FARMER (ADAM TROY) VS. FARMER (NOW KING) (MELISSA M.)
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RENDERED: APRIL 25, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000966-MR
ADAM TROY FARMER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ANDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM F. STEWART, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-00129
MELISSA M. FARMER (NOW KING)
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND NICKELL, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM, 1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ACREE, JUDGE: Adam Farmer appeals pro se from an order of the Anderson Circuit
Court denying his Kentucky Civil Rule (CR) 60.02 motion. Farmer, who had been
seeking child support for over ten years, failed to appeal from the trial court’s original
order. Instead, he filed a CR 60.02 motion asking the trial court to change the date on
which the child support obligation began to accrue. Perceiving no abuse of the trial
court’s discretion, we affirm.
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Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief
Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
Farmer and his ex-wife, Melissa King, are the parents of a son born in
1988. When the parties divorced some seven years later, they initially agreed that the
child would reside with his father. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Farmer
did not request child support because he and King agreed to joint custody and equal
sharing of child-related expenses. These terms were incorporated into their divorce
decree.
In the two years following the divorce, Farmer came to feel that King was
not furnishing a sufficient economic contribution to their son’s upbringing. Thus, he filed
his first motion for child support in September 1998. Farmer claims the Domestic
Relations Commissioner stated his intent to award child support, but reserved the final
ruling to allow King to submit proof of her contributions. Thereafter, Farmer filed similar
motions in 1999, 2000, and 2006. Finally, on March 6, 2007, King was ordered to pay
$399.36 per month in child support, despite the fact that the parties’ son was no longer
a minor. The effective date of the child support obligation was set as August 23, 2006.
Farmer made no attempt to appeal from this order. Instead, he filed a CR
60.02 motion requesting that the child support obligation be retroactive to September
22, 1998. In support of this motion, he cited comments made by the DRC during a
hearing in December 2000. The motion was heard on March 27, 2007, and denied on
April 10, 2007. This appeal followed.
Farmer argues on appeal that the trial court neglected to decide the issue
of child support for ten years and, when the issue was finally decided, erroneously
made the award retroactive for only the nine months immediately preceeding the child’s
graduation from high school. We note that Farmer’s brief contains neither supporting
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law, nor citations to the record. In fact, King has urged us to strike the brief due to these
failures, as well as Farmer’s failure to make the videotaped proceedings part of the
record on appeal. CR 76.12(8)(a). Taking note of Farmer’s pro se status and the
subject matter of the appeal, we decline to do so.
This case does not require us to determine whether the trial court chose
the proper date for the child support obligation to begin because Farmer did not appeal
from the trial court’s order awarding him child support. Farmer filed a notice of appeal
clearly stating that he was appealing from the order denying his CR 60.02 motion. The
notice of appeal is jurisdictional and, thus, this Court gains jurisdiction only over the
order identified as that from which the appeal is taken. City of Devondale v. Stallings,
795 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Ky. 1990).
CR 60.02 allows a party to request relief from a judgment upon the
following grounds:
(a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (b)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59.02; (c) perjury or falsified evidence; (d) fraud
affecting the proceedings, other than perjury or falsified
evidence; (e) the judgment is void, or has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (f) any other reason of an extraordinary nature
justifying relief.
Farmer’s CR 60.02 motion does not state which of these grounds are the basis for his
request to reconsider the trial court’s March 6th ruling. Further, “CR 60.02 addresses
itself to the broad discretion of the trial court and for that reason, decisions rendered
thereon are not disturbed unless the trial judge abused his/her discretion.” Kurtsinger v.
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Board of Trustees of Kentucky Retirement Systems, 90 S.W.3d 454, 456 (Ky. 2002).
Having reviewed Farmer’s motion, and the grounds for relief enumerated in CR 60.02,
we do not perceive any abuse on the part of the trial court. Consequently, the order of
the Anderson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Adam Troy Farmer, pro se
Danville, Kentucky
Kevin P. Fox
Frankfort, Kentucky
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