CRISWELL (MARY) VS. CRISWELL (RICHARD S.)
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RENDERED: MAY 2, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000023-MR
MARY J. CRISWELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DEBRA HEMBREE LAMBERT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00033
RICHARD S. CRISWELL
AND
APPELLEE
NO. 2007-CA-000352-MR
MARY J. CRISWELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WALTER F. MAGUIRE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00033
RICHARD S. CRISWELL
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: ACREE AND STUMBO, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ACREE, JUDGE: Mary Criswell pro se appeals from two orders of the Pulaski Circuit
Court. The first is the decree dissolving Mary’s marriage from Richard Criswell. The
second is the trial court’s denial of Mary’s motion to set aside or vacate the divorce
decree. We reverse and remand.
Mary and Richard were married on November 27, 1982, and separated on
December 26, 2004. Two children were born of the marriage, one of which was a minor
at the time of the trial. On January 12, 2005, Richard filed for divorce. Both parties
were represented by counsel until Mary’s attorney was permitted to withdraw on
October 13, 2006.
Richard served interrogatories upon Mary on March 17, 2006. After Mary
did not answer the interrogatories, Richard filed a motion to compel Mary to provide her
answers and a motion to set the matter for a final hearing on all contested issues. A
final hearing was scheduled for December 6, 2006, and counsel for the parties agreed
that answers to written discovery requests would be provided within 15 days. On
August 11, 2006, Richard filed a second motion to compel responses to the discovery
requests. At the hearing on the motion, Mary’s counsel again agreed to provide the
discovery responses within 15 days. On October 13, 2006, Mary’s attorney was
permitted to withdraw from the case. Richard never received Mary’s answers to the
interrogatories.
Richard was deposed by his own counsel on November 10, 2006. Mary
had not yet obtained new counsel and failed to appear at the deposition. That same
day, Richard filed a motion to submit the matter to the court for entry of a final decree.
The matter was set to be heard by the trial court on November 17, 2006. Prior to that
Senior Judge John W. Graves sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
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hearing, on November 15, 2006, the court sua sponte sent out an order re-scheduling
the final hearing from December 6, 2006 to January 3, 2007.
At the November 17, 2006, hearing, a special judge heard the motion to
submit and executed an order submitting the matter for judgment and decree on the
issues presented. Mary did not attend the hearing. On November 28, 2006, the trial
court entered a dissolution decree dividing the parties’ assets and debts, deciding
issues of child custody, support and visitation.
On December 27, 2006, Mary filed a motion to set aside or vacate the
decree pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02 (a) and (f). She also
filed a notice of appeal with this Court. In accordance with CR 60.04, Mary moved this
Court to abate her appeal pending the trial court’s decision on her CR 60.02 motion.
On January 17, 2006, the trial court denied Mary’s CR 60.02 motion
finding it no longer had jurisdiction over the matter as it was on appeal. Mary moved to
alter or amend the trial court’s order, but was denied again for lack of jurisdiction.
On February 9, 2007, Mary filed a second notice of appeal concerning the
trial court’s denial of her CR 60.02 motion. The appeals have been consolidated for our
review.2
We first consider the appeal denying Mary’s CR 60.02 motion on
jurisdictional grounds, without considering the merits. The trial court and Richard
appear to believe that it would be improper for a trial court to consider a motion to
vacate a judgment made pursuant to CR 60.02 while a direct appeal from the same
judgment is pending. Richard correctly notes that as a general rule, “the filing of a
Richard filed a motion to strike Mary’s appellate brief pursuant to CR 76.12(4). Richard
objects to Mary’s references to documents and matters not part of the record on appeal as well
as hearsay statements made throughout the brief. We believe his request to strike her entire
brief is overboard. Though Richard claims it too difficult to merely strike certain portions of the
brief, we feel up to the task. For the foregoing reasons, the motion to strike is denied.
However, we will be mindful not to allow our decision to be affected by matters that are not part
of the record.
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notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on any new issues while the
appeal is pending.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 109, 113 (Ky. 2000).
However, CR 60.04 specifically provides:
If a proceeding by motion or independent action is
commenced under Rule 60.02 or 60.03 while an appeal is
pending from the original judgment and prior to the time an
opinion is rendered by the appellate court, the party
commencing such proceeding shall promptly move the
appellate court to abate the appeal until a final order is
entered therein.
See also Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.06(2).
In Wilson v. Commonwealth, 761 S.W.2d 182 (Ky.App. 1988), this Court
discussed the prudence of staying an appeal while the trial court considers a motion
made pursuant to RCr 10.02.
The wisdom of permitting such an independent attack on the
conviction to proceed without awaiting the disposition of the
direct appeal should be apparent. In the first place, the
independent attack may render the direct appeal
unnecessary.
Wilson, 761 S.W.2d at 184-85. The same wisdom is applicable when using what
amounts to the civil counterpart of RCr 10.06. It is entirely appropriate, and specifically
provided for in our law, that the trial court can and should hear a motion made pursuant
to CR 60.02 even when an appeal has been filed with this Court.
It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to decline to rule on the
merits of Mary’s claims of excusable neglect and reasons of such extraordinary nature
as to justify relief. We therefore reverse the order and remand the case to the trial court
so that it may rule upon the merits of Mary’s CR 60.02 motion. The appeal in the
original action will be held in abeyance until we are properly advised of the decision of
the trial court in this proceeding.
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The judgment of the Pulaski Circuit Court is reversed and remanded for
further proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Mary J. Criswell, pro se
Somerset, Kentucky
Heidi Schultz Powers
Somerset, Kentucky
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