PITNEY (DEBRA), ET AL. VS. 8635, INC.
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RENDERED: APRIL 18, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000173-MR
DEBRA PITNEY AND TRAVIS PRENTICE
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KATHLEEN VOOR MONTANO, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-002618
8635, INC. F/D/B/A REAL
ESTATE SOLUTIONS, LLC
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND MOORE, JUDGES, BUCKINGHAM, 1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Debra Pitney and Travis Prentice appeal from a summary
judgment granted to 8635, Inc. f/d/b/a Real Estate Solutions, LLC, in which the
Jefferson Circuit Court found that no material issue of fact existed with regard to Real
Estate Solution’s claim for damages for unpaid rent. For the reasons set forth herein,
we affirm.
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Senior Judge David C. Buckingham, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief
Justice pursuant to Section 110 (5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
On April 20, 2004, Real Estate Solutions entered into a lease agreement
with Debra Pitney and Travis Prentice, who were allegedly acting on the behalf of
Amstar Mortgage. Under the terms of the agreement, Pitney and Prentice agreed to
lease the property known as 2300 Hurstbourne Village Drive, Suite 200, Hurstbourne
Village Office Condominium, Louisville, Kentucky. The lease was to begin on May 1,
2004, and expire on April 30, 2005, and Pitney and Prentice agreed to pay rent in the
amount of $200.00 per month. Real Estate Solutions agreed to pay all utilities for the
leased premises.
Also on April 20, 2004, an addendum to the lease was orally agreed upon,
in which Pitney and Prentice agreed to rent additional space for $340.00 a month, for a
total rent amount of $540.00 per month. Further, Pitney and Prentice agreed to pay the
utilities associated with the leased premises beginning on June 1, 2004. This
addendum was signed by Real Estate Solutions, but not by Pitney or Prentice on behalf
of Amstar. However, Pitney and Prentice began complying with the terms of the oral
agreement and paid rent accordingly per its terms.
When the terms of the leasehold agreement expired, Pitney and Prentice
continued to occupy the leased premises as a holdover tenant pursuant to KRS
385.695. As such, they became month to month tenants and were responsible for
paying rent on a monthly basis. According to the answer filed on their behalf, Pitney
and Prentice gave notice that they would vacate the premises by October 1, 2005. This
notice was sent to Real Estate Solutions on September 1, 2005. However, Real Estate
Solutions claims it never received such notice and in fact filed a petition for writ of
forcible entry and detainer in the Jefferson District Court in February 2006. On
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February 3, 2006, the court entered a judgment in favor of Real Estate Solutions in
forcible detainer. On March 8, 2006, a deputy sheriff executed said judgment and set
out Pitney and Prentice’s personal property from the leased premises.
Subsequently, Real Estate Solutions filed the present action seeking to
recover monies due under the lease agreement, unpaid rent, utilities, late fees, costs
and attorney fees in the amount of $4,572.05, plus interest. Real Estate Solutions filed
a motion for summary judgment, which was supported by an Affidavit of Harvey James,
the Secretary-Treasurer of Real Estate Solutions, indicating that it did not take
possession of the premises from Pitney and Prentice until March 8, 2006. It alleged that
Pitney and Prentice were responsible for paying rent until such time as it vacated the
premises. On or about September 12, 2006, Pitney and Prentice filed a response to
Real Estate Solution’s motion for summary judgment, however their response and
affidavit were never certified as having been sent to Real Estate Solutions’ counsel.
Further, the response made no mention of Pitney, Prentice, or Amstar vacating the
premises and delivering the keys to Real Estate Solutions on October 1, 2005.
On November 28, 2006, the Jefferson Circuit Court granted Real Estate
Solutions’ motion for summary judgment and awarded it $4,572.05, plus pre-judgment
interest and post-judgment interest. Subsequently Pitney and Prentice filed a motion to
alter, amend, or vacate the judgment of the court, which was denied. This appeal
followed.
“The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether the
trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and
that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916
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S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996); CR 56.03. We are mindful that “[t]he record must be
viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment
and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service
Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).
Pitney and Prentice first argue that the trial court incorrectly applied the
doctrine of res judicata to determine that the issue had been resolved between the
parties in the prior forcible detainer action. They argue that in that action, the issue
litigated was whether Real Estate Solutions was entitled to possession of the real estate
after giving notice to vacate. They argue that the issue here is whether Real Estate
Solutions is entitled to money for unpaid rent.
We find Pitney and Prentice’s interpretation of res judicata to be
misguided. The trial court did not decline to rule on the motion for summary judgment
by applying res judicata, instead it found that the underlying forcible detainer action
provided proof that the District Court had previously made a factual determination that
as of March 2006, Pitney and Prentice were in possession of the premises and
accordingly owed rent. In so doing, the court simply found that no material issue of fact
existed regarding the unpaid rent because a court had previously found Pitney and
Prentice to be in possession of the property during the time in question. Accordingly,
Pitney and Prentice’s claim that they vacated in October 2005 did not create a material
issue of fact and the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Real Estate
Solutions.
Pitney and Prentice argue that the trial court’s reliance on the judgment in
forcible detainer is further undermined by jurisdictional issues. They argue that the
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Jefferson District Court did not have personal jurisdiction over them in the forcible
detainer proceeding and accordingly the circuit court should not have considered that
judgment in the motion for summary judgment. This argument, however, is improperly
before this Court as this appeal pertains to the summary judgment granted to Real
Estate Solutions on November 28, 2006, not the forcible detainer order entered by the
Jefferson District Court on February 3, 2006. Therefore we decline to address whether
or not the Jefferson District Court had jurisdiction in the forcible detainer action.
Pitney and Prentice also argue that because they signed the lease in a
representative capacity on behalf of Amstar, they cannot be personally liable for the
unpaid rent. As Real Estate Solutions argues, Pitney and Prentice never raised the
personal capacity issue with the trial court and therefore the issue is not properly before
the court. Pitney and Prentice state that the issue was preserved for review by the
arguments on the summary judgment motion and the pre-hearing statement. However,
this court is unable to find any argument in the motions for summary judgment
pertaining to capacity and accordingly find that the issue was not properly raised before
the trial court. We have long held in Kentucky that an issue not raised in the circuit
court may not be presented for the first time on appeal. Gabow v. Commonwealth, 34
S.W.3d 63, 75 (Ky. 2000), habeas granted on other grounds, Gabow v. Deuth, 302
F.Supp.2d 687 (W.D.Ky. 2004); Shelton v. Commonwealth, 992 S.W.2d 849, 852
(Ky.App. 1999); Ruppee v. Commonwealth, 821 S.W.2d 484 (Ky. 1991), overruled on
other grounds by Lovett v. Commonwealth, 103 S.W.3d 72 (Ky. 2003); Tamme v.
Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 33 (Ky. 1998).
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Pitney and Prentice alternatively argue that if we find the issue
unpreserved we should address it as palpable error under CR 61.02. Reversing a
judgment based on palpable error requires this Court to determine that a manifest
injustice has resulted from an error which affects the substantial rights of a party. See
61.02. We do not find this to be the case. Therefore, we find the issue unpreserved and
evading review.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is hereby affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Henry K. Jarrett, III
Louisville, Kentucky
J. Gregory Joyner
Naber, Joyner & Jaffe
Louisville, Kentucky
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