MAY (LORRAINE) VS. MOORE (JAY)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MAY 23, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000978-MR
LORRAINE MAY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ROWAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-90321
JAY MOORE, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE OF DIXIE MOORE, DECEASED
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMNG
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; STUMBO, JUDGE; KNOPF,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: Lorraine May, the appellant, appeals from a summary
judgment entered against her in her lawsuit for personal injuries that she sustained
on rental property owned by Dixie Moore. Dixie Moore, the original
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to
Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
defendant/appellee, died on January 10, 2007, during the pendency of the case.
The circuit court allowed revival of the action against Jay Moore in his capacity as
administrator of the estate of Dixie Moore.
The facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed. May entered into a
rental agreement with Moore on May 5, 2004, to rent a house at 53 Clayton Lane
in Morehead, Kentucky. As part of this agreement, May agreed to “inform
[Moore] promptly of any problems which require maintenance.” The agreement
also provided May with the telephone numbers of Moore and her maintenance
man, Barry Reynolds,2 who was entrusted with making all repairs to May’s rental
properties.
In the early fall of 2004, May’s daughter entered the kitchen and
turned on a light switch. At that point, flames and black smoke shot out from one
of the two light fixtures in the kitchen. May immediately turned off the light
switch, and the flames stopped. She reported the incident to Moore.
Moore said that she would send Reynolds over to look at the light
fixture. He arrived three days later. He removed the decorative globe that covered
the fixture and inspected the damage. He told May that he was unable to fix the
light at that time because he needed to get some tools. He said that he would
return later. At this point, the light fixture at the other end of the kitchen remained
usable.
2
Reynolds passed away in the summer of 2005.
-2-
Reynolds returned approximately two or three days later with a new
decorative globe. According to May, Reynolds climbed a stepladder and began
“poking around” at the light fixture’s wiring with an unknown instrument. When
he did this, flames again shot out from the fixture, and Reynolds received an
electrical shock that almost caused him to fall from the stepladder. At this time,
the second light fixture at the other end of the kitchen “flickered like a flame;” both
of its light bulbs burned out. Reynolds taped off some exposed wiring in the first
light and instructed May not to use the corresponding light switch that turned it on
until he returned. He left and told May that he needed more tools to complete the
work but that he would be back “in a little bit.”
Three or four days passed, and Reynolds had not returned. May was
concerned about the exposed wiring and the fact that her kitchen had little to no
light for most of the day. She called Moore to express her concerns. Moore
advised May that Reynolds “would get around to it.” Approximately five or six
days after Reynolds’ second visit, May decided to take matters into her own hands.
She attempted to change the light bulb in the second light fixture to try to remedy
the problem. She climbed onto a kitchen chair but still could not reach the fixture.
While attempting to step down from the chair, May fell onto the floor. She
severely injured her left knee, and she broke the tibia in her left leg. Multiple
surgeries followed to correct her injuries – including knee-replacement.
May filed suit against Moore in Rowan Circuit Court on September
29, 2005, seeking to recover damages for the injuries that she suffered in her fall.
-3-
May claimed that Moore, both directly and through Reynolds, as her agent, was
negligent in failing to repair the light fixture in a timely and correct manner. She
also claimed that May was negligent because she had failed to install lighting
fixtures and wiring in compliance with applicable building and safety laws. May
alleged that Moore had breached the parties’ rental contract by failing to provide
timely maintenance, and she sought damages for breach of contract.3 She claimed
damages pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 367.110, et seq. - the
Kentucky Consumer Protection Act.
Following the completion of discovery, Moore filed a motion for
summary judgment on January 22, 2007. She argued that May could not assert a
claim for personal injury damages arising from a breach of contract as a result of
this court’s decision in Pinkston v. Audubon Area Community Service, Inc., 210
S.W.3d 188 (Ky.App. 2006). In arguing that no cause of action arose in
negligence, Moore contended that she only owed May a legal duty to disclose any
hidden or concealed defects of which she was aware at the time May rented the
property. As there was no breach of this duty, she contended that May had no
claim in negligence. Finally, Moore argued that she had done nothing that would
remotely constitute a proximate cause of May’s injuries resulting from her falling
from a chair while attempting to change a light bulb.
In response to Moore’s motion, May argued that Pinkston was
inapplicable and that the circuit court should have been guided by Mahan-Jellico
May later amended her complaint to add a claim that Moore had breached the parties’ rental
contract by failing to return her security deposit.
3
-4-
Coal Co. v. Dulling, 282 Ky. 698, 139 S.W.2d 749 (1940). Mahan-Jellico holds
that once a landlord undertakes to make repairs or improvements to rental property,
he has a duty to do so in a non-negligent manner. He is liable for damages if he
breaches that duty and an injury results. May contended that Reynolds’s alleged
negligence was indeed the proximate cause of her injuries and that the issue of
negligence was a question of fact for the jury.
On April 20, 2007, the circuit court entered an order granting Moore’s
motion for summary judgment. Relying on Pinkston, supra, the court held that
May could not claim damages for a personal injury claim arising from a breach of
a rental agreement. In rejecting her negligence claim, the court reasoned that
Mahan-Jellico, supra, was highly distinguishable and could not serve as precedent
because the plaintiff in that case had been reassured by the defendant landlord that
certain repairs had been made. The court noted that May was fully aware that the
repairs in her kitchen were not complete. Finally, the court held that there was no
evidence in the record to support a claim that Moore’s actions were the proximate
cause of May’s injuries as a matter of law. This appeal followed.
In reviewing a summary judgment, our standard of review is to
determine “whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996). Since we
analyze questions of law rather than of fact, our review is de novo. Blevins v.
Moran, 12 S.W.3d 698, 700 (Ky.App. 2000). We must view the record in a light
-5-
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and all doubts are to be
resolved in favor of the party adversely affected. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel
Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). Summary judgment is
appropriate only when “it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent to
produce evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor.” Id. The issue of
impossibility is viewed in a practical sense - not an absolute one. Perkins v.
Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Ky. 1992).
May first argues that the circuit court “erroneously analyzed [her]
negligence claim by concluding that any liability that arises from the landlordtenant relationship must be based in contract.” However, the wording of the order
granting summary judgment recites that May declined to base her cause of action
on the landlord-tenant relationship and instead relied on breach of the maintenance
agreement:
The plaintiff has attempted to assert a cause of action
for personal injuries that she sustained when she fell from
a chair while attempting to change a light bulb in a home
that she rented from the defendant. The plaintiff has
denied that the basis for her cause of action is a
landlord-tenant relationship, and instead is claiming
that the liability as to the defendant is based on
defendant’s failure to make repairs to a light in the rental
property, as the plaintiff argues was required under the
rental agreement. (Emphases added.)
Order and Judgment, April 20, 2007, p.1. Since the rental agreement governed, the
court correctly determined that May could not recover for personal injuries and
that her only sustainable claim for damages was the cost of repair to the electrical
-6-
problem. Its reasoning was directly congruent with our decision in Pinkston,
supra, which held as follows:
[A] landlord is not liable for injuries caused by breach of
a covenant to make repairs to a leased premises. Rather,
the remedy for breach of an agreement to repair is the
cost of repair. (Emphases added.)
Pinkston, 210 S.W.3d at 190. May has not asserted a claim for repair costs.
Consequently, the circuit court correctly concluded that May does not have a
tenable action for personal injury damages based solely upon a breach of contract.
The court separately addressed May’s claim for negligence and
correctly found that the only duty owed by a landlord to a tenant is that of
disclosure of “any known defective condition which is unknown to the tenant.”
Order and Judgment, April 20, 2007, p.2. The evolution of Kentucky law as to the
nature of this duty is ably recapitulated and summarized in Lambert v. Franklin
Real Estate, Co., 37 S.W.3d 770, 775-776 (Ky. App. 2000):
“A landlord has a duty to disclose a known defective
condition which is unknown to the tenant and not
discoverable through reasonable inspection.” Milby v.
Mears, Ky.App. 580 S.W.2d 724, 728 (1979). However,
“[i]t has been a long-standing rule in Kentucky that a
tenant takes the premises as he finds them. The landlord
need not exercise even ordinary care to furnish
reasonably safe premises, and he is not generally liable
for injuries caused by defects therein.” Milby at 728.
“[T]he landlord is under no implied obligation to repair
the demised premises in the absence of a contract to that
effect, nor is he responsible to a tenant for injuries to
persons or property caused by defects therein, where
there has been no reservation on the part of the landlord
of any portion of the rented premises. In such cases the
law applies to the contract or lease the doctrine of caveat
-7-
emptor.” Home Realty Co. v. Carius, 189 Ky. 228, 224
S.W. 751 (1920). Where the tenant is put in complete
and unrestricted possession and control of the premises,
as here, the landlord is liable only for the failure to
disclose known latent defects at the time the tenant leases
the premises. Carver v. Howard, Ky., 280 S.W.2d 708,
711 (1955).
The dangerous condition of the electrical fixtures was both open,
obvious, and known to May. Therefore, under established precedent, Moore owed
no duty to May as a matter of law. As there is no cause of action for negligence,
the issue of proximate cause is a moot point. May’s own negligent actions in
standing on a chair cannot be imputed to Moore under any viable legal theory.
Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment of the Rowan Circuit
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
David S. Strite
Michael R. McDonner
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE:
John J. Ellis
Morehead, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Joseph C. Klausing
Louisville, Kentucky
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
