WEST (LUVELL) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 6, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002488-MR
LUVELL WEST
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00091
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: KELLER, THOMPSON, AND WINE, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Luvell West appeals from an order of the McCracken
Circuit Court denying his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Kentucky
Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
On December 20, 2001, during the course of a robbery, West killed
David Thomas by beating and strangling him. A McCracken County grand jury
indicted West for murder, robbery in the first degree, tampering with physical
evidence, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO I).
Subsequently, the Commonwealth filed notice of its intent to seek the
death penalty due to the aggravating circumstances surrounding Thomas’ murder,
namely, the commission of a murder during the course of a robbery and the
defendant’s substantial history of serious criminal convictions. Thereafter, West
filed a motion to enter a guilty plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).
In exchange for his guilty plea, the Commonwealth offered West life
for the murder charge, twenty years for the first-degree robbery charge both of
which were enhanced to life by the PFO I, and five years for the tampering with
physical evidence charge which was enhanced to ten years by the PFO I.
Therefore, West would effectively receive a total sentence of life imprisonment.
On May 27, 2004, West was placed under oath and declared that his
testimony would be truthful. He then informed the trial court that he had an
eleventh grade education and that he was not under the influence of any substance
or afflicted with any mental disease that would impair his judgment. He informed
the trial court that he had read and signed the motion to enter the plea and the
Commonwealth’s plea offer.
The guilty plea that West signed contained a list of his constitutional
rights, and he acknowledged that he understood these rights, including his right to
plead not guilty. The trial court recited the rights to West who acknowledged he
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understood that he was waiving these rights by entering into a guilty plea. The
trial court then asked West if he had any questions regarding the waiver of these
rights. West stated he had no questions.
After acknowledging he understood the penalty ranges for the charged
offenses, he informed the trial court he had not been forced to accept the plea offer
and that no extrajudicial promises had been made to him in exchange for his plea.
He then acknowledged that his counsel’s representation had been competent. He
informed the trial court that his attorney had fully informed him regarding his case.
He then informed the trial court that he fully understood the charges against him
and his possible defenses to those charges.
West’s defense counsel, Vince Yustas, of the Capital Trial Branch of
the Department of Public Advocacy, informed the trial court that he had tried
approximately thirty death penalty cases in the past five years. He further
informed the trial court he had explained West’s constitutional rights to him, and
he believed that West’s plea was freely, willingly, knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently made.
Further, he informed the trial court that he had no reason to believe
West was under the influence of any substance that would impair his judgment.
He further informed that West had received two psychiatric evaluations and no
evidence of mental problems had been reported. Following this lengthy colloquy,
the trial court accepted West’s guilty plea.
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On July 14, 2004, at his sentencing hearing, West sought the trial
court’s permission to withdraw his guilty plea. He alleged that his defense counsel
had forced him to accept the plea, he did not fully understand the earlier judicial
proceedings, and that he had not been provided with discovery.
Responding to West’s allegations, the trial court informed West that
he had previously sworn that his plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly. The
trial court recited West’s extensive criminal record and experience with judicial
proceedings in refuting his alleged lack of understanding. The trial court then
informed West that his counsel was provided with discovery on May 15, 2003, and
had been provided with continuing discovery throughout the proceedings.
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied
West’s request and sentenced him in accordance with the terms of the plea bargain.
West then brought a direct appeal based on the trial court’s denial of his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed his conviction
in Case No. 2005-SC-000239-MR.
On October 2, 2006, West filed a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 to set
aside his conviction on the basis that his defense counsel had rendered ineffective
assistance. He alleged that his counsel forced him into entering a guilty plea. This
motion was denied, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, West contends that his defense counsel rendered
ineffective assistance when counsel forced him to enter into a guilty plea despite
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not having adequately advocated and protected West’s legal interests. Having
reviewed the record, we conclude that West’s contentions warrant no relief.
We first observe that Kentucky courts must follow the legal
conclusions of higher appellate courts when reviewing issues that have already
been decided on the merits. When an appellate court rejects a legal argument on
the merits, the court’s decision becomes the “law of the case,” and all lower courts
are bound by the decision. Williamson v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 323, 325
(Ky. 1989).
Specifically, the law of the case doctrine prohibits the re-litigation of
an issue decided in a previous appeal. Id. As our Supreme Court noted, “[a] final
decision of this Court, whether right or wrong, is the law of the case and is
conclusive of the questions therein resolved. It is binding upon the parties, the trial
court, and the Court of Appeals. It may not be reconsidered by prosecuting an
appeal from a judgment entered in conformity therewith.” Ellison v.
Commonwealth, 994 S.W.2d 939, 940 (Ky. 1999).
West argued to the Kentucky Supreme Court in his direct appeal that
his guilty plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Addressing
his argument on the merits, the Supreme Court wrote the following:
The evidence of record is clear that the trial court
properly conducted a hearing to determine if Appellant's
guilty plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly....
Although the trial court determined that Appellant's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea was made improperly,
the court still heard Appellant's reasons for withdrawal of
the plea at sentencing, and informed him that the earlier
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guilty plea proceeding showed that Appellant's plea was
not coerced and was entered willfully. Furthermore, our
review of the record leaves no doubt that Appellant did in
fact enter his guilty plea voluntarily and knowingly.
While West contends that his defense counsel rendered ineffective
assistance when counsel forced him to enter into a guilty plea, our Supreme Court
has extensively reviewed the record and decided that his guilty plea was entered
voluntarily and knowingly. Accordingly, we are not permitted to second-guess the
validity of West’s guilty plea. Id.
Further, to the extent that the law of the case doctrine does not cover
any particular claim of West, he is precluded from litigating these issues under RCr
11.42. RCr 11.42 motions cannot be used to re-litigate issues already decided on
direct appeal or issues which could and should have been raised during direct
appeal. Baze v. Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d 619, 626 (Ky. 2000).
Because all of West’s contentions could have been asserted to
establish the invalidity of his guilty plea on direct appeal, he cannot re-litigate
these issues collaterally pursuant to RCr 11.42. Id. Additionally, a defendant
cannot couch an issue that should have been raised in a direct appeal as a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to RCr 11.42. Id. at 628.
Accordingly, because West’s contentions were refuted by the record,
he was not entitled to any relief below, and the trial court properly denied his
motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42.
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For the foregoing reasons, the order of the McCracken Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Luvell West, Pro Se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kristin N. Logan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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