QUISENBERRY (MARCHEL) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 11, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000159-MR
MARCHEL QUISENBERRY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARTIN F. MCDONALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-000921
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT, MOORE, AND WINE, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: Marchel Quisenberry appeals, pro se, from the Jefferson
Circuit Court’s order denying his RCr1 11.42 motion to vacate, set aside or correct
his sentence. After a careful review of the record, we affirm.
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Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated the facts of
Quisenberry’s case as follows:
The indictments on the underlying offenses alleged that
on two separate occasions in January and February 1998
[Quisenberry] sexually assaulted his former girlfriend
and that, in connection with the second sexual assault,
Quisenberry first unlawfully entered her residence with
the intent to commit a crime.
At trial, the Commonwealth relied largely upon the
testimony of the victim who was also Quisenberry’s
former girlfriend. The victim testified that, at the time of
the incidents charged in the indictment, she and
Quisenberry had ended their relationship, which she
described as “rocky,” and spoke only occasionally.
According to the victim, on January 4, 1998, Quisenberry
came to her home around 1:30 p.m. and raped her
following an extended conversation in which she
informed Quisenberry she did not intend to renew their
relationship. The victim testified that Quisenberry
became hostile toward her during the course of the
conversation, and, after attempting to kiss her, jumped on
top of her, ignored her commands for him to leave her
alone and to leave the home, pushed her skirt up, and
forcibly engaged in intercourse with her after she told
him “No.” The victim described Quisenberry as a
“muscular, big guy” and testified that she found herself
unable to move after the appellant pinned her down.
After Quisenberry left, the victim called 911, declined
medical attention and went to the Louisville police
headquarters where she reported the incident, but
indicated her unwillingness to follow through with
prosecution of the offense.
The victim testified that she changed her mind regarding
prosecution of the rape charge following a second
incident on February 20, 1998. According to the victim,
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on the night of the second attack a thunderstorm wakened
her in the early morning hours and she found the lights
out in her home, which led her to believe that one of her
fuses had blown. The victim testified that as she made
her way through her home to the fuse box an attacker
grabbed her from behind, pushed her to the floor, and
anally sodomized her at knife-point. According to the
victim, she first identified Quisenberry as her assailant
when he began rubbing her shoulders following the
sexual assault, and, out of concern for her safety, she
conversed with him until he left several hours later. The
victim testified that Quisenberry admitted to her during
this conversation that he had entered the residence
through an upstairs bedroom window. The victim
reported the incident to the authorities three (3) days
later, and a subsequent medical examination revealed the
presence of semen on anal swabs.
Quisenberry denied the charges against him, but did not
testify at trial, and his defense focused on the
complaining witness’s credibility. Specifically, defense
counsel’s cross-examination of the complaining witness
addressed: (1) her inability to recall details concerning
the alleged rape, (2) the absence of corroborating medical
evidence with respect to the alleged rape, (3) her initial
decision not to pursue prosecution in connection with the
alleged rape, (4) her delay in reporting the alleged
sodomy, and (5) her admission that she spent several
hours talking with Quisenberry following the alleged
forcible sodomy. Defense counsel also criticized the
timing and extent of the police investigation of the
complaining witness’s allegations.
Quisenberry was convicted, following a jury trial, of first degree rape,
first degree sodomy, first degree burglary, and of being a first degree persistent
felony offender (“PFO”). He was sentenced to serve enhanced sentences2 of
twenty years of imprisonment for the rape conviction, twenty-five years for the
sodomy conviction, and twenty years for the burglary conviction, all of which were
2
The sentences were enhanced due to his conviction for first degree PFO.
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ordered to be served concurrently, for a total sentence of twenty-five years of
imprisonment. Quisenberry appealed, and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court’s judgment.
Quisenberry filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence, pursuant to RCr 11.42. Counsel was subsequently appointed to represent
Quisenberry, and counsel supplemented the RCr 11.42 motion. The
Commonwealth opposed the motion, and the circuit court denied Quisenberry’s
motion.
Quisenberry now appeals, arguing that his constitutional rights were
violated based upon: (1) defense counsel’s failure to request DNA testing on
evidence offered by the prosecution at trial; (2) defense counsel’s failure to request
a curative instruction, or request a mistrial, when the prosecution offered
inadmissible evidence through the testimony of the complaining witness and a
Louisville police detective; (3) defense counsel’s failure to investigate, interview,
and subpoena witnesses on Quisenberry’s behalf; (4) defense counsel’s erroneous
advice to appellant that, if Quisenberry testified on his own behalf, the prosecution
would present evidence of his prior felony convictions; (5) the cumulative effect of
defense counsel’s trial errors; and (6) the prosecutor’s misconduct during closing
arguments of the guilt and innocence phase of Quisenberry’s trial.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion brought under RCr 11.42 “is limited to issues that were not
and could not be raised on direct appeal.” Simmons v. Commonwealth, 191
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S.W.3d 557, 561 (Ky. 2006). “An issue raised and rejected on direct appeal may
not be relitigated in this type of proceeding by simply claiming that it amounts to
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. “The movant has the burden of establishing
convincingly that he or she was deprived of some substantial right which would
justify the extraordinary relief provided by [a] post-conviction proceeding. . . . A
reviewing court must always defer to the determination of facts and witness
credibility made by the circuit judge.” Id. (citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A. CLAIM REGARDING DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO
REQUEST DNA TESTING
Quisenberry first claims that his constitutional rights were violated
when defense counsel failed to request DNA testing on the anal swabs containing
semen that were offered by the prosecution at trial.
A convicted defendant claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel has the burden of: 1) identifying specific errors
by counsel; 2) demonstrating that the errors by counsel
were objectively unreasonable under the circumstances
existing at the time of trial; 3) rebutting the presumption
that the actions of counsel were the result of trial
strategy; and 4) demonstrating that the errors of counsel
prejudiced his right to a fair trial.
Id. at 561-62.
As previously noted by the Supreme Court on direct review in this
case, defense counsel’s strategy was to focus “on the complaining witness’s
credibility.” The Commonwealth argues, and Quisenberry admits, that at trial,
defense counsel argued that the sexual encounters between Quisenberry and the
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complaining witness were consensual. Thus, defense counsel focused on
diminishing the complaining witness’s credibility because the witness had
contended that the encounters were not consensual. Because counsel’s strategy
was to present the encounters as consensual, there was no reason to seek DNA
testing. Accordingly, due to the fact that counsel’s decision was one concerning
trial strategy, Quisenberry’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning the
failure to conduct DNA testing lacks merit, pursuant to Simmons.
B. CLAIM REGARDING DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO
REQUEST CURATIVE INSTRUCTION OR A MISTRIAL
Quisenberry next contends that he received the ineffective assistance
of counsel due to defense counsel’s failure to request a curative instruction, or
request a mistrial, when the prosecution offered inadmissible evidence through the
testimony of the complaining witness and a Louisville police detective. However,
the Commonwealth notes that Quisenberry alleged on direct appeal that the
prosecution presented inadmissible evidence through the complaining witness and
the Louisville police detective, and the Supreme Court held that the evidence did
not affect “Quisenberry’s substantial rights nor the jury’s verdict.” Therefore,
because the Supreme Court previously found that Quisenberry was not prejudiced
by the admission of this evidence, he cannot now prove that he received the
ineffective assistance of counsel based upon counsel’s failure to challenge such
evidence. See Simmons, 191 S.W.3d at 561-62.
C. CLAIM REGARDING DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO
INVESTIGATE
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Quisenberry’s next claim alleges that he received the ineffective
assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to investigate, interview, and
subpoena witnesses on Quisenberry’s behalf. The circuit court denied relief based
on this claim because Quisenberry and his post-conviction counsel failed to
provide facts to support this allegation. On appeal, Quisenberry attempts to allege
facts in support of this claim. However, our purpose is to review the case
presented to the circuit court, and upon review of Quisenberry’s pro se RCr 11.42
motion, as well as the supplemental RCr 11.42 motion filed by his counsel in the
circuit court, it is clear that the circuit court properly found that there were no facts
alleged to support this claim. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying
relief based on this claim. See Simmons, 191 S.W.3d at 561.
D. CLAIM REGARDING DEFENSE COUNSEL’S ADVICE
CONCERNING WHETHER QUISENBERRY SHOULD TESTIFY AT
TRIAL
Quisenberry next contends that he received the ineffective assistance
of counsel when defense counsel erroneously advised him that, if Quisenberry
testified on his own behalf, the prosecution would present evidence of his prior
felony convictions. Quisenberry’s argument is misplaced. The Kentucky Supreme
Court has held as follows concerning the introduction of evidence of prior felonies:
[A] witness may be asked if he has been previously
convicted of a felony. If his answer is “Yes,” that is the
end of it and the court shall thereupon admonish the jury
that the admission by the witness of his prior conviction
of a felony may be considered only as it affects his
credibility as a witness, if it does so. If the witness
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answers “No” to this question, he may then be impeached
by the Commonwealth by the use of all prior convictions
. . . . After impeachment, the proper admonition shall be
given by the court.
Prior to permitting questioning of a witness concerning
his prior convictions, the trial court shall determine
whether the defendant will be unduly prejudiced by such
evidence, considering nearness or remoteness of the prior
convictions, or such other factors as the court may deem
pertinent.
Identification of the prior offense or offenses, before the
jury, by either the prosecution or defense, is prohibited. .
..
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 674 S.W.2d 515, 517-18 (Ky. 1984). Therefore,
because evidence of prior felonies may, to some extent, be introduced, counsel’s
advice on this point was not erroneous, and Quisenberry’s claim lacks merit.
E. CLAIM REGARDING CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL’S ERRORS
Quisenberry also alleges that his RCr 11.42 motion should have been
granted based upon the cumulative effect of defense counsel’s trial errors.
However, because we have determined that none of the individual claims of error
have merit, there is no cumulative error. See Epperson v. Commonwealth, 197
S.W.3d 46, 66 (Ky. 2006). Consequently, this claim lacks merit.
F. CLAIM REGARDING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Furthermore, Quisenberry contends that his constitutional rights were
violated due to the prosecutor’s misconduct during closing arguments of the guilt
and innocence phase of Quisenberry’s trial. However, because this issue could
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have been raised on direct appeal, it was improperly raised in Quisenberry’s RCr
11.42 motion. See Simmons, 191 S.W.3d at 561.
G. REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Finally, Quisenberry asks this Court to direct the circuit court to hold
an evidentiary hearing concerning the merits of his RCr 11.42 claims. Pursuant to
RCr 11.42(5), if there is “a material issue of fact that cannot be determined on the
face of the record [,] the court shall grant a prompt hearing. . . .” In the present
case, because the circuit court was able to resolve Quisenberry’s claims by
examining the record, the court did not hold an evidentiary hearing.
On appeal, after “the trial court denies a motion for an evidentiary
hearing on the merits of allegations raised in a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42, our
review is limited to whether the motion on its face states grounds that are not
conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would invalidate the
conviction.” Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. App. 1986)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the present case, all of Quisenberry’s claims were conclusively
refuted by the record. Thus, the circuit court did not err in denying his request for
an evidentiary hearing.
H. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Marchel Quisenberry
Pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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