STANFORD HEALTH & REHABILITATION CENTER , ET AL. VS. BROCK (LUCILLE), ET AL.
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RENDERED: JUNE 6, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001703-MR
STANFORD HEALTH & REHABILITATION
CENTER; BEVERLY HEALTH AND
REHABILITION SERVICES, INC.;
BEVERLY ENTERPRISES, INC.;
BEVERLY CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
A/K/A BEVERLY ENTERPRISES, INC.
D/B/A BEVERLY HEALTH AND
REHABILITATION SERVICES, INC.;
GOLDEN LIVING CENTER - STANFORD;
AND GGNSC STANFORD LLC
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM LINCOLN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID A. TAPP, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00206
LUCILLE BROCK, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS THE ADMINISTRATRIX OF
THE ESTATE OF GLEN WILLIAMS,
DECEASED, AND ON BEHALF OF
ALL WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES
OF THE ESTATE OF GLEN WILLIAMS,
DECEASED
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
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APPELLEES
BEFORE: FORMTEXT ACREE, DIXON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Stanford Health & Rehabilitation Center, Beverly Health and
Rehabilitation Services, Inc., Beverly Enterprises, Inc., Beverly California
Corporation a/k/a Beverly Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Beverly Health and Rehabilitation
Services, Inc., Golden Living Center – Stanford, and GGNSC Stanford LLC
(Stanford Health) brings this appeal from a July 25, 2007, Order of the Lincoln
Circuit Court which denied Stanford Health’s motion to compel arbitration. We
vacate and remand.
Glen Williams was a resident of Stanford Health & Rehabilitation
Center in Stanford, Kentucky. Williams died on April 1, 2006. Lucille Brock, his
sister, was appointed administratrix of his estate.
Brock, in her capacity as administratrix, individually, and on behalf of
other beneficiaries, filed an action against Stanford Health alleging negligence,
breach of contract, violation of statutory duties, and breach of fiduciary duty in the
death of Williams.
Stanford Health filed a motion to hold the action in abeyance and to
compel arbitration. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 417.060. Therein, Stanford
Health alleged that Williams signed an arbitration agreement upon admission to the
rehabilitation center. By order entered July 25, 2007, the circuit court denied
Stanford Health’s motion to compel arbitration. This interlocutory appeal follows.
KRS 417.220.
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Stanford Health argues that the circuit court erred by denying its
motion to compel arbitration. Specifically, Stanford Health maintains that the
arbitration agreement constituted a binding and enforceable contract and that the
evidence established that Williams signed the agreement.
Under KRS 417.060, a person may seek a judicial order to compel
arbitration upon a showing that a valid arbitration agreement exists and that the
opposing party refuses to arbitrate. If the opposing party challenges the existence
of a valid arbitration agreement, the circuit court “shall proceed summarily to the
determination of the issue so raised.” KRS 417.060(1).
Appellate review of an otherwise unappealable interlocutory order
arises under KRS 417.220(1)(a). The standard of review by our Court from
appeals arising under this statute was recently discussed in Conseco Finance
Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 340 (Ky.App. 2001) as follows:
It may also be well to note that our review of a trial
court's ruling in a KRS 417.060 proceeding is according
to usual appellate standards. That is, we defer to the trial
court's factual findings, upsetting them only if clearly
erroneous or if unsupported by substantial evidence, but
we review without deference the trial court's
identification and application of legal principles. . . .
In this case, the circuit court made no factual findings nor can we
determine whether the circuit court’s ruling was based upon the application of
contract law or other legal principles which might justify a de novo review by this
Court.1 The circuit court’s order does indicate that the court considered
We cannot determine from review of the circuit court’s order whether the court found the
existence of a valid arbitration agreement which must be resolved first under Kentucky Revised
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documentary evidence, affidavits, and arguments by counsel. Under the
circumstances presented in this case, and in reliance upon Conseco, we believe the
circuit court is bound by the provisions of Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
52.01, which mandates that a court set forth specific findings of fact and separate
conclusions of law in its order or judgment.
In the case sub judice, the circuit court’s July 25, 2007, order denying
arbitration did not contain any findings of fact or conclusions of law. Rather, the
court merely stated that Stanford Health’s motion to compel arbitration was
denied. We believe the circuit court erred by failing to make any findings of fact
and conclusions of law in its July 25, 2007, order denying arbitration.2 See Brown
v. Shelton, 156 S.W.3d 319 (Ky.App. 2004). And, we remind the circuit court that
it speaks only through written orders entered upon the official record. See Midland
Guardian Acceptance Corp. of Cincinnati, Ohio v. Britt, 439 S.W.2d 313 (Ky.
1968); Com. v. Wilson, 132 S.W.2d 522, 280 Ky. 61 (1939). As such, any findings
of fact and conclusions of law made orally by the circuit court at an evidentiary
hearing cannot be considered by this Court on appeal unless specifically
incorporated into a written and properly entered order.
Upon remand, the circuit court shall reconsider Stanford Health’s
motion to compel arbitration in accordance with KRS 417.050 and KRS 417.060
Statutes 416.050.
This is distinguished from a case where the circuit court makes inadequate findings of fact. In
such a case, a party is bound to make a request for more definite findings under Kentucky Rules
of Civil Procedure 52.04 before reversal may be predicated upon such error.
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and shall render an order that sets forth specific findings of fact and separate
conclusions of law as required by CR 52.01.
We view Stanford Health’s remaining contentions of error to be moot.
For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Lincoln Circuit Court is
vacated and this cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
A. Courtney Guild, Jr.
Edward L. Schoenbaechler
Louisville, Kentucky
Jacques G. Balette
Houston, Texas
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