MARTIN (DARREN M.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JULY 3, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002043-MR
DARREN M. MARTIN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00041
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND STUMBO, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
STUMBO, JUDGE: Darren M. Martin appeals from an order of the Greenup
Circuit Court revoking Martin’s probation for failure to report to his probation
officer. Martin argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to
Senior Judge David W. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
1
properly take into account that he could not find his probation office because the
office had moved and his probation officer had changed. He also contends that the
court improperly allowed proof to be introduced at the revocation hearing of which
Martin had not received prior notice. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the
order on appeal.
On January 12, 2006, Martin entered a plea of guilty in Greenup
Circuit Court on three counts of Wanton Endangerment in the first-degree. He was
sentenced to two years on each count to run concurrently, after which the sentence
was probated. The terms of the probation required Martin to report to his
probation officer on an ongoing basis.
Sometime thereafter, Martin moved to Florida and authorities in that
state assumed responsibility for monitoring his probation. On April 26, 2006, he
tested positive for marijuana use. Martin returned to Kentucky, and his probation
monitoring was transferred back to Kentucky authorities.
On June 28, 2006, the Commonwealth moved to revoke Martin’s
probation based on the positive marijuana test in Florida. After taking proof, the
Greenup Circuit Court amended Martin’s order of probation to include substance
abuse counseling, anger management and three weekly narcotics anonymous
meetings.
On June 1, 2007, the Commonwealth filed another motion to revoke
Martin’s probation. As a basis for this motion, the Commonwealth claimed that
Martin violated his probation by failing to report to his probation officer since
2
returning to Kentucky. When Martin failed to appear for the motion, a bench
warrant was issued and he was returned to custody.
On September 20, 2007, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the
motion. Probation Officer Buskirk testified that Martin had not made contact with
him since Martin returned from Florida. He also testified that he had spoken with
Martin’s mother, who stated to him that she would tell Martin to report to his
probation officer.
Martin’s mother was in the courtroom, and was asked to testify. She
stated that Martin told her he was trying to get things “in order” before turning
himself in to probation and parole authorities. Martin then testified, stating that he
thought Officer Spillman was his probation officer, and that he did not know how
to contact probation officials because the office had been relocated.
After considering the proof, the circuit court rendered an order on
September 25, 2007, revoking Martin’s probation. The court found in relevant part
that Martin failed to report to probation authorities in violation of the terms of his
probation order. The order stated that the “testimony with the most probative
value supports the position of the Commonwealth that the Defendant knew or
should have known when and how to contact the Office of Probation and Parole in
order to report on a timely basis.” The order revoked Martin’s probation and
remanded him to the custody of the Department of Corrections to serve the
remainder of his sentence. This appeal followed.
3
Martin raises two claims of error. He first argues that the circuit court
abused its discretion by “ignoring” certain aspects of the evidence to his detriment.
Specifically, he contends that the court erred in failing to give proper weight to
Martin’s testimony that the Kentucky probation office moved while he was in
Florida, rendering it difficult or impossible for him to find upon his return. He also
stated that he had been looking for the wrong probation officer. He maintains that
there was insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that he knew or should
have known how to find his probation officer, and that no good purpose is served
by returning him to custody merely because he was unable to find his probation
office. In sum, he seeks an order reversing the order on appeal and reinstating his
probation.
We have closely examined the record and the law, and find no error
on this issue. It is uncontroverted that Martin was subject to an order compelling
him to - among other things - report to his probation officer on a regular and
ongoing basis. It is further uncontroverted that he did not do so. The question for
our consideration on this issue, then, is whether the circuit court abused its
discretion in attributing more weight and credibility to the evidence that his failure
to report was not justified, than to the evidence tendered by Martin that he was
unable to locate his probation office and/or probation officer. We must answer that
question in the negative.
KRS 533.030 states that,
4
(1) The conditions of probation and conditional discharge
shall be such as the court, in its discretion, deems
reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will
lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so. The court
shall provide as an explicit condition of every sentence to
probation or conditional discharge that the defendant not
commit another offense during the period for which the
sentence remains subject to revocation.
(2) When imposing a sentence of probation or
conditional discharge, the court may, in addition to any
other reasonable condition, require that the defendant: . . .
(i) Report to the probation officer as directed . . . .
A defendant has no right to probation. A panel of this Court has
previously stated that,
It is clear in this Commonwealth that probation is a
privilege rather than a right. Brown v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App., 564 S.W.2d 21 (1977). One may retain his
status as a probationer only as long as the trial court is
satisfied that he has not violated the terms or conditions
of the probation. KRS 533.030; United States v.
Markovich, 348 F.2d 238 (2nd Cir.1965). It is not
necessary that the Commonwealth obtain a conviction in
order to accomplish revocation of probation. Our review
is limited to a determination of whether, after a hearing,
the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the
appellant's parole.
Tiryung v. Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Ky. App. 1986).
Evidence was adduced that Martin knew the terms of his probation,
that those terms included mandatory reporting to his probation officer, and that his
liberty depended on his compliance with those terms. Testimony was also offered
by Martin’s own mother that he wanted to get his affairs in order before contacting
his probation officer. Martin’s proof consisted of his testimony that - for a period
5
of approximately six months - he was unable to find the probation office. He
further stated that his employment prevented him from conducting a thorough
search for the probation office.
The circuit court, as fact finder, is in the best position to judge the
weight and credibility of the evidence. CR 52.01; Croft v. Croft 240 S.W.3d 651,
655 (Ky. App. 2007), citing Bickel v. Bickel, 95 S.W.3d 925 (Ky. 2002).
Consequently, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court absent clear error. Id. We have no basis for finding that the Greenup
Circuit Court clearly erred in attributing more weight to the Commonwealth’s
evidence than to Martin’s. Ultimately, Martin was responsible for finding and
reporting to his probation officer, and the circuit court properly so found.
Martin also argues that he was denied due process of law because his
hearing was not conducted by a neutral and detached hearing body. Citing
Baumgardner v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 560 (Ky. App. 1985), Martin
contends that the circuit court improperly relied on his positive marijuana test in
Florida in revoking his probation even though “the probation officer was not
focusing on that matter.” We find no error on this issue. In Baumgardner, the trial
judge issued a revocation order, sua sponte, immediately after the conclusion of a
criminal proceeding. He did so without conducting a separate hearing or otherwise
gathering additional evidence in support of the revocation. On appeal, a panel of
this Court found that the hearing body, i.e., the trial judge, was not detached and
neutral based on the manner in which the revocation occurred.
6
In the matter at bar, the facts are quite different. Unlike
Baumgardner, Martin’s probation revocation proceeding was not conducted
immediately after a criminal conviction, by the same judge who had just conducted
the criminal proceeding, and without reliance on additional evidence. Rather,
Martin’s revocation proceeding was conducted some 19 months after the entry of
his guilty plea. It was conducted by the Honorable Robert B. Conley, Circuit
Judge, who did not preside at the prior proceeding. Also, evidence was adduced at
the proceeding by both Martin and the Commonwealth on the issue at bar. When
the record is viewed in its totality, we are not persuaded that Martin was denied the
detached and neutral hearing body to which he was entitled.
Finally, Martin claims that the circuit court improperly relied on
evidence of the positive drug test in Florida because this evidence “was not
provided in advance to appellant in the affidavit to revoke his probation.” Martin
directs our attention to Murphy v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. App.
1977) in support of his claim that said failure constitutes a basis for reversing the
revocation order.
In Murphy, a panel of this Court reversed a revocation order upon
finding that Murphy “. . . was not served with notice that a hearing would be held
for the purpose of determining whether there was probable cause to believe that he
had violated his terms of probation . . . .” Id. at 841. That is to say, Murphy
received no notice of the revocation proceeding. The facts at bar are dissimilar, as
it is uncontroverted that Martin - who had the benefit of counsel - received notice
7
of the time, place and purpose of the revocation hearing and was afforded ample
opportunity to present evidence. Murphy is distinguishable, and accordingly we
find no error.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Greenup Circuit
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Heather M. Fryman
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
8
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.