WARD (LAFE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 18, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000753-MR
LAFE WARD, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; NICKELL, JUDGE; GRAVES, SENIOR
JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: Lafe “Dee” Ward, Jr., appeals from a final judgment
and sentence of imprisonment entered by the Pike Circuit Court. Ward was found
guilty of second-degree manslaughter and was sentenced to ten-years’
imprisonment. After our review, we affirm.
On January 10, 2006, Ward, who is an attorney, was travelling home
from his office in Williamson, West Virginia, in his Lincoln Aviator SUV. He ran
a red light at an intersection on U.S. 119 and collided with the driver’s side of a
Toyota Camry being driven by Benita Dixon. At the time of the impact, the Camry
had a green light and had entered the intersection in Ward’s line of travel. There
were no skid marks or other signs of stopping before or after the point of the crash.
Ward’s SUV travelled more than 500 feet before coming to a stop on the shoulder
of the road. Lisa Bryant, who was a passenger in the Camry, was injured in the
collision. Dixon suffered multiple traumatic injuries and died en route to the
hospital approximately one hour after the accident. Ward was found slumped over
his steering wheel with his air-bag deployed. Witnesses indicated that although he
was somewhat disoriented, he was concerned that he had hit someone with his
vehicle. He also stated that he needed to speak to his wife and get home for dinner.
Ward failed a field-sobriety test administered by a Kentucky State
Police (KSP) trooper, and he was placed under arrest for driving under the
influence. After receiving his Miranda1 rights, Ward told the police that he
thought that the light was green – although he acknowledged that all other
evidence indicated that it was red. Ward also admitted that he had imbibed two
mixed alcoholic beverages at his office before he left work. The field-sobriety test
and interview, which were recorded by video, were played for the jury.
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16. L.Ed.2d 694 (1996).
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KSP troopers also found two prescription bottles (one containing
Darvocet) on Ward’s person. Although the label on the bottle recited that it had
just been filled with 90 pills, it contained only 85 ½ pills. A subsequent blood test
indicated that Ward had a blood-alcohol level of .13. A screen of Ward’s blood
and urine revealed the presence of Valium, Darvocet, Ambien, Paxil, Inderal, and
hydrocodone in his system.
Evidence later presented at trial disclosed that Ward had been to two
drug stores to purchase prescription medications immediately before the accident.
He had first visited a CVS pharmacy where he picked up prescriptions for
Darvocet (a narcotic) and Ambien (a hypnotic that induces sleep). According to
the pharmacist, the Darvocet prescription contained 90 pills; the pills were counted
three times for accuracy, and none of the pills was cut in half. The pharmacist also
testified that Darvocet and alcohol could be mixed only with extreme caution since
both have sedative effects. A warning label on each of the prescription bottles
advised that the drugs should not be taken while driving or operating machinery.
Ward then drove to the pharmacy at a Food City grocery store where
he picked up prescriptions for Inderal (a blood pressure medication), Paxil (an antidepressant), and another prescription for Ambien. The pharmacist who filled these
prescriptions testified that they were prescribed by a physician other than the one
who had prescribed the drugs from the CVS pharmacy. The pharmacist indicated
that if she had known that Ward had just picked up another Ambien prescription
from another pharmacy, she would not have filled the second prescription for
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Ambien. According to an eyewitness in a car behind him, Ward drove to the end
of the Food City parking lot and stopped for sometime between 45 and 60 seconds
before pulling out into traffic. The accident occurred shortly afterward.
On January 11, 2006, the Pike County Grand Jury returned a singlecount indictment that charged Ward with first-degree wanton murder, a capital
offense, pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 507.020. Ward appeared in
court with counsel on January 18, 2006, and entered a plea of not guilty to the
charge. Following a competency hearing on March 15, 2006, Ward was declared
competent to stand trial.
Prior to trial, Ward filed a motion to quash the indictment and to
dismiss the charges of wanton murder and second-degree manslaughter.2 Chief
among his supporting arguments was a contention that the statute under which he
had been charged, KRS 507.020(1)(b), was void for vagueness because it failed to
put the public on fair notice of what conduct constitutes capital murder and wanton
murder. The Commonwealth argued in response that the Supreme Court had
recently rejected a similar challenge in Brown v. Commonwealth, 174 S.W.3d 421
(Ky. 2005). The trial court reserved ruling on Ward’s motion until the conclusion
of the Commonwealth’s proof at trial. At that point, the trial court denied the
motion along with Ward’s motion for a directed verdict.
The trial lasted for three days, and the jury was instructed on wanton
murder (KRS 507.020) as well as its lesser-included offenses of second-degree
2
Although he was indicted under KRS 507.020, the murder statute, Ward also sought dismissal of
second-degree manslaughter (KRS 507.040) as a lesser-included offense of that statute.
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manslaughter (KRS 502.040) and reckless homicide (KRS 507.050). It found
Ward guilty of second-degree manslaughter and recommended that he be
sentenced to ten-years’ imprisonment. On April 3, 2007, the trial court entered a
judgment and sentence consistent with the jury’s decision and recommendation.
This appeal followed.
Ward first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
quash his indictment and to dismiss the charges against him. He contends that
KRS 507.020(1)(b) and 501.020 (and – in the alternative – KRS 507.040 and
501.020) are unconstitutional because they are void for vagueness when they are
read in conjunction with one another. A considerable portion of Ward’s argument
challenges the constitutionality of KRS 507.020(1)(b), the wanton murder statute.
However, since he was not convicted of wanton murder, that issue is moot. As any
analysis of the wanton murder statute would be speculative or academic in nature,
a discussion is not warranted. See Dillingham v. Commonwealth, 249 S.W.2d 827,
828 (Ky. 1952).
Ward also challenges the constitutionality of KRS 507.040(1), which
provides that a person is guilty of second-degree manslaughter when he wantonly
causes a death that results from a person’s operation of a motor vehicle:
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree
when he wantonly causes the death of another person
including but not limited to, situations where the death
results from the person’s:
(a) Operation of a motor vehicle .... (Emphases added.)
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Ward based his void-for-vagueness argument on the definition of wantonly as set
forth at KRS 501.020(3):
A person acts wantonly with respect to a result or to a
circumstance described by a statute defining an offense
when he is aware of and consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur
or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such
nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
reasonable person would observe in the situation. A
person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof
solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts
wantonly with respect thereto.
(Italics and emphasis added).
Ward particularly challenges the italicized portion of this provision
pertaining to voluntary intoxication. He argues that a person’s lack of awareness
as posing a risk of harm to another cannot serve as a proper predicate for criminal
liability. He reasons that a person cannot be on notice of that which he cannot
perceive – even if the reason for his lack of awareness is due to his own voluntary
intoxication. Therefore, a statutory decree imposing such liability must be
unconstitutional as unduly vague and illogical.
Statutes enacted by the General Assembly are presumed to be
constitutional. “The issue of whether a statute is unconstitutional is a question of
law subject to de novo review.” Wilfong v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 84, 91
(Ky.App. 2004).
In considering the constitutionality of a statute, we must draw
all fair and reasonable inferences in favor of the statute’s validity. Posey v.
Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170, 175 (Ky. 2006). “[T]he violation of the
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Constitution must be clear, complete and unmistakable in order to find the law
unconstitutional.” Kentucky Indus. Utility Customers, Inc. v. Kentucky Utilities
Co., 983 S.W.2d 493, 499 (Ky. 1998).
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is based on the requirement that a
statute be sufficiently definite for a person of ordinary intelligence to be able to
understand that certain conduct is prohibited. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77, 96
S.Ct. 612, 662, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 95. A statute must
also be worded in such a manner that it does not encourage arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement. Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 95. A statute is considered
vague if “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.”
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). Our
Supreme Court has stated the test of vagueness to be “whether a person disposed to
obey the law could determine with reasonable certainty whether contemplated
conduct would amount to a violation.” Commonwealth v. Foley, 798 S.W.2d 947
(Ky. 1990) overruled on other grounds by Martin v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 38
(Ky. 2003).
In reviewing a vagueness challenge, the essential inquiry
is whether the statute describes the forbidden conduct
sufficiently so that persons of common intelligence
disposed to obey the law can understand its meaning and
application.
Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 96.
We are persuaded that KRS 507.040(1) and KRS 501.020(3), when
read together, make it abundantly clear to a person of ordinary intelligence that
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when one drives an automobile while voluntarily intoxicated and causes a death, he
has violated the law and will be subject to prosecution for second-degree
manslaughter. There is nothing vague or ambiguous about the language. The
statutes plainly warn that a person who creates “a substantial and unjustifiable
risk” that he may cause the death of another by driving a motor vehicle while
voluntarily intoxicated assumes the risk of criminal liability when he knowingly
becomes intoxicated. If he then drives a car in that voluntarily induced state, he is
criminally liable for all consequences that ensue – regardless of his lack of
knowledge, awareness, or intent due to his intoxicated state. Criminal liability is
based on the intentional, knowing, and voluntary act of intoxication, which may
then set in motion a series of unintended tragedies. That person will be subject to
prosecution for second-degree manslaughter even if he is unaware of the risk that
he poses. We hold that these statutes provide ample notice that voluntary
intoxication can lead to conduct that is considered “wanton” under our penal code.
See McGuire v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Ky. 1994); Caretenders,
Inc. v. Commonwealth, 821 S.W.2d 83, 87 (Ky. 1991).
Additionally, these statutes are not worded in such a manner as to
encourage arbitrary or discriminatory application. Law enforcement officials are
given clear standards of what type of conduct is considered to be wanton.
Voluntary intoxication is defined in KRS 501.010(4) as follows:
“Voluntary intoxication” means intoxication caused by
substances which the defendant knowingly introduces
into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication
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he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them
pursuant to medical advice or under such duress as would
afford a defense to a charge of crime.
Such definitional sections may – and indeed must – be considered in a void-forvagueness analysis. See Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Ky.
1981); Cutrer v. Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Ky.App. 1985). Although
the consequences are severe, the statutory definitions are clear beyond dispute,
refuting Ward’s argument as to vagueness.
Ward also argues that the statutory provisions at issue are
unconstitutional because they are overbroad. The overbreadth doctrine “generally
involves a claim that in an effort to control proscribable conduct, a statute
impermissibly reaches constitutionally permissible conduct.” Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d
at 96. A statute cannot be invalidated for overbreadth unless it affects a
“substantial number of impermissible applications.” Id. Ward has failed to
indicate any constitutionally permissible conduct that might be affected by the
statutes. He also has failed to set forth the “substantial number of impermissible
applications” that is implicated by those statutes. Therefore, we are not persuaded
that his analysis has established overbreadth.
Ward next argues that the trial court erred by allowing a police officer
to testify about the capacity of people to drive with a .13 blood-alcohol content.
He objects because the officer did not personally observe Ward at the scene of the
accident and that he was not offered or accepted as an expert witness by the court.
We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
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Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2000). A court
commits an abuse of discretion when its decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Farmland Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 36 S.W.3d 368, 378 (Ky. 2000).
On the second day of trial, the Commonwealth called as a witness
Detective Eddie Crum, a nineteen-year veteran of the Kentucky State Police.
Crum testified that during his first twelve years with KSP, he worked as a road
trooper. On numerous occasions, he arrested people for drunken driving and
conducted breath and blood tests for alcohol. He also testified that he had
extensive training as an accident reconstructionist. Crum was then asked about his
experience with intoxicated drivers and how alcohol affects a person’s ability to
perceive and react while driving. Ward objected to this question. Counsel
exchanged arguments out of the presence of the jury, and the trial court overruled
Ward’s objection. Crum was then allowed to testify that he had observed people
who had tested at a .13 blood-alcohol content level during the course of his
employment as a KSP trooper and that he believed that a .13 rating generally
impaired a person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle safely. As correctly noted
above, Crum had not been present at the scene of the accident involving Ward.
Ward argues that Crum’s testimony should not have been allowed into
evidence because he was not presented to the trial court as an expert witness
pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 702 and because the court failed to
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make any findings of fact concerning his qualifications to render the expert
opinions to which he testified.
Our Supreme Court has granted trial courts wide latitude in assessing
the reliability of an expert and in deciding whether special briefing or a Daubert
hearing is necessary. Dixon v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 426, 430 (Ky. 2004).
“Thus, formal Daubert hearings are not always required.” Id.; see also, e.g.,
Mondie v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 203, 212 (Ky. 2005); Hyatt v.
Commonwealth, 72 S.W.3d 566, 575 (Ky. 2002). Nonetheless, we note that:
[e]ssential fairness in a trial requires that the trial court
carefully scrutinize the qualifications and the testimony
of the officer before permitting his opinion testimony to
be submitted to a jury.
Mondie, 158 S.W.3d at 212-13, quoting Alexander v. Swearer, 642 S.W.2d 896,
897 (Ky. 1982).
Expert opinions from police officers based upon their training and
experience are frequently admitted almost as a matter of routine. See id.; see also
Martin v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 374, 382-83 (Ky. 2005); Allgeier v.
Commonwealth, 915 S.W.2d 745, 746-47 (Ky. 1996); Sargent v. Commonwealth,
813 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Ky. 1991); Kroth v. Commonwealth, 737 S.W.2d 680, 681
(Ky. 1987); Evans v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 503, 509-10 (Ky.App. 2003).
These opinions are deemed to be distinguishable “from the more extensive and
complex knowledge required for testimony by traditional experts, such as accident
reconstructionists and forensic pathologists.” Allgeier, 915 S.W.2d at 747.
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Moreover, where proffered testimony does not require applying “any theories,
processes, or methods of novel or controversial origin,” a witness’s “actual
experience and long observation” are sufficient to qualify him as an expert in the
relevant subject area. Kurtz v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 409, 413 (Ky. 2005).
Police officers enjoy wide acceptance as expert witnesses based on their
professional experience and training alone.
The trial court in this case required the Commonwealth to lay a proper
foundation before allowing Crum to give his opinion. As noted above, Crum
testified as to his extensive experience in testing and dealing with suspected
drunken drivers as a state trooper. “The reliability of proffered expert testimony is
a preliminary question of fact reserved for the trial court and accordingly, a trial
court’s reliability ruling in this area is reviewed for clear error.” Kurtz, 172
S.W.3d at 412. Although the court did not make specific findings of fact with
respect to the reliability of Crum’s testimony, substantial evidence supported its
ruling. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the court clearly erred in finding
Crum’s opinion to be reliable. See Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 917 (Ky.
2004).
Our Supreme Court has recognized that police officers may render
opinions regarding the general relationship between a blood-alcohol percentage
and a person’s level of intoxication -- even when an officer has not personally
observed the defendant in question. See Jewell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d
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807, 812 (Ky. 1977), overruled on other grounds by Payne v. Commonwealth, 623
S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1981). In Jewell, the Court held that a police officer:
who had administered blood-alcohol examinations on
many occasions ... qualified as an expert in his own right,
and it was within his special competence to relate the
percentages to degrees of drunkenness based on his
personal observation of other persons he had tested.
Id. Thus, the testimony given by Crum has been established as the type that would
assist a trier of fact. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing it into
evidence. See Miller, 146 S.W.3d at 915.
Ward also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing
Crum’s testimony to come into evidence because the probative value of that
testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. We
disagree. “Undue prejudice” generally refers to two possible risks that might occur
when evidence is introduced:
(1) risk of an emotional response that inflames passions,
generates sympathy, or arouses hostility; and (2) risk that
the evidence will be used for an improper purpose.
Dixon, 149 S.W.3d at 431, quoting Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence
Law Handbook § 2.10[4][b], at 88 (4th ed. LexisNexis 2003). Neither risk is
involved here. There was nothing about Crum’s testimony that would tend to
generate a risk of an emotional response. Moreover, nothing about it created a risk
that it would be used for an improper purpose. Therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative value of Crum’s testimony was
not compromised or outweighed by a likelihood of producing a prejudicial impact.
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Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Ward’s remaining
arguments in this respect are equally unpersuasive.
Ward finally argues that the trial court erred by failing to direct a
verdict of “not guilty” as to the second-degree manslaughter charge. The standard
for ruling on a motion for directed verdict is as follows:
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw
all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed
verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on
the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence
for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to
such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if
under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). The evidence
presented against the defendant must be of substance, and a directed verdict is
warranted where the Commonwealth provides no more than a “mere scintilla” of
evidence. Id. at 187-88.
A review of the record before us clearly reflects that the trial court did
not err in denying Ward’s motion for directed verdict. As noted above, KRS
507.040 provides that a person is guilty of second-degree manslaughter “when he
wantonly causes the death of another person.” KRS 507.040(1). It unequivocally
includes situations in which death results from the person’s operation of a motor
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vehicle. KRS 507.040(1)(a). We have interpreted KRS 507.040(1) to mean that
driving under the influence of intoxicants will almost always be considered wanton
conduct. See Keller v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Ky.App. 1986). Our
Supreme Court has recognized that “driving under the influence [is] sufficient to
prove the element of wanton conduct required in KRS 507.020(1)(b),” the wanton
murder statute. Walden v. Commonwealth, 805 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Ky. 1991),
overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805 (Ky.
1996); see also Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 539, 541 (Ky. 1978).
The Court has also held that:
... evidence that a person charged with vehicular
homicide had intoxicating drugs in his system when the
homicide occurred is relevant to the issue of wantonness
even without additional evidence of the degree of
impairment caused by its presence.
Parson v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 775, 781 (Ky. 2004). Driving while
intoxicated is virtually a per se predicate for liability under the wanton murder
statute. Therefore, driving under the influence of alcohol and/or intoxicating drugs
would undoubtedly serve to satisfy the lesser degree of wantonness for seconddegree manslaughter in KRS 507.040(1).
The Commonwealth certainly produced more than a “mere scintilla”
of evidence in support of its case -- specifically as to whether Ward was
intoxicated at the time of the accident. To recapitulate, Ward ran a red light and
collided with another vehicle without making any effort whatsoever to come to a
stop. Immediately following the collision, after failing a field-sobriety test and
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being arrested for driving under the influence, Ward acknowledged that he had
consumed two mixed alcoholic beverages at the office before leaving to pick up his
prescriptions. Subsequent tests revealed that he had a .13 blood-alcohol content as
well as traces of multiple prescription drugs in his system at the time -- including
Darvocet and Ambien. One of the pharmacists who testified at trial indicated that
Darvocet and alcohol could be mixed only with extreme care because both
substances have sedative effects. The prescription bottles for each drug also
contained labels warning that they should not be taken while driving or operating
machinery. There was at least some evidence introduced from which a jury could
infer that Ward had taken four and one-half Darvocet tablets immediately after
leaving the Food City pharmacy. The KSP trooper who conducted the fieldsobriety test also testified as to why he believed Ward was impaired and why he
believed that Ward had failed the test. From these numerous facts, a jury could
reasonably find that Ward was intoxicated at the time of the accident and that
driving in such a state and running a red light constituted wanton conduct. See
Walden, 805 S.W.2d at 104; Hamilton, 560 S.W.2d at 541; Keller, 719 S.W.2d at
7.
We conclude that the trial court correctly permitted the case to
proceed to a jury and that a reasonable jury could have found Ward guilty of
second-degree manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no error.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Pike Circuit Court.
NICKELL, JUDGE, CONCURS.
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GRAVES, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT AND FILES
SEPARATE OPINION.
GRAVES, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURRING IN RESULT: I
concur; however, I write separately to comment on the irregularity of the
proceedings concerning the DUI charge.
Detective Eddie Crum, a 19-year veteran of the Kentucky State
Police, was permitted to answer multiple questions presented by the prosecutor
concerning anyone who registers .13 BAC (blood alcohol) and his fitness to
“perceive and react” and to drive a car. This testimony was more prejudicial than
probative because Appellant’s degree of impairment was not within the personal
knowledge of Detective Crum. It was only an opinion based on speculation.
It was error to admit abstract opinion evidence about DUI. Though
initially charged with DUI, this charge is still pending. A DUI conviction is now
precluded by double jeopardy. However, this error is harmless because other,
sufficient evidence exists to sustain the conviction.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stephen W. Owens
Pikeville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
David B. Freedman
Vincent F. Rabil
Winston-Salem, North Carolina
Jeffrey A. Cross
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Stephen W. Owens
Pikeville, Kentucky
Jeffrey A. Cross
Frankfort, Kentucky
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