WILLIAMS (AIMEE), ET AL. VS. BITTEL (TIMOTHY)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 25, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002568-ME
AIMEE WILLIAMS AND
MATT WILLIAMS
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 00-CI-00316 & 00-CI-00452
TIMOTHY BITTEL
APPELLEE
AND
NO. 2008-CA-001048-ME
AND
NO. 2008-CA-001140-ME
TIMOTHY BITTEL
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 00-CI-00316 & 00-CI-00452
AIMEE WILLIAMS AND
MATT WILLIAMS
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND CLAYTON, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE: Aimee and Matt Williams appeal from a Daviess
Family Court order entered on December 6, 2007, denying their petition to modify
custody and cross-appeal from an order entered May 5, 2008, denying their motion
to reconsider the petition. Timothy Bittel appeals from an order entered on May 5,
2008, denying his petition to modify custody and to stay a foreign judgment.
These appeals present our Court with three issues of first impression:2 (1) Whether
an out-of-state adoption preempts Kentucky custody orders; (2) Whether a de facto
custodian who is granted joint custody rights must continuously meet the de facto
custodial requirements in order to maintain standing in custody proceedings; and
(3) Whether the Daviess Circuit Court could properly condition its deference to the
Georgia courts on M.K.’s custody and visitation by providing that its prior orders
regarding Mr. Bittel’s joint custodianship and visitation with M.K. are not affected.
After considering the record, the briefs, and counsels’ oral arguments, we conclude
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
We are aware of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Mauldin v. Bearden, 293
S.W.3d 392 (Ky. 2009), which addresses some of the matters involved in the present case;
however, because the facts and procedural contexts of the present case differ sharply from those
of Mauldin v. Bearden, we believe it is accurate to characterize the issues in the present case as
first impression.
-2-
that the answer to the first two questions is “No” and the answer to the third
question is “Yes.” Hence, we affirm the Daviess Circuit Court.
No party to this appeal is a biological parent of M.K., who was born
to Wendy Kennedy and Billy Pyland3 on May 5, 1998. While she was pregnant,
Kennedy began dating Bittel. The couple later became engaged and moved in
together. During this time, Bittel and Kennedy functioned as a family unit and
shared all responsibilities and financial burdens, including caring and providing for
M.K.
When M.K. was eighteen months old, Kennedy tragically died.4
Kennedy’s sister and brother-in-law, the Williamses, assumed the responsibilities
of caring for M.K. Bittel, however, remained extremely involved in the child’s life
and even moved in with the Williamses in an attempt to help M.K. through the
grieving and adjustment process. M.K. also maintained a close bond with Bittel’s
relatives, whom she considered to be her family. Although both parties admit that
the Williamses later asked Bittel to leave their home, the motivation behind the
request is disputed.
On May 3, 2000, Bittel petitioned the Daviess Circuit Court for
custody of M.K. First, the court found that the Williamses and Bittel were de facto
custodians of M.K. Then, both parties were granted joint custody. The Williamses
3
Pyland has never had contact with M.K. or provided any financial support for the child. He has
remained absent from her life and declined to respond to any custodial court proceedings
concerning M.K.
4
Kennedy died during a routine medical procedure. A civil suit alleging medical malpractice
resulted in a settlement.
-3-
were designated primary residential custodians with liberal visitation given to
Bittel. Neither the Williamses nor Bittel appealed.
In August 2006, the Williamses notified Bittel that they intended to
move to Savannah, Georgia. Bittel filed a motion to amend the custody
arrangement and argued that it was in M.K.’s best interest to remain in Daviess
County. In September 2006, prior to the court’s ruling on Bittel’s motion, the
Williamses moved to Georgia.
On July 20, 2007, Bittel withdrew his motion for custody modification
and moved the court for specific visitation. Six days later, the Williamses filed a
motion to modify custody.5 The motion was denied based upon the Williamses’
failure to support their motion with an affidavit, as required by KRS 403.350.
Following a hearing and a recommendation by the Domestic Relations
Commissioner, the court granted Bittel’s motion for specific visitation and
carefully outlined a visitation schedule.
On October 12, 2007, the Williamses moved the court to reconsider
their petition for custody modification. Following a November 13, 2007, hearing,
the court entered an order on December 6, 2007, denying the motion. On
December 17, 2007, the Williamses filed a notice to appeal the December 6, 2007,
order.
During the pendency of the custody action in Kentucky, the
Williamses initiated and completed an adoption of M.K. in Georgia. Bittel
5
The trial court found that the Williamses’ motion was not properly brought before the court
because it lacked the evidentiary support required, and denied their motion.
-4-
attempted to intervene in the adoption. Because Georgia law only allows blood
relatives standing to intervene in adoption cases,6 Bittel’s intervention effort failed.
On March 24, 2008, the Williamses filed the Georgia adoption decree
with the Daviess Circuit Court under KRS 403.340. Bittel moved to stay the
foreign judgment. On May 5, 2008, the Daviess Circuit Court upheld Bittel’s
rights as joint custodian of M.K., despite the adoption. It determined that
Kentucky courts continued to have custody and visitation jurisdiction but deferred
to Georgia as the more convenient forum.
On May 30, 2008, Bittel filed a notice to appeal from the May 5,
2008, order. On June 10, 2008, the Williamses also filed a notice to cross-appeal
the May 5, 2008, order. We shall now consider the consolidated appeals.
I. Interstate Custody Dispute: Does the Georgia adoption divest Kentucky of
custody jurisdiction? We say “No.”
The Williamses claim that the Georgia decree of adoption renders the
Daviess Circuit Court custody orders moot. Although M.K. currently resides in
Georgia, Kentucky custody orders were in effect at the time of the adoption.
Therefore, we must determine whether Kentucky lost jurisdiction of the custody
proceedings.
6
Georgia law prohibits parties who are not related by blood to the child from intervening in an
adoption proceeding. McDonald v. Hester, 115 Ga. App. 740, 155 S.E.2d 720, 721 (1967).
-5-
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) was enacted in
1968 by the Kentucky legislature to avoid jurisdictional conflict and competition in
custody matters. In 2004, the Kentucky legislature repealed the UCCJA and
replaced it with the Uniform Child Custody and Juvenile Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA) in order to comply with the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A. Wallace v. Wallace, 224 S.W.3d 587, 589 (Ky.
App. 2007). The Act is codified in KRS 403.800 through 403.880. While the
UCCJEA retained much of the rationale of the UCCJA, the UCCJEA introduced
the concept of “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.” KRS 403.824 provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in KRS 403.828, a
court of this state which has made a child custody
determination consistent with KRS 403.822 or 403.826
has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the
determination until:
(a) A court of this state determines that neither the
child, nor the child and one (1) parent, nor the
child and a person acting as a parent have a
significant connection with this state and that
substantial evidence is no longer available in this
state concerning the child’s care, protection,
training, and personal relationships: or
(b) A court of this state or a court of another state
determines that the child, the child’s parents, and
any other person acting as a parent do not
presently reside in this state.
In Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2003), the Kentucky
Supreme Court found that the UCCJA governed adoption proceedings because
they were transfers of custody. However, KRS 403.802 specifically exempts
-6-
adoptions from the UCCJEA. The Williamses argue that this exemption
relinquishes jurisdiction of all custody proceedings to the Georgia courts.
While the UCCJEA does not apply to adoptions, Bittel has never
claimed that Kentucky should have jurisdiction over the adoption. Nor does Bittel
challenge the validity of the Georgia adoption. Instead, Bittel argues that
Kentucky retains jurisdiction of the custody matters. We agree, but we also
recognize that jurisdiction includes the discretionary power to decline to exercise
jurisdiction and defer to a more convenient forum. Our reading of both the
UCCJEA and PKPA persuades us that exclusive, continuing jurisdiction of the
custody matters remains in Kentucky as long as Bittel resides in Kentucky and
maintains a significant relationship with M.K. Mauldin v. Bearden, 293 S.W.3d
392 (Ky. 2009); KRS 403.824. Therefore, we conclude that the Georgia adoption
decree does not invalidate or alter the Daviess Circuit Court’s custody orders.
The Williamses successfully circumvented the spirit of the law. Their
actions create the precise problems that the UCCJEA and the PKPA attempted to
avoid; viz., interstate custody disputes and competition. This loophole cannot be
closed by our Court, only by legislative action.
II. De Facto Custodianship: Must Bittel continuously meet the de facto custodian
requirements in order to maintain standing in custody proceedings? We say “No.”
The Williamses also claim that Bittel has no standing in the custody
proceedings because he was improperly designated as a de facto custodian.7 KRS
7
Although Bittel was named a de facto custodian in 2000, when M.K. was less than three years
old, the Williamses did not contest the designation until now. The Williamses claim that they are
M.K.’s primary residential custodian and sole financial supporters, which eliminates Bittel’s
-7-
403.270(1)(a) describes a de facto custodian as, “a person who has been shown by
clear and convincing evidence to have been the primary caregiver for, and financial
supporter of, a child who has resided with the person for a period of six (6) months
or more if the child is under three (3) years of age . . . .” The Williamses argue that
Bittel never met that standard.
We cannot ignore that M.K. resided with Bittel and her mother for the
first eighteen months of her life and with Bittel and the Williamses following
Kennedy’s death. While Bittel has never been M.K.’s sole source of financial
support, Kennedy and Bittel intermingled their money and provided for M.K. with
those intermingled funds. These facts are of minimal importance, however, since
joint custody was established and maintained for over eight years.
While Bittel’s de facto custodian status was the basis for the trial
court’s award of joint custody, Bittel’s standing to participate in the custody
proceedings is derived from his status as a joint custodian. There is no requirement
under Kentucky law that a non-parent who is granted custodial rights due to his or
her designation as a de facto custodian must maintain the de facto custodian status
in order to maintain standing as a joint custodian. Such a requirement would place
an unfair burden upon the non-residential joint custodian.
The Williamses rely on Sullivan v. Tucker, 29 S.W.3d 805 (Ky. App.
2000), to support their attack on Bittel’s de facto custodial status. This reliance is
misplaced. In Sullivan, our Court declined to answer whether de facto custodians
eligibility as a de facto custodian.
-8-
have a right to participate in future custody hearings. Sullivan differs from this
case because Bittel not only participated, but was granted joint custody rights.
Although Sullivan is easily distinguished from the case at hand, Sullivan reminds
us that the purpose of de facto custodianship is to provide standing in custody
matters to non-parents who have taken on a parental role in the life of a child
whose custody is in dispute. Id. at 808.
In order to contest Bittel’s custody rights, the Williamses’ only
recourse was to petition the court for a modification of the custody arrangement.
Although the Williamses filed a modification motion, they failed to present any
evidence to suggest that Bittel’s status as joint custodian is not in M.K.’s best
interest, as required by KRS 403.340. Therefore, the motion was properly denied.
III. The Inconvenient Forum Issue: Could the Daviess Circuit Court properly
condition its deference to Georgia courts on custody and visitation issues by
providing that its prior orders regarding Bittel’s joint custodianship and visitation
are not affected? We say “Yes.”
Clearly a trial court may defer jurisdiction to another court under the
inconvenient forum clause of the UCCJEA, KRS 403.834(2). The statute
provides:
Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum,
a court of this state shall consider whether it is
appropriate for a court of another state to exercise
jurisdiction. For this purpose, the court shall allow the
parties to submit information and shall consider all
relevant factors, including:
(a) Whether domestic violence has occurred and is
likely to continue in the future and which state
could best protect the parties and the child;
-9-
(b) The length of time the child has resided outside
this state;
(c) The distance between the court in this state and
the court in the state that would assume
jurisdiction;
(d) The relative financial circumstances of the
parties;
(e) Any agreement of the parities as to which state
should assume jurisdiction;
(f) The nature and location of the evidence
required to resolve the pending litigation,
including testimony of the child;
(g) The ability of the court of each state to decide
the issue expeditiously and the procedures
necessary to present the evidence; and
(h) The familiarity of the court of each state with
the facts and issues in the pending litigation.
Our review of the statute raises questions concerning the trial court’s
decision to defer jurisdiction. The court did not make specific findings as to each
of the mandatory factors. Therefore, we cannot ascertain the weight assigned to
each factor or the logic behind the court’s decision. But because neither party
moved the trial court for more specific findings, we cannot address the issue.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.04.
Moreover, we believe the trial court had authority to include the final
sentence in its order entered on May 5, 2008, to wit: “However, this Court’s
-10-
previous orders are not affected in any manner as they refer to Mr. Bittel’s joint
custodianship of [M.K.] and the visitation rights resulting therefrom.”
KRS 403.834(3) provides:
If a court of this state determines that it is an
inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is a
more appropriate forum, it shall stay the proceedings
upon condition that a child custody proceeding be
promptly commenced in another designated state and
may impose any other condition the court considers just
and proper.
We conclude that the trial court’s imposition of the condition set out
in the above-quoted final sentence of its order entered on May 5, 2008, is a just and
proper condition to its decision to defer to Georgia’s courts on the issue of Bittel’s
custody and visitation rights with M.K. Whether and to what extent the Georgia
courts will enforce the “previous orders” of the Daviess Circuit Court are issues
not before us.
Finally, although the issue is not raised on appeal, we note that the
order entered on May 5, 2008, does not expressly “stay the [Daviess Circuit Court]
proceedings upon condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly
commenced in another designated state[,]” which KRS 403.834(3) requires. If this
issue is raised in the trial court, an appropriate amendment to the order entered on
May 5, 2008, would appear to be warranted.
-11-
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the Daviess Circuit Court
orders entered on December 6, 2007, and May 5, 2008.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR AIMEE WILLIAMS AND
MATT WILLIAMS:
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR TIMOTHY BITTEL:
J. Fox DeMoisey
Louisville, Kentucky
Angela L. Thompson
Owensboro, Kentucky
-12-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.