D.E. VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 21, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001882-DG
D.E., A CHILD UNDER EIGHTEEN
v.
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM LINCOLN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID A. TAPP, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 07-XX-00002 & 99-J-00118
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; STUMBO, JUDGE; GUIDUGLI,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
STUMBO, JUDGE: D.E.2 was charged with third-degree criminal trespass and
third-degree criminal mischief for throwing rocks at a house. She was found guilty
1
Senior Judge Daniel T. Guidugli sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
2
Since the child in this case is under eighteen, her name shall be kept confidential and she shall
be identified by her initials.
of both charges. Her conviction was affirmed by the circuit court and this Court
granted discretionary review. She argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support a charge for third-degree criminal trespass as there was no evidence
presented at trial that she entered the property at issue and that a person must enter
onto the property to be guilty of trespass. The Commonwealth responds that even
if she did not enter the property, the rocks she threw did and this is sufficient. We
find that there was no evidence of criminal trespass in this case and therefore the
conviction for this charge is reversed.
A juvenile petition was filed against D.E., as well as other youths,
which charged them with criminal trespass and criminal mischief. The petition
alleged that the children threw rocks at a house and caused damage to the siding.
During trial in the district court, the Commonwealth relied on the
testimony of the owner of the house and her son. Neither testified that D.E. had
entered onto the property. D.E. testified that she threw rocks at the house, but
denied hitting it and causing damage. Counsel for D.E. moved for a directed
verdict at the close of the Commonwealth’s case and again at the end of the
defense’s case. Both motions were denied.
D.E. was found guilty of both charges, and her sentence was probated
by the court. The court found that the throwing of the rocks constituted the
trespass.
2
D.E. then appealed to the circuit court which affirmed the conviction
on the grounds that even though there was no evidence that D.E. herself entered
the property, she controlled the rocks which did enter the property, and thus, was
guilty of trespass.
“A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when he
knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises.” Kentucky Revised
Statute (KRS) 511.080(1). D.E. argues that the statute requires a person to enter
the property because it says a “person is guilty” and uses the pronoun “he.”
In affirming the conviction of D.E. on the trespass charge and denying
D.E.’s argument that the person must enter onto the property, the circuit court used
an illustration. It stated that:
[a]n individual could simply avoid all criminal
trespassing charges by assembling a long pole that would
allow the individual to reach onto another person’s
property while the individual remained on his own or
public property. Presumably, this individual could wreak
all manner of mischief with this pole and they could not
be charged with criminal trespass provided that only the
pole intruded into the victim’s property and the
individual did not physically intrude into the victim’s
property.
While this is a compelling analysis, it overlooks the argument put
forth by D.E. D.E. argues that the person using the pole in the court’s illustration
could be guilty of other crimes, such as criminal mischief. In other words, the
Commonwealth has other criminal avenues to pursue when a person uses objects to
cause damage on another person’s land.
3
Our research into this case revealed that there has been no Kentucky
criminal case law dealing with objects being used for criminal trespass. We did,
however, find an Attorney General’s Opinion which we found persuasive. In OAG
82-262, a question is posed to the Kentucky Attorney General about whether a
hunter who releases dogs onto another’s property can face criminal liability.
The Attorney General opined that there can be no criminal liability for
the dog’s trespass. One part of the opinion states that criminal trespass requires
entry by a person. It then notes that the Kentucky Penal Code defines a person as
“a human being, and where appropriate, a public or private corporation, an
unincorporated association, a partnership, a government, or a governmental
authority.” KRS 500.080(12). A dog fits into none of those categories.
We find this opinion persuasive. If one cannot be held criminally
liable for a dog’s trespass, then the same can be said for a rock. “Where the words
of the statute are clear and unambiguous and express the legislative intent, there is
no room for construction or interpretation, and the statute must be given its effect
as written. An unambiguous statute must be applied without resort to any outside
aids.” Lincoln County Fiscal Court v. Department of Public Advocacy Com. of
Ky., 794 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Ky. 1990) (citations omitted).
KRS 511.080(1) states that a person is guilty of trespass when he
knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon another’s premises. A person
must enter onto the property to be found guilty of criminal trespass. As stated
4
above, there were other charges that could be brought in this case when D.E. threw
a rock onto another person’s property. In fact, D.E. was charged with third-degree
criminal mischief and found guilty. Criminal mischief was an appropriate charge
under the circumstances; however, criminal trespass was not.
Since the decisions of the lower courts were based on the rock D.E.
threw entering onto the land and that there was no evidence that D.E. herself
entered onto the land, we reverse the conviction for third-degree criminal trespass.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Timothy G. Arnold
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Daryl K. Day
Lincoln County Attorney
Special Assistant Attorney General
Stanford, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Robert K. Strong
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Daryl K. Day
Lincoln County Attorney
Special Assistant Attorney General
Stanford, Kentucky
5
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