ASHLEY (MICHAEL WAYNE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 13, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000089-MR
AND
NO. 2008-CA-000327-MR
MICHAEL WAYNE ASHLEY
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RUSSELL D. ALRED, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00180
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
APPEAL NO. 2008-CA-000089-MR AND
AFFIRMING CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2008-CA-000327-MR
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER, MOORE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Michael Wayne Ashley brings Appeal No. 2008-CA-00089MR from a January 8, 2008, judgment upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of
rape in the third degree and sodomy in the third degree and sentencing him to sixyears’ imprisonment. The Commonwealth of Kentucky brings Cross-Appeal No.
2008-CA-000327-MR from the same judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand Appeal No. 2008-CA-000089-MR and affirm Cross-Appeal No. 2008CA-000327-MR.
Michael Wayne Ashley was indicted by a Harlan County Grand Jury
upon the offenses of rape in the third degree and sodomy in the third degree. The
charges stemmed from events that occurred in 2004 and 2005 while Ashley was a
teacher at Green Hills Elementary in Harlan County and the victim, K.K., was a
fourteen-year-old eighth-grade student. Following a jury trial, Ashley was
convicted upon both offenses and was sentenced to six-years’ imprisonment.
These appeals follow.
APPEAL NO. 2008-CA-000089-MR
Ashley brings essentially three claims of error for our review: (1) the
trial court improperly admitted into evidence “prior bad acts” in contravention of
Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 404(b); (2) the trial court improperly admitted
certain hearsay evidence; and (3) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to
review the official videotaped trial testimony of select witnesses, which included
bench conferences held outside of the jury’s presence. We have thoroughly
reviewed the relevant trial proceedings and considered the Commonwealth’s
counterarguments to Ashley’s claims of error. We are also cognizant of the serious
nature of the crimes Ashley was convicted, which underscores our constitutional
burden to ensure that Ashley’s conviction was the result of a fundamentally fair
trial. We are, however, compelled to conclude that Ashley did not receive a
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fundamentally fair trial, thus necessitating reversal of his judgment of conviction
and remand to the trial court for a new trial. To aptly explain our reasoning, we
address Ashley’s claims of error in reverse order and initially address his third
claim, as we view it to be most egregious.
In Ashley’s third claim of error, he alleges the trial court committed
reversible error by allowing the jury to view the official videotaped trial testimony
of select witnesses. A review of the record reveals that after the jury retired to
deliberate it submitted the following written questions to the trial court:
Can’t find social worker’s journal
Kimberly Spurlock
Need Detective Halcomb’s testimony
Sheila Grant’s testimony
Need Mr. Ashley’s testimony
In response to the questions, the trial court informed the jury that Spurlock’s
journal was not admitted into evidence and also informed the jury that it could
review the trial testimony of Kimberly Spurlock, Detective Doyle Halcomb, Shelia
Grant, and Ashley by viewing the official videotaped recording of the trial
proceedings. The jury was then allowed to view the pertinent videotaped
testimony on a television in the courtroom. The trial court told the jury that the
“clerk” would first “key up” the testimony of Spurlock; the jury would be
permitted to view Spurlock’s testimony and was to notify the bailiff when finished.
Per the trial court’s directions, the clerk would then return and key up the
testimony of each subsequent witness. Presumably, the jury viewed the entire
recorded trial testimony of all four witnesses in this manner. There is no indication
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by either party that the official videotaped proceedings were redacted in any
manner prior to the jury’s review of these four witnesses’ testimony.1
Upon our review of the videotaped testimony of the four witnesses, it
is clear the jury also viewed bench conferences that occurred between the trial
court and attorneys. Of particular import is a bench conference that occurred
during Ashley’s testimony. This bench conference took place on November 13,
2007, and began at 11:57 a.m. after the jury left the courtroom. It ended at 12:15
p.m. when the court proceedings were suspended for lunch. And, at 1:20 p.m., the
bench conference resumed and only ended at 1:38 p.m. Thus, the bench
conference lasted a total of approximately thirty minutes.
During the bench conference, the trial court, defense attorney, and
Commonwealth Attorney discussed at great length the admissibility of certain
evidence. This evidence consisted of three emails purportedly sent to a former
eighth-grade female student, A.C., by Ashley and an August 22, 2005, letter from
the Superintendent of Harlan County Board of Education to Ashley terminating
Ashley’s employment as a teacher. The Commonwealth sought to introduce the
emails and letter as exhibits to which Ashley objected. During the bench
conference, the trial court ruled that the three emails were inadmissible for lack of
1
Based on the record before this Court, it appears that the jury’s review of the videotaped
witness testimony violated Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure 9.74, although Michael
Wayne Ashley did not object to the jury’s review of the tapes at trial. See also, Mills v.
Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 366 (Ky. 2001), where a similar error was found to be of
“constitutional magnitude.”
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proper authentication and also redacted significant portions of the August 22, 2005,
letter before admitting the residue of the letter as Commonwealth’s Exhibit #6.
During the parties’ arguments to the trial court concerning
admissibility of said evidence, the contents of one of the three emails Ashley
purportedly sent to A.C. was discussed in detail. This email was graphically
described as depicting a male cartoon character with an erection and as containing
a statement “I kind of feel like old Chuck [cartoon character] in that cartoon.” This
email, as was the case with the other two emails, was sent from an anonymous
email account. However, during the bench conference, the Commonwealth
repeatedly argued that these three emails could be authenticated by A.C., who
would testify that Ashley acknowledged to her that he had sent the three emails.
Also, at the bench conference, the trial court redacted certain
paragraphs of the August 22, 2005, letter terminating Ashley’s employment. In so
doing, the trial court read aloud some of the redacted portions of the August 22,
2005, letter. Specifically, the trial court recited the Board of Education’s findings
that Ashley had engaged in inappropriate conduct with underage female students
and had misused email at school.
As these discussions concerned the admissibility of evidence and
occurred during a bench conference, it is clear that neither the trial court nor the
parties intended for the jury to hear same. Indeed, the trial court remarked that it
would constitute reversible error to admit the three emails into evidence. Yet, the
jury was privy to these discussions and the content of the aforementioned excluded
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evidence when it viewed the unredacted trial testimony of Ashley via the official
videotaped record. The Commonwealth has acknowledged the error but argues
that Ashley failed to object at trial. Thus, the Commonwealth believes any error
was unpreserved for appellate review.
As an appellate court, we may review an unpreserved error under
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26, which provides:
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a
party may be considered by the court on motion for a
new trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even though
insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and
appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination
that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.
To constitute a palpable error under RCr 10.26, the unpreserved error must affect a
substantial right of a party and result in manifest injustice. Schoenbachler v. Com.,
95 S.W.3d 830 (Ky. 2003). To determine if a palpable error resulted under RCr
10.26, we must initially determine whether the evidence was properly excluded
and, if so, the effect of the inadvertent admission of such evidence. We begin our
analysis with the three emails.
We have searched the record for the three emails; however, it does not
appear that the Commonwealth or Ashley offered the emails into the record by
avowal or by proffer. From the discussions that occurred between the parties and
the trial court at the bench conference, it appears that the three emails were sent to
A.C. sometime in 2002 and were sent from an anonymous email account. Hence,
the sender of the emails was not apparent from the face of the emails. Also, at
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least one of the emails contained explicit sexual references and content, which was
previously described in this opinion. During the bench conference, the
Commonwealth Attorney repeatedly stated that Ashley acknowledged to A.C. that
he sent the emails to her, including the sexually explicit email. The
Commonwealth believed these emails could be properly authenticated by A.C.’s
testimony. The trial court ruled that the three emails were not properly
authenticated and excluded the emails.
Under KRE 901(a), a document is authenticated by “evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.” Generally, there must exist sufficient evidence to establish the
genuineness of the document. Horn v. Com., 258 Ky. 718, 81 S.W.2d 576 (1935).
A trial court’s determination under KRE 901 as to authentication is given broad
discretion and will only be disturbed where a clear abuse of that discretion is
demonstrated. Johnson v. Com., 134 S.W.3d 563 (Ky. 2004).
In this case, the three emails were sent from an anonymous email
account and, thus, did not identify Ashley as the sender. And, the three emails did
not appear to contain any distinctive indicia of authorship, such as the use of
Ashley’s nickname or information known solely by Ashley. The only offered
evidence of genuineness was A.C.’s own testimony that she received the emails
from Ashley and that Ashley acknowledged to her that he sent them. Given the
unique opportunities that emails present for fabrication, we are unable to conclude
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that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that A.C.’s testimony was
insufficient to authenticate the three emails under KRE 901(a).
Considering that Ashley vehemently denied having any inappropriate
sexual contact with either A.C. or K.K. at trial, the emails constituted the only
documentary evidence wherein Ashley impliedly admits to such sexual contact
with A.C. by the very explicit sexual content of at least one of the emails. With
this email, the jury was presented with ostensibly Ashley’s own statements
demonstrating his sexual deviance, as concerns A.C. only, not K.K.
The prejudicial effect of such evidence cannot be overlooked. At
trial, the jury was essentially presented with two versions of events, and the verdict
was dependent upon which the jury found more credible. Upon the whole, we
conclude that a substantial right of Ashley’s was affected by the jury’s viewing of
the bench conference and that manifest injustice resulted therefrom. See
Schoenbachler, 95 S.W.3d 830.2 As such, we view the error as being palpable
error under RCr 10.26, thus entitling Ashley to a new trial. We next address
Ashley’s second claim of error.
Ashley contends that the trial court committed reversible error by
admitting certain hearsay evidence. In particular, Ashley argues that the August
22, 2005, letter terminating his employment, a journal kept by the victim, K.K.,
and four emails allegedly sent by Ashley to A.C. should have been excluded as
constituting hearsay evidence. We address each item of evidence separately.
2
As we decide that palpable error resulted in regard to the three emails, we do not reach the
effect of the inadvertent admission of the redacted portions of the August 22, 2005, letter.
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As to the August 22, 2005, termination letter, Ashley testified on
direct examination that he was the recipient of the 1997 Teacher of the Year award
in Harlan County, was nominated for Who’s Who of American Teachers, and was
nominated by students for Walt Disney’s Teacher of the Year program. On crossexamination, the Commonwealth asked Ashley about disciplinary action taken
against him as a teacher. The Commonwealth specifically inquired as to the
August 22, 2005, termination letter and then questioned Ashley concerning the
termination letter.
The trial court ruled that the August 22, 2005, letter was admissible to
impeach Ashley’s direct testimony concerning his teaching awards and
nominations. The trial court redacted significant portions of the August 22, 2005,
letter by deleting specific instances of misconduct that led to Ashley’s termination.
In this case, we think Ashley “opened the door” by his own testimony concerning
his various professional achievements. See Smith v. Com., 904 S.W.2d 220 (Ky.
1995). Moreover, the August 22, 2005, letter was not admitted “to prove the truth
of the matter asserted” but was rather admitted solely to impeach Ashley’s direct
testimony. KRE 801(c). As such, we do not believe that the trial court erred by
admitting into evidence the redacted version of the August 22, 2005, letter. We
next address the admissibility of the journal kept by the victim, K.K.
K.K. was the second witness to testify at trial. During K.K.’s
testimony on direct examination, the Commonwealth asked K.K. if she kept a
journal, and she responded affirmatively. Next, the Commonwealth questioned
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K.K. about the journal. Relevant to this appeal, K.K. testified that she wrote in the
journal about Ashley’s sexual abuse of her, that the dates in the journal were
correct, and that the entries accurately reflected the events recorded therein. The
journal was entered into the record as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 4.
K.K.’s journal clearly constituted hearsay. The journal was
undisputedly out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matters
asserted therein. KRE 801(c). The trial court ruled that K.K.’s journal constituted
a present sense impression under KRE 803(1) and was admissible thereunder.
KRE 803(1) reads:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rules,
even though the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or
explaining an event or condition made while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or
immediately thereafter.
Under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule, a
hearsay statement is admissible if the statement describes or explains an event
perceived by the declarant. Such a statement is not admissible under KRE 803(1)
if it is merely “about” the perceived event. Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky
Evidence Law Handbook §8.60(3) (4th ed. 2003). Moreover, to qualify as a
present sense impression, the statement must be made contemporaneous to the
event it describes or immediately thereafter. Young v. Com., 50 S.W.3d 148 (Ky.
2001). Although “immediately thereafter” is not defined in KRE 803(1), it is clear
that only a slight lapse of time between the event and statement is permissible.
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Young, 50 S.W.3d 148; Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook
§ 8.60(3) (4th ed. 2003). Indeed, the Supreme Court held that an eyewitness’s
statement describing the physical characteristics of a murderer and given to a
police officer seven minutes after the murder was not made “immediately after” an
event so as to constitute a present sense impression. Young, 50 S.W.3d 148. In the
case sub judice, the evidence clearly did not establish that K.K.’s statements in the
journal were made immediately after the events described therein. Thus, we do not
think the journal was admissible as a present sense impression under KRE 803(1).
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that prior
hearsay statements of a witness are admissible as substantive evidence under three
circumstances:
(1) [W]hen the prior statement is inconsistent with the
witness's present testimony; (2) when the prior statement
is consistent with the witness's present testimony and is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the
declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive; or (3) when the prior statement is one of
identification of a person made after perceiving the
person. KRS 801A(a).
Miller v. Com., 77 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Ky. 2002). In this appeal, none of the above
three circumstances are present. The journal was not offered as a prior inconsistent
statement of K.K. It also was not offered to rebut a charge of fabrication as the
journal was introduced into evidence by the Commonwealth and during K.K.’s
direct examination. See Miller, 77 S.W.3d 566. Moreover, there is no suggestion
that the journal was offered for identification purposes. Upon the whole, we
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conclude that the trial court erred by admitting K.K.’s journal into evidence. We
finally address the admissibility of the emails allegedly sent by Ashley to A.C.
Ashley argues that the four emails received by A.C. constituted
inadmissible hearsay. As previously noted, three of the four emails were sent from
an anonymous email account. The trial court ruled that these three emails were
inadmissible for lack of proper authentication, and we have affirmed this ruling.
As to the remaining email, the trial court ruled that this email was admissible, and
it was entered into evidence as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2. The record reveals
that this email was sent from an email account in Ashley’s name and Ashley was
identified as the “sender” on the face of the email. Additionally, A.C. testified that
Ashley acknowledged sending the email to her. 3
We believe the email was properly admitted as an admission of a
party under the hearsay exception found in KRE 801A(b)(1), which provides:
(b) Admissions of parties. A statement is not excluded by
the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available
as a witness, if the statement is offered against a party
and is:
(1) The party's own statement, in either an individual
or a representative capacity[.]
Thereunder, a hearsay statement is admissible if the statement is made by a party
and it is offered against the party. Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Law Evidence
Handbook § 8.15 (4th ed. 2003). Here, the email clearly satisfies the requirements
3
We note that the email admitted into evidence clearly identified the sender’s account as being
that of Ashley’s. This fact distinguishes it from the other three emails that were excluded from
evidence.
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of KRE 801A(b)(1) as an admission by a party – there was evidence that the email
was made by Ashley from his admitted email account and the email was offered by
the Commonwealth against him at trial. Thus, we hold that the trial court properly
admitted this email into evidence.
In his last remaining claim of error, Ashley contends the trial court
erred by admitting into evidence certain prior bad acts. Specifically, Ashley
asserts that the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of A.C., including an
email she purportedly received from Ashley. Ashley claims that A.C.’s testimony
should have been excluded as evidence of prior bad acts under KRE 404(b).
KRE 404(b) provides, in relevant part:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible:
(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident; or
(2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence
essential to the case that separation of the two (2)
could not be accomplished without serious adverse
effect on the offering party.
Simply put, KRE 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
generally not admissible to prove character. However, the rule provides for an
exception – such evidence may be admissible to show “motive, identity, absence of
mistake or accident, intent, or knowledge, or common scheme or plan.” Martin v.
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Com., 170 S.W.3d 374, 380 (Ky. 2005)(citing Pendleton v. Com., 685 S.W.2d 549
(Ky. 1985)). Where evidence is offered to demonstrate a common scheme or plan,
“the facts surrounding the prior bad acts must be so strikingly similar to the
charged offense as to show ‘(1) the acts were committed by the same person,
and/or (2) the acts were accompanied by the same mens rea.’” Martin, 170
S.W.3d at 380 (quoting Com. v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)). The
relevant inquiry is whether “common facts” exist between both acts and is not
whether there exists a common criminality. Martin, 170 S.W.3d at 380. By
establishing the presence of a common scheme or plan, relevancy is also
established. Once relevancy is established, the evidence should be admitted
“unless the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value.” Id. at 380.
This determination is within the trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of that discretion. Id.
In the case sub judice, the Commonwealth sought to introduce A.C.’s
testimony, including an email purportedly sent from Ashley to A.C. At trial, A.C.
testified as to Ashley’s statements and acts toward her while she was a student at
Green Hills Elementary. Specifically, she testified that Ashley proposed to have a
sexual relationship with her but she refused to do so.
The Commonwealth has identified several similarities in the acts of
Ashley toward A.C. and toward the victim, K.K. The Commonwealth argues that
A.C.’s testimony was admissible under KRE 404(b)(1), as demonstrating a
common scheme or plan. In support thereof, the Commonwealth points out that
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both girls: (1) were thirteen or fourteen years old and in the seventh or eighth
grade, (2) were taken out of other classes by Ashley, (3) were allowed not to
complete class assignments, (4) were told by Ashley that he wanted to kiss them
during class, (5) were invited to Ashley’s home when his wife was out of town, (6)
were complimented by Ashley on their appearance and intelligence, (7) were told
by Ashley that his sex life with his wife was awful, (8) were hugged by Ashley and
told that the hugs “excited” him, and (9) were told that he would take
“precautions” that younger boys would not take. In both instances, Ashley
purportedly used the teacher/student relationship to engage in inappropriate
conduct with both female students and specifically used similar methods to
“groom” both female students to have sexual relations with him.
Upon review of A.C.’s testimony, we believe Ashley’s prior acts
toward A.C. were sufficiently similar to Ashley’s acts toward K.K. to demonstrate
a “common scheme or plan” under KRE 404(b)(1). As such, we do not believe the
trial court abused its discretion by admitting A.C.’s testimony, including the email,
pursuant to 404(b)(1).
CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2008-CA-000327-MR
The Commonwealth asserts that the trial court erred by ruling that the
three emails sent to A.C. from an anonymous email account were inadmissible as
lacking proper authentication. We addressed this very issue in Ashley’s direct
appeal and concluded that the trial court properly excluded the three emails upon
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authentication grounds. Consequently, we view the Commonwealth’s assertion to
be without merit.
In sum, we reverse Ashley’s judgment of conviction and remand this
cause for a new trial.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Harlan Circuit Court is
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in Appeal No. 2008-CA-000089MR and affirmed in Cross-Appeal No. 2008-CA-000327-MR.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
David A. Johnson
Joshua J. Mullins
Hazard, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE:
James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
David A. Johnson
Hazard, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT:
James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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