GLASS (GEORGE REID) VS. GLASS (NANCY ELLIS)
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RENDERED: MAY 23, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000301-MR
&
NO. 2007-CA-000368-MR
GEORGE REID GLASS
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-04736
NANCY ELLIS GLASS
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, KELLER, AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: This is an appeal and a cross-appeal from a judgment of the
Fayette Circuit Court dissolving the marriage between George Reid Glass (“Reid”)
and Nancy Ellis Glass (“Nancy”). In his direct appeal, Reid argues that the trial
court clearly erred in its characterizing assets and real property as Nancy’s nonmarital property, and that the court abused its discretion in dividing the marital
property. In her cross-appeal, Nancy argues that the trial court clearly erred in
finding that a portion of her engagement ring was marital property and subject to
division. Finding no clear error or abuse of discretion, we affirm.
Reid and Nancy Glass were married in 1963 and separated in 2005.
Two children were born of the marriage, both of whom are now adults. Reid filed
a petition for dissolution of the marriage on November 1, 2005. The parties
disputed a number of property issues, including: (1) Nancy’s claims that a
percentage of proceeds from the sale of a marital residence were non-marital; (2)
Nancy’s claims to a significant non-marital interest in the increase in value of her
non-marital property; and (3) Nancy’s claims that three rings received during the
marriage were non-marital gifts from Reid.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued findings of
fact, conclusions of law and a decree of dissolution on November 30, 2006. In
pertinent part, the trial court first found that $124,974.40 of the $132.257.00
received from the sale of the marital residence was Nancy’s non-marital property.
The court evenly divided the remaining $7,282.60. Next, the trial court found that
Nancy’s claimed non-marital expenditures of $226,090.61 toward the
improvement of her non-marital property, which had increased that property’s
value, should be reduced by 10%, resulting in a non-marital contribution of
$203,481.55. The court restored Nancy’s non-marital interest and divided the
marital portion of the increase in value of that property 65% to Nancy and 35% to
Reid. Regarding the rings, the trial court found that Nancy had used non-marital
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funds for one-half of the cost of her largest engagement ring. Consequently, the
court found that the ring is 50% Nancy’s non-marital and 50% marital. The court
awarded the ring to Nancy, and ordered her to pay Reid $6,875.00, representing his
share of the marital interest in the ring. The court found that the other two rings
were entirely marital and have a value of $3,600.00. The court awarded the rings
to Nancy and ordered her to pay Reid $1,800.00 for his interest in the bands.
Finally, the court equally divided the remaining marital property.
Both parties filed motions to alter, amend or vacate the judgment.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 59.05. After considering the briefs and
arguments, the court denied Reid’s motion, but partially granted Nancy’s motion
with respect to the two smaller rings. The court found that the parties had agreed
that each party would keep their respective rings with no money to offset any
additional marital interest. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
In his direct appeal, Reid primarily challenges the trial court’s
characterization of certain assets as Nancy’s non-marital property. While these
assets are mostly distinct, several of the issues involving these assets are related.
Therefore, it is necessary to set out some of the context surrounding the acquisition
of these assets.
For most of the marriage, Nancy remained at home with the children
while Reid worked. However, Nancy received substantial gifts and income from
inheritances during the marriage. Nancy also inherited property in Eminence,
Kentucky, and a one-fourth interest in a home in Florida.
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In 1973, the parties moved to Memphis, Tennessee, and purchased a
home. In 1983, they sold the Memphis residence and purchased a new home in
Germantown, Tennessee. The parties agree that Nancy contributed $49,400.00 in
non-marital funds toward the down payment, and an additional $16,000.00 down
payment came from the proceeds of the sale of the Memphis house. The parties
financed the remaining $166,000.00 of the purchase price with a conventional
mortgage.
Thereafter, in late 1993 and early 1994, Reid and Nancy became silent
partners in an engine rebuilding business. Although they did not put up any capital
at that time, Reid guaranteed the liabilities of the business with his retirement
accounts, and Nancy signed a guarantee for $51,000.00 in loans to the Small
Business Administration. Two years later, the business failed and filed for
bankruptcy. Since Reid’s retirement accounts could not be liquidated without
substantial tax penalties, the parties agreed that Nancy would use $75,555.40 of her
non-marital funds to pay the outstanding obligations of the business.
The parties sold the Germantown residence in 2000, from which they
received net proceeds of $138,302.74. These proceeds were deposited into
Nancy’s non-marital Vanguard Money Market account (“the Vanguard account”).
Nancy alleges that the parties had agreed that she would be repaid for her
$49,400.00 down payment on the Germantown residence and for her $75,555.40
payment toward the bankruptcy debt. Reid agrees that Nancy is entitled to recover
her non-marital down payment, but he contends there was insufficient proof of any
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agreement to reimburse Nancy for her payment of the bankruptcy debt. Reid
further testified that he and Nancy had agreed only that the proceeds from the sale
of the Germantown residence would go toward the improvement of the Eminence
property.
As Reid correctly points out, Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”)
403.190(3) starts with the presumption that all property acquired after marriage is
marital property. Thus, the proceeds from the sale of the Germantown residence
generally would be considered marital property. However, this presumption does
not apply to property acquired in exchange for non-marital property, or property
excluded by a valid agreement of the parties. KRS 403.190(2)(b) and (d). The
party claiming the non-marital interest must present clear and convincing evidence
to overcome the presumption. Brosick v. Brosick, 974 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Ky. App.
1998); Browning v. Browning, 551 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Ky. App. 1977).
There is very little Kentucky case law on the proof necessary to
establish an agreement to exclude property from the marital estate. Unlike in
Bratcher v. Bratcher, 26 S.W.3d 797 (Ky. App. 2000), the parties in this case did
not make the alleged agreement after separation or during circumstances when they
were contemplating divorce. Consequently, their agreement is not subject to the
requirements for separation agreements under KRS 403.180. Id. at 799.
Furthermore, the proof necessary to trace non-marital assets depends upon the
particular circumstances of the parties. In some cases, tracing to a mathematical
certainty is not always possible, and may promote marital disharmony. Chenault
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v. Chenault, 799 S.W.2d 575, 578 (Ky. 1990). But in other cases, the party
claiming the non-marital interest should reasonably be expected to maintain
detailed records about the transaction. Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, 64 S.W.3d 816,
821 (Ky. 2002).
Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the agreement
may be proven by oral testimony. Both parties testified that Nancy paid the
bankruptcy debt from her non-marital funds due to the tax consequences of
withdrawing funds from Reid’s retirement accounts. The proceeds from the sale of
the Germantown residence were deposited into the Vanguard account. The parties’
conduct at the time is more consistent with Nancy’s version of the agreement than
Reid’s.
Furthermore, Nancy’s testimony was corroborated by the testimony of
the parties’ adult sons, Byron and Brent. Byron spoke with Nancy at the time she
paid the bankruptcy debt, and she told him that the proceeds from the sale of the
Germantown residence would be used to repay her for the bankruptcy debt. Brent
also testified that he was present at the time his parents discussed this agreement.
The trial court found Nancy’s testimony about the parties’ agreement
to be more credible than Reid’s. Reid contends that his testimony was more
credible than that of Nancy, Byron or Brent. However, we must defer to the
considerable discretion of the trial court unless it has committed clear error or has
abused that discretion. Herron v. Herron, 573 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Ky. 1978). The
trial court as finder of fact is in the best position to determine the credibility of the
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witnesses and to resolve conflicting evidence. CR 52.01. See also JanakakisKostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843, 852 (Ky. App. 1999). An appellate court
“cannot disturb the findings of a trial court in a case involving dissolution of
marriage unless those findings are clearly erroneous.” Cochran v. Cochran, 746
S.W.2d 568, 569-70 (Ky. App. 1988). While the evidence would have supported a
different conclusion, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the parties
intended that Nancy would be repaid for the bankruptcy debt with the proceeds
from the sale of the Germantown residence.
Reid next argues that the trial court erred in its determination that
Nancy was entitled to recover most of her non-marital contributions to the
Eminence property. The parties agree that the Eminence property was worth
$70,000.00 at the time Nancy inherited it, and was worth $385,000.00 at the time
of separation. However, they disagree about the status of the remaining
$315,000.00 in equity.
After the sale of the Germantown residence, the parties lived either at
Nancy’s non-marital Florida home or at the Eminence home. Since the Eminence
property had fallen into disrepair, the parties undertook to renovate the property.
Nancy used $226,090.61 from her Vanguard account to finance the renovation, but
both Reid and Nancy worked extensively on the project. As previously noted, the
trial court found that Nancy’s non-marital expenditures toward the improvement of
her non-marital property had increased that property’s value by $203,481.55, and
restored that amount to her as her non-marital interest.
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Reid agrees that Nancy invested the non-marital funds into the
renovation of the Eminence property, but he contends that Nancy failed to
conclusively demonstrate that those funds actually increased the value of the
property. KRS 403.190(2)(e) provides the increase in value of property acquired
before the marriage is non-marital “to the extent that such increase did not result
from the efforts of the parties during marriage.” When the property includes an
increase in the value of an asset containing both marital and non-marital
components, the trial court must determine from the evidence why the increase in
value occurred. Travis v. Travis, 59 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Ky. 2001). In this case, the
evidence is undisputed that the increase in value of the Eminence property can be
attributed in part to Nancy’s non-marital investments and in part to the joint efforts
of the parties.
We agree with Reid that the party asserting that she should receive an
appreciation on a non-marital contribution carries the burden of proving the portion
of the increase of value attributable to the non-marital contribution. Id.
Nevertheless, it is elementary that, when a party to a marriage acquires property or
an interest therein with non-marital funds, the property or interest is properly
classified as non-marital property, and property includes equity in property.
Schoenbachler v. Minyard, 110 S.W.3d 776, 786 (Ky. 2003). Thus, Nancy may
recover her investment of non-marital funds for the renovation of the Eminence
property to the extent that those funds actually increased the equity in the property.
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Reid maintains that Nancy could only meet her burden of proof by
specifically tracing each non-marital expenditure to a corresponding increase in the
value of the property. We disagree. Nancy presented evidence that she spent
$226,090.61 toward improvements on the Eminence property. Given the
significant increase in the value of the Eminence property above Nancy’s initial
non-marital interest and subsequent non-marital investment, there was no reason
for the trial court to conclude that the improvements did not contribute to the
increase in the property’s value. While the trial court found that some of those
expenditures were insufficiently documented, the court also noted that Reid had
agreed that “the ‘vast majority’ of the improvements set forth on Nancy’s exhibit
detailing the expenditures were in fact made to the property.” Consequently, the
trial court reduced the value of the improvements by 10% to $203,481.55. This
conclusion was reasonable based upon the evidence presented in this case.
The trial court characterized the remaining $111,518.45 equity in the
Eminence property as marital. However, the trial court awarded 65% of that equity
to Nancy and 35% to Reid. Reid argues that the evidence did not support an
unequal division in favor of Nancy.
KRS 403.190(1) provides that a trial court
shall divide the marital property without regard to marital
misconduct in just proportions considering all relevant
factors including:
(a) Contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the
marital property, including contribution of a spouse as
homemaker;
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(b) Value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(c) Duration of the marriage; and
(d) Economic circumstances of each spouse when the
division of property is to become effective . . . .
A trial court is to divide marital property in just proportions
considering all relevant factors. KRS 403.190(1). See also Wood v. Wood, 720
S.W.2d 934 (Ky. App. 1986); Herron v. Herron, 573 S.W.2d 342 (Ky. 1978).
However, just proportions do not necessarily mean equal proportions. Wood,
supra. We review the trial court’s division of marital property under an abuse of
discretion standard. A court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly
erroneous findings of fact, when it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous
legal standard. Overstreet v. Overstreet, 144 S.W.3d 834, 838 (Ky. App. 2003).
We cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion by dividing the
marital equity in the Eminence property in favor of Nancy. There is no question
that the $111,518.45 in equity above Nancy’s non-marital contributions is marital.
Although the court separately gave credit to Nancy for those contributions, the
court also recognized that the majority of the increase in the value of the property
was attributable to Nancy’s non-marital contributions. The trial court attempted to
give Reid credit for his “sweat equity” in the improvements to the property.
However, the court did not entirely accept his testimony regarding the amount of
time he spent working and improving the home. Under the circumstances, the trial
court’s division of the marital equity was reasonable and supported by the
evidence.
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By the same token, we disagree with Reid’s position that the evidence
compelled a division of the marital property in his favor. Reid points out that
Nancy has substantial non-marital property which was restored to her.
Furthermore, this was a long-term marriage of 40 years, during most of which Reid
worked and provided income for the family. Reid also testified that he helped to
manage Nancy’s investments of her non-marital property.
Given Nancy’s substantial non-marital estate, Reid contends that the
trial court should have awarded a greater portion of the marital estate to him.
However, Nancy also submitted evidence that she contributed a large amount of
non-marital funds during the marriage which were not restored to her. And while
the trial court did not discuss each of the statutory factors, the court stated that it
considered all of the factors under KRS 403.190(1)(a)-(d) in dividing the marital
property. Under the circumstances, we cannot find that the trial court abused its
discretion by equally dividing the remaining marital property.
In her cross-appeal, Nancy argues that the trial court clearly erred in
its division of the rings. At the time of the marriage, Reid gave Nancy an
engagement ring with a one-half carat diamond. Fifteen years into the marriage,
Reid and Nancy decided to replace the one-half carat ring with a larger one carat
diamond ring. The one-half carat stone was used to make a pinky ring for Nancy.
Thereafter, in 1982, the parties decided to replace the one carat ring
with a larger diamond. They purchased a 3.06 carat diamond for $10,000.00.
One-half of the cost of the diamond came from Nancy’s non-marital funds and
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one-half came from marital funds. The one carat diamond was used to make a
pinky ring for Reid.
Sometime thereafter, Nancy lost her one-half carat pinky ring. Reid
agreed to give his one carat ring to make another pinky ring for her. In return,
Nancy bought a one and one-half carat diamond for a replacement ring for Reid.
At the time of separation, the 3.06 carat diamond ring was appraised
at $27,500.00, and the one carat ring was appraised at $3,600.00. Reid did not
have his one and one-half carat ring appraised and he did not know its value. On
cross-examination, Nancy’s counsel questioned Reid about the value of the rings
and the circumstances surrounding their acquisition. At one point, he stated that
the value of the rings should be considered a “wash” – that is, he would keep his
ring and Nancy would keep her rings without any offsetting payment. After Reid
made this statement, Nancy’s counsel moved on to another line of inquiry.
While the trial court attempted to clarify this statement, it is not clear
whether Reid was willing to offset his one and one-half carat diamond against
Nancy’s one carat diamond, or against both of Nancy’s rings. In its supplemental
judgment, the trial court concluded that he had agreed only to the former. Thus,
the court modified its prior order requiring Nancy to pay Reid for his interest in the
smaller rings, but maintained its order requiring Nancy to pay Reid for his interest
in the 3.06 carat ring.
Nancy argues that the court clearly erred in its interpretation of Reid’s
statement. But on reviewing the record, we find that the trial court’s interpretation
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of Reid’s testimony was reasonable. Furthermore, since the value of the two
smaller rings was entirely offset against each other, any issue regarding Reid’s
failure to have his ring appraised is now moot.
The primary issue in Nancy’s cross-appeal concerns the status of the
3.06 carat diamond. Nancy points out that each of the “upgraded” rings was to
replace the smaller rings with a larger diamond. Consequently, she contends that
each ring should retain the earlier rings’ status of gifts from Reid, and thus be
considered her non-marital property. But since Nancy kept each of the smaller
rings, there was no evidence to support a finding that those gifts were exchanged
for the larger diamond.
Furthermore, the trial court’s determination concerning the gift or
non-gift status of an item must be upheld unless there is clear error. Ghali v.
Ghali, 596 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Ky. App. 1980). In determining whether an item is a
gift, the court must look to: 1) the source of the money with which the item was
purchased, 2) the intent of the donor at that time as to the intended use of the
property, 3) the status of the marriage relationship at the time of the transfer, and 4)
whether there was any valid agreement that the transferred property was to be
excluded from the marital property. Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56, 62 (Ky. App.
1990), citing O’Neill v. O’Neill, 600 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. App. 1980). In this case, the
evidence could have supported a finding that the 3.06 carat diamond was a gift, but
it did not compel such a finding.
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As Nancy points out, the parties were buying a new engagement ring
for Nancy, which typically is a gift. But on the other hand, Nancy used nonmarital funds to pay half the cost of the diamond. Such conduct is not entirely
consistent with a gift. Furthermore, Reid testified that the parties had discussed
buying the diamond as an investment. While Nancy contends that this testimony
was not credible, the trial court was within its discretion to accept Reid’s version of
events. Therefore, we cannot find that the trial court clearly erred in finding that
one-half of the diamond ring was marital and subject to division.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
Carl D. Devine
Micah E. Salsman
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Crystal L. Osborne
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE:
Carl D. Devine
Lexington, Kentucky
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