LUMPKIN (RYAN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 25, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001172-MR
RYAN KEITH LUMPKIN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-002304
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; KELLER, JUDGE; HENRY,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: Ryan Keith Lumpkin appeals from an order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court denying his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. He maintains that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) trial counsel misinformed him
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
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regarding parole eligibility for a murder conviction, and (2) his guilty plea to firstdegree manslaughter was not knowing and voluntary because he was never advised
that he was pleading guilty to an intentional crime after he repeatedly maintained
that his shooting of the victim was an accident. For the reasons stated below, we
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to Lumpkin’s statement to the police, Lumpkin and his
friend Willie Washington moved from Chicago to Louisville and met the victim,
Krystal McLauren. Shortly thereafter, Lumpkin and Washington moved in with
McLauren. On October 10, 2002, Lumpkin, McLauren, Washington, and
Lumpkin’s cousin went out to several bars. They returned to McLauren’s
residence and the cousin left their company. Lumpkin was armed with a .25
caliber automatic pistol.
When they arrived at the residence, Lumpkin, for some reason, fired
the pistol into the air. Lumpkin, Washington, and McLauren entered the residence,
at which time McLauren and Washington got into an argument over his dancing
with other women. After shooting pool for a short while, Lumpkin went upstairs
and found McLauren talking on the telephone. The victim told him that he and
Washington needed to pack their things and move out, apparently because of some
missing money.
As Lumpkin started packing his things, McLauren started calling him
a “punk” and a “pussy.” Lumpkin thereupon pulled the telephone from the wall
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and threw it across the room, at which time McLauren started hitting him about the
head. Lumpkin became further upset, picked up his pistol, and pointed it at
McLauren. Washington grabbed Lumpkin’s arm and the pistol fired, striking
McClauren. McLauren died as a result of the gunshot.
Lumpkin fled in McLauren’s vehicle, but later retained an attorney
and turned himself in.
On October 2, 2002, the Jefferson County Grand Jury indicted
Lumpkin upon the charges of murder (Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 507.020);
tampering with physical evidence (KRS 524.100); and felony theft by unlawful
taking (KRS 514.030).
In due course Lumpkin entered into a plea agreement with the
Commonwealth. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the murder charge was amended
to first-degree manslaughter (KRS 507.030) based upon the premise that the
shooting was a product of extreme emotional distress (KRS 507.030(1)(b). Under
the plea agreement, the Commonwealth would recommend a sentence of 15 years
on the manslaughter count; 5 years on the tampering count; and 5 years on the theft
count, with all sentences to run concurrently for a total of 15 years to serve. On
May 1, 2003, the trial court entered judgment consistent with the plea agreement.
On May 1, 2006, Lumpkin filed a motion for post-conviction relief
pursuant to RCr 11.42. The Department of Public Advocacy later filed a
supplement to the motion. In his motion Lumpkin maintained that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel misinformed him regarding
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parole eligibility for a murder conviction, and that his guilty plea to first-degree
manslaughter was not knowing and voluntary because he was never advised that he
was pleading guilty to an intentional crime after he repeatedly maintained that his
shooting of the victim was an accident.
MISADVICE CONCERNING PAROLE
Lumpkin contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because trial counsel misinformed him regarding parole eligibility for a murder
conviction.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth the standard
governing review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Under this
standard, a party asserting such a claim is required to show: (1) that the trial
counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell outside the range of
professionally competent assistance; and (2) that the deficiency was prejudicial
because there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different but for counsel's performance. Id. at 687. This standard was adopted by
the Kentucky Supreme Court in Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky.
1985).
This test is modified in cases involving a defendant who enters a
guilty plea. In such instances, the second prong of the Strickland test includes the
requirement that a defendant demonstrate that but for the alleged errors of counsel,
there is a reasonable probability that he would not have entered a guilty plea, but
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rather would have insisted on proceeding to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721
S.W.2d 726 (Ky.App. 1986).
A reviewing court must entertain a strong presumption that counsel's
challenged conduct falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. The defendant bears the burden of overcoming this
strong presumption by identifying specific acts or omissions that he alleges
constitute a constitutionally deficient performance. Id. The relevant inquiry is
whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.
at 694.
In his brief, Lumpkin frames his parole misadvice argument as
follows:
Lumpkin alleged in his RCr 11.42 petition that prior to
his acceptance of the plea offer by the Commonwealth
his trial attorney advised him that if he rejected the plea
offer the Commonwealth would indict him as a Persistent
Felony Offender. The Commonwealth had previously
alleged that Lumpkin’s prior drug felony conviction in
Illinois made him eligible for a Persistent Felony
Offender charge. Lumpkin further alleged in his petition
that his trial counsel informed him that under Kentucky
law any time assessed under the PFO count would run
consecutive to any sentence imposed for the originally
indicted offense of murder. Lumpkin, according to his
attorney, would not be eligible for parole until he had
served 20 to 25 years on his murder charge and another
10 years on the PFO charge. As a matter of law this
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advice was grossly incorrect on its face. KRS 532.080(5)
expressly provides that the parole eligibility for a
Persistent Felony Offender in the Second Degree who is
also found to be a Violent Offender is set by KRS
439.3401. That statute holds that a person convicted of a
class A felony [sic]2 such as murder and who receives a
life sentence shall serve a minimum of 20 years
imprisonment before being eligible for parole. If a term
of years is fixed, 85% of that sentence, (to a maximum of
20 years), must be served before parole may be granted.
Lumpkin entered his plea under the mistaken belief that
his parole eligibility on his original charge of murder
would at a minimum [be] at least a third longer than what
is actually set under Kentucky Law.
In summary, Lumpkin contends that trial counsel informed him that if
he did not accept the present plea, he would be indicted as a second-degree
persistent felony offender and, as a result, would not be eligible for parole until he
served 30 to 35 years when, in fact, he would be eligible for parole after serving 20
years.
The provision of gross misadvice regarding parole eligibility may
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885
(6th Cir. 1988). Accepting Lumpkin’s allegation that trial counsel gave him the
above stated misadvice regarding parole eligibility, nevertheless, based upon the
strength of the evidence against him and the overall favorability of his plea
agreement, we do not believe that the giving of accurate advice concerning parole
would have resulted in a reasonable probability that he would not have entered a
guilty plea, but rather would have insisted on proceeding to trial.
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Murder is not a Class A felony; rather, it is a capital offense. KRS 507.020(2).
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The alleged misadvice concerns the murder charge, a capital offense.
Pursuant to KRS 532.030(1), “[w]hen a person is convicted of a capital offense, he
shall have his punishment fixed at death, or at a term of imprisonment for life
without benefit of probation or parole, or at a term of imprisonment for life without
benefit of probation or parole until he has served a minimum of twenty-five (25)
years of his sentence, or to a sentence of life, or to a term of not less than twenty
(20) years nor more than fifty (50) years.”
While the Commonwealth did not file a notice to seek the death
penalty in this case, if Lumpkin had proceeded to trial and was convicted, he
nevertheless would have been subject to sentences of life without parole, life
without the possibility of parole for 25 years, or life. And under KRS 439.3401(2),
if he had received a life sentence he would not have been eligible for parole until
he had served a minimum of 20 years in the penitentiary. In addition, KRS
439.3401(3) provides that “[a] violent offender who has been convicted of a capital
offense . . . shall not be released on probation or parole until he has served at least
eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence imposed.”3 Thus, while the alleged
advice of trial counsel was inaccurate, nevertheless, in comparison to the plea
agreement, Lumpkin, if convicted of murder, risked significant incarceration prior
to being eligible for parole – including life without the possibility of parole.
Assuming that Lumpkin would have been indicted as a second-degree persistent felony
offender, KRS 532.080(5) provides that “[a] violent offender who is found to be a persistent
felony offender in the second degree shall not be eligible for parole except as provided in KRS
439.3401.” Thus his PFO status would not have affected his parole eligibility.
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Under the plea agreement, however, Lumpkin disposed of the capital
charge and two other Class D felonies for a single 15 year sentence. Under the
agreement, he will be eligible for parole after serving 85% of the sentence, or 12
years and 9 months.
Moreover, his risk of a murder conviction was substantial. KRS
507.020(1)(b) provides that it is murder if the defendant “wantonly engages in
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person and thereby causes
the death of another person.” By his own admission Lumpkin pointed a loaded
pistol at the victim, who was unarmed, and the pistol discharged when Washington
grabbed his arm. A jury may reasonably have concluded that this conduct rose to
the level of wantonness necessary to support a murder conviction under KRS
507.020(1)(b).4
In summary, given the inculpatory evidence as reflected in his own
statements and the favorability of the plea bargain in comparison to the potential
penalties faced, even if given correct advice concerning his parole eligibility in the
event of a murder conviction, we conclude that there is not a reasonable probability
that Lumpkin would have chosen not to plead guilty, but instead would have
insisted on going to trial.
VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA
Alternatively, the jury may have rejected Lumpkin’s version of events and concluded that he
was guilty of intentional murder under KRS 507.020(1)(a).
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Lumpkin alleges that his guilty plea to first-degree manslaughter was
not knowing and voluntary because he was not informed that he was pleading
guilty to an “intentional crime,”5 whereas he has always maintained that the
shooting was an accident. Citing Elliott v. Commonwealth, 976 S.W.2d 416 (Ky.
1998), he notes that if he “did not intend to kill, and if his mental state with respect
to the victim's death was neither wanton nor reckless, the death was accidental and
the defendant is not guilty of any degree of homicide.”
The test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the
plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of
action open to the defendant. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160,
164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). There must be an affirmative showing in the record
that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily made. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). However, “the validity of a
guilty plea is determined not by reference to some magic incantation recited at the
time it is taken but from the totality of the circumstances surrounding it.” Kotas v.
Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ky. 1978) (citing Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 749, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)); Sparks v.
Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky.App. 1986).
In his Motion to Enter a Guilty Plea signed by Lumpkin on April 29,
2003, Lumpkin stated: “I have reviewed a copy of the indictment and told my
KRS 507.030(1)(b) defines first-degree manslaughter as pled by Lumpkin as follows: “With
intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third
person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under the influence
of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in subsection (1)(a) of KRS 507.020.”
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attorney all the facts known to me concerning my charges. I believe he/she is fully
informed about my case. We have fully discussed, and I understand, the charges
and any possible defenses to them.” Further, at the plea agreement hearing
Lumpkin admitted to shooting the victim in the head, killing her, while acting
under extreme emotional distress. “Solemn declarations in open court carry a
strong presumption of verity.” Centers v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51, 54
(Ky.App. 1990), citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52
L.Ed.2d 136 (1977).
In addition to the foregoing, the description of the shooting given by
Lumpkin in his statement to the police does not, even by the most generous of
interpretations, describe an accidental shooting. As previously noted, Lumpkin
admitted that he intentionally pointed a loaded pistol at McLauren, who was
unarmed. The pistol discharged when Washington grabbed his arm, apparently in
an effort to protect McLauren. Following this, instead of calling the police and
reporting an accidental shooting, Lumpkin stole the victim’s vehicle and fled,
which is reflective of a consciousness of guilt of the criminality of the shooting.
Based upon the foregoing, the record refutes Lumpkin’s postconviction allegation that the shooting was an accident and that if he knew he was
pleading guilty to an intentional crime he would have chosen to go to trial. As
such, we are unpersuaded by his claim that his guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary on the basis that he did not realize he was pleading guilty to an
intentional crime.
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EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Finally, Lumpkin contends that the trial court erred by failing to
conduct an evidentiary hearing because the claims raised in his RCr 11.42 motion
are not refuted by the record.
An evidentiary hearing upon an RCr 11.42 motion “is required if there
is a material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e., conclusively
proved or disproved, by an examination of the record. The trial judge may not
simply disbelieve factual allegations in the absence of evidence in the record
refuting them.” Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452-53 (Ky. 2001)
(internal citations omitted).
As discussed in the preceding sections of this opinion, the grounds for
post-conviction relief raised by Lumpkin are conclusively resolved from the
record, and the trial court did not err by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Paul J. Neel, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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