SMIALEK (KURT C.) VS. SMIALEK (PAULA CASH)
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RENDERED: AUGUST 8, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002613-MR
AND
NO. 2006-CA-002648-MR
KURT C. SMIALEK
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
v.
HONORABLE ELEANORE GARBER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-504143
PAULA CASH SMIALEK
AND EUGENE L. MOSLEY
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS; CHIEF JUDGE; KELLER, JUDGE; HENRY, SENIOR
JUDGE.
KELLER, JUDGE: In this dissolution action, Kurt Smialek has appealed and
Paula Cash Smialek and her attorney, Eugene L. Mosley, have cross-appealed from
the Jefferson Family Court’s May 3, 2006, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
Distribution of Property and Debts, and Supplemental Decree, and from its
November 17, 2006, Order ruling on the parties’ motions to alter, amend, or
vacate. Among the issues we shall address are the award of maintenance, the
assignment of debt, and the partial award of attorney fees to Paula’s attorney. For
the reasons set forth below and after a thorough review of the record, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Kurt and Paula were married in Oldham County, Kentucky, on July 6,
1984. Two children were born of the marriage; both are now adults. During the
course of their marriage, Kurt and Paula owned and operated two businesses,
Smialek Enterprises and Louisville Power Sports. Paula, who has a degree in
business management, worked as the bookkeeper. The parties separated on
December 25, 2003, and Paula filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage on
November 3, 2004. In her prayer for relief, Paula requested an equitable division
of marital property and debts as well as maintenance. The same day she filed the
petition, Paula sought a status quo order to prevent Kurt from disposing of,
transferring, or dissipating their assets. The family court granted Paula’s motion
on November 29th and ordered that Paula would continue as the bookkeeper for the
businesses. Kurt filed his response and counterclaim on December 28, 2004,
asserting that Paula should be required to contribute to his support, as he was
without funds to maintain himself. We note that this dissolution proceeding was
highly contentious, with each party blaming the other party for the collapse of their
business and of dissipating both business and personal assets. The family court
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dissolved the marriage in a decree entered December 21, 2005, which was
subsequently amended on April 5, 2006.
After holding several hearings, the family court entered a 48-page
judgment on May 3, 2006, in which it set forth its findings of fact, conclusions of
law, distribution of property, and supplemental decree. To Paula, the family court
awarded the marital residence (fair market value $220,000), the first mortgage debt
of $149,000, and the $73,000 debt owed to Stock Yard Bank. To Kurt, it awarded
the lakehouse (fair market value $213,400), the first mortgage debt of $115,000,
and the second mortgage debt of $100,000. Due to the debts associated with the
real properties, no equity remained to be divided. Regarding Paula’s claim for
maintenance, the family court looked to Paula’s earnings ability, as well as Kurt’s
ability to meet his needs while paying maintenance, and determined that Kurt was
barely able to meet his own living expenses. For those reasons, the family court
denied Paula’s motion for maintenance. The family court then ordered Kurt to pay
$7,500 toward Paula’s attorney fees, which at that point equaled $63,000, noting
that Kurt had a higher earning potential than Paula.
Both Kurt and Paula moved the family court to alter, amend, or vacate
its prior ruling. Following another hearing, the family court entered a 15-page
order on November 16, 2006, ruling on the two motions. Significantly, the family
court reversed its previous maintenance ruling and awarded Paula maintenance in
the amount of $730 per month for seven years. These direct and cross-appeals
followed.
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We have identified three primary issues between Kurt’s direct appeal
and Paula’s cross-appeal: 1) maintenance; 2) the assignment of debt; and 3) the
award of attorney fees. In his direct appeal, Kurt raises essentially two arguments,
which address the award of maintenance to Paula and the family court’s
assignment of marital debt.1 In her cross-appeal, Paula raises secondary issues
concerning the use of Kurt’s testimony from a prior hearing, the valuation of
Smialek Enterprises, dissipation by Kurt, the divisibility of a storage shed, the
valuation of several vehicles, the imputation of income to Paula, maintenance, and
the award of attorney fees. We shall address each of the primary issues after we
address secondary issues Paula raised in her cross-appeal.
Our standard of review is described in Hunter v. Hunter, 127 S.W.3d
656, 659 (Ky. App. 2003), as follows:
Under CR 52.01, in an action tried without a jury,
“[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses. The findings of a commissioner, to the
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as
the findings of the court.” See also Greater Cincinnati
Marine Service, Inc. v. City of Ludlow, Ky., 602 S.W.2d
427 (1980). A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if
it is supported by substantial evidence. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, Ky., 976 S.W.2d 409, 414
(1998); Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Garland, Ky., 805
S.W.2d 116, 117 (1991). Substantial evidence is
evidence, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence,
In his prehearing statement, Kurt listed the award of attorney fees as an issue that would be
raised in his appeal, and therefore named Paula’s attorney as an appellee in his notice of appeal.
Kurt did not, however, raise the issue of attorney fees in his brief filed in support of his direct
appeal. We note that in his cross-appellee brief, Kurt instead argued that the $7,500 fee award
was within the family court’s discretion.
1
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which has sufficient probative value to induce conviction
in the mind of a reasonable person. Golightly, 976
S.W.2d at 414; Sherfey v. Sherfey, Ky.App., 74 S.W.3d
777, 782 (2002). An appellate court, however, reviews
legal issues de novo. See, e.g., Carroll v. Meredith,
Ky.App., 59 S.W.3d 484, 489 (2001). (Footnote
omitted).
With this standard in mind, we shall consider the issues raised in the present
appeals.
SECONDARY ISSUES
1. Prior Hearing Testimony
First, Paula contends that the family court erred when it struck the
transcript of Kurt’s testimony from earlier hearings regarding his income and
business activities. From what we can glean from the record, following the second
hearing in January 2006, the family court entered an interim order permitting Paula
to introduce Kurt’s deposition testimony. Kurt then submitted a copy of Paula’s
deposition as evidence, and Paula submitted transcripts of the earlier hearings as
well as another of her depositions. At that point, Kurt withdrew his submission of
Paula’s deposition and moved to strike Paula’s submissions. In its May 3, 2006,
judgment, the family court noted that:
During the hearing, neither party requested permission to
submit as evidence Paula’s entire pre-trial depositions or
the June 2, 2005 and July 22, 2005 hearings. The Court
did allow the parties to be deposed post trial and submit
their depositions as rebuttal evidence; however, the Court
did not hold the case open for submission of any other
evidence.
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Accordingly, the family court refused to admit either the transcripts of the previous
hearings or Paula’s pre-trial depositions.
Paula now argues that the family court should not have stricken the
hearing transcripts as there was no basis in law for them to be excluded. She
contends that the family court had authority under Kentucky Rules of Evidence
(KRE) 613 to include this as evidence. It appears to this Court that even if the
family court erred in excluding the hearing transcripts, any error would be
harmless. The videotaped recordings of the two hearings are in the certified record
and available for review, regardless of whether the transcripts are in evidence.
Therefore, we decline to disturb the family court’s decision to strike the hearing
transcripts.
2. Value of Smialek Enterprises
Paula contends that the family court erred when it failed to place a
value on Smialek Enterprises. In its initial order, the family court found that
Smialek Enterprises was a combination of Kurt’s trim carpentry business and
Paula’s nameplate business, although neither was working through Smialek
Enterprises at the time the decree was entered. After reviewing the evidence
submitted, the family court determined that Paula did not provide any supporting
documentation regarding her claim that the Smialek Enterprises was worth
$100,000. In its later order, the family court indicated that the unaudited financial
statements from 2002 and 2003 were not reliable support for her claim of the value
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of the business, and therefore declined to place a value on the business. In that
same order, the family court also indicated that Kurt’s trim business was worth
more than Paula’s nameplate business.
Paula now contends that there was no basis for the family court’s
finding that the financial statement valuations were inadequate, and that the family
court should have assigned the trim portion to Kurt and the nameplate portion to
Paula and ordered Kurt to pay Paula $25,000 to equalize the division. On the other
hand, Kurt points out that the accountant who prepared the financial statements
was not called to testify and was therefore not subject to cross-examination.
Accordingly, Kurt argues that the family court did not commit any error or abuse
its discretion in assigning no value to the business.
In Gomez v. Gomez, 168 S.W.3d 51, 55 (Ky. App. 2005), this Court
addressed its role in reviewing a lower court’s valuation of a business, stating that:
[A] trial court’s ruling as to valuations in a dissolution
action will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly
contrary to the evidence submitted. [Clark v. Clark, 782
S.W.2d 56 (Ky. App. 1990),] set the task of the appellate
court to determine whether the trial court’s approach
fairly estimated the value of the business and the
individual’s interest. [Internal citations omitted.]
We also note that the weight and credibility of evidence is within the sole province
of the factfinder. Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface Mining Co., 798 S.W.2d 459 (Ky.
1990).
In its November 17, 2006, order, the family court explained its
decision not to assign a value to Smialek Enterprises:
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The Court did not place a value on Smialek
Enterprises because reliable evidence of the true value
was not submitted to the Court. Had the parties followed
this Court’s Order of June 24, 2005 and August 11, 2005
to turn over all business records and accounts to a
receiver, this Court might have had some reliable
information to value Smialek Enterprises.
The fact finder is not required to adopt the value
placed on an item by one party simply because the other
party does not place a value on that item. We decline to
make a guess based upon an unreliable past report. The
accountant preparing the 2002 and 2003 report was not
even called as a witness and examined as to the basis of
his valuation. . . .
We agree with Kurt that the family court did not commit any error in deciding not
to accept Paula’s valuation based upon its finding that the submitted reports were
not reliable.
3. Dissipation
Next, Paula contends that the family court erred in failing to find that
Kurt had dissipated marital assets. In its initial judgment, the family court
concluded that “neither party has been truthful about assets and both sold assets for
less then [sic] fair market value. Neither party has proved that the other party’s
actions were any different prior to separation. Dissipation has not been proven on
either side.” In its subsequent order, the family court upheld its previous
conclusion, adding that, “[n]either party showed an intent to deprive the other of
their marital share.” The family court also noted that neither Kurt nor Paula
established how money was deposited into the Smialek Enterprises account prior to
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their separation, leading to its inability to determine whether their actions changed
after the separation.
In Robinette v. Robinette, 736 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Ky. App. 1987), this
Court addressed the issue of dissipation, stating:
KRS 403.190(1) provides that “[The court] also
shall divide the marital property without regard to
marital misconduct in just proportions considering all
relevant factors. . . .” (Emphasis our own.)
Nevertheless, there is authority in this jurisdiction to
require one to account for marital property improvidently
spent. Barriger v. Barriger, Ky., 514 S.W.2d 114
(1974). We believe the concept of dissipation, that is,
spending funds for a nonmarital purpose, is an
appropriate one for the court to consider when the
property is expended (1) during a period when there is a
separation or dissolution impending, and (2) where there
is a clear showing of intent to deprive one’s spouse of his
or her proportionate share of the marital property. Id., p.
115; see also Culver v. Culver, Ky.App., 572 S.W.2d 617
(1978). [Footnote omitted.]
See also Brosick v. Brosick, 974 S.W.2d 498 (Ky. App. 1998).
Paula contends that the family court disregarded her proof that Kurt
received $52,174.97 that he failed to deposit in the Smialek Enterprises account,
that Kurt removed property and concealed it at the lake house, and that Kurt
transferred titles to marital property but kept the property in his possession.
Based upon our review of the record and the family court’s rulings,
we agree with Kurt that Paula failed to establish a clear intent on Kurt’s part to
deprive her of her share of the marital property. Therefore, we shall not disturb the
family court’s findings or conclusions on this issue.
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4. Valuation of Storage Shed
Next, Paula contends that the family court erred when it failed to
order Kurt to reimburse her for their marital interest in a storage shed previously
owned by Kurt’s parents. The family court found that Kurt and Paula contributed
$12,000, or two-thirds of the cost, to the building of the storage shed on his
parents’ property, which they used to store items. However, Paula did not present
any written evidence that she and Kurt had a two-thirds marital interest in the shed.
Because there was no proof of any ownership, the family court characterized their
interest as an indivisible right to lease and did not assign any marital interest in the
storage shed.
We agree with the family court that Paula did not adequately support
her position that there was a marital interest in the shed. Accordingly, we shall not
disturb the family court’s ruling on this issue.
5. Valuation of Vehicles
Next, Paula argues that the family court erred in relying on values
provided to Kurt by Bill Humble for three vehicles that Kurt transferred to his
sister. Humble did not testify, but instead provided written appraisals for the three
vehicles at issue; namely, the 1967 Camaro, the 1967 Chevrolet truck, and the
1994 Corvette. Because he did not testify at trial, Paula contends that it was an
abuse of the family court’s discretion to consider Humble’s appraisals. On the
other hand, Kurt asserts that Paula failed to object to Humble’s valuations at trial,
waiving her right to presently raise this issue. Furthermore, Kurt contends that the
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family court considered not only Humble’s appraisals, but also the testimony of
Sam Swope used car manager, Tracy Childress, as well as photographic evidence
of the vehicles’ conditions.
We are unable to identify any abuse of discretion on the family court’s
part regarding its findings as to the vehicles at issue. The family court did not rely
solely on Humble’s testimony, but rather viewed all of the evidence regarding
valuation before setting the proper value for each vehicle. We perceive no abuse
of discretion and shall not disturb the family court’s decision.
6. Imputation of Income to Paula
Paula argues that the family court improperly imputed income to her
of $40,000 to $45,000 per year, when it should have relied solely on the evidence
of her actual net income for 2005, which was $26,304.49. She contends that in
doing so, the family court was improperly requiring her to have two jobs to support
herself. Kurt, on the other hand, argues that the family court properly imputed
income to Paula based upon a variety of factors, including her past work
experience and her advanced educational background.
We agree with Kurt that the family court’s decision to impute income
to Paula was supported by the record. Paula has an associate’s degree as well as a
bachelor’s decree in business management; she has worked for many years as a
bookkeeper; and she has obtained licenses in the field of real estate. Furthermore,
the expert testimony of vocational evaluator Ralph Crystal, PhD, concerning
Paula’s ability to earn income supports the family court’s ultimate finding. We
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specifically disagree with Paula’s claim that the family court was requiring her to
have two jobs; it merely determined what her possible income could be based upon
the evidence of record. Accordingly, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the
family court’s finding that Paula’s monthly income equaled $3,583.
PRIMARY ISSUES
1. Assignment of Debt
Having completed our review of the secondary issues, we shall now
turn to the three main issues we have identified. First we shall address the family
court’s assignment of debt. Kurt contends that the family court abused its
discretion in inequitably assigning him 65% of the debt, while only assigning Paula
35% of the debt, without providing any justifiable reason. He asserts that the
reasons given by the family court, which were that his absence from the business
contributed to its demise and his receipt of valuable assets from Louisville Power
Sports, do not support the family court’s assignment to him of the majority of the
debt. On the other hand, Paula argues that both of them were encumbered with a
substantial amount of debt that was equitably distributed based upon their
respective incomes as well as the amount of property each retained.
Kentucky’s appellate courts have recognized that although “[t]here is
no statutory authority for assigning debts in an action for dissolution of
marriage[,] . . . such assignments are routinely made as a matter of common law in
all divorce actions[.]” Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513, 522 (Ky. 2001).
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The Neidlinger court went on to list several factors to consider when assigning
debt:
Debts incurred during the marriage are
traditionally assigned on the basis of such factors as
receipt of benefits and extent of participation; whether
the debt was incurred to purchase assets designated as
marital property; and whether the debt was necessary to
provide for the maintenance and support of the family.
Another factor, of course, is the economic circumstances
of the parties bearing on their respective abilities to
assume the indebtedness. [Citations omitted.]
Id. at 523. “As with the division of marital assets, the trial court has broad
discretion in its allocation of marital debt.” Lykins v. Lykins, 34 S.W.3d 816, 822
(Ky. App. 2000).
In reviewing the assignment of debt, it appears that the family court
assigned debt in line with the property awarded. We perceive no abuse of
discretion.
2. Maintenance
Both Kurt and Paula have raised the issue of maintenance in their
respective appeals. Kurt contends that the family court abused its discretion in
awarding maintenance to Paula, while Paula contends that she should have been
awarded maintenance at a higher amount for a longer duration.
The family court initially denied Paula’s motion for maintenance. It
first estimated Kurt’s income to be $5,292.39 per month, after deducting an
expense ratio of 63% from his gross income for 2005, which equaled $171,645.
The family court then determined that Kurt’s reasonable living expenses equaled
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$5,000. Turning to Paula, the family court determined that she could earn a
combined income of $3,333 to 3,750 per month and that her reasonable expenses
equaled $4,313. Based upon those findings, the family court concluded:
Due to the few assets in this case, Paula received
less than $2,000 in assets. She did not receive any nonmarital monetary assets. None of the assets she received
will produce any income (other than the sign business).
Based upon Paula’s ability to earn $40,000 to
$45,000, she is unable to fully support herself through
appropriate employment. However, Kurt is barely able
to meet his own living expenses. He does not earn
enough to pay Paula maintenance.
However, the family court altered this ruling when it ruled on the
parties’ respective motions to alter, amend or vacate. The family court imputed a
specific income to Paula in the amount of $3,583 per month and noted its prior
finding that her reasonable living expenses totaled $4,313 per month. Based upon
those calculations, the family court noted that Paula required an additional $730
per month to meet her expenses. Regarding Kurt, the family court reduced his
expense ratio from 63% to 43% because he no longer had employees, but rather
was paying contractors. Accordingly, his gross income increased to $9,318 per
month. Looking to maintenance, the family court, as it did before, determined that
Paula was entitled to maintenance and then conducted the necessary inquiry
pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 403.200(2). This time, however, the
family court awarded Paula maintenance in the amount of $730 per month for
seven years.
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Kentucky’s legislature provided for the award of maintenance in KRS
403.200:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal
separation, . . . the court may grant a maintenance order
for either spouse only if it finds that the spouse seeking
maintenance:
(a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital
property apportioned to him, to provide for his
reasonable needs; and
(b) Is unable to support himself through
appropriate employment or is the custodian of a
child whose condition or circumstances make it
appropriate that the custodian not be required to
seek employment outside the home.
(2) The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and
for such periods of time as the court deems just, and after
considering all relevant factors including:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance, including marital property
apportioned to him, and his ability to meet his
needs independently, including the extent to which
a provision for support of a child living with the
party includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient
education or training to enable the party seeking
maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(c) The standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, and the physical and emotional
condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; and
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(f) The ability of the spouse from whom
maintenance is sought to meet his needs while
meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
See also Gomez v. Gomez, 168 S.W.3d 51 (Ky. App. 2005). “The amount and
duration of maintenance is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Russell
v. Russell, 878 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Ky. App. 1994). “The test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.” Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 272
(Ky. 2004), citing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.
1999)(citations omitted); Kentucky Nat. Park Com’n ex rel. Commonwealth v.
Russell, 301 Ky. 187, 191 S.W.2d 214, 217 (1945). The Russell court further
stated: “It is appropriate to award maintenance when a party is not able to support
themselves [sic] in accord with the same standard of living which they enjoyed
during marriage and the property awarded to them is not sufficient to provide for
their reasonable needs.” 878 S.W.2d at 26.
Kurt first argues that the family court erred when it failed to consider
Paula’s ability to support herself through appropriate employment pursuant to KRS
403.200(1)(b). He cites the family court’s decision to deny Paula temporary
maintenance, coupled with her ability to support herself during the pendency of the
action, as supporting his argument that she is not entitled to maintenance. Kurt
also points to Paula’s work experience, her professional licensing, and her
educational background. We disagree with Kurt’s assertion and note that the
family court considered the factors Kurt raised when it imputed income to Paula.
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However, even with imputed income added to her proven earnings, Paula did not
earn enough to support herself fully on a monthly basis. Furthermore, the family
court found, and Kurt has not disputed, that Paula was awarded insufficient assets
to support herself. Therefore, we hold that the family court did not err in finding
that Paula met the threshold for maintenance.
Next, Kurt argues that the family court erred and abused its discretion
when it failed to consider Kurt’s ability to pay maintenance pursuant to KRS
403.200(2)(f). Paula asserts that the family court did consider Kurt’s ability to pay
and appropriately awarded maintenance.
Although not specifically stated, we may infer from the family court’s
orders that its original reason for denying maintenance (Kurt’s inability to pay)
was negated by the increase in Kurt’s gross monthly income from $5,292.39 to
$9,318 as a result of the reduction of his expense ratio from 63% to 43%. Kurt
contends that the family court failed to provide an adequate explanation as to why
it reduced the expense ratio other than that Kurt no longer had any paid employees.
Although he no longer had that expense, Kurt contends that his ability to generate
income decreased because he was the only person performing any of the work. He
also cites to his health limitations that will affect his ability to perform the same
amount of carpentry work. However, we note that the family court took into
account his hiring of contractors and a bookkeeper when it set Kurt’s expense
ratio. Furthermore, the family court determined that Kurt’s monthly income was
more than $4,000 over his reasonable expenses, meaning that he was capable of
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paying $730 in maintenance to Paula even if the expense ratio were closer to the
original 63%. Based upon the evidence of record, we hold that the family court did
not err in finding that Kurt was able to support himself while paying Paula
maintenance.
Finally, Kurt asserts that the amount and duration of maintenance are
excessive based upon Paula’s work experience, degrees, and real estate licenses.
He argues that the family court failed to make specific findings for each of the
factors listed in KRS 403.200(2), but focused instead on Paula’s imputed income.
On the other hand, in her cross-appeal, Paula argues that the amount of
maintenance awarded was too low and the duration too short.
In reviewing the November 17, 2006, order awarding maintenance,
we note that the family court conducted the necessary inquiry pursuant to KRS
403.200(2) before it determined the amount and duration of maintenance. Based
upon those relevant factors, including the lengthy marriage, Paula’s degrees and
employment history, the parties’ earning history, and Kurt’s ability to pay
maintenance, we hold that the family court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
Paula maintenance in the amount of $730 per month for seven years.
3. Attorney Fees
Paula argues that the family court should have awarded her more than
$7,500 toward her attorney fees, which totaled more than $63,000, based upon the
assets Kurt received, as well as his earnings and earning potential. Although he
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initially disputed the award, Kurt now contends that the family court did not abuse
its discretion in awarding $7,500 in attorney fees.
In Allison v. Allison, 246 S.W.3d 898, 909 (Ky. App. 2008), this Court
set out the standard for an award of attorney fees as follows:
Attorney fees may be awarded to a party pursuant to
KRS 403.220. Expert witness fees may also be awarded
pursuant to that statute. See Culver v. Culver, 572
S.W.2d 617, 622 (Ky.App. 1978). The statute states that
the court should consider “the financial resources of both
parties [.]” KRS 403.220. Further, the statute states that
the court may award a “reasonable amount” for the fees.
Id. An award of fees is reviewed by this court under an
abuse of discretion standard. Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d at
520.
In deciding to award fees to Paula, the family court noted the high
fees both parties generated, which it attributed to their failure to turn over
bookkeeping responsibilities to a receiver as ordered and to provide better
documentation of their respective claims. Additionally, the family court looked to
assets awarded to each party, noting that Kurt’s award left him with a negative
balance, while Paula’s award did not. Finally, the family court noted that Kurt had
higher earnings and a higher earning potential than Paula. In light of the family
court’s findings, which are supported by the record, we perceive no abuse of
discretion in the decision to award a portion of Paula’s attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jefferson Family Court
is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Terry W. Holloway
Ashley Holloway Frank
Louisville, Kentucky
Eugene L. Mosley
Louisville, Kentucky
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