital asset and awarded Ms. Day one-half of the
settlement. The court granted joint custody of the minor children with Ms. Day as
the primary residential custodian. The court further ordered Mr. Day to pay
$417.00 per month in child support. The trial court entered amended findings and
conclusions of law on December 21, 2007. The trial court specifically found that
Mr. Day dissipated $11,300.00 of his workers’ compensation settlement. This
appeal followed. Ms. Day did not file an appellee brief.
Mr. Day first argues that the trial court erred by determining that his
entire workers’ compensation settlement was a marital asset and that the trial court
failed to divide the settlement in just proportions.
-2-
At the outset, we note that Ms. Day failed to file an appellee brief.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(8)(c) states:
If the appellee’s brief has not been filed within the time
allowed, the court may: (i) accept the appellant’s
statement of the facts and issues as correct; (ii) reverse
the judgment if appellant’s brief reasonably appears to
sustain such action; or (iii) regard the appellee’s failure
as a confession of error and reverse the judgment without
considering the merits of the case.
The penalties contained in CR 76.12(8)(c) are discretionary, and we elect to review
the merits of Mr. Day’s claims. See Flag Drilling Co., Inc. v. Erco, Inc., 156
S.W.3d 762, 766 (Ky. App. 2005).
In Quiggins v. Quiggins, 637 S.W.2d 666 (Ky. App. 1982), this Court
held that workers’ compensation benefits in either the form of a lump sum
settlement or ongoing benefits are marital property. Mr. Day cites Mosley v.
Mosley, 682 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. App. 1985), and Jessee v. Jessee, 883 S.W.2d 507
(Ky. App. 1994), in support of his arguments that exceptions have been created to
the rule established in Quiggins. These cases are distinguishable from the present
case.
In Mosley, this Court held that workers’ compensation payments
which accrued and were received after dissolution were not marital property.
Mosley, 682 S.W.2d at 463. In the present case, Mr. Day received his entire
workers’ compensation award prior to dissolution. In Jessee, this Court simply
held that the portion of a workers’ compensation award which accrued prior to the
marriage was non-marital and that the portion which accrued during the marriage
-3-
was marital. Jessee has no application to the facts of the present case. The trial
court correctly applied the rule stated in Quiggins.
Next, Mr. Day argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to divide the workers’ compensation settlement in just proportions as
directed by KRS 403.190.
KRS 403.190(1) states:
In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage or for
legal separation, or in a proceeding for disposition of
property following dissolution of the marriage by a court
which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse
or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court
shall assign each spouse’s property to him. It also shall
divide the marital property without regard to marital
misconduct in just proportions considering all relevant
factors including:
(a) Contribution of each spouse to acquisition of
the marital property, including contribution of a
spouse as homemaker;
(b) Value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(c) Duration of the marriage; and
(d) Economic circumstances of each spouse when
the division of property is to become effective,
including the desirability of awarding the family
home or the right to live therein for reasonable
periods to the spouse having custody of any
children.
The trial court divided the workers’ compensation settlement equally. The trial
court also found that Mr. Day had dissipated funds from his workers’
compensation settlement. This finding has not been challenged. The trial court
-4-
recited that it considered the KRS 403.190 factors. The trial court specifically
stated that the marriage was not of a short duration, that Mr. Day has not
demonstrated that he is totally disabled, and that he has the ability to obtain
appropriate job skills but has chosen not to do so. The trial court found that the
parties contributed equally to the marriage.
Mr. Day cites Reeves v. Reeves, 753 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. App. 1988), in
support of his argument that an equal division of the settlement award was not in
just proportions.
In Reeves, the marriage between the parties lasted only nineteen
months. The only substantial marital asset was the husband’s Jones Act award of
$107,000.00. The husband was totally disabled, while the wife was not. This
Court found that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding the wife 25% of
the Jones Act award. By way of contrast, in the present case, the marriage between
the parties lasted five years. Mr. Day’s workers’ compensation settlement was not
the only substantial marital asset, nor is he totally disabled.
Trial courts are vested with broad discretion when dividing marital
property. Smith v. Smith, 235 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. App. 2006). It is apparent from the
amended findings and conclusions entered on December 21, 2007, that the trial
court considered each of the KRS 403.190 factors. We are mindful that Mr. Day
was injured only three months before separation and received his settlement only
months prior to dissolution. However, in the context of the division of marital
-5-
property as a whole, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
simply because we may have weighed the evidence differently.
Next, Mr. Day argues that the trial court erred in its determination of
his child support obligation. However, we are cited to no legal authority nor to any
specific evidence in the record which would demonstrate that the trial court’s
determination of child support was in any way contrary to law.
Accordingly, the order of the Kenton Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
No appellee brief filed.
Joseph M. Schulte
Covington, Kentucky
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.