PROPES (JOHN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 6, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001440-MR
JOHN PROPES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONROE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE C. LOVELACE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00043
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CAPERTON, LAMBERT, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: John Propes appeals from an order of the Monroe Circuit
Court denying his motion for additional jail time credit for the 352 days he served
prior to pleading guilty to second-degree assault. For the reasons stated herein, we
affirm.
On February 17, 2005, Propes entered a plea of guilty. In the plea, the
Commonwealth agreed to dismiss the charges of operating a motor vehicle under
the influence of drugs or alcohol, second offense; driving with a suspended license,
first offense; and wanton endangerment, first-degree. Additionally, the
Commonwealth agreed to amend Propes’ charge of assault in the first degree to
assault in the second degree. Finally, the plea provided that Propes agreed to
waive any jail time credit for his jail service prior to accepting the plea offer which
was 352 days. On March 23, 2005, in accordance with the guilty plea, the trial
court sentenced Propes to ten years’ imprisonment.
Subsequently, citing KRS 532.120(3), Propes filed a motion to be
granted additional jail time credit for the time he spent in jail prior to accepting his
plea. On June 28, 2007, the trial court denied Propes’ motion for additional jail
time credit. This appeal followed.
Propes contends that the trial court erred when it denied him 352 days
of jail time credit representing the time he spent in custody prior to accepting the
Commonwealth’s plea offer. Specifically, he contends that the denial of his jail
time credit resulted in an illegal sentence being imposed against him because his
effective sentence exceeded the maximum term of the criminal offense for which
he was convicted.
Essentially, he contends that the maximum term for second-degree
assault, a class C felony, is ten years’ imprisonment. Therefore, when he was
sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment without the benefit of his 352 days of jail
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time credit, he contends that he was effectively sentenced to eleven years’
imprisonment for an offense with a maximum term of ten years’ imprisonment.
Propes further contends that the trial court was required to credit him
with 352 days by virtue of KRS 532.120(3). In pertinent part, KRS 532.120(3)
provides that “[t]ime spent in custody prior to the commencement of a sentence as
a result of the charge that culminated in the sentence shall be credited by the court
imposing sentence toward service of the maximum term of imprisonment.” Noting
that the statute contains mandatory language, Propes argues that the trial court was
compelled to give him jail time credit.
Propes correctly states that KRS 532.120(3) provides credit for time
spent in custody prior to the commencement of a sentence. However, there is
nothing that precludes a defendant from voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waiving the operation of this statute. Defendants may waive many constitutional
and statutory rights which would otherwise operate for their benefit.
Commonwealth v. Townsend, 87 S.W.3d 12, 15 (Ky. 2002).
Specifically, our Supreme Court has held that a defendant may validly
waive the maximum aggregate sentence limitation found in KRS 532.110(1)(c).
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 90 S.W.3d 39, 44 (Ky. 2002). This statute limits the
term of imprisonment that a defendant must serve when he is sentenced to
consecutive terms. Further, in Johnson v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 704, 706,
our Supreme Court noted, in pertinent part, the following:
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“Any right, even a constitutional right, may be
surrendered in a plea agreement if that waiver was made
knowingly and voluntarily.” United States v. Ashe, 47
F.3d 770, 775-776 (6th Cir.1995); see also Town of
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393, 107 S.Ct. 1187,
1192, 94 L.Ed.2d 405, 416 (1987)(holding that plea
bargaining does not violate the U.S. Constitution even if
important constitutional rights are waived). It is likewise
well established that a plea agreement and any waivers
contained therein are binding upon a defendant. United
States v. Beason, 42 Fed.Appx. 787, 789 (6th Cir.2002).
In this case, Propes accepted and signed a plea agreement which
specifically provided that he was waiving any jail time credit accumulated prior to
accepting the Commonwealth’s plea offer. While Propes contends he was illegally
sentenced, the Commonwealth agreed to amend his first-degree assault charge, a
Class B felony with a maximum term of twenty years, to second-degree assault,
and to dismiss his first-degree wanton endangerment charge.
Therefore, we conclude that Propes’ guilty plea waived the operation
of KRS 532.120(3). Furthermore, because the waiver of the statute does not
constitute a constitutional waiver, there is no constitutional prohibition against
presuming that Probes’ waiver was valid. Johnson, 90 S.W.3d at 45. Finally, we
note that Probes has failed to place his plea agreement or a transcript or recording
of the court proceedings of his plea agreement into the appellate record, and this
failure operates to support that Propes’ plea was valid. Clark v. Commonwealth,
223 S.W.3d 90, 102 (Ky. 2007) (appellate courts will assume that any missing
portion of the record supports the ruling of the trial court).
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For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Monroe Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John Propes, Pro Se
Fredonia, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Louis F. Mathias, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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