DURBIN (MARK), ET AL. VS. LOUISVILLE METRO PLANNING COMMISSION , ET AL.
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RENDERED: JULY 11, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001408-MR
MARK DURBIN;
COLLEEN MCKINLEY; and
DON MULHALL
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE FREDERIC J. COWAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-008898
LOUISVILLE METRO PLANNING
COMMISSION;
PRIMROSE MEADOWS, LLC; and
THE PADDOCKS, LLC
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE: Mark Durbin, Colleen McKinley, and Donald Mulhall
appeal a Jefferson Circuit Court opinion and order affirming the Louisville Metro
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
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Planning Commission’s (Commission) approval of Primrose Meadows, LLC
(Primrose), a proposed subdivision. The residents claim that the decision was
arbitrary on two grounds. First, the residents claim that the decision was not based
on substantial evidence. Second, the residents claim that the approval was based
upon invalid regulations that do not comply with the Comprehensive Plan which
was established to guide the Commission in such decisions. Finding that the
Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, we affirm the judgment of the
circuit court.
On July 3, 2006, Primrose filed an application with the Commission
to build a one-hundred acre lot subdivision in southern Jefferson County, located
on Thixton Lane (Thixton). The Commission held a public meeting to discuss the
proposal and gather opinions from residents of the area. Residents expressed
concerns that additional traffic on Thixton would worsen an already inadequate
road.
On September 14, 2006, the residents presented evidence that Thixton
was not 18-feet wide, as required by the subdivision regulations. Along with
testimony, statistics and pictures, the residents presented a report from David S.
Lee, a traffic engineer. Lee claimed that the majority of traffic from the proposed
subdivision site will travel towards Preston Highway, the portion of Thixton that
the residents argue is most narrowed and already damaged. Lee recommended that
the Commission deny the proposal of Primrose until additional development
occurs in the area and a plan for the reconstruction of Thixton is in place.
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Primrose presented traffic engineer Dianne Zimmerman. Zimmerman
testified that while the traffic counts given by Lee and the residents were accurate,
she believed that they were skewed by cut-through traffic traveling from
Bardstown Road to Preston Highway. She claimed that the majority of Primrose
subdivision traffic would likely travel to Bardstown Road, rather than Preston
Highway, because Primrose is two miles closer to Bardstown Road than to Preston
Highway. After hearing evidence presented by Primrose and the local residents,
the Commission approved the Primrose subdivision plan and found that Primrose
complied with the Louisville Metro Subdivision Regulations (Subdivision
Regulations). However, the Commission conditioned the approval on Primrose
widening the areas of Thixton between the proposed Primrose subdivision and
Bardstown Road that are not eighteen feet wide. Upon the completion of the
improvements, Primrose could begin construction on the subdivision.
Residents appealed the approval to the Jefferson Circuit Court. The
court upheld the Commission’s decision, finding that the actions of the
Commission were neither arbitrary nor capricious. This appeal follows.
It is well-established that the standard of review of an administrative
decision is limited to whether the decision was arbitrary. American Beauty Homes
Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 379 S.W.2d
450 (Ky. 1964). Courts deem a decision arbitrary if it exceeds the powers granted
to that administrative office; fails to meet the requirements of procedural due
process; or is not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 456-57. In Danville-3-
Boyle County Planning & Zoning Comm’n v. Prall, 840 S.W.2d 205 (Ky. 1992),
the Kentucky Supreme Court explained, “by arbitrary we mean clearly erroneous
and by clearly erroneous we mean unsupported by substantial evidence.” Id. at
208; Fritz v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 986 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1998).
Further, when Courts review decisions made by zoning commissions,
the commission decision is presumed reasonable and based upon the law, Hatch v.
Fiscal Court of Fayette County, 242 S.W.2d 1018, 1021 (Ky. 1951). Therefore,
the residents have the burden to prove that the Commission’s decision was
arbitrary.
The residents argue that the approval was arbitrary because the
evidence presented did not support the Commission’s conclusion. The residents
claim that Thixton is narrow, dangerous, and in need of repair. They claim that the
majority of Thixton traffic travels towards Preston Highway, the portion of
Thixton that is most deficient. The residents suggest that Primrose presented no
evidence to refute their claims that the proposed Primrose subdivision would not
be “served by an adequate street network” as required by the subdivision
regulations. In the absence of refuting evidence, the residents claim the decision of
the Commission was not based on substantial evidence. And while the
Commission required Primrose to repair and widen portions of Thixton, the
residents contend the Commission required Primrose to repair the wrong portion of
Thixton. Therefore, they claim that under Fritz, the Commission’s approval of
Primrose was arbitrary. We disagree.
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While the evidence presented by Primrose conceded most of the
residents’ assertions, Zimmerman, Primrose’s traffic engineer, concluded that the
statistics offered by the residents and Lee, the residents’ traffic engineer, were
skewed by “cut-through” traffic traveling from Bardstown Road to Preston
Highway. She opined that the majority of traffic created by Primrose would travel
to Bardstown Road instead of Preston Highway. The Commission essentially
adopted Zimmerman’s opinion by requiring Primrose to repair the portion of
Thixton that runs from the proposed subdivision site to Bardstown Road, as a
condition to the approval.
Nonetheless, the residents continue to argue the facts as they were
presented to the Commission. However, the question of which portion of Thixton
needs repair is not in our discretion. The Court may not substitute its opinion as to
the weight of the evidence given by the Commission. American Beauty Homes,
379 S.W.2d at 457. Although Zimmerman’s testimony differed from that of Lee,
conflicting evidence alone does not invalidate the Commission’s approval.
Leutenmayer v. Mathis, 333 S.W.2d 774 (Ky. 1959). Therefore, we find that the
Commission’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Upon determining that the Commission’s approval was supported by
substantial evidence, our review is limited to whether the Commission correctly
applied the law. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 100.193 requires that the
Commission prepare a comprehensive plan which serves as a guide for public and
private development in the most appropriate manner. Fritz, 986 S.W.2d at 459.
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This master plan for an area is comprehensive in that numerous and extensive
elements or studies are to be considered in formulating and adopting the plan.
KRS 100.187.
The residents argue that the Commission failed to apply the correct
rule of law because the subdivision regulations and Land Development Code
(LDC), used by the Commission, do not comply with mobility and transportation
guidelines set out in Cornerstone 2020, the comprehensive plan adopted by
Jefferson County. Therefore, the residents suggest that the regulations to do not
comply with the requirements of KRS 100.281. We disagree with this claim.
KRS 100.281 requires that local subdivision regulations must be
based on the comprehensive plan. Subdivision regulations must contain
specifications for physical improvements of streets, as well as any improvements
that serve as conditions precedent to the approval of subdivision proposals. This
Court, in Snyder v. Owensboro, 528 S.W.2d 663 (Ky. 1975), stated, “[t]he statute
plainly contemplates that specific standards shall be set forth, rather than mere
broad generalizations with regard to health, safety, morals and general welfare, or
the use of such flexible terms as ‘most advantageous development.’” It follows,
therefore, that subdivision approval by the Commission is a ministerial function to
ensure compliance with the subdivision regulations. Snyder v. Owensboro, 528
S.W.2d 663 (Ky. 1975). Consequently, the regulations must be specific enough to
remove the element of discretion from the approval process. Id. at 664.
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To succeed in proving that the regulation allows arbitrary decisions,
the residents must show that that no “rational connection between that action and
the purpose for which the [enacting] body’s power to act exists.” City of Louisville
v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Ky. 1971). We disagree that the regulations
in issue lack specific standards.
The subdivision regulations enacted for Jefferson County state:2
[i]n or adjoining any major subdivision of land
hereafter proposed, access from new lots or a new street
connecting an existing street shall not be approved unless
the Planning commission . . . determines that the
subdivision will be served by an adequate street network
. . . the street . . . providing most direct means of access
to an arterial level street shall have a minimum roadway
width of 18 feet of pavement. The Commission may
determine . . . that the traffic flow associated with the
proposed subdivision will utilize more than one route to
one or more arterial streets. As a result of such
determination, the Planning Commission may require
that more than one route (street or combination of streets)
must have a minimum roadway width of 18 feet. In
addition to roadway width, the Planning Commission
may require other off-site improvements to correct
conditions that would impede the safe flow of traffic
associated with the new subdivision . . . .
The regulations used by the Commission to approve Primrose
correlate with the objectives expressed in the comprehensive plan. Both require
arterial streets that serve subdivisions to be at least 18 feet wide. Although the
residents argue that the repairs should have been completed prior to the
Commission’s approval, the comprehensive plan anticipated such situations,
providing that:
2
Section 7.3.10, Louisville Development Code
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[w]hen existing services are inadequate and public
funds are not available to rectify the situation, the
developer may be asked to make improvements,
proportional to the projected impact of the proposed
development, to eliminate present inadequacies if such
improvements would be the only means by which the
development would be considered appropriate at the
proposed location.
The regulations and the comprehensive plan specifically detail
requirements for roads to assure standards of safety and convenience. Those
requirements are compatible with the directives of KRS 100.281, and, under City
of Louisville v. McDonald, are rational. Furthermore, the regulations are rationally
related to the intents and policies set out in the comprehensive plan. By approving
Primrose conditioned on the repair of Thixton, the Commission acted in
accordance with the regulations and the comprehensive plan.
Therefore, we reject the residents’ arguments that the approval, as
well as the regulations, are arbitrary and capricious and must be reversed. A
review of the record reveals that the approval was supported by substantial
evidence. Further, the regulations are rational and adequately detailed to provide
sufficient guidelines upon which the Commission can act.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Kyle T. Hubbard
Louisville, Kentucky
William B. Bardenwerper
Clifford H. Ashburner
Louisville, Kentucky
Jonathan L. Baker
Theresa Z. Senninger
Jefferson County Attorney’s Office
Louisville, Kentucky
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