KRAUS (KARL) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 16, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000802-MR
KARL KRAUS, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LIVINGSTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CLARENCE A. WOODALL III, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 02-CR-00018 & 04-CR-00006
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON AND STUMBO, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
GRAVES, SENIOR JUDGE: Karl Kraus, Jr., appeals from the denial of a motion for
relief pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 without an
evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
The grand jury of Livingston County indicted Kraus on charges of two
counts of first-degree rape; two counts of first-degree sodomy; two counts of firstdegree sexual abuse; and for being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO).
The victims were Jessica Hale and Rachel Riley, each of whom suffered from mental
and physical disabilities. Following the first trial, the jury found Kraus guilty of one count
Senior Judge John W. Graves sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
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of first-degree sexual abuse in connection with Hale and the trial court declared a
mistrial on all of the remaining charges. This Court affirmed Kraus’s conviction for firstdegree sexual abuse in an unpublished opinion.2 Kraus v. Commonwealth, 2004-CA000183-MR (Ky.App. rendered April 8, 2005).
Upon retrial of the remaining charges, the jury found Kraus guilty of two
counts of first-degree rape, one count of first-degree sodomy, one count of first-degree
sexual abuse, and for being a PFO. Kraus received a total sentence of sixty-five years’
imprisonment. The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review of the
single conviction affirmed by this Court and consolidated that case with its direct review
of the remaining convictions. On September 13, 2006, the Supreme Court affirmed all
of the convictions in an order without an opinion. The Supreme Court noted that the
judgment was affirmed by a vote of three to three pursuant to SCR 1.020. On January
24, 2007, Kraus filed a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 alleging numerous instances of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion without an
evidentiary hearing. This appeal follows.
Our Supreme Court has explained the applicable standard of review at
length:
The standards which measure ineffective assistance of
counsel are set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord Gall v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985); Sanborn, supra.
In order to be ineffective, performance of counsel must be
below the objective standard of reasonableness and so
prejudicial as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial and a
reasonable result. “Counsel is constitutionally ineffective only
if performance below professional standards caused the
defendant to lose what he otherwise would probably have
won.” The critical issue is not whether counsel made errors
but whether counsel was so thoroughly ineffective that
defeat was snatched from the hands of probable victory. The
purpose of RCr 11.42 is to provide a forum for known
2
This opinion contains a full exposition of the facts underlying Kraus’s convictions.
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grievances, not to provide an opportunity to research for
grievances.
In considering ineffective assistance, the reviewing court
must focus on the totality of evidence before the judge or
jury and assess the overall performance of counsel
throughout the case in order to determine whether the
identified acts or omissions overcome the presumption that
counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance.
A defendant is not guaranteed errorless counsel, or counsel
judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel likely to render
and rendering reasonably effective assistance. Strickland
notes that a court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. The right to effective assistance of
counsel is recognized because of the effect it has on the
ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.
Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 441-2 (Ky. 2001)(internal citations omitted).
Kraus first argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to discuss various
defenses and trial strategy with him. This argument merely consists of a blanket
conclusion. Kraus does not state any particular defense or tactic he wished to discuss
or pursue much less defenses that would have been victorious. Reversal on this basis
is unwarranted.
Next, Kraus contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a
hearing to suppress the results of police interviews with the victims that were allegedly
tainted by overly suggestive techniques. “Taint hearings” are not required by Kentucky
law. Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 83 S.W.3d 522, 526 (Ky. 2002). The issue is one of
competency to testify rather than witness credibility. Id. The competency of both
victims to testify was an issue that could have presented on direct appeal. RCr 11.42 is
not intended as an additional vehicle to pursue such matters. Gross v. Commonwealth,
648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983). Moreover, Kraus had the opportunity to crossexamine the victims and challenge their credibility before the jury. Counsel was not
ineffective.
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In his third assertion of error, Kraus argues that counsel was ineffective for
failing to adequately investigate the case. Kraus alleges that counsel failed to obtain
phone numbers and documents from the taxi company and failed to interview potential
witnesses. In his motion before the trial court, Kraus only argued that counsel was
ineffective for failing to discover a false statement made by the investigating officer in
obtaining a search warrant. We are not directed to where this alleged false statement
occurred in the record and we will not scour the numerous volumes to find it. The other
matters concerning counsel’s investigation have been raised for the first time on appeal
and are, therefore, unpreserved for our review.
Fourth, Kraus asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing adequately
research the legal issues presented by his case. Kraus argues that the sexual abuse
charges should have merged with the rape charges and that counsel should have
challenged the PFO charge.
In his motion before the trial court, Kraus complained that counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to alleged errors in the procedure the court used for the
examination of the prosecuting witnesses. The merger issue was not presented to the
trial court and this Court will not address it here. The record demonstrates that Kraus
entered a guilty plea on the PFO charge against the advice of counsel. The procedure
used by the trial court in examining the prosecuting witnesses via closed-circuit
television is an issue more appropriately addressed on direct appeal. Gross, 648
S.W.2d at 856.
Next, Kraus argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to request funds
for mental health experts to provide evidence concerning the victim’s credibility during
the pre-trial and trial proceedings. Kraus has not provided the name of any expert or
what any proposed testimony might have been. The trial court held two competency
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hearings. The mothers of the victims testified as well as two medical doctors. Counsel
did, in fact, pursue the competency issue and was afforded the opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses. On the basis of the record before us, we are not convinced that
the presence of a defense expert would have changed the outcome of this case.
Finally, Kraus argues that the trial court erred by failing to make adequate
factual findings concerning his RCr 11.42 motion and by denying him an evidentiary
hearing. An evidentiary hearing is unnecessary where, as here, the allegations in the
motion are refuted by the face of the record. Hopewell v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d
153, 154 (Ky.App. 1985). Kraus did not move the trial court to make additional factual
findings as required by CR 52.04 which is applicable to RCr 11.42 proceedings.
Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 898, 902 (Ky.App. 1977).
Accordingly, the order of the Livingston Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lisa Bridges Clare
Assistant Public Advocate
Dept. of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky.
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